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# *The Teutonic Order's Politics toward Polish-Lithuanian Union in 1413 and the Reincorporation's Formula of the Union of Horodło*

Polityka zakonu krzyżackiego wobec unii polsko-litewskiej w 1413 roku
a horodelska formuła inkorporacyjna

## SUMMARY

The article addresses anew the problem of the Teutonic Order's significance in the Union of Horodło based on the latest research and presents various crisis aspects of the Teutonic Order and its state in Prussia after 1410, with particular emphasis of the policy of incorporation in 1411–1413. The study justifies the thesis that despite the signatories' declarations, Poland and Lithuania were not threatened by the Order, but they in fact had aggressive plans against it. Lithuania's incorporation to Poland made sense in terms of consolidation and its anti-Teutonic stylistics reflected the attitudes expressed at the meeting in Horodło.

**Keywords:** Teutonic Order; Union of Horodło; Lithuania; Poland

## INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS – HORODŁO PROVISIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE TEUTONIC ORDER PROBLEM

On the 2nd–4th October 1413 in Horodło, situated in Chełm Land, a meeting took place between Władysław Jagiełło, Vytautas the Great, as well as Polish and Lithuanian noblemen accompanying them. The major result of this convention was another amendment, after the Ostrów agreement and after the so-called Pact of Vilnius and Radom, regarding the Polish-Lithuanian union, referred to

as the Union of Horodło after the place of the meeting[1]. Among external circumstances remaining genetically related to the decision undertaken at that time in Horodło, the issue universally regarded in historiography as the most important was the problem of the Teutonic Order, mainly in the form of threats from the Order[2]. This view found its justification in the wording of one of the key fragments of the union's documents, issued by the King of Poland and the Grand Duke of Lithuania, and referring to the declared reasons for reincorporating Lithuania to the Polish Crown[3]. This was seconded by a relatively widespread belief of historians about the constant aspiration of the Grand Master, Heinrich von Plauen, to

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[1] Among the most important historiographic works on the union of 1413 one should indicate the following: S. Kutrzeba, *Unia Polski z Litwą*, [in:] *Polska i Litwa w dziejowym stosunku*, Kraków 1914, pp. 495–504; O. Halecki, *Dzieje Unii Jagiellońskiej*, vol. I, Kraków 1919, pp. 203–217; L. Kolankowski, *Dzieje Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego za Jagiellonów*, Oświęcim 2014, pp. 111–125 (first published: Warszawa 1930); H. Łowmiański, *Polityka Jagiellonów*, collected for printing by K. Pietkiewicz, Poznań 1995, pp. 74–80; J. Krzyżaniakowa, *Rok 1413*, [in:] *Pax et bellum*, ed. K. Olejnik, Poznań 1993, pp. 75–85; K. Myśliński, *Król Władysław Jagiełło a unia horodelska – przyczynek do charakterystyki władcy*, "Lituano-Slavica Posnaniensia", vol. 7, 1995, pp. 119–131; A. Sochacka, *Możnowładcy polscy wobec unii horodelskiej*, "Średniowiecze Polskie i Powszechne", vol. 3, 2004, pp. 122–139 (see also below); B. Nowak, *Wielki książę Witold i społeczeństwo litewskie wobec unii horodelskiej*, "Zamojskie Studia i Materiały", vol. 7, 2005, issue 3(18), pp. 157–170; G. Błaszczyk, *Dzieje stosunków polsko-litewskich od czasów najdawniejszych do współczesności*, vol. II: *Od Krewa do Lublina*, part 1, Poznań 2007, pp. 368–426. The most recent on the union of Horodło: J. Nikodem, *Witold wielki książę litewski (1354 lub 1355 – 27 października 1430)*, Kraków 2013, pp. 295–319; idem, *Unia horodelska. Skuteczny kompromis czy zarzewie przyszłych konfliktów?* "Zapiski Historyczne" [hereafter: ZH], vol. 78, 2013, issue 3, pp. 7–38; L. Korczak, *Horodło na drodze ku dziedzicznej monarchii jagiellońskiej*, [in:] *1413 m. Horodlės Aktai (Dokumentai ir tyrinėjimai). Akty horodelskie z 1413 r. Dokumenty i studia*, eds. J. Kiaupienė, L. Korczak, Vilnius-Kraków 2013, pp. 57–69; P. Rabiej, *Dokumenty unii horodelskiej*, [in:] *1413 m. Horodlės Aktai*…, pp. 83–110; M. Koczerska, *Twórcy unii horodelskiej*, "Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego. Prace Historyczne" [hereafter: ZNUJPH], vol. 141, 2014, issue 2, pp. 257–287; R. Petrauskas, *Monarcha i wasal: Witold a unia horodelska*, ZNUJPH, vol. 141, 2014, isssue 2, pp. 221–233; A. Sochacka, *Stosunek polskiej elity politycznej do unii w Horodle*, [in:] *Unia w Horodle na tle stosunków polsko-litewskich. Od Krewa do Zaręczenia wzajemnego Obojga Narodów*, ed. S. Górzyński, Warszawa 2015, pp. 55–68; R. Frost, *Oksfordzka historia unii polsko-litewskiej. Powstanie i rozwój 1385–1569*, vol. 1, translated by T. Fiedorek, Poznań 2018, pp. 183–201. The older scholarship on the research topic is gathered in these works.

[2] i.e.: A. Prochaska, *Król Władysław Jagiełło*, vol. I, Kraków 1908, pp. 338–339; O. Halecki, *Dzieje Unii*…, p. 208; L. Kolankowski, *Dzieje Wielkiego Księstwa*…, p. 115; M. Biskup, *Wojny Polski z Zakonem Krzyżackim 1308–1521*, Oświęcim 2014, p. 112 (first edition: Gdańsk 1993); G. Błaszczyk, *Dzieje stosunków*…, vol. II, pp. 369–375; cf. J. Nikodem, *Witold*…, pp. 306–308.

[3] *Actum princicpum, Regis Poloniae atque Supremi Ducis Lithuaniae Vladislai Jogaila et Magni Ducis Lithuaniae Alexandri Vytautas*, coll. by L. Korczak, [in:] *1413 m. Horodlės Aktai*…, p. 38: *Volentes tamen terras predictas Lyttwanie propter hostiles insultus et insidias Cruciferorum et eis adherencium ac aliorum quorumcumque inimicorum, qui prefatas terras Lyttwanie et Regnum Polonie demolliri nituntur et in ipsorum destruccionem machinantur, in certitudine, securitate et tutela melioribus reponere […]*; cf. *Akta Unji Polski z Litwą 1385–1791*, eds. S. Kutrzeba, W. Semkowicz, Kraków 1932, no. 51, pp. 63–64.

a military rematch for the battle of Grunwald[4]. Against this backdrop, the union's renewal was to all and sundry manifest of the Jagiellonian monarchy's unity and solidarity in the face of the aggressive intentions of the Teutonic Order. At present, in view of the current scholarship on politics initiated by the Gediminids towards the Teutonic Knights' state already in 1411, and in particular from the moment of the treaty with Sigismund of Luxembourg, the Holy Roman Emperor and King of Hungary, from March 1412[5], this opinion widespread in the academia does not stand up to criticism[6].

In 2013, Lidia Korczak decided to weaken the link between the problem of the Teutonic Order and the genesis of the Union of Horodło, exposing the internal – mainly dynastic – reasons that prompted King Władysław Jagiełło and his circles to renew the union[7]. Only then, and somewhat by chance, the union's decisions could have been used for external purposes. Although generally convincing, the theory presented by the scholar from Cracow does not bring a satisfactory response to the question about the choice of this particular, and not any other, moment to make amendments to the union. A question concerning why the relevant steps were not

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[4] C. Gerstenberg, *Heinrich von Plauen 1410–1413*, Halle 1873, pp. 30–62; E. Lampe, *Beiträge zur Geschichte Heinrichs von Plauen 1411–1413*, "Zeitschrift des Westpreußischen Geschichtsvereins", H. 26, 1889, pp. 19–45; A. Prochaska, *Król Władysław*…, pp. 321–323; O. Halecki, *Dzieje unii*…, p. 206; B. Baustaedt, *Heinrich von Plauen*, "Jahrbuch der Albertus-Universität zu Königsberg", Vol. 2, 1952, pp. 114–137; H. Boockmann, *Johannes Falkenberg, der Deutsche Orden und die polnische Politik. Untersuchungen zur politischen Theorie des späten Mittelalters. Mit einem Anhang: Die Satira des Johannes Falkenberg*, Göttingen 1975, pp. 91ff and 111–114; M. Biskup, *Wojny Polski*…, pp. 109, 111; G. Błaszczyk, *Dzieje stosunków*…, p. 374; recently also: R. Frost, *Oksfordzka historia*…, p. 184.

[5] A. Szweda, *Po wielkiej wojnie. Zjazdy polsko-krzyżackie w 1411 r.*, [in:] *Kancelaria wielkich mistrzów i polska kancelaria królewska w XV wieku*, ed. J. Trupinda, Malbork 2006, pp. 267–298; idem, *Pierwszy pokój toruński w stosunkach polsko-krzyżackich do 1423 r.*, "Miscellanea Historico-Archivistica" [hereafter: MHA], vol. 19, 2012, pp. 69–73; idem, *Zakon krzyżacki wobec Polski i Litwy w latach 1411–1414*, ZNUJPH, vol. 141, 2014, issue 2, pp. 531–553; D. Wróbel, *Elity polityczne Królestwa Polskiego wobec problemu krzyżackiego w czasach Władysława Jagiełły*, Lublin 2016, pp. 283–305.

[6] Cf. S. Zakrzewski, *Uwagi nad unią horodelską*, [in:] idem, *Zagadnienia historyczne*, vol. II, Lwów 1936, p. 200. J. Nikodem was right to address doubts regarding the reality of the Teutonic threat in 1413, explained in the document by Jagiełło and Vytautas (idem, *Witold*…, pp. 306–307), but his conclusion about the irrelevance of the entire incorporation fragment goes too far. Already L. Kolankowski convincingly proved the existence of the expansive intentions of both Gediminids towards the Order in 1411 – idem, *Dzieje Wielkiego Księstwa*…, p. 113ff. In this context the earlier comments by S. Kutrzeba (*Unia Polski*…, p. 499) that in Horodło the Polish and Lithuanian magnates went beyond the previous expression of the joint decision on war, is also valuable. In 1401 the discussion concerned a cooperation in a defensive war while in 1413 a joint offensive war was taken into consideration – see *Akta Unji*…, no. 39, p. 39; ibidem, no. 44, p. 46.

[7] L. Korczak, *Horodło*…, pp. 61–62; see also the comments by R. Petrauskas (*Monarcha i wasal*…, p. 229), who perceives the then dynastic interests of Jagiełło and Vytautas as joint (the Gediminids dynasty).

taken in 1408 or 1409 could be asked if we were to accept a relatively suggestive notion about the significance of motivation behind the union's dynastic creators. Since that time particularly, the perspective has already had an outline of conflict with the greatest enemy of the Polish-Lithuanian union – the Teutonic Order[8]. As aptly noted by Jarosław Nikodem[9], the reincorporation's expression in the shape we know it from the document of the King and the Grand Duke from the 2nd of October 1413, would have fit best in the pre-Grunwald context. However, the facts confirm that the union was renewed only five years after the royal daughter's birth and after more than three years since the Order's crushing defeat.

The above-mentioned reincorporation's expression was most certainly neither accidental nor irrelevant from the point of view of the issuers of the document. It has already been pointed out that the Horodło documents were prepared very carefully and their content was subjected to previous consultations[10]. Unfortunately, the sources did not keep any direct information about it; nevertheless, some circumstances, which seem quite probable as moments of such discussions[11], are identified, i.e. the meeting between Władysław Jagiełło and Vytautas the Great at the River Bug near Hrubieszów in September 1412[12]. All this leads to the conclusion that the participants of the Horodło meeting were consciously and purposely referring to the very current issue of the problem with the Teutonic Order. Moreover, the careful and elaborate form of the incorporation article and its presence at the beginning of the document's outline require to regard it as a resolution of primary importance. Its content could have been inadequate to both the then reality (the Teutonic Order's threat) and the past it recalled (incorporation from 1386), but this does not change the fact that it was clearly assigned an important role to play in Horodło. To sum up this topic, I uphold the previous historiographical view about the essential importance of the problem with the Teutonic Order for the renewal of the Union of Horodło, although at the same time I notice a need to reformulate and clarify it.

In this article, I am going to test the assumption that in order to explain and understand the reasons for using the above-mentioned reincorporation's expression, the following points are of fundamental significance: 1) situation of the Order and its power in Prussia in the first years are the defeat at Grunwald and

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8 D. Wróbel, *Elity polityczne*…, pp. 147–209.

9 J. Nikodem, *Witold*…, p. 307.

10 P. Rabiej, *Dokumenty unii*…, pp. 88–89, 104–106; M. Koczerska, *Twórcy unii*…, p. 263.

11 See: K. Myśliński, *Król Władysław*…, pp. 130–131; M. Koczerska, *Twórcy unii*…, p. 262.

12 *Joannis Dlugossi Annales seu cronicae incliti Regni Poloniae*, book X/XI (1406–1412), eds. C. Baczkowski et al., Varsaviae 1997, pp. 208–209; see: A. Gąsiorowski, *Itinerarium króla Władysława Jagiełły 1386–1434*, 2nd edition, Warszawa 2014, p. 77; S. Polechow, *Itinerarium wielkiego księcia litewskiego Witolda: 4/5 sierpnia 1392–27 października 1430*, "Rocznik Lituanistyczny", vol. 5, 2019, p. 65.

the politics of corporation towards its neighbours stemming from it; 2) temporary *status quo* of the Order's relationship with Poland and Lithuania, and other neighbours at the time of the Horodło agreement. These topics have already been subjects of competent analyses conducted from various perspectives[13], which allows integration of the previous studies' results with re-analysis of events taking place in late summer and autumn of 1413. I believe this can shed a new light on the above-mentioned problem.

## ASPECTS OF THE TEUTONIC ORDER'S CRISIS IN 1411–1413

In order to adequately present the political situation of the Order and its territorial rule in Prussia at the time when the famous meeting at Horodło took place, it is necessary to go back a few years, i.e. to the period of the so-called Great War between Poland-Lithuania and the Teutonic Order from 1409–1411, and to the victory at the battle of Grunwald (15th of July 1410) in the fore-front. The famous battle left a strong mark on all the participants, i.e. the Poles, Lithuanians, Teutonic Knights, and their subjects, but also on the guests from Western Europe supporting them[14]. There is no doubt about it, even if not all the consequences of the "great defeat" became obvious in the near future. What did it offer to the Teutonic Knights?

The memorable date of the 15th of July 1410 is rightly considered as a turning point in the Order's history[15]. A word that best describes the situation of

[13] See bibliography cited below.

[14] A. F. Grabski, *Bitwa grunwaldzka w świadomości europejskiej XV w.*, [in:] *Grunwald w świadomości Polaków*, ed. M. Biskup, Warszawa-Łódź 1981, pp. 20–30; M. Biskup, *Das Echo der Tannenberger Schlacht und der Belagerung Marienburgs im deutschen Zweig des Deutschen Ordens im Sommer 1410*, [in:] *Beiträge zur Geschichte des Deutschen Ordens*, vol. 2, ed. U. Arnold, Marburg 1993, pp. 116–123; K. Kwiatkowski, *Pierwsze wrażenia w Prusach po porażce zakonu niemieckiego w bitwie grunwaldzkiej*, ZH, vol. 75, 2010, issue 2, pp. 47–63; S. Kwiatkowski, *O ludziach na pobojowisku grunwaldzkim. W związku z artykułem Krzysztofa Kwiatkowskiego Pierwsze wrażenia w Prusach po porażce zakonu niemieckiego w bitwie grunwaldzkiej*, ZH, vol. 76, 2011, issue 2, pp. 87–94; see also: idem, *Verlorene Schlachten und Gefallene in der geistigen Tradition des Deutschen Ordens*, "Ordines Militares" [hereafter: OM], vol. 16, 2011, pp. 150–153; idem, *Pamięć, żałoba, pojednanie. Bitwa grunwaldzka jako wstrząs mentalności jej uczestników i ludności Prus zakonnych*, [in:] *Wojna, pamięć, tożsamość. O bitwach i mitach bitewnych*, ed. J. M. Piskorski, Warszawa 2012, pp. 90–106, 175–179.

[15] K. Górski, *Państwo krzyżackie w Prusach*, Gdańsk-Bydgoszcz 1946, p. 141; M. Biskup, *Rozwój gospodarki czynszowej i utrwalenie ustroju stanowego na Pomorzu Wschodnim pod rządami krzyżackimi (1310–1466)*, [in:] *Historia Pomorza*, vol. I: *do roku 1466*, ed. G. Labuda, 2nd edition, Poznań 1972, pp. 695, 696; K. Militzer, *Historia zakonu krzyżackiego*, translated by E. Marszał, J. Zakrzewski, Kraków 2007, p. 8, 206; cf. H. Boockmann, *Zakon krzyżacki*, translated by R. Traba, 2nd edition, Gdańsk-Warszawa 2002, pp. 134–135; see also: S. Ekdahl, *Die Schlacht von Tannenberg und ihre Bedeutung in der Geschichte des Ordensstaates*, [in:] *Žalgiro laikų Lietuva ir jos kaimynai*, eds. R. Čapaitė, A. Nikžentaitis, Vilnius 1993, pp. 34–64; K. Militzer, *Auswirkungen der Schlacht bei Tannenberg auf den Deutsche Orden*, [in:] *Žalgiro laikų Lietuva*…, pp. 94–112.

the monastic corporation and its territorial rule in the post-Grunwald period is crisis. This phenomenon decided about the irreversible loss of political initiative and a progressive degradation of the Teutonic state's significance in the region throughout the 15th century. The institution crisis was multidimensional and multifaceted, touching many spheres of the then reality[16]. It is enough to mention here a few of the most important ones, becoming visible already in 1413, i.e. the demographic, economic, ideological, and political sphere.

One third of all Teutonic Knights who were in Prussia died at the battle of Grunwald or were captured, including the most important dignitaries and the Grand Master[17]. Therefore, a sudden depopulation followed, at first resulting in the corporation's paralysis. In the following decades the number of friars in Prussia never came close to that of the pre-Grunwald period (differently estimated, from 600 to even 1000 people)[18]. It is worth emphasising that the best and the most experienced members of the Order were gone. Recent studies by Bernhardt Jähnig clearly indicate that after 1410 the general level of the corporation's representatives at managerial levels was considerably decreased[19]. However, it should be noted that the data from sources from the period after 1410 do not provide a clear picture of the overall number of the Teutonic Knights in Prussia. On the one hand, there were shortages in the personnel of individual convents and, on the other hand, the financial crisis engendered their impoverishment, which meant that individual commanders had problems with providing proper living standards to a smaller number of friars than from before Grunwald[20].

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[16] K. Górski, *Zakon krzyżacki a powstanie państwa pruskiego*, Wrocław etc. 1977, pp. 120–121, 143–144; M. Biskup, G. Labuda, *Dzieje zakonu krzyżackiego w Prusach. Gospodarka – Społeczeństwo – Państwo – Ideologia*, 2nd edition, Gdańsk 1988, pp. 379–386; S. Jóźwiak, *Kryzys władzy terytorialnej*, [in:] *Państwo zakonu krzyżackiego w Prusach. Władza i społeczeństwo*, eds. M. Biskup, R. Czaja, Warszawa 2008, pp. 332–356; R. Czaja, *Die Krise der Landesherrschaft. Der Deutsche Orden und die Gesellschaft seines Staates in Preußen in der ersten Hälfte des 15. Jahrhunderts*, OM, vol. 16, 2011, pp. 159–171.

[17] K. Kwiatkowski, *Wyprawa letnia 1410 r.*, [in:] S. Jóźwiak, K. Kwiatkowski, A. Szweda, S. Szybkowski, *Wojna Polski i Litwy z zakonem krzyżackim w latach 1409–1411*, Malbork 2010 [hereafter: *Wojna Polski i Litwy*…], pp. 432–437, 440.

[18] J. Tandecki, *Zakon krzyżacki*, [in:] *Państwo zakonu*…, pp. 406–407. The difficulty of researching the numbers of individual Teutonic Knights' monasteries in the first half of the 15th c. was pointed out by S. Jóźwiak, *Liczebność konwentów zakonu krzyżackiego w Prusach w pierwszej połowie XV wieku*, ZH, vol. 72, 2007, issue 1, pp. 7–21; see also S. Jóźwiak, J. Turpinda, *Organizacja życia na zamku krzyżackim w Malborku w czasach wielkich mistrzów (1309–1457)*, 2nd edition, Malbork 2011, pp. 333–336; idem, *Krzyżackie zamki komturskie w Prusach. Topografia i układ przestrzenny na podstawie średniowiecznych źródeł pisanych*, Toruń 2012, pp. 52–64.

[19] B. Jähnig, *Eine Korporation in Personalnöten. Die Bedeutung des Schlachtentods von 203 Deutschordensbrüdern am 15. Juli 1410*, MHA, vol. 19, 2012, pp. 121–134.

[20] S. Jóźwiak, *Liczebność konwentów*…, pp. 7–21.

Although spectacular, the loss of human lives was not everything because no less severe were material losses and damages created during the war fought mainly in the territories of the Teutonic Order. During a few month presence of the Polish-Lithuanian army in Prussia, an unprecedented looting took place together with stripping of food in a large part of the country, particularly in the areas of Malbork (Żuławy Wiślane)[21]. It is also clear that the winners managed to leave Prussia with abundant spoils[22], and the war damages – difficult to be estimated – affected both the corporation's wealth as well as the residents of the Teutonic state and local Church institutions.

The treaty of Toruń from the 1st of February 1411 included a provision that was particularly troublesome for the Teutonic Knights, i.e. an obligation to ransom the captives who – in unspecified numbers – were in Polish or Lithuanian captivity or were set free after pledging to pay a relevant ransom. The Order's friars were to allocate a round sum of a hundred thousand stacks of Prussian groschens for this purpose, and to pay it out in four instalments within one year[23]. Problems with collecting and paying this sum on time present a scale of the Order's financial crisis, particularly since a spectre of losing control over the Neumark temporarily appeared in this context[24]. The difficult financial situation of the Teutonic Knights was additionally worsened by mercenaries recruited already during the war and later, who demanded their overdue pay[25]. It should also be added that the convic-

[21] The loss of registers with war damage – from i.a. 1410 – during the Second World War seriously hinders the studies on this problem – see H. Gollub, *Die Schadenbücher des Deutschen Ordens*, "Altpreußische Forschungen", vol. I, 1924, issue 2, pp. 143–144. On war damage in the area of Żuławy: W. Długokęcki, *Żuławy Wiślane w okresie wojny zakonu krzyżackiego z Polską i Litwą w latach 1409–1411*, [in:] *Na szlakach dwóch światów. Studia ofiarowane Profesorowi Jerzemu Hauzińskiemu*, ed. A. Teterycz-Puzio, Słupsk 2016, pp. 595–606.

[22] E. Potkowski *Monarsze dary książkowe w polskim średniowieczu – pogrunwaldzkie dary Jagiełły*, [in:] *Ojczyzna bliższa i dalsza. Studia historyczne ofiarowane F. Kirykowi w 60-tą rocznicę urodzin*, eds. J. Chrobaczyński et al., Kraków 1993, pp. 359–373; idem, *Nach der Schlacht von Tannenberg – Schenkungen des Königs Władysław Jagiełło an die Polnischen Kirchen*, [in:] *Mittelalterliche Kultur und Literatur im Deutschsordenstaat in Preußen: Leben und Nachleben*, eds. J. Wenta, S. Hartmann, G. Vollmann-Profe, Toruń 2008, pp. 157–172; cf. the account by Jan Długosz on the Polish deputation to Kuria in 1411 – *Joannis Dlugossi Annales*…, pp. 183–184.

[23] *Die Staatsverträge des Deutschen Ordens in Preussen im 15. Jahrhundert*, vol. I, ed. E. Weise, 2nd edition, Marburg 1970, no. 83b, point 2; M. Pelech, *Der Verpflichtungsbrief des Hochmeisters Heinrich von Plauen bezüglich der Bezahlung von 100 000 Schock Bohm. Groschen an den König von Polen vom 31 I 1411*, "Preußenland" vol. 17, 1979, pp. 55–64; A. Szweda, *Traktat pokojowy*, [in:] *Wojna Polski i Litwy*…, p. 713.

[24] See below.

[25] S. Ekdahl, *The Teutonic Order's Mercenaries during the 'Great War' with Poland-Lithuania (1409–1411)*, [in:] *Mercenaries and Paid Men. The Mercenary Identity in the Middle Ages*, ed. J. France, Leiden 2008, pp. 345–364; idem, *Der 1. Thorner Frieden (1411) im Spiegel der Söldnerfrage*, OM, vol. 18, 2013, pp. 74–78; see also: idem, *Verträge des Deutschen Ordens mit Söldnerführen aus den ersten Jahrzehnten nach Grunwald*, "Questiones Medii Aevii Novae", vol. 11, 2006, pp. 51–95.

tion of the Order's leaders – which was growing over time – that it was inevitable to resume the war resulted not only in not dismissing the mercenaries from their service, but also in making new enlistments[26]. Even though the opposing side was at that time struggling with similar problems[27], it could be assumed that it was largely amortised by the Teutonic war contribution. Scholars of the Order's history emphasise usually rather unanimously that as a result of the above-mentioned factors, the Teutonic Order's financial system collapsed for the first time[28].

The financial collapse was one of the symptoms of a wider economic crisis devouring the Order's rule in Prussia[29]. Obviously, part of the phenomena occurring at that time was of an objective nature (they included the following: the collapse of the Hanseatic League's monopoly on the Baltic Sea and the British and Dutch merchants' expansion that accompanied it[30], devaluation of rents, repetitive periods of recession at a local and supra-regional scale)[31], or it had occurred much earlier (i.e. conflicts with foundations in economy and the Order's economic competition with their own subjects)[32]. Nevertheless, after 1410 we are dealing

[26] S. Ekdahl, *Das Soldbuch des Deutschen Ordens 1410/1411, Die Abrechnungen für die Soldtruppen*, vol. 1, Köln-Wien 1988, passim; idem, *Verträge des Deutschen Ordens*…, pp. 51–95. On the costs of carrying out wars also: J. Sarnowsky, *Die Wirtschaftsführung des Deutschen Ordens in Preussen (1382–1454)*, Köln 1993, pp. 392–413; idem, *Wirtschaftliche Aspekte der Geschichte der Kriege am Beginn des 15. Jahrhunderts*, [in:] *Tannenberg – Grunwald – Žalgiris. Krieg und Frieden im späten Mittelalter*, eds. W. Paravicini, R. Petrauskas, G. Vercamer, Wiesbaden 2012, pp. 123–134.

[27] See: *Zbiór dokumentów małopolskich*, part VI, eds. S. Kuraś, I. Sułkowska-Kuraś, Wrocław 1974, no. 1856, 1857.

[28] M. Dygo, *Die Münzpolitik des Deutschen Orden in Preussen in den ersten Hälfte des 15. Jahrhunderts*, Warszawa 1987, p. 20; O. Volckart, *Die Münzpolitik im Ordensland und Herzogtum Preußen von 1370 bis 1550*, Wiesbaden 1996, pp. 66–75; however, cf.: J. Sarnowsky, *Die Wirtschaftsführung*…, pp. 387–388; see also: R. Czaja, *Die geldpolitischen Fragen und die wirtschaftliche Lage des Ordenslandes in Preussen im 14. und in der ersten Hälfte des 15. Jahrhunderts*, "Acta Classica Universitatis Stientiarum Debreceniensis", no. 49, 2013, pp. 81–92.

[29] More broadly on this topic: R. Czaja, *Strefa bałtycka w gospodarce europejskiej XIII–XV wieku*, [in:] *Ziemie polskie wobec Zachodu. Studia nad rozwojem średniowiecznej Europy*, ed. S. Gawlas, Warszawa 2006, pp. 195–245, esp. pp. 237–243.

[30] S. Jenks, *Die preußischen Hansestädte und England*, [in:] *Die preußischen Hansestädte und ihre Stellung im Nord- und Ostseeraum*, eds. Z. H. Nowak, J. Tandecki, Toruń 1998, pp. 113–131; R. Holbach, *Die preußischen Hansestädte und die Niederlande*, [in:] *ibidem*, pp. 91–111; Z. H. Nowak, *W okresie kryzysu państwa krzyżackiego*, [in:] *Historia Torunia*, vol. I: *W czasach średniowiecza (do roku 1454)*, , ed. M. Biskup, Toruń 1999, p. 259.

[31] R. Czaja, *Strefa bałtycka*…, pp. 237–243; J. Gancewski, *Wybrane aspekty gospodarcze z dziejów zakonu krzyżackiego w XV stuleciu*, [in:] *Zakon krzyżacki w historii, ideologii i działaniu – symbole dziejowe*, ed. idem, Olsztyn 2010, pp. 80–83, 85–87.

[32] R. Czaja, *Miasta pruskie a zakon krzyżacki. Studia nad stosunkami między miastem a władzą terytorialną w późnym średniowieczu*, Toruń 1999; J. Sarnowsky, *Die ständische Kritik am Deutschen Orden in der erste Hälfte des 15. Jahrhundert*, [in:] *Das Preußenland als Forschungaufgabe. Eine europäische Region in ihren geschichtlichen Bezügen*, eds. B. Jähnig, G. Michels,

with their accumulation and intensification which – as can be assumed – was not unrelated.

It is easy to understand that in this situation the Grand Master had to take extraordinary steps in order to gather the needed financial means. The Teutonic Order's treasury was empty at that time and there were no prospects for a quick restoration of the previous resources since the enterprises of ministers in Malbork and Królewiec deteriorated significantly in the meantime and were not able to generate the necessary sums[33]. The money was searched for also in Livonia and Teutonic bailiwicks situated in the areas of Western Europe, but mainly among the Prussian subjects[34]. As a result, the fiscalism of the Teutonic Knights towards the residents of Prussia increased drastically already in 1411. This caused the population's resistance, which Heinrich von Plauen repeatedly dealt with using force[35]. All this was certainly not fostering the rebuiling of trust between the rulers and subjects, which was tested throughout the years of war.

Additionally, there were negative consequences of the military defeat of an ideological and prestige background. The Order lost its previous aura of invincibility and generally ceased to be attractive for guests from the West. Although, as studies by Werner Paravicini prove, the downward trend of knights visiting Prussia had started slightly earlier, it was Grunwald that ultimately sealed the end of the era of expeditions[36]. From this point onwards the friars usually could not

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Lüneburg 2000, pp. 403–422; S. Jóźwiak, *Kryzys władzy*…, pp. 342–347; see also the recent: R. Czaja, *Die Ritterbrüder des Deutschen Ordens und die städtishe Gesselschaft in Preußen bis zur Mitte des 15. Jahrhunderts*, [in:] *Herrschaft, Netzwerke, Brüder des Deutschen Ordens in Mittelalter und Neuzeit*, ed. K. Militzer, Weimar 2012, pp. 119–132; idem, *Społeczeństwo i władza terytorialna w państwie zakonu krzyżackiego w Prusach na początku XV wieku*, [in:] *Conflictus magnus apud Grunwald. Między historią a tradycją*, eds. K. Ożóg, J. Trupinda, Malbork 2013, pp. 17–27.

[33] E. Maschke, *Die Schäffer und Lieger des Deutschen Ordens in Preußen*, [in:] idem, *Domus Hospitalis Theutonicorum. Europäische Verbindungslinien der Deutschordensgeschichte. Gesammelte Aufsätze aus den Jahren 1931–1963*, Bonn-Bad Godesberg 1970, pp. 69–103; R. Czaja, *Miasta pruskie*…, pp. 158–160; J. Sarnowsky, *Die Wirtschaftsführung*…, pp. 86–115, 286–302.

[34] K. Militzer, *Historia zakonu*…, pp. 210, 245, 257–260; M. Pelech, *Zu den Steuern im Deutschordensland Preußen unter Hochmeister Heinrich von Plauen*, "Beiträge zur Geschichte Westpreußens", vol. 9, 1985, pp. 41–50; J. Sarnowsky, *Die Wirtschaftsführung*…, pp. 181–263; idem, *Zölle und Steuern im Ordensland Preußen (1403–1454)*, [in:] *Zakon krzyżacki a społeczeństwo państwa w Prusach*, ed. Z. H. Nowak, Toruń 1995, pp. 67–81.

[35] Ch. Krollmann, *Die Politik des Hochmeisters Heinrich von Plauen gegen die großen Städte*, "Oberländische Geschichtsblätter", vol. 12, 1910, pp. 81–93; M. Biskup, *Pod panowaniem krzyżackim (od 1308 r. do 1454 r.)*, [in:] *Historia Gdańska*, vol. 1: *do roku 1454*, ed. E. Cieślak, Gdańsk 1978, pp. 486–492; T. Jasiński, *Spory i konflikty miast pruskich z komturami krzyżackimi*, [in:] *Zakon krzyżacki a społeczeństwo państwa w Prusach*, ed. Z. H. Nowak, Toruń 1995, pp. 61–65.

[36] W. Paravicini, *Die Preußenreisen des europäischen Adels*, vol. I, Sigmaringen 1989, p. 29ff; idem, *Vom Kreuzzug zum Soldzug: Die Schlacht bei Tannenberg und das Ende der Preußenfahrten des europäischen Adels*, [in:] *Conflictus magnus*…, pp. 120–126; see also: K. Militzer, *Historia zakonu*…, pp. 166–168; J. Sarnowsky, *The Late Medieval Military Orders and the Transformation*

attract anyone willing to fight in the name of faith, if they did not manage to simultaneously offer an adequately high temporal payment. The traditional ideology and legitimization of the Teutonic state also failed[37], particularly since the Polish-Lithuanian side took on a wide-ranging ideological and propaganda offensive with the help of Cracow's scholars, and thus taking away the Teutonic Knights' initiative on that matter and even taking over some of the motifs from their ideology (i.e. the notion of a bulwark of Christianity)[38]. Besides, the Teutonic Knights had a clear problem with forming new ideological foundations or even with modifying the traditional ones. The motif of the German nobility's shelter, which began to appear already at that time, had no bearing capacity in comparison to the idea of crusades[39].

Political crisis of the Teutonic corporation after 1410 is visible on the internal and external level. In the first case, we are faced with an unprecedented collapse of the Teutonic rule in Prussia. The Teutonic Knights' authority among their subjects became severely strained. A clear alternative to the rule of the Order's rule appeared – although for a short time – in the summer of 1410 and it was quite tempting for some circles (i.e. representatives of some cities, knights of Chełmno, etc.)[40]. Residents of Prussia, including the local bishops, were *en masse* switching

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*of the Idea of Holy Wars*, [in:] idem, *On the Military Orders in medieval Europe: Structures and Perceptions*, Farnham 2011, V, pp. 1–24.

[37] S. Kwiatkowski, *Powstanie i rozwój krzyżackiej koncepcji przywództwa religijnego w Prusach*, [in:] *Zakon krzyżacki a społeczeństwo państwa w Prusach*, ed. Z. H. Nowak, Toruń 1995, pp. 137–148; M. Dygo, *Ideologia panowania zakonu niemieckiego w Prusach*, [in:] *Państwo zakonu krzyżackiego w Prusach. Władza i społeczeństwo*, eds. M. Biskup, R. Czaja, Warszawa 2008, pp. 357–369.

[38] P. W. Knoll, *Poland as antemurale christianitatis in the late Middle Ages*, "The Catholic Historical Review" vol. 60, 1974, no. 3, pp. 381–401; U. Borkowska, *The ideology of 'antemurale' in the sphere of Slavic Culture (13th–17th centuries)*, [in:] *The Common Christian Roots of the European Nations*, vol. II, Florence 1982, pp. 1206–1221; J. Krzyżaniakowa, *Polska – antemurale christianitatis – polityczne i ideologiczne podstawy kształtowania się idei*, [in:] *Docendo discimus. Studia historyczne ofiarowane Prof. Zbigniewowi Wielgoszowi w 70. rocznicę urodzin*, Poznań 1999, pp. 295–313; P. Srodecki, *Antemurale Christianitatis. Zur Genese der Bollwerksrhetorik im östlichen Mitteleuropa an der Schwelle vom Mittelalter zur Frühen Neuzeit*, Husum 2015, pp. 112–113, 123, 132–135.

[39] K. Militzer, *Der Wandel in der Begründung der Existenz des Deutschen Ordens und seiner Selbstrechtfertigung vor und nach der Schlacht bei Tannenberg*, [in:] *Kancelaria wielkich mistrzów i polska kancelaria królewska w XV wieku*, ed. J. Trupinda, Malbork 2006, pp. 179–190; cf. also: J. Sarnowsky, *The Late Medieval…*, pp. 1–24; R. Czaja, *Die Identität des Deutschen Ordens in Preussen*, [in:] *Cura animarum. Seelsorge im Deutschordensland Preussen*, ed. S. Samerski, Köln-Weimar-Wien 2013, pp. 44–57.

[40] A. Czacharowski, *Grupa kierownicza Starego Miasta Torunia i jej związki z Polską w okresie wojny 1409–1411*, [in:] *Społeczeństwo Polski średniowiecznej*, vol. 2, ed. S. K. Kuczyński, Warszawa 1982, pp. 221–243; idem, *Opozycja rycerstwa ziemi chełmińskiej w dobie Grunwaldu*, [in:] *W kręgu stanowych i kulturowych przeobrażeń Europy Północnej w XIV–XVIII wieku*, ed. Z. H. Nowak, Toruń 1988, pp. 77–96; G. Białuński, *Opozycja rycerstwa pruskiego na początku XV wieku*, "Komunikaty Mazursko-Warmińskie", no. 3, 2010, pp. 256–276; D. Wróbel, *„Hołd*

sides to join the winners from the end of July 1410[41]. The phenomenon of a mass betrayal of the previous masters clearly indicated that the loyalty of the Teutonic Order's subjects was not unconditional. A relative strangeness of the Order's representatives in Prussia towards the local population – an advantage in specific circumstances, i.e. due to the possibility to build an efficient system of managing – turned out to be a burned in this case.

In fact, deeper ties between those in charge and subjects were not established here. At the same time, the period of war showed that the residents of the Teutonic state have their own political awareness and aspirations to influence the state's power. If we add to this the classical situation in which the weakened power is forced to turn to the society for financial aid, we will obtain an outline of circumstances, in which the processes of political activation of the social factor were accelerated[42]. It is important that apart from applying brutal repressions against the opposition, the Grand Master appointed in 1411 his own side state council which consisted of representatives of the nobility and middle class[43]. The fact that it was of a façade nature does not change the situation that the Order's elites noticed the necessity to undertake a broader dialogue with the society, while the process of political activation of the middle class and knights – signalled above – very quickly got out of the Order's control.

It is worth adding as a side note that the crisis in ruling also affected the corporation itself. I refer here, first and foremost, to the office of the Grand Master. After 1410, its weakening is clearly noticeable in favour of the privy council of dignitaries[44]. The situation was also reflected in the emancipation of individual

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*pruski" sto piętnaście lat wcześniej. O jednym precedensie z czasów Władysława Jagiełły*, MHA, vol. 23, 2016, pp. 93–107; S. Ekdahl, *Einestellung der Bevölkerung Preussens zur Herrschaft des Ordensritter*, MHA, vol. 23, 2016, pp. 111–114.

[41] K. Kwiatkowski, *Wyprawa letnia*…, pp. 473–526 passim.

[42] K. Górski, *Początki reprezentacji rycerstwa w stanach państwa krzyżackiego w Prusach w XV w.*, ZH, vol. 33, 1968, issue 3, pp. 473–490; H. Boockmann, *Zu den politischen Zielen des Deutschen Ordens in seiner Auseinandersetzung mit den Preussischer Ständen*, "Jahrbuch für die Geschichte Mittel- und Ostdeutschlands", vol. 15, 1967, pp. 57–104; idem, *Zakon*…, p. 148ff.; M. Biskup, *Der Deutsche Orden und die Freiheiten der großen Städte in Preußen vom 13. bis zur Mitte des 15. Jahrhunderts*, [in:] *Stadt und Orden. Das Verhältnis des Deutschen Ordens zu den Städten in Livland, Preußen und im Deutschen Reich*, ed. U. Arnold, Marburg 1993, pp. 112–128; S. Jóźwiak, *Kryzys władzy*…, pp. 347–354; R. Czaja, *Die Ritterbrüder*…, pp. 119–132; S. Kwiatkowski, *Społeczeństwo pruskie wobec Zakonu po 1410 r. Pokolenie, które przeżyło Grunwald*, [in:] *Conflictus magnus*…, pp. 162–172.

[43] M. Pelech, *Die hochmeisterlichen Räte vom Jahre 1412: Ihre Tätigkeit und Bedeutung*, "Blätter für deutsche Landesgeschichte", vol. 119, 1983, pp. 33–63.

[44] On the office of the Grand Master before 1410: S. Jóźwiak, *Urząd wielkiego mistrza w państwie Zakonu Krzyżackiego w Prusach do 1410 r.*, "Kwartalnik Prawa Publicznego", vol. 2, 2002, issue 1/2, pp. 213–232; idem, *Centralne i terytorialne organy władzy zakonu krzyżackiego w Prusach w latach 1228–1410: rozwój, przekształcenia, kompetencje*, Toruń 2001, pp. 81–88. On the changes after 1410 – idem, *Kryzys władzy*…, pp. 336–338.

monastic bailiwicks in Europe and the distance, sometimes even in open opposition, from the national masters: the German and Livonian[45]. In these circumstances deteriorated the morale of the corporation's members, where the symptoms of crisis typical of the then European monasticism had already appeared (secularization, overriding provisions of the original rules of organisation, collapse of discipline and morals)[46].

Symptoms of the political crisis of the Teutonic corporation after Grunwald can be detected also on the external level. Initially, it looked as if the Order had emerged from the war of 1409–1411 unscathed. Until the end of 1410, the friars managed to regain control over their rule in Prussia and Polish troops held only a few frontier castles[47]. The perpetual peace treaty (preliminaries) of Toruń, concluded on the 1st of February 1411, was quite beneficial particularly in terms of territorial matters for the Teutonic Knights[48], as it was essentially based on *status quo ante bellum*. Even Samogitia, the reason for which the war broke out, was ultimately going to return to the Order's rule[49]. At the time, the Teutonic Knights were supported by the King of Hungary, Sigismund of Luxembourg, soon chosen as the Holy Roman Emperor (finally on the 21st of July 1411)[50]. This moment is usually ignored in studies, suggesting that the king did not intend to get too involved in the conflict[51]. However, the then participants and observers of the events saw it in a completely different light, which is strongly proved by the comments by leading Polish notables recorded eleven years later at the Polish-Teutonic trial. Those, who testified unanimously, stated that the Polish king was forced to

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[45] J. Kostrzak, *Stanowisko inflanckich władz zakonnych wobec wojen polsko-krzyżackich w latach 1409–1422*, (part 1), ZH, vol. 39, 1974, issue 4, pp. 7–27; K. Militzer, *Historia zakonu*…, pp. 228–229, 245–251, 257–260.

[46] K. Górski, *Zakon krzyżacki*…, pp. 120–121, 143–144; U. Arnold, *Reformatorskie tendencje w zakonie krzyżackim w Prusach w I połowie XV wieku*, ZH, vol. 45, 1980, issue 4, pp. 7–19; H. Boockmann, *Zakon*…, p. 146; S. Jóźwiak, *Kryzys władzy*…, pp. 332–336.

[47] K. Kwiatkowski, *Kontrakcja militarna Zakonu. Napływ kontyngentów posiłkowych i zaciężnych z obszarów Rzeszy*, [in:] *Wojna Polski i Litwy*…, pp. 572–656; idem, *Działania militarne w grudniu 1410 i w styczniu 1411 roku*, [in:] ibidem, pp. 675–693.

[48] *Die Staatsverträge*…, pp. 83–89; A. Szweda, *Traktat pokojowy*, [in:] *Wojna Polski i Litwy*..., pp. 712–716.

[49] *Die Staatsverträge*…, no. 83b, pp. 86–87 (point 4); A. Szweda, *Traktat pokojowy*, [in:] *Wojna Polski i Litwy*..., pp. 714, 716.

[50] A. Kaufmann, *Die Wahl König Sigmunds von Ungarn zum römischen Könige*, "Mitteilungen des Vereins für Geschichte des Deutschen in Böhmen", vol. 17, 1877–1878, pp. 134–165; J. K. Hoensch, *Kaiser Sigismund. Herrscher an der Schwelle der Neuzeit 1368–1437*, München 1996, pp. 148–161; K. Dürschner, *Der Wacklige Thron. Politische Opposition im Reich von 1378 bis 1438*, Frankfurt am Main 2003, pp. 224ff, 242–249.

[51] J. Garbacik, *Zygmunt Luksemburczyk wobec Wielkiej Wojny polsko-krzyżackiej (1409–1411)*, "Małopolskie Studia Historyczne", vol. 3, 1960, issue 1–2, pp. 27–33; S. M. Kuczyński, *Wielka Wojna z zakonem krzyżackim w latach 1409–1411*, 5th edition, Warszawa 1987, p. 523; see also recent: S. Szybkowski, *Konflikt polsko-węgierski 1410–1411*, [in:] *Wojna Polski i Litwy*…, pp. 656–668.

make peace due to the threat from Hungary[52]. Therefore, it should be assumed that directly after the peace treaty preliminaries real possibility existed to non-plus the Jagiellonian monarchy due to the alliance between Hungary and Teutonic Order. It was not so much about the threat of invasion from two sides, but about causing a chilling effect and, as a consequence, preventing the Polish-Lithuanian side from resuming military operations in the North. Otherwise known intense actions taken by the Polish diplomacy throughout 1411 and at the beginning of 1412 also testify to the recognition of the Roman emperor's role in shaping the political situation in the region[53].

## THE TEUTONIC ORDER'S POLICY TOWARDS POLAND AND LITHUANIA PRIOR TO HORODŁO

Trying to see how the post-Grunwald political strategy of the Teutonic Knights looked like, we reach the politics – triggering various assessments – of the Grand Master (from the end of 1410), Heinrich von Plauen, a famous defender of Malbork during the summer campaign of 1410. Polish and German historiography have been dominated for a long time by an image of a militant revisionist, eager to revenge, and striving with all his energy to provoke another war with Poland and Lithuania, and their coalition partners[54]. This rather categorical view should now be corrected. In accordance with a thorough analysis by Adam Szweda a few years ago[55], the head of the Order was an authentic supporter of the treaty of Toruń, but – which was becoming increasingly clearer with time – he was the only one of the signatories interested in literal implementation of provision.

Already a few months after finalising the treaty's preliminaries, the Order realised what the real aim of the actual politics of Władysław Jagiełło and Vytautas was. It became clear in September 1411 that the Polish-Lithuanian side is not interested in complying with the commitments stemming from the treaty of Toruń[56]. The Teutonic Knights' refusal to pay the third instalment of ransom for prisoners of war, set for the 11th of November 1411, was a proof of their change in attitude. The tactics undertaken in this situation by the head of the Order – i.e. presenting

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[52] *Lites ac Res gestae inter Polonos Ordinemque Cruciferorum. Spory i sprawy pomiędzy Polakami a zakonem krzyżackim. Akta postępowania przed wysłannikiem papieskim Antonim Zeno z Mediolanu w latach 1422–1423*, 3rd edition, eds. S. Jóźwiak, A. Szweda, S. Szybkowski, Toruń 2015, pp. 251, 263, 284, 315, 333, 343, 377, 396, 409, 421, 431, 453–454, 466–467, 479, 499, 518–519, 534–535, 548–549, 566, 577; cf. also *ibidem*, p. 123 (point 81).

[53] Summary on this topic: Z. H. Nowak, *Dyplomacja polska w czasach Jadwigi i Władysława Jagiełły (1382–1434)*, [in:] *Historia dyplomacji polskiej*, vol. I: *poł. X w.–1572*, ed. M. Biskup, 2nd edition, Warszawa 1982, pp. 328–331.

[54] See n. 4 above.

[55] A. Szweda, *Zakon krzyżacki*…, pp. 531–545.

[56] A. Szweda, *Po wielkiej wojnie*…, pp. 145–156; idem, *Zakon krzyżacki*…, p. 534.

a decisive stand aimed at deterring the opponent, maintaining an ongoing military alert and strict repressions against political opponents in their own ranks – was risky and was going to prove very costly for Plauen himself. In addition, it seems that he made a very significant political mistake by refusing to approve a new agreement with King Sigismund of Luxembourg, negotiated by the Grand Marshall, Michael Küchmeister. More attention will be given to him further in the article.

Drawing conclusions from the effects of the above-mentioned September meeting in Kuyavia, the Order's leaders decided to strengthen their position through deepening ties with the Roman king. Already in November 1411, the Grand Marshall went to Hungary with the task to renew and strengthen the alliance with Sigismund of Luxembourg[57]. The instructions he was equipped with stated that: 1) Sigismund as the Roman king will provide protection to the Order with respecting its rights; 2) the ally will personally, together with his entire army, make a preventive attack on Poland around the 25th of July 1412, for which the Order pledged to pay three hundred thousand guilders; 3) mutual military help will apply also later in case of an attack by the enemies; 4) the Order will attack Lithuania when Sigismund goes against Poland; 5). the signatories will not enter into a separate agreement with the Gediminids[58].

The notion of agreement from the 4th of January 1412 issued in the Roman king's chancellery departed, however, from the Teutonic instruction in a few important points. It included a meaning that the Order *czu uns unde dem heiligen Römisschen Riche gehören*[59]. There was also no discussion of a preventive offensive campaign since King Sigismund intended to keep the Polish-Hungarian peace treaty made already on the 17th of November 1411 in Spiš and being in force until the 15th of August 1412[60]. The Order's contract partner anticipated instead to be in a role of an arbitrator in the dispute between Poland and the Teutonic Knights. The arbitration was to take place before the end of the above-mentioned truce. Only in the case if the Polish-Lithuanian side agreed to this verdict or attacked

[57] J. Caro, *Geschichte Polens*, vol. III, Gotha 1869, p. 377; H. Schaeder, *Geschichte der Pläne zur Teilung des alten polnischen Staates seit 1386*, vol. 1: *Der Teilungsplan von 1392*, Leipzig 1937, pp. 88–89; Z. H. Nowak, *Międzynarodowe procesy polubowne jako narzędzie polityki Zygmunta Luksemburskiego w północnej i środkowowschodniej Europie (1412–1424)*, Toruń 1981, pp. 27–28; W. Nöbel, *Michael Küchmeister Hochmeister des Deutschen Ordens 1414–1422*, Bad Godesberg 1969, pp. 47–51; Ž. Mačiukas, *Zigmanto Liuksemburgiečio veiksnys Lietuvos santykiuose su Vokiečių Ordinu*, [in:] *Tarp istorijos ir būtovės. Studijos prof. Edvardo Gudavičiaus 70-mečiui*, eds. A. Bumblauskas, R. Petrauskas, Vilnius 1999, pp. 159–174; L. Pósán, *Sigismund von Luxemburg und der Erste Frieden von Thorn*, [in:] *Konfliktbewältigung und Friedensstiftung im Mittelalter*, eds. R. Czaja, E. Mühle, A. Radzimiński, Toruń 2012, pp. 130–131.

[58] *Die Staatsverträge*…, no. 86, pp. 91–92.

[59] Ibidem, p. 92.

[60] *Dokumenty polskie z archiwów dawnego Królestwa Węgier*, vol. 1 (until 1450), ed. S. A. Sroka, Kraków 1998, no. 40, pp. 58–60 (insert).

the Order in the meantime, Sigismund of Luxembourg promised military support to the Order. It is worth emphasising that in this way the possibility to provide military aid was significantly limited in relation to the expectations of Malbork. Additionally, the king demanded as much as three hundred seventy-five thousand guilders for this help, which was to be paid within two years[61]. In another diploma from that day, he generously surrendered Kuyavia and Dobrzyń Land to the Teutonic Knights if they were captured in the course of possible military campaign[62]. The agreement from January negotiated by the Order's deputy was ultimately not ratified because Heinrich von Plauen must have recognized that the marshal had exceeded his mandate too much. As was noticed in the scholarship[63], it was not only about the financial matters, but also the independence of the corporation.

Complications in relations within the Order's management were most certainly not improved by another project, also endorsed by Grand Marshal Küchmeister, i.e. the idea of replacing the remaining financial contribution for the war captives, for whom the Order had problems to pay, with giving the Neumark to Poland as a pledge[64]. This initiative was also ultimately knocked down by Plauen[65]. According to many historians, i.e. Wilhelm Nöbel, the author of Michael Küchmeister's biography, these were clear indications to the existence of serious discrepancies in the Order's management regarding the current foreign affairs already in 1412[66]. The head of the opposition was naturally supposed to be the Grand Marshal who – after Plauen's dismissal – was chosen as his successor[67]. Thus, this is one more manifestation of the fall of the authority of the Order's superior after Grunwald.

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[61] *Die Staatsverträge*…, no. 87, pp. 92–93 = *Lites*…, 2nd edition, vol. II, ed. I. Zakrzewski, Poznań 1892, no. 1, pp. 33–35.

[62] *Die Staatsverträge*…, no. 89, pp. 93–94 = *Lites*…, 2nd edition, vol. II, no. 2, pp. 35–36.

[63] A. Szweda, *Zakon krzyżacki*…, p. 535.

[64] More broadly on this topic: J. Voigt, *Die Erwerbung der Neumark. Ziel und Erfolg der Brandenburgischer Politik unter den Kurfürsten Friedrich I. und Friedrich II. 1402–1457*, Berlin 1863, pp. 120–127; J. Caro, *Geschichte*…, pp. 397–398; C. Gerstenberg, *Heinrich von Plauen*…, pp. 53–54; M. Nöbel, *Michael Küchmeister*…, pp. 52–56; M. Pelech, *W sprawie okupu za jeńców krzyżackich z Wielkiej Wojny*, issue 2, ZH, vol. 52, 1987, issue 2, pp. 96–97; cf. also: J. Kurtyka, *Początki starostwa spiskiego i pierwsi starostowie. Z dziejów polityki Władysława Jagiełły wobec Zakonu Krzyżackiego i Zygmunta Luksemburskiego w latach 1411–1430*, "Studia z Dziejów Państwa i Prawa Polskiego", vol. 9, 2006, issue 1, pp. 155–167.

[65] In a letter to the archbishop of Gniezno and noblemen of Greater Poland from the 20th of December 1412, Heinrich von Plauen explained that taking over the Neumark by the Polish king is impossible due to the opposiotion from the Neumark social classes – *Regesten zu den Briefregistern des Deutschen Ordens III: die Ordensfolianten 5, 6 und Zusatzmaterial*, ed. J. Sarnowsky, Göttingen 2017 [hereafter: RBDO], no. 6/66; see also: K. Heidenreich, *Der Deutsche Orden in der Neumark (1402–1455)*, Berlin 1932, p. 48.

[66] A. Prochaska, *Król Władysław*…, pp. 325–326; W. Nöbel, *Michael Küchmeister*…, pp. 56–57.

[67] W. Nöbel, *Michael Küchmeister*…, p. 69.

As far as the would-be agreement from the 4th of January 1412 between the Teutonic Knights and Sigismund of Luxembourg is concerned, it is impossible to tell to what extent its rejection by the Grand Master opened a way to the conclusion of treaty between Poland and Sigismund of Luxembourg in Spiš in March 1412[68]. Already from the spring of 1411, the northern politics of the Hungarian king was clearly twofold, resulting partly from the attitude of at least some of the Hungarian noblemen who were reluctant to war with Poland[69]. It should be strongly emphasised that the treaty of Lubowla and the secret agreement – accompanying it but concluded probably somewhat later[70] – of an anti-Teutonic overtone became foundations for a new Polish-Lithuanian strategy towards the Order, executed in 1412–1420[71]. Generally speaking, the strategy was based on pushing the Teutonic Knights on the defensive in diplomacy, in propaganda confrontations, as well as in military struggles[72].

As a result of the agreement of Košice that was put into effect soon after the treaty of Lubowla[73], Sigismund of Luxembourg imposed himself as a superarbitrator in the Polish-Teutonic conflict. He convinced the Polish king to this idea while the Order was forced to accept the arbitration[74]. The trial started in Buda towards the end of May, but only on the 24th of August 1412, the Roman king is-

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[68] *Joannis Dlugossi Annales*…, pp. 193–195; Z. H. Nowak, *Międzynarodowe procesy*…, pp. 28–30; D. Wróbel, *Stanowisko Mikołaja Trąby wobec pokoju toruńskiego z 1411 roku i układu z Zygmuntem Luksemburskim z 1412 roku*, [in:] *Mikołaj Trąba mąż stanu i prymas Polski*, ed. F. Kiryk, Kraków 2009, pp. 65–68.

[69] Peace process in the Polish-Hungarian relations is tangible in the sources from the end of February 1411 – on this issue see: *Codex epistolaris Vitoldi magni ducis Lithuaniae 1376–1430*, ed. A. Prochaska, Kraków 1882 [hereafter CEV], no. 470, pp. 219–220; *Codex diplomaticus Regni Poloniae et Magni Ducatus Lithuaniae*, ed. M. Dogiel, Wilno 1758, pp. 42–43; *Codex epistolaris saeculi decimi quinti (1384–1492)*, vol. II, ed. A. Lewicki, Kraków 1891, no. 36, pp. 43–45; *Dokumenty polskie*…, no. 39–40, pp. 54–60; *Rachunki królewskie z lat 1393–1395 i 1412. Rachunki podrzędztwa krakowskiego, rachunki stacji nowosądeckiej*, coll. by H. Wajs, Warszawa 1993, pp. 150–155, 159; *Codex epistolaris*…, no. 47–48, pp. 52–54; *Regesta Imperii*, XI: *Die Urkunden Kaiser Sigmunds (1410–1437)*, vol. 1, ed. W. Altmann, Innsbruck 1896–1897, no. 198.

[70] It was probably agreed upon in Košice in the last days of March 1412 – D. Wróbel, *Stanowisko Mikołaja*…, p. 66; cf. *Joannis Dlugossi Annales*…, p. 191.

[71] More broadly on this topic: D. Wróbel, *Elity polityczne*…, pp. 307–374.

[72] Z. H. Nowak, *Międzynarodowe procesy*…, pp. 28–96; idem, *Dyplomacja polska*…, pp. 331–335, 337–339; idem, *Główne aspekty walki ideologicznej Polski i Litwy z Zakonem krzyżackim na forum europejskim w I połowie XV wieku*, [in:] *Ekspansja niemieckich zakonów rycerskich w strefie Bałtyku od XIII do połowy XV wieku*, ed. M. Biskup, Toruń 1990, pp. 187–200; M. Biskup, *Wojny Polski z Zakonem*…, pp. 109–160.

[73] *Lites*…, 2nd edition, vol. II, no. 6, p. 39, no. 7, p. 39–40; see also: ibidem, no. 11, p. 42–44, no. 16, p. 49–51.

[74] Z. H. Nowak, *Międzynarodowe procesy*…, p. 31–36; W. Sieradzan, *Der Thorner Frieden von 1411 und die Prozesse zwischen dem Deutschen Orden und Polen als Beispiel der Bewältigung zwischenstaatlicher Konflikte im Spätmittelalter*, [in:] *Konfliktbewältigung*…, p. 135–147.

sued a preliminary ruling which thoroughly confirmed the validity of the peace treaty of Toruń[75]. Some disputed matters, i.e. those which occurred after the 1st of February 1411, were to be examined on the spot by a sub-arbitrator specialising in law and appointed especially for this case, who was the king's courtier, Benedict Makrai[76]. He was also to state whether both parties had complied with the preliminary ruling of Sigismund of Luxembourg. The sub-arbitrator's activity in the areas of the Teutonic Order's state, Poland, Lithuania, and their allies took place from the end of 1412 to the middle of the following year[77].

The Teutonic Knights' opponents used the mission of Benedict mainly to question the validity of Samogitia's renunciation done by Jagiełło and Vytautas and to present their territorial postulates which were going significantly beyond the provision of the treaty of Toruń and the Buda verdict of King Sigismund. Argumentation presented by a prosecutor of the Polish king – Provost of Włocławek, Andrzej Łaskarzyc – and Polish lawyers supporting him aimed at questioning the rightness of privileges and documents gathered by the Teutonic Knights as legal claims to the acquired lands. It presented new, expansive, and aggressive intentions of the Polish-Lithuanian party towards the Order[78]. Therefore, it is not surprising that in this situation the Grand Master, Heinrich von Plauen unilaterally rejected through his plenipotentiaries the arbitration already in mid-March 1413[79]. It is possible to think that this was in line with the Gediminids' plans, for whom a road to a military intervention opened up and, simultaneously, the possibility of a thorough erasure of the treaty of Toruń.

Rejecting participation in procedural activities of Benedict Makrai, the Order's superior addressed the Polish ruler at the same time with an initiative to or-

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[75] *Lites*…, 2nd edition, vol. II, no. 18, pp. 52–69.

[76] *Codex epistolaris*…, vol. II, no. 52, pp. 59–60 = *Lites*…, 2nd edition, vol. II, no. 20, pp. 70–71.

[77] *Lites*…, 2nd edition, vol. II, no. 20, pp. 70–71 = *Codex epistolaris*…, vol. II, no. 52, pp. 59–60. Protocol with procedural steps undertaken by Benedict Makrai – *Lites*…, 2nd edition, vol. II, no. 32, pp. 88–351; more broadly on the topic: W. Sieradzan, *Misja Benedykta Makraia 1412–1413. Z dziejów pokojowego rozwiązywania konfliktów międzypaństwowych w późnym średniowieczu*, Malbork 2009, pp. 55–162 (earlier studies included).

[78] Cf.: A. Wojtkowski, *Tezy i argumenty polskie w sporach terytorialnych z Krzyżakami*, Olsztyn 1968, pp. 44–56; Z. H. Nowak, *Międzynarodowe procesy*…, pp. 38–41; K. Ożóg, *Udział Andrzeja Łaskarzyca w sprawach i sporach polsko-krzyżackich do soboru w Konstancji*, [in:] *Polska i jej sąsiedzi w późnym średniowieczu*, eds. K. Ożóg and S. Szczur, Kraków 2000, pp. 170–177; idem, *Uczeni w monarchii Jadwigi Andegaweńskiej i Władysława Jagiełły (1384–1434)*, Kraków 2004, pp. 190–201; W. Sieradzan, *Misja Benedykta*…, pp. 67–68, 70–74, 76–77, 113–117; D. Wróbel, *Elity polityczne*…, pp. 316–320.

[79] *Lites*…, 2nd edition, vol. II, pp. 168–175; see also: ibidem, appendix no. 74, p. 474 = RBDO III, no. 6/109, p. 190; also: RBDO III, no. 6/108, pp. 189–190 and no. 6/111-6/113, pp. 191–193; W. Sieradzan, *Misja Benedykta*…, pp. 75, 106–107; A. Szweda, *Zakon krzyżacki*…, pp. 540–541.

ganise a summit meeting of both parties[80]. This idea was undertaken by the Poles, but a few months of preparations ended up in a failure[81], and instead of a meeting of the Polish king with the Grand Master a sudden deterioration of mutual relations took place in August 1413.

The war almost broke out in June 1413 when the news spread around Poland about murdering, plundering, and desecrating bodies of a few (?) Polish merchants on a public route between Gniew and Nowe in the area of Gdańsk Pomerania[82]. The incident took place most likely towards the end of May, but people started talking about it in Poland around Whitsunday, which in 1413 were on the 11th of June[83]. The intelligence reports that reached Plauen indicated that the news triggered a great indignation among the nobility of Greater Poland[84]. The state of tension is also clear in the official Polish correspondence from that times, excluding – interestingly enough – the letters of the king to the Grand Master[85].

In July of the same year, Malbork kept receiving information from the frontiers' officials regarding plans and preparations for war made in Poland and Mazovia[86]. Undoubtedly, these reports encouraged the Grand Master to intensify his own activities, the traces of which were preserved in the sources[87].

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[80] *Lites*…, 2nd edition, vol. II, p. 474.

[81] See A. Szweda, *Organizacja i technika dyplomacji polskiej w stosunkach z zakonem krzyżackim w Prusach w latach 1386–1454*, Toruń 2009, p. 225.

[82] This case was broadly discussed many times in the Polish diplomacy and propaganda, and in trails with the Teutonic Knights. Merchants' personal data were referenced in the articles put forward in Buda (seven people) – *Lites*…, 2nd edition, vol. III, ed. J. Karwasińska, Warszawa 1935, p. 127 (point 12). The Polish king's letter to a Czech nobleman from the 13th of June 1413 mentions as many as two hundred people with wives and children (*Kodeks dyplomatyczny Litwy*, ed. E. Raczyński, Wrocław 1845, [hereafter: KDL], p. 170). The complaints addressed to foreign recipients emphasised the cruel handling of the murdered merchants' bodies by the perpetrators (KDL, pp. 163, 174; cf. also statements given in this case by the townspeople of Poznań in 1422 – *Lites*…, [3rd edition], pp. 316, 335, and 344).

[83] On the date see *Lites*…, 2nd edition, vol. III, p. 127. Statements of witnesses indicated May (ibidem, p. 136) and a date around Whitsunday, which should probably be identified with the moment of receiving the information (ibidem, pp. 131, 134).

[84] S. Jóźwiak, *Wywiad i kontrwywiad w państwie zakonu krzyżackiego w Prusach*, Malbork 2004, pp. 167–168.

[85] KDL, pp. 164–165, 170–171; cf. ibidem, pp. 166–167, 169.

[86] *Regesta historico-diplomatica Ordinis S. Mariae Theutonicorum 1198–1525*, P. I, vol. 1, eds. E. Joachim, W. Hubatsch, Göttingen 1948, no. 1966, 1971, 1977. Enlistments to the army made by the then prefect of Brzezie is confirmed by procedural material – *Lites*…, 2nd edition, vol. III, pp. 125–126.

[87] RBDO III, no. 6/168, 6/178, 6/189, 6/191; S. Ekdahl, *Verträge des Deutschen Ordens*…, pp. 51–95; J. Sarnowsky, *Die Wirtschaftsführung*…, pp. 407, 842–843.

## *STATUS QUO* IN THE TEUTONIC ORDER'S RELATIONS WITH ITS NEIGHBOURS AT THE TIME OF THE HORODŁO MEETING

The issue of military actions taken up at the initiative of the Grand Master towards his neighbours in September 1413 has already been the topic of historiographic examination[88], but it still has a cognitive potential. For a long time, scholars have been interested whether the Grand Master intentionally synchronised the planned military action with information he had at his disposal on the planned meeting between Poland and Lithuania. Did he pragmatically try to use the fact that his enemies were busy in distant Horodło in order to attain a surprise effect? This is not impossible, but it is also otherwise unconfirmed[89]. Moreover, this was probably not a primary issue since the military objectives included also the duchies of Płock and Słupsk, the rulers of which did not take part in the meeting and, at the same time, were aware of the Teutonic Knights' war preparations.

It is not known when exactly the military operation began[90]. Determining the right moment when they were started is difficult because there were no incidents of a military nature at the frontier, for which the frontier officials were responsible, and which should, nevertheless, be distinguished from the discussed military operation decided at the central level[91]. According to the Teutonic chronicler, the entire Teutonic army was divided into three corps – the first one was to attack Mazovia, the second one Dobrzyń Land, and the third one the lands of the Duke of Słupsk, Bogusław VIII[92]. Regardless of this information's accuracy, it seems that it is at least partially explaining the lack of one date for starting

[88] J. Voigt, *Geschichte Preußens von den ältesten Zeiten bis zum Untergange der Herrschaft des Deutschen Ordens*, vol. VII, Königsberg 1836, pp. 210–213; J. Caro, *Geschichte*…, pp. 416–417; E. Lampe, *Beiträge zur Geschichte*…, pp. 45–46; W. Nöbel, *Michael Küchmeister*…, pp. 61–63; in Polish historiography: M. Biskup, *Wojny Polski*…, p. 111 (briefly); W. Sieradzan, *Sąsiedztwo mazowiecko-krzyżackie w okresie przemian politycznych w Europie środkowowschodniej w latach 1411–1466*, Toruń 1999, pp. 25–26; A. Szweda, *Zakon krzyżacki*…, pp. 543–544.

[89] A. Szweda, *Zakon krzyżacki*…, p. 543.

[90] Cf. J. Caro, *Geschichte*…, p. 416.

[91] A lot of such incidents regarding the discussed period are documented by evidence from the trial of Buda in 1414 – see *Lites*…, 2nd edition, vol. III, pp. 124–128, 138–140, 177–179, and 193. Undobtedly, information by Gillbert de Lannoy about his participation in the expedition to the lands of the Duke of Słupsk – described by him with a great exaggeration (J. Lelewel, *Gilbert de Lannoy i jego podróże*, Poznań 1844, pp. 21, 23) – refers to the period from before September 1413; cf. M. Radoch, *Ziemie pruskie w oczach Gillberta de Lannoy*, "Komunikaty Mazursko-Warmińskie", no. 4, 2005, pp. 477–479. Due to chronological reasons, it can be linked with the operation led by the commanders of Człuchów and Tuchola at the turn of June and July 1413 (*Lites*…, 2nd edition, vol. III, p. 178, point 2).

[92] *Johanns von Posilge, Officials von Pomesanien, Chronik des Landes Preussen (von 1360 an, fortgesetzt bis 1419)*, ed. E. Strehlke, [in:] *Scriptores rerum Prussicarum*, eds. T. Hirsch, M. Töppen, E. Strehlke, vol. III, Leipzig 1866, p. 334.

military operations. There is much evidence that the attack of individual Teutonic troops was not synchronised in time and did not take place simultaneously. On the basis of the sources, it is possible to indicate at least four different dates: a) attack on the Kuyavia areas (?) shortly before the 13th of September[93]; b) attack on Płock in Mazovia on the 15th of September[94]; c) expedition against the area of Krajna in the last days of September[95]; d) attack on the Duchy of Pomerania at the turn of September and October[96].

There is no direct information on the commanders of individual corps. Nevertheless, it is worth noting in this context that the Grand Master did not command the army in person, but under pretence of illness – he remained in Malbork[97]. It seems that in this situation the actual command fell on the shoulders of the Order's most important dignitaries, led by Marshal Michael Küchmeister[98]. As part of the corps operating in the western frontier's territory of Teutonic Prussia, i.a. the commander of Człuchów together with the Order's friars from Debrzno was responsible for the attack on Polish Krajna which suffered in the last days of September 1413. In this territory, the invaders burnt the castle in Kamień (Krajeński) of the Gniezno bishops and also the city of Łobżenica, together with the surrounding villages and farmhouses that belonged to Piotr of Wałdowo[99]. Another army, or perhaps the Teutonic army, commanded by the prefects of Bratiańsk, Działdów, and the prosecutor of Nidzica, carried out a devastating raid on the northern areas

[93] KDL, p. 174. A comment in the royal complaint from the 13th of September 1413 written during the monarch's stay in Sandomierz (see A. Gąsiorowski, *Itinerarium króla*…, p. 79). The document mentions destruction of property from the Włocławek church. Undoubtedly, information from the local bishop and/or the chapter, or perhaps from the local prefects, reached the royal court.

[94] *Lites*…, 2nd edition, vol. III, pp. 166–171; cf. *Registri damnorum a Cruciferis in Mazovia anno 1413 factorum fragmentum*, [in:] *Monumenta Poloniae historica*, vol. V, ed. W. Kętrzyński, Lwów 1888, pp. 926–930; see W. Sieradzan, *Sąsiedztwo*…, pp. 25–26, 115.

[95] *Lites*…, 2nd edition, vol. III, p. 126.

[96] *Lites*…, 2nd edition, vol. III, pp. 179–180 (point 5); R. Simiński, *Konflikt – pojednanie – współpraca. Studia nad polityką książąt zachodniopomorskich i biskupów kamieńskich wobec zakonu krzyżackiego w Prusach w latach 1320–1423*, Wrocław 2019, pp. 208–214.

[97] J. Lelewel, *Gillbert de Lannoy*…, pp. 23, 25.

[98] Michael Küchmeister should be considered as the commander of the entire army due to his office of a marshal. However, this does not exclude his personal command of one of the three separate corps. Unfortunately, a specific activity of the marshal in September of 1413 was not reflected in the sources – see: J. Voigt, *Geschichte*…, pp. 210–213; W. Nöbel, *Michael Küchmeister*…, pp. 61–63.

[99] KDL, p. 163; *Lites*…, 2nd edition, vol. III, p. 126; A. Szweda, *Polsko-krzyżackie kontrowersje na Krajnie w latach 1411–1422*, [in:] *Europa Środkowo-Wschodnia: Ideologia, historia a społeczeństwo. Księga poświęcona pamięci Profesora Wojciecha Peltza*, eds. J. Dudek, D. Janiszewska, U. Świderska-Włodarczyk, Zielona Góra 2005, pp. 204–207. It seems that before looting the castle in Kamień, the Teutonic Knights captured its burgrave, Jerzy of Bielice, in nearby Cerekwica (*Lites*…, 2nd edition, vol. III, p. 150).

of Płock Mazovia (i.a. on Zawkrze Land), most likely reaching as far as Płońsk[100]. According to the French knight, Gilbert de Lannoy, who was staying at that time with the Teutonic Knights, the expedition which started on the 15th of September was supposed to last sixteen days[101].

In the light of material presented at the trial of Buda in 1414 by the royal prosecutor, relatively the smallest intensity and range can be attributed to the Teutonic Knights' operations in Dobrzyń Land. Articles presented by Andrzej Łaskarzyc regarding these regions focused primarily on the issue of closing off the roads to merchants, which took place around the 15th of August 1413[102]. Even though the third article, presented at the session on the 21st of May 1414, stated that the entire Dobrzyń Land suffered havoc and destruction as a result of the Teutonic attack, only two villages which had been affected by the invasion were mentioned, bishopric Miesiączkowo and royal Żyda (currently non-existent)[103]. These circumstances, juxtaposed with the information on opposing the orders of the Order's superior by the Grand Marshal and knights subjected to him[104], lead to the assumption that he personally commanded the corps operating in the Kuyavian-Dobrzyń area[105].

Juxtaposing these military operations started by the Teutonic Knights in September 1413 (and continued to the beginning of the next month with the date of the meeting near the Bug River) and taking into consideration the distance between the military operations and the meeting place of the Poles and Lithuanians, it is clear that information on the Teutonic aggression reached Horodło both on the day before the meeting as well as throughout its duration[106]. It can be assumed that it had an impact on the moods at the meeting. They are expressed not only in the anti-Teutonic

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[100] Nomenclature of *Polleur* – present in the work by Gillbert de Lannoy (J. Lelewel, *Gillbert de Lannoy*…, p. 23) – can be identified with this place. The city was not captured and perhaps this is why it is not listed in the Mazovian registers of damages – *Lites*…, 2nd edition, vol. III, pp. 166–171; *Registri damnorum*…, pp. 928–930. Identifying it with Pułtusk, situated in the area ruled by Duke Janusz I the Older, which was not captured by the invaders, seems to be less probable.

[101] J. Lelewel, *Gilbert de Lannoy*…, p. 23.

[102] *Lites*…, 2nd edition, vol. III, pp. 112–114; date from: ibidem, p. 113 (point 7); see also: ibidem, pp. 184–185.

[103] Ibidem, p. 125, points 1–3.

[104] *Johanns von Posilge*…, pp. 334–335; W. Nöbel, *Michael Küchmeister*…, p. 61.

[105] This supposition is reinforced by the fact that another official from the Order – commander of Toruń – who had significant role in Chełmno Land and southern Pomerania (see B. Jähnig, *Zur Stellung des Komturs von Thorn unter den Deutschordens-Gebietigern in Preußen*, [in:] *Thorn. Königin der Weichsel 1231–1981*, eds. B. Jähnig, P. Letkemann, Göttingen 1981, pp. 99–144) was in the state's capital at the time of the military operations (CEV, no. 559, pp. 266–267).

[106] There is no possibility to precisely recreate the Polish king's and the Grand Duke of Lithuania's route to Horodło. Their itineraries at the time are too scarce – see: A. Gąsiorowski, *Itinerarium króla*…, p. 79 (an unconfirmed stay of the king in Lvov on the 26th of September 1413 should be removed from the then itinerary since the source documenting his stay refers to 1419); S. Polechow, *Itinerarium wielkiego księcia*…, p. 65.

motif cited above in the form of the reincorporation's diploma of the King and Grant Duke, but also in a complaint against the Order drafted on the 4th of October 1413 in the royal chancellery most likely by the then king's secretary, Stanisław Ciołek[107].

How did the Order's leaders react to the news about the results of the Polish-Lithuanian meeting in Horodło? There is no direct information about it, but it is possible that the participants of the meeting themselves informed their enemies, which could be a premise to the fact of having the above-mentioned Horodło complaint preserved in the Teutonic archives[108]. It is intriguing that the moment of concluding the union coincided with the dismissal of Heinrich von Plauen from his office, which took place a week later[109]. This concurrence does not seem to be accidental. Even if on the 9th of October 1413 the members of Malbork's chapter did not know about concluding the union and its content, they undoubtedly realised tendencies for consolidation among the Poles and Lithuanians, as well as the failure of Teutonic politics to date. In this situation, the dismissal of Heinrich von Plauen was supposed to restore the Order's negotiation skills in the eyes of the Teutonic elites. Actions to resume the talks were taken immediately. On the same day, the elected temporary deputy of the Master, Grand Hospitaller Hermann Gans, wrote a letter to Sigismund of Luxembourg emphasising the legality of the undertaken operations and explaining their reasons[110]. The next day, on the 10th of October 1413, the Teutonic dignitaries collectively informed the Polish king of dismissing the Grand Master from his office, at the same time reporting their readiness to resume the talks[111].

## CONCLUSION

The use of the reincorporation's expression as a rule for the union renewed in Horodło by the policymakers from Poland and Lithuania is still best explained within the Teutonic Order's context. This provision cannot be ignored and situates

[107] KDL, pp. 161–164. The formula *ad relacionem*, in which Chancellor Wojciech Jastrzębiec was included (ibidem, p. 164) was added at the end of the claim. On the authorship of documents issued in Horodło: Z. Kowalska, *Stanisław Ciołek (†1437). Podkanclerzy królewski, biskup poznański, poeta dworski*, Kraków 1993, p. 30. Objections previously expressed by W. Semkowicz, which were recently supported by P. Rabiej (*Dokumenty unii*…, pp. 106–110), refer rather to the integrator of the union's document, who was not necessarily identified with their editor. A broader context of Stanisław Ciołek's chancellery work, in which he became known as a specialist on Teutonic Order's issues, serves in favour of the notion that he was the complaint's editor (Z. Kowalska, *Stanisław*…, p. 31). On the other hand, it is possible in this context to hypothetically take into consideration the then employee of the royal chancellery, Zbigniew Oleśnicki, as the author of the complaint, who mentioned writing complaints against the Teutonic Knights, i.a. in 1413, during his statements given at the Polish-Teutonic trial in 1422 (*Lites*…, 3rd edition, p. 455).

[108] *Regesta historico-diplomatica*…, no. 1995.

[109] W. Nöbel, *Michael Küchmeister*…, pp. 61–62.

[110] RBDO III, no. 6/211.

[111] CEV, no. 562 = RBDO III, no. 6/212.

its significance in the background, which obviously does not collide with the possible premises of the union's dynastic nature.

Stylisation of the expression, undoubtedly deliberate and calculated, emphasised the threat from the Teutonic Order's side both in the past and currently, which, however, did not have a reference to the real geopolitical situation at the time of the Horodło amendment. This is manifested not only by the presented crisis symptoms which consumed the Teutonic corporation and its territorial rule, but also the policies of the Grand Master, Heinrich von Plauen, which cannot be defined as aiming for the change of the *status quo*, but rather as its defence. The strategy carried out by the Grand Master was not free from errors, which was carefully used by the opposing side. A clear manifestation of taking over the initiative by the Polish-Lithuanian side was the treaty of Lubowla and slightly later agreement in Košice with Sigismund of Luxembourg. Henceforth, i.e. from the summer of 1412, the policymakers in Cracow and Vilnius carried out – slowly and not without obstacles, but at the same time with great consistency – the policy of revising the treaty of Toruń concluded in 1411, which the Order's leaders could not successfully oppose. It is in this context that one should place the preparations for the union's renewal, the manifestation of which was i.e. the meeting near the Bug River, next to Hrubieszów, in September 1412.

It is not known when the plan of the Horodło meeting was ultimately construed and when its date was set, but it is worth noting that the perspective of resuming the war with the Teutonic Order in Prussia took quite a realistic shape already in mid-March 1413 when the Teutonic Knights – constantly provoked by the Polish-Lithuanian side – unilaterally resigned from the arbitration carried out under the auspices of king Sigismund. The Gediminids and their circle obtained a necessary pretext for war, additionally strengthen by widely discussed incident of the murder of a few Polish merchants in the territories of Teutonic Prussia. At the same time, these circumstances were difficult to overestimate for the plans of the union's renewal. Their chronological alignment with the imminent perspective of conflict with the Teutonic Knights becomes clear.

Did the problem with the Order influence also the content of the Horodło agreement? This is highly likely taking into consideration the *ad hoc* circumstances of the meeting near the Bug River. The meeting between the Poles and Lithuanians took place already after the Teutonic Order's military aggression against the Kingdom of Poland and its allies – Duchies of Mazovia and Słupsk. Looking from the perspective of the political aims at that times of the Gediminids and their supporters, it was an extremely desirable circumstance, although only accidentally synchronised with the Horodło meeting. It can be assumed that the participants were almost deliberately bombarded with reports of rapes and destruction done by the Teutonic Knights. Creating an atmosphere of threat, but also revenge and retaliation, served to consolidate those gathered around the aims

formulated in the decision-making centre. Undoubtedly, this facilitated the adoption of the desired solutions by the organisers of the meeting in Horodło.

Considering the reincorporation expression itself, one should emphasise its strictly anti-Teutonic nature which was not necessary for highlighting the incorporation's core significance, similarly to the "reminder" of the circumstances in which the union had been established. Therefore, it seems that the intentional bringing to the fore and the stylistics used in the formula resulted from the attitudes of hostility towards the Teutonic Knights, which dominated the meeting. Literally speaking, the formula did not reflect the actual or past reality, but it nevertheless fit perfectly in the actual political aims of the Jagiellonian monarchy.

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## STRESZCZENIE

W artykule na nowo poruszono problem znaczenia kwestii krzyżackiej w unii horodelskiej w oparciu o najnowszy stan badań oraz przedstawiono różne aspekty kryzysu zakonu krzyżackiego i jego państwa w Prusach po 1410 roku, ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem polityki korporacji w latach 1411–1413. Wywody uzasadniają tezę, że wbrew deklaracjom sygnatariuszy unii i skardze na krzyżaków, zredagowanej w Horodle, Polska i Litwa nie były zagrożone przez zakon, lecz same miały agresywne zamiary wobec niego.

**Słowa kluczowe:** zakon krzyżacki; unia horodelska; Litwa; Polska