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WISDOM AS AN ETHICAL GOAL IN THE PROFESSIONAL ROLE OF A PEDAGOGUE*

Introduction: The topic of the article concerns the category of wisdom from the perspective of the role it plays in the profession of a pedagogue. Wisdom was presented as the objective of professional development, with particular emphasis on its ethically non-neutral nature. The analyses of the wisdom category were related to the broader axiological context and the perception of wisdom through the ethical prism of good.

Research Aim: The aim of the research is to pay special attention to the place and role of wisdom in the education of pedagogues, and not only its importance as an objective in the educational process. The idea is to show the ethical side of what wisdom is and what benefits would come from promoting the approximative nature of developing wisdom. Moreover, the emphasis in the text is on the conversion of knowledge into values and the phenomenon of axiological internalization as a key process in shaping the reflective, autonomous and responsible attitude of a wise pedagogue.

Evidence-based Facts: The article refers to, in an interdisciplinary way, the views of researchers who particularly emphasize the importance of wisdom for human development. In the presented analyses, the Socratic vision of wisdom, closely related to good, was particularly highlighted. The text also emphasizes that in preparing pedagogues for their profession, the category of wisdom should play a particularly significant role due to the fact that ethical tasks in this profession go beyond knowledge or qualifications.

Summary: The close connection between wisdom and good cannot leave one indifferent to the place and importance of the category of wisdom in the process of preparing pedagogues for their profession. Wisdom brings with it an ethical objective and emphasizes the axiological context of pedagogical work, which is not free from normative meanings. Moral competences are therefore an integral part of training for the professional role of a pedagogue.

Keywords: wisdom, good, ethics, pedagogue, education, values

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INTRODUCTION

The article attempts to look at the problem of wisdom in the education of future pedagogues from the perspective of a didacticist-axiologist preparing students for the ethics of the profession. It is about a topical analysis of the validity of referring to this category in the perspective of the professional role of the pedagogue. The gap that separates knowledge and education from skills and competences confirms, time and again, the need to more urgently initiate education in the spirit of wisdom rather than qualifications alone, especially in a profession that is described as a profession of public trust. We remember from our own educational path mainly those pedagogues who go beyond the framework of the depository of information, and although we know many educated pedagogues, this does not mean that all of them can boast of wisdom. This is because wisdom is not the same as knowledge and is not a sufficient basis for its development. There are many reasons to see wisdom as far more than intelligence, a wealth of information and mature age. "Intelligence and creativity can foster wisdom, but they can also exist independently of it and not influence its development" (Szmids, 2013, p. 34).

Unfortunately, it is not easy to define what wisdom is, and it seems to have been effectively devalued and does not constitute a conceptually or practically relevant category today (Borowiecka, 1994). However, particularly in the context of competency-based professions, where qualifications alone are a necessary but not sufficient condition, the problem arises of determining the level of specific capabilities, which are not measurable on the scale of achievements associated with education and acquired knowledge alone. The evocation of the category of wisdom in the context of the pedagogue's professional ethics is not accidental; since "it seems that only in wisdom can an opportunity for our culture be found" (Skarga, 1999, p. 32), it is difficult to imagine it being absent in the context of a profession so closely associated with the transmission of values. Pedagogy contains specific values that are closely related to the process of education and training, but apart from that, the process itself and the scope of the pedagogue's skills in this respect may also be subject to a normative process. "The fact that pedagogy makes such assessments is due to its practicality. It has a specific function, not only a strictly cognitive one, but also a practical and social one; it answers practical questions related to education" (Leś, 2019, p. 18). In professional roles with a particularly high degree of social responsibility, it is important whether or not wisdom is the basis for professional skills. By downplaying the problem, we only widen the gap between the theoretical base and practical skills, which also include ethical skills and moral competence.

RESEARCH AIM AND QUESTION

The problem of wisdom is usually explored in the context of the goal of educating humans as individuals. The aim of this article is to bring a pedagogical perspective to a strictly philosophical term. However, even if returning to the category of wisdom may seem an old-fashioned idea, we should not forget about its fundamental importance, not only in the context of pedagogy. The ambiguity of explaining what wisdom is should not interfere with the search for it, especially since it plays a significant role in the way educational activities are integrated, remaining in the optics of the goal of education (Pietrasiński, 2001). The history of philosophy is largely the history of the search for wisdom, and the scarcity of contemporary analyses on wisdom as such, “it is a kind of sad joke on man, who has always desired wisdom in his own life, believing that goodness will come with it” (Jodłowska, 2012, p. 12); sadder still because, even if we refer to the category of wisdom today, it has less and less in common with goodness, a connection that was taken for granted in classical, ancient terms (Leś, 2016). Meanwhile, by divesting wisdom from the space of contemporary research, we are at the mercy of knowledge and education alone, even the highest level of which will not guarantee the validity of the choice. As Dziedzic points out, we have innumerable amounts of information, knowledge and data, but this does not translate into a better, more sustainable state of the world. Therefore, even in the space of economics, there is an increasingly common constation that “an economy based on wisdom is based on values” (Dziedzic, 2017, p. 100), and that we need wise people who know what to do with the information available so that it produces good results, and good in a decidedly ethical way. This makes us all the more in need of wise people in pedagogy, where contact with values is not only inevitable, but involves their transmission in direct contact. The awareness that this message should be particularly well thought-out depends on the quality of the internalisation of certain values, which only “work” if they are authentically assimilated. Questions of validity are unavoidable in the context of pedagogical work, even if it means accepting undefined normativity within it.

To know wisely means not only to know, but above all to understand in a lasting and searching way. Those who only know are condemned to the residual nature of the information they have; those who understand accept the limitations they have and try to actively confront them. “While the pursuit of knowledge can be described as the satisfaction of the need to know, the pursuit of wisdom is (...) the pursuit of the need to understand” (Mlicki, 1988, p. 180). Therefore, whoever wishes to develop himself, also professionally, will sooner or later encounter the issue of wisdom, which does not so much enhance possibilities as emphasizes the approximative nature of searching for them independently and creatively. Perhaps it is even the awareness of the need for development that drives any change, rather than the mere desire to be wise. There is also some inaccuracy in the fact that we devote so much space to wisdom as the goal of education, when the order should

be different or at least synchronous. As Jarmuż rightly points out, “in order to learn wisdom and educate others, knowledge of wisdom and methods of working to develop this virtue are needed” (Jarmuż, 2023, p. 219); and if we assume, as the author does, that wisdom is transferable, then even if we are unable to specify and establish specific practices in this regard, being responsible for the quality of our own contact with values says a lot about ourselves, especially in the professions where confidence in this responsibility is greatest.

EVIDENCE-BASED REVIEW

Wisdom is not easy to define; it has a range of contexts, meanings and references (Pomykało, 1998; Szmidt, 2013; Kałużna-Wielobób, 2014; Jarmuż, 2023). It is a field of interest not only for philosophers, but also for sociologists, cultural anthropologists, psychologists and pedagogues, although as far as the latter are concerned, as Szmidt notes, it is difficult to find “wisdom-related topics in any pedagogy textbook” (Szmidt, 2013, p. 26). In terms of a general theoretical approach, wisdom refers to a particular kind of ability, usually acquired, not overlapping with knowledge, which helps a person, through reflection and observation, to find the right direction in life (Herbut, 1997). Therefore, wisdom is the ability to direct actions in the right way, which results from both our own and other people’s experiences. In the context of the pedagogue’s profession, this refers, among other things, to the issue of personal role models in the profession, but not only – it is also about the conscious choice of what is meaningful, has meaning and axiological value, i.e. the relationship of wisdom to values (Szmidt, 2013), and therefore also to goodness. As Okoń notes, wisdom is “a feature of a person’s personality consisting in the orientation of his or her reason according to a system of universal human values, whereby its symptom is both the choice of values themselves and the use of reason in the realisation of these values” (Okoń, 2007, p. 241). There is no relativism in wisdom, because even if value systems differ, a wise person seeks a common matrix for values as fundamental as dignity, honesty, truth or enabling people to work on themselves so that they can realise their full potential (Sternberg, 2001). Meanwhile, Wójcik notes that, despite everything, “the emphasis in professional development falls firmly on substantive professionalism and methodical knowledge transfer skills” (Wójcik, 2019, pp. 148–149).

The most important point here is to see that what is wise has an axiological dimension, i.e. it undeniably concerns the world of values both chosen, internalised and realised. Wisdom is seeing the bigger picture, even in the context of conclusive issues: it is “the ability to know the deepest reasons and the ultimate goal of reality” (Chrobak, 2013, p. 172). In addition, there is also wisdom in the sense of knowledge and life experience, and then “wisdom can be understood as expertise

in solving problems related to the pragmatics of life, based on experiences that form a system of topical and procedural knowledge” (Kielar-Turska, 2000, p. 324). This way of understanding wisdom seeks a kind of balance between the acquired knowledge and the ability to use it, which further emphasises the fact that in the pedagogue’s profession theoretical preparation will never be equal to competence; “wisdom is not equivalent to knowledge; it is not built only in theoretical cognition or only through practical experience, but it requires the unity of these processes; a wise person lives according to the requirements of the truths he or she has arrived at in his or her life” (Jodłowska, 2012, p. 131) and, to a large extent, these are axiological truths. Wisdom is also not synonymous with intelligence: as Sternberg notes with the help of intelligence one can act efficiently and achieve freely chosen goals (Sternberg, 2001), while wisdom is definitely not morally neutral, which in practice would enable decisions to be not only effective, but also morally right.

Finally, wisdom is the capacity for reason, it is a balance, a kind of harmonious balancing (Sternberg, 2001; Baltes et al., 2004). It avoids extremes and excess because “wise thinking is balanced” (Hendryk, 2012, p. 155). Perhaps for this reason it is also worth recalling the understanding of the category of wisdom that Skarga insists on: “as a name for that penetrating view of the world which defends both against the absolutising tendencies of reason and against attempts to drown thought and action in irrationality” (Skarga, 1999, p. 32). Wisdom understood in this way contains a large dose of balanced insight, a specific tendency to know the world in a reasonable way, without exaggeration; it is the ability to see everyday professional and private life in the perspective of values that objectively transcend it; and even if we are unable, definitively and unequivocally, to propose a set of objective values, this does not mean that the whole project of understanding wisdom in relation to education or pedagogy should therefore fail, as Sternberg, for example, argues (Sternberg, 2001). Values are an integral part of wise thinking and cannot be avoided; Pachociński states explicitly: “Wisdom is knowledge placed in a system of values” (Pachociński, 1999, pp. 57–58), therefore only someone who can read values understands the ethical context of this profession.

A wise man is not free of ethical dilemmas; his competence in this regard is simply enhanced by the force of exercise, experience, skill and, above all, awareness and responsibility – every value encountered demands an answer of his will. This is a very relevant context, concerning the transformation of the way of thinking and the way of being; “wisdom not only allows one to know; it allows one to »be« differently” (Hadot, 1992, p. 222) and, as a pedagogical category, it refers to the recognition of one’s professional responsibility in the perspective of understanding what value is and how much depends on the ethical capacity of the pedagogue. Without an efficient recognition of values, wisdom is impossible, which therefore closely links it to the process of assimilation of values: It is a complex process, as Malicka notes, for “it is not enough to know what a value is in itself, much less

to recognise it as one's own. In order to recognise a value as one's own, one must first experience it personally and directly" (Malicka, 2000, p. 278); a pedagogue is expected to know the range of moral requirements in the profession, but nevertheless only the phenomenon of axiological internalisation is the basis for conscious participation in the world of values not only learned but permanently recognised, not only personal but also professional. To internalise a value is much more than to acquire information about it; if this were the case, every artist would only create the highest quality art, and every pedagogue would be an expert in the nurturing care of human beings. For just as "awareness of values is not equivalent to knowledge of them" (Malicka, 2000, p. 278), knowledge and qualifications are no substitute for competence and good knowledge, i.e. wisdom. "Understanding values requires, in addition to naming them, also knowing them directly in contact with the person who implements them and also with the creations that constitute their carriers" (Olbrycht, 2012, p. 97), and thus the quality of pedagogical work actually determines the degree of authenticity in the implementation of values, which osmotically permeate when they are credibly adopted. It is not just a matter of personal preference as to what degree of ethical commitment to the role of a pedagogue we are talking about: "the term »ethical competence« is used to describe professionals who act responsibly and autonomously" (Labbé, 2021, p. 168). These competencies help to understand the ethical goal of the pedagogue's profession, especially as they are an inherent component of wisdom. Intellectual qualities and abundance of knowledge are only a description of the possibilities that one could have if one tried to live them. With knowledge it is often the case that the more a person knows, the less he understands; with wisdom it is still different – he who understands a lot acts better and better, because the close connection between wisdom and understanding also allows us to understand that for wisdom to have value, it must translate into ethically good action.

"We are heirs to the Socratic tradition, which urges us to look at education as a consciously undertaken responsibility for another person and their dialogue with the world and themselves within a horizon of values, the foremost of which is wisdom understood as a general knowledge of the good" (Jodłowska, 2012, p. 232). Sternberg rightly argues that wisdom is not about good answers, but about the capacity for balanced reflection in the search for the good in general (Sternberg, 2001). A wise man acts with ethical prudence and is "creative in the field of good" (Grzywak-Kaczyńska, 1988, p. 65). Similarly, Skarga argues and notes that "wisdom (...) is sensitive to the traces of the good" (Skarga, 2001, p. 143) and it is thanks to this sensitivity that permanently changed, morally justified behaviour and action is possible. Wisdom makes it possible to understand that goodness is a natural consequence of the assimilation of values through direct contact with them, which in turn shows that values oblige: it turns out that with the recognition of their importance in one's own life, it will become necessary, as Olbrycht empha-

sises, to have an increasing axiological awareness, up to the point of understanding what selflessness and voluntariness are (Olbrycht, 2012). It is not possible to become wise without the participation of values which require a certain attitude and permanently oblige one to take responsibility for what is assimilated. This is why wisdom is definitely more difficult than obtaining a diploma and confirming the possibility of working in a profession because it “flows from a properly organised personality (...) and serves purposes beyond the personal – the universal goal” (Grzywak-Kaczyńska, 1988, p. 65). The problem with wisdom is therefore not only individually pressing, but also socially necessary. It turns out that a wise person can refer to a much broader perspective, related to objectively important values.

As Maxwell argues, “the emergence (...) of global problems has been the result of enormous developments in scientific and technological knowledge, without an accompanying increase in global wisdom” (Maxwell, 2011a, p. 69). The asymmetrical nature of knowledge and wisdom is one thing, but there is also a discernible contemporary problem with the integration of ethical discourse into the wider social space, which includes the category of wisdom increasingly separated from the ability to recognise ethical goodness. Meanwhile, “the wise man in Sternberg’s theory of equilibrium takes into account in his actions not only his own perspective, but also the needs of others around him and the global perspective. The actions of the wise man led to the common good” (Kozerska, 2017, p. 128). Sternberg, like Baltes and Smith, refer in their conceptions of understanding wisdom to a typically Socratic approach, linking the capacities flowing from knowledge to a person’s moral competence (Sternberg, 2001; Baltes and Smith, 2009). And even if there is an element of emphasis on value relativism in Baltes’ conception (Baltes et al., 2004), I think it is more to do with the acceptance of variability and non-obviousness, as well as tolerance of diversity. The very ability to see values in a communal way (an overarching, objective way) allows a person to do well, and certainly far better than when he or she is guided only by a private hierarchy of values. Łukaszewski also emphasises the importance of the overarching goal of wisdom understood as the common good (Łukaszewski, 2018). It is about building understanding, beyond the different, the separate. All the more so as “community has become particularly important in a globalising world. People from different cultures are involved in carrying out joint projects. The search for what is universally similar is crucial (Jarmuż, 2023) therefore the ability to see similarities has a connection with contemporary wisdom. Values are therefore a fundamental way of seeing the world in an objectivised way; relativism is universal and very easy to prove. However, ever since Tatarkiewicz (1992) dealt with this problem and his theory of absolute goods, it has been known that the objectivity of value is not a matter of proof, but of understanding the nature of the characteristics of what we call good or bad. A wise person is able to see something ethically common to all people in a harmonious way, beyond differences, and this is obvious to him. This

is a rare trait because “self-evident truths have little to do with commonly held truths” (Tatarkiewicz, 1992, p. 49).

According to Sternberg and Karami (2021), but also noted by Jarmuż (2023), wisdom is a way of organising the mind, and its main purpose is to direct the mind in such a way that one does good. They propose to understand these good deeds as a common good or some overarching goal; as do Glück and Kunzmann, who analyse wisdom as either a focus on the common good or as a “balanced, holistic and integrated view of the world of human affairs” (Glück and Kunzmann, 2002, p. 143). On an axiological level, this holistic way of looking at things can be called the kind of superiority that lies in the non-relativised form of objective value. Wisdom in this approach would be the ability to see from a broader perspective, in a way that allows one to grasp the whole, to read in the right proportions, to seek a human-wide point of view; moreover, the pursuit of the common good, the higher, greater good, characterised most ancient conceptions of wisdom, where the ability to use common categories allowed one to live and act better among people. In view of the above, factors that may be crucial for the development of wisdom include: “(a) a strong motivation to act for the global good, (b) a desire, flowing from the depths, to know the truth, (c) a task that is important for the destiny of many people, which has »appeared on the path« of the person in question, and the meeting of which requires the development of wisdom, (d) a premonition of objective higher values” (Kałużna-Wielobób, 2014, p. 76).

We have become fascinated by pure knowledge, as free as possible from any opinion about it. However, the fact that we choose not to value knowledge does not mean that it will be free from opinion, and in the context of wisdom, perhaps it should not be; “wisdom opens the way for us to allow values to be the basis of valid judgements” (Hendryk, 2012, p. 158). Chmielecka even argues that “we need to attach a value-oriented reflection to axiologically neutral knowledge, indicating its appropriate applications. Pure knowledge is not wisdom, but without it there is no wisdom” (Chmielecka, 2004, p. 11). We need to know, but what is more important we need to understand. A wise man may not know something, especially as he is aware of the limits of his own cognition; but if someone knows and at the same time does not understand, this is much more worrying. The potential of knowledge is only a canvas for the ways in which it can be used. That is why “knowledge should become wisdom. The combination of knowledge and values creates wisdom” (Chmielecka, 2004, p. 11) and without an axiological context, we focus on this ingredient of wisdom, which is in fact fundamental but not crucial to it. However, if knowledge, education and qualifications replace wisdom, competence and professional ethics, then scientific progress will mean moral and cultural regression. Maxwell even argues that it would be necessary “to change the relationship between social research and the natural sciences so that social research becomes intellectually more fundamental in terms of capturing the problems of life that

promote wisdom” (Maxwell, 2011b, p. 291), rather than exclusively specialised, technical and expert. Hendryk, on the other hand, adds that “man reflects less and less on whether his actions are morally right, just, or serve the common good” (Hendryk, 2012, p. 153). As Czerwiński notes, also in the pedagogical context “the common good is an (almost) absent category” (Czerwiński, 2020, p. 46). In a similar vein, Wójcik suggests that “contemporary and expansive sources of information are axiologically indifferent. There is a sad prospect ahead of us – a civilization saturated with information, but without the understanding of good and evil. The risks seem obvious” (Wójcik, 2019, p. 147). If we get accustomed to equipping human beings with mere quantitative sets of information, the qualitative normative context of which seems to be only a superfluous way of looking at knowledge, then instead of a communal grasp of what is axiologically objective for human beings, we will get a pseudo-neutrality which will be underdetermined, nonexistent and bland rather than ethically complementary. “Character and reason are two poles that cannot exist one without the other” (Hendryk, 2012, p. 153), just as pedagogy cannot exist without ethics and axiology (Leś, 2019). Wise valuing is therefore not only a goal of teaching and educating others, but should first and foremost be an object of aspiration for pedagogues themselves; “it is pedagogy as a science that constitutes the proper field for attempts to establish the practical conditions for the realisation of the ideal of wisdom” (Leś, 2018, p. 49), and these attempts are inscribed in the profession and competence of the pedagogue.

Leś emphasises that “wisdom is also an important value in pedagogy, as it is linked to the fundamental goals of different systems and concepts of education” (Leś, 2018, p. 49). The ways of determining if knowledge is possible from a value perspective is a typical pedagogical task; after all, “a pedagogue, teacher, tutor and caregiver is someone who supports the development of the Other, who leads towards independence and explains the complex meanings of events and experiences, stories and symbols” (Chrobak, 2013, p. 179). The pedagogue’s efforts do not take place in an axiological vacuum and are always closely linked to a goal that goes far beyond purely educational tasks. Awareness of the complexity of this goal, as well as its relationship to values, helps “to shape social attitudes and professional profiles [as well as] to place future pedagogues in the space of both knowledge and skills as well as competencies” (Wójcik, 2019, p. 153). As Jodłowska observes in her Socratic view of wisdom, “only wisdom secures a good, decent and worthwhile life, thus allowing a person to fulfil their role” (Jodłowska, 2012, p. 35) and to support others in this. If, when working with others, it is their well-being that constitutes the pillars of professional activity, then “the basic goal of pedagogy as the main knowledge about upbringing should be the acquisition of wisdom, which is the condition for choosing and implementing the good” (Jodłowska, 2012, p. 35). A wise person seeks goodness, not just knowledge, and therefore education alone cannot provide the attitude that co-creates the social meaning of pedagogical

work. Only personal aspirations of a clearly ethical nature can allow for an assimilation of knowledge with values, qualifications with competences and science with education in the future. Therefore, “the content of pedagogical responsibility are both values, knowledge and skills, development and happiness and the capacity for innovative collective action. Therefore, a competence inseparable from responsibility, which is part of the professional culture of teachers and pedagogues, is wisdom” (Kwieciński, 1998, pp. 83–84). In view of the above, “it would be advisable to introduce educational and development programmes aimed at disseminating knowledge about wisdom and shaping different aspects of wisdom. In particular, this is important in the education of those being prepared for the education professions” (Kałużna-Wielobób, 2014, p. 76).

Pedagogy is a syncretism – it includes science, culture, society, ethics and philosophy; if we are to speak of the efficacy of this syncretism, it must become “again what it was for Socrates: an endeavour to put reason at the service of the growth of wisdom in life” (Maxwell, 2011b, p. 292). Jodłowska, in particular, looks at pedagogy in terms of a return to its Socratic traditions and emphasises that “wisdom is the most important goal of upbringing, both the close – everyday and the distant – ideal to which man strives throughout his life” (Jodłowska, 2012, p. 130); an approach that is very close to my own. If working on oneself is a lifelong task, it is impossible not to see how the initiator of these efforts plays a key role in the effort and how much ethical responsibility he or she bears; Leś stresses that, in the context of wisdom, the knowledge a pedagogue has also concerns ethical knowledge (Leś, 2018, p. 51) and it is impossible to base a pedagogue’s work on knowledge detached from moral competence. In a broader perspective, as Maxwell notes, it should be the case that “the fundamental intellectual and humanitarian task (...) would be to support (...) in obtaining wisdom – wisdom being the ability to realize (...) what is valuable in life, for oneself and for others” (Maxwell, 2011b, p. 285). Therefore, the task for pedagogues is different than what would result from knowledge and professionalism alone. For it is the quality of the way in which the pedagogue communicates that conveys the most content, more than we can imagine for the distant future of students, pupils or wards. If it is the ability to determine what is valuable that constitutes wisdom, then we should act so that, in Maxwell’s words, “the goal of education is to know how to learn wisdom in life” (Maxwell, 2011a, p. 69). A pedagogue can only infect those values that he has acquired himself; so if he remembers that he is not only educating, but shaping, he is helping others to understand that “wisdom is essentially a state to which one aspires without hope of attaining it” (Hadot, 1992, p. 47), that it is in a sense an inspiration and an approximation at the same time. It is not easy to propose an empirical way of developing wisdom (Borawski, 2017); for a wise “man is not so much what he is as what he becomes with every moment of wise existence” (Jodłowska, 2012, p. 29). This gradability can also be promoted in others, because the attitude of approximative

aspiration is contagious; after all, we mainly remember the pedagogue as a human being and not as a specialist in a particular field of knowledge. From a practical point of view, in an extremely mobile reality, “without wisdom we become helpless in the face of an overwhelming chaos of information, data, norms and values, and this helplessness gives rise to inaction and apathy” (Mlicki, 1988, pp. 180–181) similar to relativistic indifference in the search for the axiological foundations of humanity. Therefore, if wisdom can bring us changes in the world that are relevant to all people (Sternberg, 2001, p. 242), it is only in the context of a changed pedagogical perspective, with a particular focus on the ethical competence of the pedagogue’s work. Such a complementarity of pedagogy and ethics, or more broadly, as Nowak suggests, a symbiotic philosophical-pedagogical reflection, could be an opportunity to bring wisdom back into practice and life in general, without purely theoretical considerations, thanks to which perhaps “it would also be possible to arrive at pedagogical wisdom” (Nowak, 2016, p. 36).

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The authors quoted in the article agree that the implementation of pedagogical tasks cannot do without wisdom and the need for it should be reinforced. From an ethical point of view, right and wrong apply to the work of the pedagogue, regardless of which conception of education we are talking about. “Wisdom is therefore constitutive of pedagogical practice and theory. However, despite these close links, the rational construction of a pedagogical theory (...) is a highly problematic matter. This is because of the ethical aspect of wisdom” (Leś, 2018, p. 66), which is both obvious and debatable, but does not change the fact that ethical reflection is an integral part of a pedagogue’s professional preparation. Only by adding evaluative reflection to knowledge and qualifications that we go beyond the typically cognitive area and allow the shaping not only of the mind but also of character. If the pedagogue’s profession has such a great impact factor, then “the formulation of wisdom goals must take into account prior decisions of a normative nature, related to ethical knowledge (understanding of right and wrong)” (Leś, 2018, p. 66). Wisdom clearly has pedagogical implications, and it should also have them in the context of the work of pedagogues themselves.

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MĄDROŚĆ JAKO ETYCZNY CEL W ROLI ZAWODOWEJ PEDAGOGA

Wprowadzenie: Problematyka artykułu dotyczy kategorii mądrości w perspektywie roli, jaką odgrywa ona w zawodzie pedagoga. Mądrość została zaprezentowana jako cel zawodowego rozwoju ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem jej nienaturalnego etycznie charakteru. Analizy kategorii mądrości zostały odniesione do szerszego kontekstu aksjologicznego oraz postrzegania mądrości przez etyczny pryzmat dobra we współczesnym świecie.

Cel badań: Celem badań jest zwrócenie szczególnej uwagi na miejsce i rolę mądrości w kształceniu pedagogów, a nie tylko jej znaczenia jako celu w procesie wychowania. Chodzi o pokazanie etycznej strony tego, czym mądrość jest w oparciu o wybrane koncepcje i sposoby jej rozumienia. Poza tym akcent pada w tekście na konwersję wiedzy z wartościami i zjawisko internalizacji aksjologicznej, kluczowej w kształtowaniu refleksyjnej, autonomicznej i odpowiedzialnej postawy mądrego pedagoga.

Stan wiedzy: Artykuł przywołuje w sposób interdyscyplinarny poglądy badaczy szczególnie akcentujących znaczenie mądrości dla rozwoju człowieka. W prezentowanych analizach szczególnie wyróżniona została sokratejska wizja mądrości, ściśle powiązana z dobrem. Tekst uwytkula fakt, iż w przygotowaniu pedagogów do zawodu, kategoria mądrości powinna odgrywać znaczącą rolę ze względu na to, że zadania etyczne w tym zawodzie wykraczają poza samą tylko wiedzę czy kwalifikacje.

Podsumowanie: Mądrość jest kategorią moralną, nie intelektualną, co w procesie przygotowywania pedagogów do zawodu jej bardzo istotne. Mądrość przynosi z sobą cele etyczne i podkreśla aksjologiczny kontekst pedagogicznej pracy, która nie jest wolna od znaczeń normatywnych. Kompetencje moralne są wobec tego integralną częścią roli zawodowej pedagoga.

Słowa kluczowe: mądrość, dobro, etyka, pedagog, kształcenie, wartości