Adam Głaz

Extended Vantage Theory in Linguistic Application

The Case of the English Articles

WYDAWNICTWO UNIWERSYTETU MARII CURIE-SKŁODOWSKIEJ

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
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to the late Robert E. MacLaury,
María I. MacLaury
and all the researchers in VT

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Last but not least, I thank my family for the support I have received.

Adam Głaz
Lublin, June 15, 2012

Introduction

The book has a dual orientation and a dual aim: theoretical and analytical. On the theoretical side, it presents a relatively little known cognitive model of categorization, Vantage Theory (henceforth also VT), surveys its linguistic applications and proposes its adaptation, called Extended Vantage Theory (EVT). The adaptation is designed to suit a specific purpose, an extended analysis of the English articles, which constitutes the analytical part. The book is thus as much a testing ground for a theory as it is a hands-on struggle with specific data.

In the cognitive linguistic enterprise, to which the book subscribes, the most fundamental question is that of the nature of the relationship between language and cognition. An in-depth discussion of the problem would add a third, probably a superfluous dimension to the book; instead, the issue reappears as a recurrent theme in the presentation of VT and of its modified version. In brief terms, the cognitive abilities of the conceptualizer and language speaker as an active agent act as the driving force responsible for language use. This view of language and cognition has been shaped by the scholarly milieu in which the present work took shape, namely the cognitivist approach to language pursued at the Department of English, Maria Curie-Skłodowska University in Lublin, Poland. Inspired by the work of e.g. George Lakoff, Mark Turner, Gilles Fauconnier, Adele Goldberg, but predominantly Ronald Langacker, the research conducted in the department extended the work of these and other linguists to analyses of Slavic, especially Polish data. Such is for example Henryk Kardela's (2000) account of noun morphology, aspect, complementation and the

structure of events in Polish, couched within Ronald Langacker's framework of Cognitive Grammar. However, there have also been theoretically more radical proposals, such as Przemysław Łozowski's idea of language as a symbol of individualized experience. In Łozowski's panchronic approach, language change is viewed as resulting from an ongoing activity of human symbolic cognition: this the author concludes having analysed King Alfred's personalized use of the Old English *cunnan*, *magan* and *motan*. Łozowski says that

> [being] motivated by their experiential, inferential, and self-expressive predisposition, language users project onto language a subjective picture of human self. [Thus,] we have come up with an individualized approach to grammaticalization, i.e., a language change that is brought about by the speaker's spatio-temporal operation on experience in the cross-generational chain of self-expressive inferences. (Łozowski 2008: 177)

Although responding to very different data and couched within a vastly different descriptive apparatus, such is also, in its fundamental tenets, the approach represented by Robert E. MacLaury, an American anthropologist and linguist, the proponent of Vantage Theory. MacLaury designed VT in order to account for what appeared to be somewhat deviant but nevertheless repetitive behaviour of speakers in the domain of colour categorization. He proposes an account of cognition as a mechanism that enables us to take broad or constricted points of view on categories. This leads him to reformulate the notion of relativity, which is attributed not to the influence of linguistic forms but to the plasticity of cognitive procedures that enable the construction of categories as points of view.

It is in this light that the use of the English articles is considered: as an expression of speakers' cognitive construals of the situations described, along with the tensions inherent both in those situations and in the ways they are conceptualized. This also pertains to idiomatic, conventionalized uses. Convention does not come from nowhere: from behind its arbitrary appearances – which Bühler (1990 [1934]: 346), in reference to German, calls "labyrinthine" – there frequently lurks a deep cognitive motivation. The analytical parts of the book (part of Chapter 4, plus Chapters 5-6) are devoted to an account of that motivation. The theoretical parts, in turn, are concerned with three subjects: Vantage Theory as originally formulated (Chapter 1), linguistic applications of the theory (Chapter 2 and part of Chapter 4) and a survey of previous approaches to the English articles (Chapter 3).

The cognitive grounding of language in general and specifically of the use of articles requires that one extends the understanding of the term's etymology. *Article* comes from Latin *articulus* 'small joint' (*artus* + diminutive suffix *-culus*), ultimately from Proto-Indo-European **ar-tu-*, from **ar-* 'fit together'. The term fits very well with the Ancient Greek idea of linguistic structure as "articulation", in the sense of a jointed state or formation, and anaphoric words as "joints" which link the various elements of the structure (Bühler 1990 [1934]: 349). However, as will be illustrated in the analysis, the function does not only pertain to linking the elements for the purpose of textual coherence but also to the way they link *what* is being talked about with *how* it is talked about. Ultimately, the link reaches deep into the cognitive processes of the speaker and how that speaker operates mentally in relation to the mental object he or she is dealing with.

It is hoped that by combining the theoretical presentation with the analysis, the book will reveal the huge potential dormant in VT. I became more and more aware of the potential over the course of time, ever since my first encounter with it in the late 1990s. I owe the encounter, through reading, to Henryk Kardela. Then, at the 6th International Cognitive Linguistic Conference in Stockholm, 1999, came a personal encounter with Robert MacLaury. Sadly, the scholar passed away shortly before another conference, where he was to give a plenary lecture, Progress in Colour Studies, in Glasgow, UK, 2004. Over the years in between, however, we exchanged dozens of e-mails devoted to VT; I also became acquainted, though e-mail or personal contact, with several other VT researchers, notably Keith Allan. Without the help and personal guidance of VT's originator, understanding the intricacies of the theory and applying it to language data proved challenging, thanks to Keith and many other colleagues it has also been rewarding.

A few words of explanation are in order as to why it is the use of articles that has been chosen as the testing ground for Vantage Theory and its extension. While it may be true that potentially all aspects of grammar involve the notions of viewpoint (recall the title of Maturana 1987: "Everything said is said by an observer"), there are some that offer an especially fertile ground in this respect. In English, these include the use of tenses, word order (in e.g. clefting, pseudo-clefting, inversion) or markers of modality. Articles doubtless belong to the group: their use has been analysed from the logical, functional, pragmatic etc. angles (cf. Chapter 3 here) and it seems that while all of these approaches offer crucial insights, none can do so without leaving gaps for others to fill. This is especially conspicuous in the case of novel, original, surprising and

apparently little-motivated uses, oftentimes sidestepped as simply idiomatic or conventional. While I do not negate the existence of convention, I claim that it is all too easily resorted to as the ultimate answer. On the contrary, in the present work I attempt to seek cognitive motivation for what, having sprung up from cognition, later became conventionalized.

Secondly, the English articles constitute a very demanding aspect of usage for native speakers. It is probably a regular experience of thousands of non-native English teachers, translators, writers and scholars to inquire with native speakers about this or that usage and receive different, often contradictory answers from different competent informants. Moreover, the same speaker may provide diverse solutions to the same problems on different occasions. This shows not only that speakers adopt various viewpoints on the same portion of reality, but also that they do not always control these viewpoints at the conscious level. But they need not: the mechanism of categorization described in VT as vantage construction does not require that that the speaker be aware of what happens in cognition and language use and why.

It is therefore especially appropriate that the use of articles be also subjected to an analysis based on the notion of point of view. Because the articles are small in number and form a system of oppositions, it is very tempting to describe them in systemic terms, and indeed such descriptions have been frequently proposed. Yet, despite their neatness and partial appropriateness, they are woefully insufficient. The present account proposes to at least partially amend that insufficiency by searching for the cognitive grounding of both the systemic oppositions and the uses that go beyond them. If language is a system (a view not always shared by the more radical thinkers, such as Łozowski 2008), it is definitely *more* than a system. Whatever it is, its nature and shape must, I believe, be attributed to cognitive grounding, both in the areas which do and those that do not exhibit systemic features.

The reader is thus invited to embark on this two-directional journey: into the intricacies of Vantage Theory and into the vast but navigable seas of the English article usage. The two paths eventually merge into one, hopefully coherent, account.

CHAPTER 1

Vantage Theory: origin and basic tenets

1. Introductory comments

Between 1978 and 1981, an American anthropologist and linguist, Robert E. MacLaury, toured Mesoamerica with a set of Munsell colour chips and conducted interviews with speakers of indigenous languages. His aim was to discover how his subjects categorize colour. In total, MacLaury and his associates interviewed approximately 900 speakers of 116 languages. The fieldwork was conducted as the Mesoamerican Color Survey, part of the more comprehensive World Color Survey, and its findings were later enriched with data from many other language families. The scholar then attempted to explain his findings by means of the models available at the time. However, none seemed to be fully adequate, be it the classical conception of necessary and sufficient conditions, Zadeh's (1965) fuzzy sets or Rosch's (e.g. 1975, 1978) prototype approach. Puzzled by the findings, MacLaury proposed his own model, which he called Vantage Theory (VT). In a nutshell, the model postulates that categories are constructed as *vantages*, or points of view. However, these are not mere locations one adopts for seeing but complex and coherent arrays of cognitive procedures constructed as arrangements of mental coordinates.

A comprehensive description of both the interviews and the theory is MacLaury's *Color and Cognition in Mesoamerica* (1997, reprinted in 2011). The present chapter will present VT succinctly.

1.1 The Munsell set

The equipment used by MacLaury is, in his own words (p.c. at the 6th ICLC in Stockholm, Sweden, July 1999), "the simplest and yet the most ingenious" apparatus that can be used in categorization and semantic research. It ultimately derives from the three-dimensional Munsell colour solid (Figure 1-1), devised by Albert H. Munsell in the early 20th c. as a spatial representation of colour in its three dimensions.



Figure 1-1. The Munsell colour solid representing three parameters of colour: hue (along the circumference), brightness (lightness or luminance, along the vertical axis) and saturation (vividness or purity of colour, as the distance from the centre, maximum saturation on the outer layer). Hue, brightness and saturation are psychological dimensions correlated with the physical dimensions of, respectively, wavelength, amount/intensity and complexity of light. (From MacLaury 1997: 11; reproduced with permission of Texas University Press.)

The Munsell chart or array (see insert, © Hale Color Consultants, William N. Hale, Jr., reproduced with permission) is a two-dimensional rendering of the outer layer of the solid, the point at which colours have maximum saturation. The colours are arranged in rows according to hue and in columns according to brightness. The actual equipment used in interviews consists of 320 colourful chips and an additional column on the left hand-side of the array contains ten achromatic colours from white at the top through shades of grey to black at the bottom.

In order to arrive at the array, the Munsell solid has first to be transformed into a cylinder (for details see MacLaury 1997: 10ff) and then severed along a line between two columns. The disruption is frequently introduced in the

middle of the red area, with yellows, greens, blues and purples from left to right, but for immediate purposes it can be effected at any column.

The array can be manipulated in that it consists of individual chips and so may be randomized and de-randomized at will.

1.2 Interviews

In interviews, MacLaury required his informant to apply three kinds of procedure: *naming*, *focus selection* and *mapping*. In the procedure of naming, an informant is shown each of the chips in isolation and asked to provide its name. The chips are shown one by one, in random order and against a grey background, so as to reduce the influence of context. The names are recorded and the chips are then arranged into the full array, which shows the ranges of each colour category. In the next step, the informant is asked to choose the best example or the focus of each category he/she has used in the naming task. Finally, in mapping, the informant is shown the arranged set and asked to put a grain of rice on every chip he/she would name X. This proceeds in stages: when finished, the interviewer repeats the same request until the informant insists that no more chips can be so named. The boundaries of category range (broken down into stages) are recorded and the next term is covered in the same way.

A scrutiny of the data thus obtained yields rather surprising results. For example, the naming and mapping ranges of a category need not coincide, the focus of a particular term may fall on the area named with another term or two terms can be used in reference to the same category by the same speaker during a single interview. These and other observations (the full list of a hundred regularities can be found in MacLaury 1997, Appendix VII, pp. 449-457) led MacLaury to conclude that conceptualizers view and talk about a category from different points of view. In other words, they construct different arrangements of cognitive coordinates. He further proposed that the manipulation of the coordinates is performed by analogy to what humans do in spatio-temporal orientation, the idea of which we turn to below.

2. The theory

2.1 The space-time: categorization analogy

A person locates him or herself in space-time by plotting the spatial axes of up-down, front-back and left-right, unified into a single body of reference, with the temporal coordinate manifested as motion. The coordinates define the person's location in space-time or a series of locations through which the person progresses. Einstein's (1920) classic example is that of a rock dropped from a moving train. For someone on the train, its trajectory is straight but for someone standing by the track it is parabolic. From the shape of trajectory one can deduce the position of the viewer.[1]

MacLaury's example to illustrate the way a person functions in space-time is that of someone locating an object through a series of figure-ground arrangements:

> To comprehend the ordinary spatial description *The newspaper is on the living room table*, one must locate the living room in relation to the house design, the table in relation to the living room, and the newspaper in relation to the table. One "zooms in" from a broad to a narrow purview by envisioning three relations of figure to ground: living room to house design, table to living room, and newspaper to table. As one narrows concentration through the three levels, one takes the figure from the broadest level to use as the ground on the next level. Thus, the living room is a figure in relation to the house design but a ground in relation to the table, which, in turn, is a figure in relation to the living room but a ground in relation to the newspaper. (MacLaury 1997: 139)

There also exists the reverse phenomenon of *zooming/panning out*. Both are continuously utilized in spatio-temporal orientation. Aoyagi (1995) provides the following example:

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[1] In Einstein's own words:

> I stand at the window of a railway carriage which is travelling uniformly, and drop a stone on the embankment, without throwing it. Then, disregarding the influence of the air resistance, I see the stone descend in a straight line. A pedestrian who observes the misdeed from the footpath notices that the stone falls to earth in a parabolic curve. I now ask: Do the "positions" traversed by the stone lie "in reality" on a straight line or on a parabola? ... The stone traverses a straight line relative to a system of co-ordinates rigidly attached to the carriage, but relative to a system of co-ordinates rigidly attached to the ground (embankment) it describes a parabola. With the aid of this example it is clearly seen that there is no such thing as an independently existing trajectory, but only a trajectory relative to a particular body of reference. (Einstein 1920, ch. 3)

> Imagine a flower vase on a table. Initially, the vase is a figure and the table is a ground. By zooming in, one can look into the vase, where the vase becomes a ground in which the figure of a flower is located. By zooming out, the view may move from the table on which the vase is located to the room in which the table is located. A new ground of room is introduced, and the table becomes a figure. Through a series of zooms, vantages are constructed and linked with each other in narrow and broad scopes. (Aoyagi 1995: 334-335)

But locating objects in space need not necessarily involve physical movement: the conceptualizer may zoom in or pan out mentally. The points of reference or orientation are therefore treated as coordinates in the zooming procedure:

> In vantage theory, the newspaper on the living room table is a point of view constructed in reference to "fixed" and "mobile" coordinates. The house plan, living room, table, and newspaper are coordinates. They are "fixed" when thought of as a ground and "mobile" when thought of as a figure, even though they do not actually move. Rather, each figure is held in attention against an established background as a moving object would be regarded in relation to a stationary surround. Further, each figure can be moved to the next level of concentration where it is converted to established knowledge and thereby becomes a ground where, in relation to it, a new figure is introduced as the point of active interest. (MacLaury 1997: 140)

An important caveat is in order: even though the authors refer to physical objects, the processes of zooming in and out in fact involve coordinates as mental constructs: it is on this basis that one can postulate the existence of an analogy between space-time and categorization. In other words, "[t]he analogy is performed between two systems of thought, not between ... things and a system of thought" (MacLaury 1997: 140).

Thus, as a result of the subconsciously performed analogy, a conceptualizer establishes *inherently fixed coordinates*, characteristic of a given domain (in the domain of colour, these are typically hue, less frequently brightness, and as a theoretical possibility saturation), and *inherently mobile coordinates* of reciprocally balanced emphases on *similarity* or *difference*.[2] In the process of zooming in

[2] *Difference* is the more commonly used term, also in MacLaury's latest publications, though in his major work, (1997) he consistently talks about *distinctiveness*. I will predominantly use *difference*, the more recent and therefore probably the preferred term, although *distinctiveness* will also be evoked in a small number of contexts. In an e-mail of March 24, 2001, MacLaury writes: "I was using distinctiveness and difference synonymously. I switched from distinctiveness to

and out a coordinate may change its status from fixed to mobile for immediate purposes, though retaining its inherent, "default" value. Examples follow but a more precise formulation of the correspondences (*equivalences* in MacLaury's terminology) between space-time and categorization is offered in MacLaury (2003a) and Głaz (2010a).[3]

2.2 Vantages

As has been stated previously, the origin and the primary area of the application of the theory is the colour domain. Let us assume that a person constructs a hue-based category called *blue*. The process starts with selecting the focus (a blue hue), after which other stimuli are incorporated into the category's range. As long as they are deemed similar to the focus, the range will expand; once they start being viewed as different from the focus, the range will be curtailed. Figure 1-2 models the process.

Levels	Fixed Coordinates	Mobile Coordinates	Entailments
1	Bu	S	focus, range
	⇩		
2	S	D	breadth, margin

Figure 1-2. Modelling of the BLUE category in VT

In this simplest case, the inherently fixed Bu (for *blue*) is on level 1 juxtaposed with the inherently mobile attention to similarity (S). Then, on level 2, S is "fixated": its status changes from new to old information, allowing for new information to be added. This is analogous to the "zooming in" process while locating the newspaper (where the table is first new information relative to the room but once located, it is treated as known and capable of serving as a reference point for locating the paper). That new information on level 2 is the attention to difference (D) at the expense of attention to similarity (more on attention in section 2.3).[4]

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difference to simplify the terminology, and to make it match that of psychologists. But, come to think of it, ... the terms are not the same".

[3] The analogy between categorization and space-time, rather than space *and* time, also has another consequence. It is namely not the case that time is universally conceptualized in spatial terms, as is frequent in English or many other (Indo-European) languages. This kind of mapping may either be non-existent or need not agree with the time's arrow.

[4] The nature of similarity as understood in VT is in itself worthy of a separate study. Since,

These processes are hidden cognitions, whose existence is postulated on the basis of observable linguistic behaviours called *entailments*. On level 1 the category is endowed with a focus (i.e. the primary inherently fixed coordinate as the starting point) and – through attention to similarity – with a range: a certain number of colour stimuli are perceived as similar to the Bu focus. Once attention to similarity weakens sufficiently for difference to become more prominent on level 2, the category receives its boundary or margin.

Crucially, the value of the whole arrangement derives from *all* of its levels as a coherent whole, even though only one level is focused on at any single moment:

> Because a person can concentrate on only one level at a time – on only one ground-figure relation at any instant – the other level will be remembered as a presupposition... The level out of concentration is presupposed by the level in concentration because the coordinates comprise a closed system of parameters..., in which each part is linked to the others and so implies their existence – even when a particular part is not at the center of awareness. (MacLaury 2002: 496)

The BLUE category thus modelled is characterized by only one arrangement of coordinates, one point of view or *vantage*. But there may be more than one, each being referred to with a separate term. Such is for instance the case with COOL (usually blue-green) or WARM (usually yellow-red) categories in a number of world languages. As an example consider the COOL category in Zulu (the Bantu group, Niger-Congo family), in Figure 1-3.

	DOMINANT VANTAGE *hlaza*			**RECESSIVE VANTAGE** *kosazana*		
Entailments	**FC**	**MC**	**Levels**	**FC**	**MC**	**Entailments**
focus, range	Bu	S	1	Gn	D	focus, margin
	⇖			⇖		
breadth	S	Gn	2	D	Bu	curtailment
	⇖			⇖		
margin	Gn	D	3	Bu	S	range

Figure 1-3. Modelling of the Zulu COOL category in VT

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however, it falls outside the focus of the present work, some discussion will only be offered on the relationship between similarity and cognitive distance in section 2.4.

The category is conceptualized as two vantages, called *dominant* and *recessive*. The dominant vantage starts with a blue focus and the stronger attention to similarity endows it with a wider range. At level 2, S is fixated and the new mobile coordinate Gn (green) is introduced. This is in turn fixated at level 3, when difference (D) appears on stage. Otherwise phrased, as a result of the appearance of the green hue in the conceptualizer's field of attention, the role of similarity weakens to make way for difference: the vantage is endowed with a margin. The recessive vantage arises through a reversal of the coordinates: Gn is the primary fixed coordinate, D is emphasized first and more than S. As a result, the margin of the vantage is established before its range: the range "fills in" the portion of the colour spectrum between Gn and the margin thus instituted. The blue hue is introduced late as weakly similar to the green starting point. The procedures are diagrammed in Figure 1-4.



Figure 1-4. Levels of concentration in the dominant and recessive vantages of the COOL category (modified Fig. 14, the WARM category, of MacLaury 1999: 21; cf. Figs. 2 and 5 in MacLaury 2002)

A category as a whole is a sum of its vantages, or more precisely, an assembly of its coordinates plus their arrangement. For example, a COOL category may consist of the blue and green foci plus reciprocally balanced degrees of attention to similarity and difference. The coordinates, however, are structured,

rather than constituting a random aggregate. Therefore, a category is a "dynamic relation among selective emphases, coordinates, and at least one point of view" (MacLaury 1997: 181). The relation is dynamic because of the processes of zooming in and out, the selective emphases relate to degrees of attention to either S or D; coordinates are fixed reference points and the S-or-D relations between them; a point of view is an arrangement of the above, i.e. a vantage.

How are the differences between the dominant and the recessive vantages manifested in a colour category? Figure 1-5 shows the results of the naming and focus-selection procedures for the COOL category in Zulu (cf. Figure 1-3 above).



Figure 1-5. Naming and focusing of the cool category in Zulu (Bantu group, Niger-Congo family) (received by the author from Robert E. MacLaury)

Chips F29 and F17 are what MacLaury calls elemental blue and green, i.e. "the purest, most intense perceptions" of these hues (MacLaury 1997: 467[5]). C17 and G28 are foci.

As can be observed in the figure, the dominant *hlaza* names 62 chips, as opposed to 56 for the recessive *kosazana*, but it only spans 20 columns vs. 25 that *kosazana* spans. (Although the recessive vantage need not span a larger area than the dominant vantage, and usually it does not, the phenomenon is frequent enough to deserve explanation and comment, provided below.) Further, *hlaza* is focused in G28, which is very near elemental blue in F29, whereas *kosazana*'s first focus (the second focus being disregarded for the present purposes)

[5] Elemental colours are "the purest, most intense perceptions of red, yellow, green, blue, white and black" (MacLaury 1997: 467), although black and white are traditionally not treated as colours. The term is MacLaury's coinage and is based on Miller and Wooten's (1990) elemental hues, plus the achromatic black and white (the six elemental colours are recognized as "fire-engine red", "chrome yellow", "kelly green", "true blue", "snow white" and "jet black", MacLaury 1997: 467).

falls on C17, three rows above elemental green in F17. The differences are summarized in Table 1-1.

Table 1-1. Characteristics of the dominant and recessive vantages

DOMINANT VANTAGE	RECESSIVE VANTAGE
greater number of chips named and mapped	smaller number of chips named and mapped
range (often) more concentrated – over a more compact area	range (often) more dispersed – over a larger area
focus more centralized relative to elemental colours	focus less centralized relative to elemental colours

The type of vantage, then, depends on whether its first and predominating inherently mobile coordinate is similarity or difference. The value of one inherently mobile coordinate (S or D) can be increased6 at the expense of the other. This does not happen with inherently fixed coordinates, which only function as points of orientation and cannot be augmented (even though they may occur at two levels in a vantage model). Thus, the formula for the dominant vantage of the Zulu COOL category is Bu SS Gn D (but not *Bu SS GnGn D), while that for the recessive vantage is Gn DD Bu S (and not *Gn DD BuBu S). The predominating inherently mobile coordinate occurs as the first and the stronger one of the two.

2.3 An excursus: attention

As will have become clear by now, a crucial parameter in Vantage Theory architecture is that of *attention to* (or *emphasis on* – MacLaury seems to be using the terms interchangeably) one of the inherently mobile coordinates, similarity or difference, at the expense of the other. In a classic account, attention is

> the taking possession by the mind, in clear and vivid form, of one out of what seem several simultaneously possible objects or trains of thought. Focalization, concentration, of consciousness are of its essence. It implies withdrawal from some things in order to deal effectively with others. (James 1890: 403-404)

[6] *Doubled* here does not mean "made (exactly) twice as strong" but rather "made (significantly) stronger than the other". This misleading term is used because the appropriate symbol is actually doubled in VT formulae.

According to a contemporary but a fundamentally compatible definition, it is

> [t]he means by which we actively process a limited amount of information from the enormous amount of information available through our senses, our stored memories, and our other cognitive processes. (Sternberg 2009: 123)

Attention thus underlies other crucial psychological processes, such as figure-ground organization or its continuation in Cognitive Grammar in terms of profile and base (Langacker 1987, 1991a,b, 2008). Talmy (2010) (a fuller account in Talmy forthcoming), in turn, is a study of attention as one of the systems that assist in organizing the conceptual content in language, the others being configurational structure, perspective point, force dynamics and cognitive states. In VT, a terminological and theoretical distinction is drawn between *attention*, *concentration* and *focusing*, even if all three pertain to a process of mentally selecting one entity or aspect of experience and downplaying others. Attention is a selection, on the part of the conceptualizer, of either similarity or difference as the primary mobile coordinate for vantage construction. Concentration is enhanced mental contact with one of the vantage levels (called, in fact, levels of concentration). Finally, focusing (a category) is the selection of its best example, prototype or, in colour categories, focus (the primary fixed coordinate for vantage construction) (MacLaury 1997: 487). It must be borne in mind, however, that the distinction between the three cognitive procedures is theory-internal and that all three may in some broad overarching approach be deemed to represent attentional behaviour.

For MacLaury, when a person attends to either similarity or difference, they are probably making use of their ability to employ goal-driven (or endogenous) attention. The "probably" stems from the fact that the conceptualizer need not exercise full attentional control and the choice of the coordinate may not be voluntary – in fact, MacLaury views the space-time : categorization analogy as performed instinctively rather than consciously (1997: 180) and suggests that the mechanism may be innate.[7] Even so, it is a top-down procedure in that attention comes from the subject and is not caused by the properties of the objects. Contrasted with it may be a bottom-up, exogenous attention, when the senses "by themselves" react to a strong, perhaps an unexpected stimulus and result in automatic attention shift.

[7] It is not inconceivable, although it must be subjected to further consideration and debate, that there is an affinity of this view with Kant's (1952 [1781/1787]) idea of the innateness of space and time.

Since the capacity of short-term memory is finite, concentration on one vantage level, i.e. a pairing of coordinates in a figure-ground fashion, makes the other levels recede to "the back of the mind" (MacLaury 1997: 139). Concentration, as well as attention to similarity or difference, are covert processes, mental acts, rather than overt processes, in which a stimulus directs sense organs to itself (cf. Wright and Ward 2008).

It is the third procedure, focusing a category, that may be hypothesized to be an overt process: senses are directed to colour stimuli, one of which is then selected as a vantage focus. Essentially, concentration and focusing are distinct in that they occur on different planes: it is thanks to focus selection that a vantage obtains its primary fixed coordinate, which is a prerequisite for arranging the vantage levels of concentration. Focus selection necessarily involves sensory perception, whereas concentrating on a figure-ground arrangement does not: it is a purely mental operation. The experience of the two processes being distinct is commonplace, as when thinking of something (attending to it mentally) while performing a routine activity, such as ironing or driving through a familiar terrain.[8]

These brief comments cannot possibly present a full picture of what attention is, or even what it is in VT. Such, however, is not their aim; rather, they hopefully help locate MacLaury's understanding of attention with regard to his other, related concepts. The following section shows the further consequences of selectively attending to similarity vs. difference.

2.4 Contraction and protraction of cognitive distance

The major consequences of attending to similarity or difference is the contraction or protraction of the cognitive distance between the entities being perceived. When attention to similarity prevails, the cognitive distance contracts and the objects viewed are brought closer together. When the emphasis is very strong, they become indistinguishable and may be treated as a homogeneous mass. Stronger attention to difference, on the other hand, causes protraction of the mental distance and the objects being conceptualized can be viewed as discrete entities.

This kind of correlation between similarity and (cognitive) distance rests on the assumption that attention to similarity is a fundamental, perhaps

[8] These are multi-modal contexts. It is interesting to note that in single-modal ones, covert attention precedes overt organ shifting, at least in vision (Peterson, Kramer and Irwin 2004).

a primitive, cognitive process. Thinking along these lines has enjoyed a rather long tradition in philosophy and psychology: similarity has been thought of as a natural operation of the mind, one of the principles of connecting ideas (Hume 1975 [1739-1740]: 662; his term: resemblance), an elementary law (Mill 1843), an elementary relation (James 1950 [1890]: 688), an epistemologically primitive relation (Carnap 1967 [1928]), a fundamental concept in theories of knowledge and behaviour (Tversky 1977: 327), one that is "basic, primitive, not further explicable" (Heil 2003: 151) and "central to many cognitive processes" (Schwering and Kuhn 2009: 30) or even to "all categorisation processes" (Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk, forthcoming).

However, the status of similarity as a primitive is not something that is advocated unanimously. For example, Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk follows the ideas of Shepard (1987; cf. Chater and Vitányi 2003: 347), and treats similarity (resemblance) as a function of conceptual distance within or between conceptual spaces, in the understanding of Gärdenfors (2000) – colour, shape, etc. She uses the notion of similarity to model the metonymic nature of meaning and communication: only a portion of the meaning in the mind is actually expressed and it is expressed from a certain point of view (Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 2010 addresses the problem in the context of translation).

For Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk, then, meanings are networks that fall within the bounds imposed by the upper and lower limits, the so-called tolerance space. A meaning is acceptable if it does not exceed a tolerance threshold. In this way, says the author, speakers in communication reconstruct meanings, approximate and enhance similarity between them by reducing the distance between the speaker and hearer:

> It is argued ... that, conceptually, similarity is a mapping of physical distance on a cline between the Speaker's and Addressee's conceptual spaces, containing objects, relations and events. Discourse participants manipulate the distance – either by shortening or by lengthening it, even though the prototypical intention of the interactants is to reduce the distance between meanings... They use numerous strategies (synonymy, paraphrase, polysemy, super-/subordinate category members, etc.) to achieve this communicative goal. (Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk, forthcoming)

The author proposes parameters of the approximation, noting that "resemblances are culture-, context- and ... speaker-specific". While this is unquestionable, MacLaury's point is different: conceptualizers do not want to *achieve* the

similarity of structures or meanings but *employ* it in order to contract or protract the cognitive distance between them and the object of conceptualization or between the conceptualized objects. Degrees of attention to similarity, then, effect values of cognitive distance and in this sense it is a universal phenomenon found in all humans. Being such, its specific manifestations certainly *are* subject to cultural, contextual or individual idiosyncratic pressures. More discussion can be found below in accounts of the spotlight effect and viewpoints.

Admittedly, Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk's ideas challenge the approach adduced here in one more respect. She proposes that in online communication *tolerance threshold* emerges for categories, whereas MacLaury's model has been constructed mainly on the basis of experimental data (questionnaires): it remains dubious whether experimental conditions replicate the processes that take place in living speech. However, an application (with the necessary modification) of VT to linguistic material, such as that proposed in the present book, allows one to test the viability of VT or its extended version to findings from outside the questionnaire context. Naturally, only an observation of the activity of the brain would illuminate how speakers operate cognitively but, first, this would also require a theoretical background necessary for the interpretation of the findings; second, the requirement pertains to both Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk's and MacLaury's models; and third, such direct brain monitoring would also entail experimental conditions. Having said that, areas within VT that require further justification must certainly be marked out – it is with this proviso that one should approach the similarity-distance correlation as viewed in VT.

Because emphases on S or D function within the vantage architecture, they produce different effects depending on their position in a vantage and result in what we will call, somewhat modifying MacLaury's terminology, *non-discriminatory*, *analytic* and *synthetic-systemic viewing modes* (or *modes of conceptualization*; cf. Chapter 4 for elaboration). Figure 1-6 illustrates this.

	DOMINANT VANTAGE		**RECESSIVE VANTAGE**	
non- discrimination	SS	1	DD	(autonomous) analysis
(grounded) analysis	D	2	S	systemic synthesis

Figure 1-6. Three kinds of viewing mode/mode of conceptualization arranged as two vantages

The dominant vantage starts with strong emphasis on similarity and so results in non-discrimination: the entities being observed are collapsed into

a homogeneous mass. But against this background, difference becomes somewhat stronger at level 2, and produces analysis: some of the entities can be viewed as distinct, though only in a coarse-grained fashion. The recessive vantage, on the other hand, starts with strong attention to difference, which results in significant protraction of the cognitive distance between the objects within the conceptualizer's purview: this is analytic viewing. Then, on level 2, attention to similarity takes over and causes contraction of the cognitive distance between the entities. But now the contraction is not so radical and instead of the entities merging into a homogeneous mass, they are synthesized or linked "into an abstraction, a theory, or a systemic understanding" (MacLaury 1997: 291). In other words, the dominant vantage is a progression from non-discriminatory to analytic viewing, while the recessive vantage from analytic to synthetic/systemic viewing.

Crucially, the two analytic viewing modes, on level 1 of the dominant vantage and on level 2 of the recessive vantage, are not the same. The former operates against the background of non-discriminatory mode on level 1, the latter is the initial step in conceptualization. I will call them *grounded* and *autonomous* analysis, respectively. Any of the viewing modes can be weakened or strengthened – further elaboration will be provided in Chapter 4. In Chapters 4-6 the notion of viewing modes (modes of conceptualization) will be capitalized on in an analysis of the English articles.

2.5 Universal width of purview and the spotlight effect

Recall that the range of the dominant vantage is wider (embraces more chips), whereas that of the recessive vantage is narrower (fewer chips). This is caused by the fact that stronger attention to similarity in the former causes *contraction* of the cognitive distance between stimuli: "similar" translates into "closer". In the latter case, stronger attention to difference results in *protraction* of that distance, so that "different" in effect means "farther away". Assuming that under normal circumstances the range of the visual scene in a healthy human being is stable and spans about 120º, and that imaged categorization is based on visual experience, the purviews projected in the dominant and recessive vantages are the same: this is referred to as the *universal width of purview*. In other words, regardless of which vantage a person is constructing, they have at their disposal a "visual stage" of the same size. However, depending on the vantage, they operate on each stage differently: when attention to similarity

prevails, objects on the stage are drawn closer, when attention to difference takes over, they are pulled apart. From this it follows that the density of stimuli in the dominant vantage is greater than in the recessive vantage, as modelled in Figure 1-7.



Figure 1-7. Vantages modelled in terms of the universal width of purview (based on Fig. 7a of MacLaury 2000: 267, with kind permission by John Benjamins Publishing Company, Amsterdam/Philadelphia, www.benjamins.com)

This is the view projected *by the conceptualizer*. If transposed into the Munsell array in an actual interview, which is an objectified, external view of the analyst, it appears that the recessive vantage should include a smaller number of chips – precisely as has been found in interviews. This is because the array is composed of chips with equal perceptual differences between them: the distances between any two of them in a row or a column are the same. Thus, the conceptualizer (subjectively) contracts or protracts the cognitive distance between the stimuli and projects purviews of equal width, but in the objective, independently-constructed Munsell array the purviews surface as wider or narrower because the distance there is stable – see Figure 1-8.



Figure 1-8. Semantic ranges of vantages (based on Fig. 7b of MacLaury 2000: 267, with kind permission by John Benjamins Publishing Company, Amsterdam/Philadelphia, www.benjamins.com)

In other words, given the stable purview width, the attention to S or D results, respectively, in a denser or sparser stimulus population due to the cognitive distance between the stimuli being contracted through similarity or protracted through difference (Figure 1-8). But given the same objectively measured distance in the Munsell array, the recessive vantage appears as narrower because it is populated by fewer stimuli (Figure 1-8).

However, somewhat paradoxically, the recessive vantage, although narrower, is usually more widely dispersed over a greater area than the more compact dominant vantage (as is the case with the recessive *kosazana* vs. dominant *hlaza* in the Zulu COOL category; cf. Figure 1-5 above). This observation is modelled in VT in terms of the so called *spotlight effect*, the effect that a spotlight has on a theatre stage. When the light is close to the stage, it lights a small portion of it and its zone of operation is rather limited. If it is backed away, its luminosity on the actual stage diminishes but it can, in an overarching fashion, pan across a much broader area, perhaps the whole of the stage, selecting its various portions (Figure 1-9).



Figure 1-9. The spotlight effect: cognitive distance, range dispersion and span (modified Fig. 15 of MacLaury 1999: 22)

This means that from a closer location, the spotlight's possibility of manoeuvre is smaller, the whole of its "attention" being absorbed by the selected area. This is the dominant vantage. From a more distant location (which is the standard situation in a theatre), the spotlight can illuminate portions of the stage distanced from one another. This is the recessive vantage: a smaller number of more dispersed chips.[9]

[9] MacLaury's spotlight effect in the recessive vantage thus bears resemblance to the moving-spotlight model of attention (cf. e.g. LaBerge, Carlson, Williams and Bunney 1997) though it probably does not directly derive from the latter.

The recessive vantage, thus, is one in which there is not only protraction of the cognitive distance between stimuli but also between the conceptualizer and the stimuli. In that sense, it is the more objective and detached point of view, relative to the more subjective and engaged dominant vantage.

2.6 Variants of the dominant-recessive pattern

Each of the inherently mobile coordinates, S or D, can not only be attended to more at the expense of the other but can also bear different *strengths* in either case. That is, regardless of which coordinate receives greater attention, each of the two is of neutral, augmented or decreased strength. Attention to either S or D is thus tantamount to selecting it as the primary mobile coordinate for a vantage, whereas assigning a degree of strength to it is the amount of cognitive effort that the coordinate attracts regardless of whether it has been selected or not.[10] Mobile coordinate strength is instrumental in producing a specific type of the dominant-recessive pattern within a category. There are thus three major types of dominant-recessive relationships, called *near-synonymy*, *coextension* and *inclusion* (coextension is a unique phenomenon and will be discussed in more detail below). The strengths of S and D progress in that order from stronger S for near-synonymy, equal balance for coextension and stronger D for inclusion. A fourth kind of relationship, *complementation*, results from an extreme strength of D and obtains between separate categories rather than vantages within a category: extreme value of D results in category split. The relationships are summarized in Figure 1-11, with the strengths of the coordinates being indicated by means of + and -.[11] Importantly, the four types of relationship are "segments of a continuum, not discrete kinds of relation" (MacLaury 1997: 112).

[10] Strength is a somewhat mysterious parameter in MacLaury's own formulation of the model; for example, it is difficult to find an unambiguous definition of it in his work, nor is it listed in the glossary to MacLaury (1997) etc., despite its crucial role in the internal differentiation of the dominant-recessive pattern.

[11] This notation has its drawbacks in that it suggests that strengths have specific values (double or triple the normal level). In fact, they cannot be calibrated with this degree of precision and are only to be viewed as relative: on the whole, the strengths of S and D within a vantage must balance so that stronger S requires weaker D and vice versa. However, the original notation of different font sizes used by MacLaury probably has to be discarded for practical reasons: it is difficult to control in typesetting and the danger of error outweighs its benefits. Occasionally, MacLaury endorsed, albeit reluctantly, the + and - system.

		Category Z (comprising X and Y)	
		Dominant vantage	**Recessive vantage**
within a category	near-synonymy	X SS^{+} Y D-	Y DD^{-} X S^{+}
	coextension	X SS Y D	Y DD X S
	inclusion	X SS^{-} Y D^{+}	Y DD^{+} X S^{-}
		Category X Dominant vantage	**Category Y Dominant vantage**
across categories	complementation	X SS^{--} D^{++}	Y SS^{--} D^{++}

Figure 1-10. Types of the dominant-recessive pattern

In near-synonymy, the vantages are very much alike in terms of focus selection and range, the differences being minimized by considerable strength of S and relative weakness of D. This type is rare in pure form. MacLaury (1997: 123) provides an example from Jicaque (or Tol), an isolate spoken in Honduras. His informant used only one term, *he*, in reference to the WARM category, but when asked she also focused and mapped the other possible term, *lu*. MacLaury supposes (1997: 125, 488) that the two terms may have meant the same to that person but that she used the recessive *he* to mark the rare occasion of being interviewed by a white-faced scholar.

Coextension, the next "stop" along the continuum, is the most mysterious of all and apparently not previously recognized, though MacLaury (1997: 112) specifies authors who had commented on this or similar phenomena. Its major characteristics, some of which need not always be present, are the dominant term's wider range, more central focus and larger steps in mapping. Crucially, however, the mapping of each term includes the focus of the other. (I return to coextension below.)

In inclusion, the naming and/or mapping ranges of the recessive term fall inside that of the dominant term: MacLaury (1997: 195-196) provides an example of a speaker of Aguacatec (Awakateco), a Mayan language of Guatemala. The scholar notes, however, that the term *inclusion* in VT sense may be misleading: it need not refer to a situation when one semantic range encompasses another (cf. Whitehead and Russell 1910-1913). Rather, it arises when one of the ranges tends to drift away from the other (as a result of strong D), but when the two still share fixed cognitive coordinates. When the cognitive link is broken (and the two ranges separate), inclusion becomes complementation, a relation obtaining between the dominant vantages of distinct categories, which have different primary fixed coordinates though are otherwise represented by the same formula.

2.7 Coextension

As mentioned above, coextension is the most puzzling of all types of dominant-recessive relationships, therefore also the most interesting (the fullest account can be found in MacLaury 1997, chapter 5; see also MacLaury 1995, 2000, 2002). In fact, it was the identification of this relation that induced MacLaury to postulate the spatio-temporal analogy for colour categorization. Coextension was first observed in the WARM category of Uspantec (Uspanteco), a Mayan language of Guatemala, and later in dozens of interviews in Mesoamerica and elsewhere. It is more frequent and more distinct in the WARM than the COOL category, which is in line with the physiologically explicable property of yellow and red hues being perceived as more distinct (and more readily dividing into separate categories) than green and blue. I will therefore discuss its characteristics in the WARM category. The first four of these characteristics are more common than the remaining ones, though all are subject to some degree of variation:

1. One category is named with two different root terms.
2. Each of the two terms is focused in reference to a different elemental hue (cf. footnote 3 for an explanation of *elemental colour* and *elemental hue*).
3. The mapping of each term encompasses the focus of the other.
4. There is substantial overlap of the mapping of the two terms (e.g. as significant as 79% in one interview with a speaker of Uspantec; MacLaury 1997: 113-114, Figure 5.1).

The more variable features are:

1. Mappings progress in opposite directions (e.g. the Uspantec speaker mentioned in point 4 mapped *kʸaq* from red, orange and purple to yellow, yellowish green, brown and light pink, whereas *q'en* was mapped from yellow and red to brown and purple).
2. Naming ranges are intermixed, so that chips named with one term may be surrounded on all or most sides by those named with the other (MacLaury 1997: 114-115, Figures 5.2 and 5.3).
3. Foci are polarized. In moderate cases this means that a speaker focuses a term close to the category margin or at least between its margin and the relevant elemental hue; in more extreme cases the focus or foci may fall outside the naming range of the term. Usually one of the terms has a polarized focus, sometimes both (MacLaury 1997: 115; cf. Figures 5.2 and 5.3 therein). This might be the initial stage of category division: as the process gains momentum, each term pulls away from the other and towards its own polarized focus.

Figure 1-11 shows coextension in an early phase (closer to near synonymy than to inclusion). Another example is the Zulu COOL category in Fig. 1-5 above.



Figure 1-11. Coextension in an early phase: WARM in Tzeltal (Mayan, Tzeltalan), Paraje Nabil, Tenejapa, Chiapas, Mexico, male 65, 1980; (a) naming and foci, (b-c) mappings. (Figure received from Robert E. MacLaury.)

MacLaury comments on the status of coextension in the following manner:

> Semantic coextension is inexplicable solely in terms of perceptual axioms, because different organizations of the same colored stimuli by a single individual during one short interview do not inhere in neural response to wavelength.

> It is the observer who assumes opposite slants on the same sensations and names them differently from each angle. (MacLaury 1997: 112-113)

The observation is important for linguistic reasons: it provides a strong argument in favour of the subjectivity of meaning and speaker agency (cf. Chapter 2, section 2).[12]

Coextension also provides the strongest evidence for why two vantages constitute points of view on one category, rather than two categories, i.e. why we associate a name with a vantage, not with a category. The reason is that many informants in interviews did not realize they mapped a category with two terms until they were made aware of this by the interviewer. Consider the following report by MacLaury:

> A seventy-four year-old [Uspantec speaker] named numerous red and yellow chips either *kʸaq* or *q'en* and focused *kʸaq* near elemental red and *q'en* near elemental yellow; he mapped *kʸaq* throughout red and yellow ... [W]e asked him to map *q'en*, but he protested that he had already mapped the term. We told him that he had mapped *kʸaq*, but now we would like to see him map *q'en*. He replied to the effect of "If you say so," and he mapped *q'en* throughout yellow and red. For the most part, his mappings of *kʸaq* and *q'en* covered the same warm colors, but he laid down the rice in opposite directions: for *kʸaq*, he mapped red and later yellow; whereas he mapped *q'en* in the reverse order. The first mapping step of each term matched its respective focus, which was placed at maximum distance from the focus of the other.
>
> It appeared that both terms named the warm category but with distinct stresses.[13] Later ... at least 100 examples of the same semantic relation were attested by the three-part method; ... and the relation pertained to names of various categories, for example, cool, dark-cool, green, brown, purple, and desaturated color. (MacLaury 1997: 111)

The two terms with their two directions of mapping are thus complementary categorical points of view: neither constitutes the category without the other. And, as is manifest in MacLaury's report above, they may be entertained simultaneously.

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[12] Coextension has also been proposed, at least tentatively, as a pattern responsible for the configuration of some linguistic data (cf. Taylor 2003b or Geeraerts 1997: 171, 186 – more details and a discussion of problems with Taylor's analysis in Chapter 2, section 3.3.5).

[13] Apparently, MacLaury is using the word stress here in a non-technical sense. The technical VT usage is explained in sections 2.10-2.11.

There obviously remains the question of the cognitive mechanism responsible for a pattern so bizarre, yet far from haphazard. Although MacLaury never suggests it explicitly (at least I have not been able to locate the idea), it may be traceable to the equal strengths of S and D, such that the categorizer's mental effort is evenly distributed over both vantages and terminological options. Given that vantage construction is an instinctive and subconscious process, the categorizer has no chance of controlling the parameters that constitute a category and so reacts to the equal mental effort exerted over S and D by collapsing the two vantages into a single experience. It takes an external observer and an experimental procedure to expose the pattern.

2.8 Individual cognition

The emergence of the dominant-recessive pattern, after other possibilities had been considered and rejected, was attributed to individual cognition (MacLaury 1997: 136-137). I will now briefly review the other possibilities.

There are two perception-based views which may potentially illuminate the problem. First, the dominant term is the one based on the more perceptually salient hue. However, the statistics for the WARM category show no significant gap between yellow-dominance and red-dominance, the former being only slightly more common, so nothing in the perceptual qualities of either hue seems to render it favourable. Second, assuming that the acuity of colour vision diminishes with age, the dominant-recessive pattern should not be as conspicuous in elderly speakers – but it is: the dominant-recessive pattern is found in Mesoamerican data in speakers of all ages.

There is also a possible cultural explanation, which proposes that the pattern is conditioned by a given culture or community, such as the preference of some Tzeltal speakers (a Mayan language of Chiapas, Mexico) to choose the yellow-focused *k'an* as the dominant term vs. the red-focused recessive ¢ah. But the tendency is not absolute: other speakers of the same language treat ¢ah as dominant. Further, the pattern cannot be inherited by children from their caretakers (mothers) because even those adults who had always lived in the same village produced differently structured patterns. As has been shown in language acquisition at large, children are active constructors and not passive imitators in the process.

Finally, a person might be physiologically "predisposed" to favour a specific range as dominant, on a par with left- or right-handedness. MacLaury treats this proposal as insufficient, since it does not address the issues of why the

dominant term is more evenly spaced and usually more centrally focused, as opposed to the more skewed and polarized recessive term.

MacLaury's proposed solution, in the form of a "research hypothesis", does exhibit affinity to the "personal predisposition" view: the pattern results from individual cognition, an application of a mental process of constructing, maintaining and recalling a category. The strategy is the same for all speakers but due to individual selection of coordinates and their respective emphases and strengths, it yields diverse results.

2.9 Frames

So far we have only considered cases of categories involving two vantages but occasionally three are possible. In such a case the three vantages, called *dominant*, *recessive* and *ultra-recessive*, are grouped into two *frames*, a frame being "a separate system in which an independent balance of strength prevails between S and D" (MacLaury 1999: 50). In other words, the values of S and D are balanced within a single frame and are closed to outside influence. Given three vantages, (a), (b) and (c), in which the attention to difference grows in that order, (a) and (b) constitute a frame, as do (b) and (c), whereas (a) and (c) are not directly linked. The two frames are thus two dominant-recessive relations, in Frame I vantage (a) being dominant in relation to recessive (b), which in Frame II is in turn dominant in relation to the recessive vantage (c) (Figure 1-12).



Figure 1-12. Framed and non-framed approaches to three-vantage categories

The term *ultra-recessive*, therefore, does not apply to a framed analysis nor can *dominant* and *recessive* be viewed as absolute descriptors. Rather, they are

relative in the sense of assuming different values depending on their relation to other vantages on a given category.

The closest to MacLaury's understanding of frame is probably that proposed by Minsky, for whom it is a "data-structure for representing a stereotyped situation" and "collections of related frames are linked together into frame-systems" (1974: 1).[14]

MacLaury (1999: 50-52) exemplifies the framed analysis with an idealized case of a COOL category and then with an actual category from Uspantec Maya (Guatemala), whose speakers use three terms: *reš* (focused in green), *seleste* (focused in blue) and *asul* (also focused in blue, most certainly from Spanish *azul*). The first two terms constitute Frame I, the second and the third constitute Frame II (full and partial inversion of coordinates are involved, as well as a curtailment of two inherently fixed coordinates Gn and Bu to just Bu for *asul*).

MacLaury's notion of frame has been used, with idiosyncratic modifications, in a number of linguistic analyses, e.g. Adachi (2002) or Allan (2002), discussed in Chapter 2.

2.10 Stress

Another property of vantage construction (though not ubiquitous) is *stress*, i.e. emphasis on either the fixed or the mobile coordinates in a vantage. Realizing that *stress* usually brings to mind phonological stress, MacLaury at one point

[14] Minsky acknowledges inspiration from earlier authors, who have used different terms for the idea. The notion of frame has enjoyed a splendid career in psychology, computer science, AI, anthropology, sociology and linguistics. Originating in Transformational Generative Grammar, Fillmore's (1968) "case frames" were valence descriptions for verbs in deep structure; the notion of frame was then extended to incorporate encyclopedic semantics: it is claimed to be "any system of concepts related in such a way that to understand any one of them you have to understand the whole structure in which it fits" (Fillmore 1982: 111). Thus, a frame is not only a descriptive but a cognitive construct: we "employ cognitive frames to produce and understand language" but also "to conceptualize what is going on between the speaker and addressee" (Cienki 2007: 173). In Fillmore (1975), the author links frame to the notion of prototype and because the notion proved to be so capacious, in a later work (Fillmore 1986) he no longer tries to differentiate between the related terms frame, schema, scene and script: they all "reflect different levels of frame knowledge" (Cienki 2007: 174).

Fillmore's lexical frame semantics later developed into a similar treatment of grammatical constructions in Construction Grammar (Goldberg 1995); the idea that linguistic structure is parallel to conceptual structure led to the development of Hudson's (1984) Word Grammar or Langacker's (1987, 1991a and b, 2008) Cognitive Grammar. It proved seminal for lexical semantics, first-language acquisition and historical linguistics. The term *frame* has been used for the idea of presentation of viewpoints, e.g. in politics and social discourse (e.g. Reddy [1979] 1993, Schön [1979] 1993, Lakoff 2004). A generative-type version of semantic frames has been proposed by Pustejovsky (1995) as "lexical semantic structures".

suggested *proximity* or *approximate* as alternatives. These are sensible proposals but they have not been used in VT literature so far and a change in terminology would now probably cause too much chaos. Besides, the two realms of usage are distinct enough for context to disambiguate their respective realms of usage.

In the colour domain, stress is the categorizer's greater mental proximity to hues than to relations between them, or the opposite: the categorizer may approximate the relations between the hues, not the hues themselves (MacLaury 1997: 533). Stress is the same throughout a vantage and does not change from one level to another, i.e. the categorizer approximates one *type* of coordinate but not the other despite the fact that coordinates change their status from mobile to fixed. Figure 1-13 diagrams two possible placements of stress in a one-vantage, green-focused COOL category.



Figure 1-13. Exemplification of stress in the COOL category: (a) stress on fixed coordinates, (b) stress on mobile coordinates (from MacLaury 1999: 56)

If stress falls on the fixed coordinates, such as hues, "the individual hues ... are more important than their relations, even though the relations are not and cannot be ignored" (MacLaury 1999: 56). In this situation one of the hues functions as the primary reference point which "draws" the category to itself (the process is called *skewing*). If the force is strong enough, the category will divide into two (or more?) separate categories, the original name being retained

for the hue which was the primary fixed coordinate before the division. This happened in the Mayan language of Kekchí (Guatemala, Belize and El Salvador), some of whose speakers used in interviews only one green-focused term for the COOL category, *raš*, while others added a purple-focused *morado* or blue-focused *asul* and *seleste*, *morado* and *asul* being loan words from Spanish (MacLaury 1999: 57).

If mobile coordinates are stressed (Figure 1-13b), it is the relations that receive greater prominence at the expense of the hues. In the COOL category diagrammed above, the category will not skew towards either Gn or Bu. Interestingly, the vantage may be focused on the mobile Bu at level 2 (as a consequence of stress), even though Gn is the primary fixed coordinate (the preference is weak, which is marked as a parenthetical (focus)). Focus placement may be random and Gn and Bu may substitute for each other: speakers do not exhibit any preference towards either. As a result, the original COOL term may be replaced by two separate names for green and blue. An example is the COOL category in Mazatec (Huautla), an Oto-Manguean language of Mexico (MacLaury 1997: 312-315; 1999: 58-59), in which *su*^{4}*sæ*^{4}, the original COOL term, has been replaced by some speakers by *asul* and *verde*. Once the category divides and is renamed, fixed rather than mobile coordinates are stressed in *asul* and *verde*, which is why their foci and ranges are not switched.[15]

The most conspicuous case of stressing mobile coordinates is that of the coextension in the COOL category in the Mayan language of Mam (Guatemala) (cf. MacLaury 1997: 294-306, Figs. 10.1-8, Tables 10.1-3). Eleven interviews were conducted with Mam speakers and in several of them a mismatch was observed between naming ranges, foci and mappings both for a single speaker and between speakers. For example, one speaker would name a term in blue but map it in green, while another did the opposite; then, which seemingly introduced further chaos, their mismatches criss-crossed when they mapped the second

[15] A related and an important issue, though not necessarily directly linked to VT's stress, is that of the systemic changes which arise as a result of borrowings and other foreign influences. In the cases quotes, the loan words *asul*, *verde* and *morado*, from Spanish, intrude into the vernacular systems and in doing so change the systems. That is, they do not merely enrich the lexicons of the borrowing languages by providing their speakers with alternate naming options, but cause shifts in foci, vantage ranges, boundaries and entailments. The resulting lexicons are thus kinds of systemic amalgams, new qualities (Uspantec Maya-Spanish, Kekchí-Spanish or Mazatec-Spanish), especially as MacLaury's research captured the changes in progress, when they had been adopted only by some speakers and to various degrees. If so, the analyst faces another challenge: how much of the categorical behaviour of informants has been effected by situational and idiosyncratic factors, such as the presence of an overseas scholar, the informant's degree of self-consciousness etc. These phenomena certainly deserve closer investigation.

term. In spite of this, both speakers maintained the dominant-recessive pattern, though without any preference for which hue was dominant or recessive. In other words, the pattern itself seems to be more important than the hues on which it is based. It appears that the pattern, in a way, "hovers in the air", without any solid support from the hues – this is specifically caused by mental approximation (i.e. stressing) of the relative strengths of S vs. D rather than any hues to which these relate. The behaviour is consistent and possible to model in VT terms, and although it appears chaotic, the impression only arises in speakers used to stressing fixed coordinates, as in Indo-European languages.

The phenomenon of stress has been found important in modelling speaker stance (MacLaury 2003b) as well as different uses of a lexical item (cf. Chapter 4, section 1.3).

2.11 Viewpoints

Stress plays a role in what MacLaury calls *viewpoints*, i.e. the various degrees of objectivity or subjectivity with which a person constructs a category, or conceptualizes an object or scene (cf. especially MacLaury 1997: 280-283, 1999: 54-55, 2002: 528-529). Viewpoints are correlated with the mental distance of the conceptualizer from the conceptualized: the greater the distance, the wider the overview and the greater the degree of objectivity (speaker detachment). It is important not to misuse MacLaury's rather confusing terminology at this juncture: *viewpoints* are not the same as *points of view*. A *point of view* is a vantage (a "take" on a category, in the sense specified), whereas a *viewpoint* rests on the degree of subjectivity/objectivity of viewing, as described in this section. We will see in Chapter 2 (sections 3.1.6 and 3.1.7) that viewpoints may function as coordinates in a vantage. It can only be regretted that MacLaury introduced this very unfortunate terminological awkwardness but the literature on Vantage Theory has grown to numbers which preclude modifications.[16]

In VT, four categories of viewpoint are distinguished: VP-1, VP-2, VP-3 and VP-4. Of these, VP-1 is the most subjective and VP-4 the most objective. In a somewhat simplified manner, one could say that a subjective viewpoint obtains when the conceptualizer is mentally close to the perceived object and as a result has a very personal or engaged relationship with that object, whereas an objective viewpoint obtains when the two are distant, so that the object can be viewed in an "aloof", detached manner. The four types are idealized points along a cline and each exhibits internal diversification.

[16] Confusion sometimes arises even in MacLaury's own writing.

VP-1 is untypical and not relevant to the naming of colour. Its situational illustration is the behaviour of a child who carelessly collides with people in a shopping mall: "the viewpoint and its coordinates are collapsed into an egocentric singularity" (MacLaury 1999: 54). In language use it is very rare, if at all possible; it perhaps surfaces in first-person pronouns *I*, *me*, *my* or *myself*. VP-1 may be present in what Piaget (1971) calls *egocentric speech*, typical of children aged 3-5, who do not yet extend their purview outside their own private worlds.

Much more common are cases of VP-2 and VP-3. VP-2 is called *partial* (vs. *impartial*) *deixis*, the partiality being achieved through stress: in extreme cases, the viewpoint is fused with one of the coordinates, in less radical ones it is closer to the fixed or to the mobile coordinates. In language, VP-2 is present in sentences of the type *There's the book*, in which the existence or position of an object is identified relative to the speaker, or in deictic expressions such as *here* or *now*, in which space or time are conceptualized egocentrically.

VP-3, *impartial deixis*, obtains when the observer is at equal (mental) distance from all coordinates. This mental location is more detached from the object of conceptualization and may or may not be known. Time adverbials, such as *yesterday*, *tomorrow* or *last year*, exemplify VP-3: they are removed from but anchored in the present. (Time adverbials are discussed more fully in Chapter 2; cf. MacLaury 1997: 281 and Głaz 2007b). In VP-3, the conceptualizer may explicitly use another entity as a reference point, as in *The book is in front of Harry*.

Finally, VP-4 is an omniscient perspective, the most detached or remote of all, its location in relation to coordinates being unspecified and "loose". It is very rare or perhaps impossible to attain in pure form. In language, one approaches it when describing something objectively, e.g. *A dog is in the yard*: "[a]lthough there must be a point of view from which to envision the scene, its location is unspecified or unimportant" (MacLaury 1997: 280). A quasi-VP-4 may obtain when a person regards "the past from the present, one frame of reference from another, one language from another, or, better, one's past culture or language from the view of one's present culture or language" (MacLaury 1999: 54). Should a specific location be assigned to the conceptualizer (even if implied rather than precisely known), it would become VP-3.

An exemplification of the notion of viewpoint in colour categorization is an account of the different foci of the COOL category in Tzeltal, Lacandón, Tonantzintla Nahuatl, and other Mesoamerican languages (details in MacLaury 1997: 286ff and MacLaury 1999: 54-55). As already mentioned, VP-1 is not relevant to colour naming. VP-2 is common in languages whose speakers focus their COOL category in either blue or green but never both in response to the

same request (Tenejapa Tzeltal, Mayan family, Eastern Central Mexico). The speakers of Lacandón (Eastern Central Mexico) construct it from a detached VP-3. They focus COOL in blue, perhaps to contrast themselves with the green-focusing languages around them – this requires a detached perspective. VP-4 can be observed in the behaviour of the inhabitants of Santa Maria Tonantzintla, a Central-Mexican village, who construct their former Nahuatl COOL category from the present-time Spanish-speaking perspective: they produce triple foci, blue, green and turquoise, under the influence of the Spanish *azul* and *verde*.[17]

The conception of viewpoints will be exemplified in Chapter 2, with data from VT-informed analyses of language, including MacLaury's own account of contextualized vs. decontextualized thinking (1997: 282ff.).

3. Vantage Theory in a broader context

Before closing this chapter, it is important to locate Vantage Theory in a broader philosophical and psychological context.

VT is an embodied-cognition model. Says MacLaury:

> Johnson's (1987) notion of embodiment characterizes the involvement that a person maintains with a category... When I include within my model of color categorization an analogy with the coordinate system by which people keep their balance or maintain awareness of their position in a terrain, I am applying Johnson's concept to ordinary categorization. (MacLaury 1997: 9; cf. also p. 180)

Obviously, the details of Johnson's and MacLaury's proposals differ. The former's idea is that of sensations leading to the emergence of image schemata and these to the emergence of concepts, the latter maintains that spatial awareness translates, via analogy, to categorical behaviour. The two share, however, the view of the fundamental role of a person's interaction with the spatio-temporal environment in how the person ultimately conceives of his or her "world". Thus, embodiment or embodied cognition differs from body-mind interactionist dualism (Descartes 1637/1998), i.e. the idea that mental and physical states causally interact with each other but are fundamentally distinct, or monism, i.e. the view that there is only one type of substance, be it mental

[17] This, in fact, may well be an example of a novel lexical system produced under the influence of another language, alluded to in note 15 above.

(Berkeley 1710/1957) or physical (cf. Neurath 1931). In VT, it is claimed that the physical environs constitute the primary context in which a person functions, but also a springboard for categorizing, i.e. mentally organizing the realm of one's operation. The physical aspects of human experience feed the mental aspects. Also, because the spatio-temporal setting is intimately linked with the cognitive organization of that setting and, by analogy, with the cognitive organization of other domains, VT is a non-phenomenological model: there is the physical world with its spatial landmarks and relative motion, there are perceptions of those, and there is a mechanism that organizes and translates these perceptions into categorical vantages. For the same reason, the embodied cognition approach opposes idealism (Jeans 1930), for in idealism the material is said to derive from the mental, whereas cognitive science is to a large extent concerned with the brain, the neurological grounding of conceptualization or the way in which concepts derive from bodily interaction with the environment via image schemata.18 Even if VT has not contributed to research on the brain, its descriptive apparatus may greatly benefit from it: a still unexplored area.

Embodied cognition is not only opposed to Cartesian dualism of body and mind but also to cognitivism in the Chomskyan paradigm, i.e. the view of cognition as consisting of discrete internal states that can be manipulated through rules and/or algorithms. Rather, it sees the mind as actively interacting with the environment19 and bears resemblance to Merleau-Ponty's consciousness as the object "through the intermediary of the body" (1945: 161; trans. Dirk Geeraerts 1993: 67).20 Therefore, the mind is said to be not a mere product of the brain but also of the environment and the force it exerts on the cognizing organisms (this is usually called cognitive externalism). Thus, cognition is said to be situated (cf. Greeno 1989), the importance of bodily interactions with the environment is stressed.

An interesting solution to the mind-body problem is emergentism: when physical properties of the brain give rise to mental states, a new quality emerges

[18] There are also views such as Donaldson's (1980) anomalous monism and the idea of supervenience: mental states are said to be non-reducible to physical states but to supervene them. While this is an interesting solution, its link with VT is at best tenuous.

[19] This is a view found, among others, in Kant, even though the philosopher proposed "a schema, that is a content and arrangement of parts determined a priori" (1952 [1781/1787]: 243). For a more in-depth account of the philosophical background to embodiment and cognitive linguistics in general, cf. Głaz (2002, ch. 1).

[20] Cf. also the following lines from J. R. Firth: "The human body is that region of the world which is the primary field of human experience but it is continuous with the rest of the world. We are in the world and the world is in us" (Firth 1968: 199).

and it is this quality that is called the mind. The solution was proposed by analogy to natural sciences, as when a synthesis of hydrogen and oxygen yields waters, whose properties are decidedly different from those of the two gasses. A similar phenomenon can be found in language's duality: combinations of meaningless sounds produce meaningful expressions. Also in conceptual blending, the blend is not a mere combination of the input spaces but involves a new quality. However, some thinkers (Wittgenstein 1953; Putnam 2001) have proposed that the mind-body problem should not be solved because it is illusory in its very essence. In this view, mental and biological states require descriptions in different terms: mental phenomena must neither be sought in nor described in terms of the brain.

This calls for an account of not only where and how concepts arise but also of how humans access and manipulate them. The epistemological stance of Vantage Theory is basically externalist, i.e., it is postulated that knowledge is conditioned not by pure psychological states but by factors that come from outside them – though even if psychological states were to be deemed sufficient, whence would they originate? It is the environment of human beings, namely space-time, that provides the "raw material" from which to extract coordinates and transpose them for the purpose of categorization.

These considerations take us to the related question of how the researcher collects data and what procedures he/she employs to interpret them. Two extreme approaches are behaviourism, with its preoccupation with pure observation, and introspectionism, directed towards one's internal thoughts and feelings. A middle ground is represented by e.g. Anna Wierzbicka, who on the one hand relies heavily on language corpora and methodical observation of language in use, but on the other hand underscores the importance of speaker intuitions, including the intuition and introspection of the analyst: "Obviously, we need both: methodical introspection and working with informants. But given the prevailing practice it is the former, not the latter, that needs to be stressed" (Wierzbicka 1996: 347). Although Vantage Theory is a model significantly different from Wierzbicka's Natural Semantic Metalanguage approach, one can find affinities between the two: in VT data are collected through carefully planned and methodically executed interviews with informants, which combine observation of objective behaviour with inquiry into the informants' intuitions.

A major challenge to VT's reliability is the problem of the allegedly universal nature of category construction vs. the specifics of actual categories in the world's languages and cultures. What and how much is actually universal?

Where do the differences come from? To what extent are these differences caused by cultural factors and what are the specific factors? What is the role of the natural and social environment of the informants and the way it affects perception? What is a given informant's relationship to the interviewer? How reliable are his/her responses in the rather non-commonplace situation of the interview? These and other questions must be borne in mind. The subject matter and scope of the present book does not allow us to address them at greater length but some consideration is necessary.

An argument in favour of MacLaury's general standpoint (i.e. an instinctive, possibly inborn, and therefore universal mechanism of space-time analogy vs. the diversity of actual colour categories as a result of the mechanism's plasticity) is the scope of his work and the diversity of his data. If it is possible to abstract regular patterns of behaviour, derived from interviews conducted with approximately 900 speakers of 116 Mesoamerican languages, which were enriched with interviews with speakers representing diverse language families,[21] the universal nature of the latter seems to be more than mere speculation. Admittedly, Henrich, Heine and Norenzayan (2010) very aptly warn against a haphazard identification of a behaviour[22] as "human", but their major point is that no such generalization should be plausibly made on the basis of a single population, as has been frequently the case with people from WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich and Democratic) societies. These, the authors states, constitute a tiny and a non-representative sample of the world's people(s). Both arguments are valid but neither directly pertains to Vantage Theory: as has been said, the data come from a multitude of linguistic and cultural backgrounds, an overwhelming majority of them being in fact non-WEIRD. The space-time analogy and its architecture is a *model* of the universal in behaviours, but a model that has emerged from numerous, detailed and culturally varied acts of categorization.

Yet questions remain, the major one being the influence of culture on visual perception – indeed, this is the very wording of the title of Segall, Campbell and Herskovitz's (1966) seminal book. In chapter 8 of the book, the authors report that people in different cultures (nearly 2,000 respondents from fifteen cultural backgrounds) are susceptible to geometrical illusions to different degrees. For

[21] Including Indo-European, though these constitute a minority.

[22] In fact, they cover with their research both behaviours and other domains: "visual perception, fairness, cooperation, spatial reasoning, categorization and inferential induction, moral reasoning, reasoning styles, self-concepts and related motivations, and the heritability of IQ" (Henrich, Heine and Norenzayan 2010: 61).

example, Western peoples are more susceptible to the Müller-Lyer (1889) illusion and to Sander's parallelogram (first in Luckiesh 1922: 58) than non-Western peoples are, the factors responsible being learning and experience with two-dimensional images. Furthermore, plain dwellers are more susceptible to the horizontal-vertical illusion (see Luckiesh 1922: 46) than city dwellers and much more than forest dwellers, due to the kind of terrain in which they live (flat and open vs. moderate and mixed vs. spatially restricted). Generally, then, the differences that have been found depend on both the kind of illusion used for testing and the external factors affecting the subjects' performance. The authors conclude that "to a substantial extent we *learn* to perceive" (italics A.G.) and "in spite of the ... absolute character of our perceptions, they are determined by perceptual inference habits; ... various inference habits are differentially likely in different societies" (Segall, Campbell and Herskovitz 1966: 214). This, however, does not invalidate the universal-perception view; rather, it "merely" points to the role of experience a populace has with the physical environment and that of their life histories: "For all mankind the basic process of perception is the same; only the contents differ and these differ only because they reflect different perceptual inference habits" (p. 214).

Cultural influences on visual perception have also been identified by Hudson (1962), reported in Lloyd (1972: 61ff). Hudson's subjects were Bantu, European and Indian workers and children in South Africa and Ghana, whom he tested for recognition of three-dimensional relationships in two-dimensional pictures. Generally, the ability increased with the amount of schooling received but mainly due to exposure to two-dimensional images outside school. Although Hudson's results and conclusions were later adjusted when subjects were asked to respond to visual perception tasks by building models (cf. Cole and Scribner 1974: 69-70), it is certainly the case that depth-perception in two-dimensional representations is a matter of convention effected by learning. Again, interesting as these reports are, Hudson's scope of research does not directly coincide with MacLaury's, although it does point to what in visual perception is culturally acquired rather than universally human.

A more directly relevant research was conducted by Masuda and Nisbett (2001), who compared sensitivity to context in visual perception in Japanese vs. American subjects. Nisbett and Miyamoto (2005), who report on this and related studies, conclude that Asian people rely more on context and holistic viewing, whereas Westerners are more analytic and context-independent in their perception. Does this inveigh against the now classic notions of figure vs. ground and the indispensability of both in constructing a mental representation of

a scene? If so, it would cast serious doubts, in the context of VT, on the notions of vantage focus, the architecture of vantage as a series of figure-ground alignments or the dominant-to-recessive vantage relationship. But this is not necessarily the case, since the major factor responsible for the Eastern-Western perceptual differences is "participation in socialization processes characteristic of each culture, including child rearing practices" (Nisbett and Miyamoto 2005: 469) – this can apparently override the universal cognitive tendencies in local cultural contexts but hardly renders them spurious. The relationship between perception and cultural effects is a dynamic one: subjects, especially bilingual and bi-cultural ones, can be primed for performing in a holistic or analytic fashion (Hong, Morris, Chiu and Benet-Martinez 2000).

A major and rather fundamental doubt on the validity of universalist claims in colour perception is cast by studies such as Classen (1993). Classen shows that the ocularcentrism of Western cultures is hardly a rule and different communities prioritize different senses, e.g. the Ongee of the Andaman Islands order their lives by smell (p. 1). But the doubt is cast on the legitimacy of the whole endeavour to search for universals in colour perception, beginning with Berlin and Kay (1969), rather than specifically on VT. Indeed, VT is less universalist in its claims and Berlin and Kay's Basic Colour Terms approach, for its holds that colour is but a manifestation of cognitive processes, whose nature is more fundamental and domain-independent: the processes are the space-time analogy and the mechanism of categorization as vantage construction. For precisely this reason, VT has been extended and subjected to testing in several domains outside colour (see Chapter 2), one of the attempts being the present book.

There certainly remain other issues related to the data-collection procedures, namely the decontextualized nature of interviews or the degree and nature of the informant-interviewer rapport: the influence of those on the quality of the data probably cannot be eliminated. However, the interview settings were designed as such to minimalize idiosyncrasies of context and the possibly diverse natures of the relationships between the two sides of the interview are probably evened out by the amount of data collected. While questions remain, it seems that the consistency of the approach in MacLaury's research defends the model he proposes against invalidation.

4. Synopsis

A synopsis of what has been said on VT so far is in order. I will begin with repeating and possibly rewording the crucial definitions for a clearer picture:

space-time analogy – an instinctive and possibly innate mechanism thanks to which humans construct categories (or more precisely: vantages) by analogy to the way they orient themselves in space-time;
inherently fixed coordinates – stable landmarks which serve as anchors for constructing a category; inherently fixed coordinates depend on the domain of categorization, in the colour domain they are hue, less frequently brightness and possibly saturation;
inherently mobile coordinates – similarity or difference between the perceived stimuli/entities; they are reciprocally balanced in the sense that either can be attended to more than the other;
vantage – a point of view on a category; an arrangement of figure-to-ground alignments composed of fixed and mobile coordinates; a way or manner of seeing a category;
dominant vantage – a vantage type in which similarity is attended to more than difference;
recessive vantage – a vantage type in which difference is attended to more than similarity;
focusing – selecting the primary fixed coordinate (the best example, focus) for a vantage;
zooming in/out – progression of concentrations on figure-ground alignments in a vantage (vantage levels); only one such level can be concentrated on at a time;
entailments – observable and/or measurable effects of vantage levels in operation; visible consequences of hidden cognitions;
category – an assembly or a sum of its vantages; in the colour domain, it may consist of just one vantage (dominant), frequently two (dominant and recessive), occasionally three (see frame);
strength of similarity or difference – the value (regular, increased or decreased) of either coordinate, regardless of whether it is attended to more than the other or not (i.e. either coordinate can bear any degree of strength both when it is and when it is not attended to);

near-synonymy, inclusion, coextension – kinds of relationship between the dominant and recessive vantages, produced by an increasing strength of difference;
complementation – relationship that arises from category split, when very strong difference causes vantages to drift apart and become distinct categories;
frame – an arrangement of two vantages in a three-vantage category, whereby the category is composed of two frames with two vantages in each, such that vantages A, B and C are grouped into frames [A B] and [B C];
stress – mental approximation of the categorizer to either the fixed or the mobile coordinates in a vantage; stressing the mobile coordinates is manifested as the dominant-recessive pattern with no apparent importance being attached to the choice of the foci for the respective vantages;
viewpoints – the various degrees of objectivity or subjectivity with which a person constructs a category; the categorizer's mental location effected through stress (see above).

Thus, Vantage Theory proposes a unique view of categorization as space-time analogy. Observers locate themselves, objects and events in space-time by harmonizing the spatial and temporal coordinates. Analogously, they construct categories as vantages by arranging the inherently mobile coordinates (hue, brightness or saturation in the colour domain; others in other domains) with the reciprocally balanced degrees of attention to similarity and difference, an indispensable aspect of the process. Vantages thus constructed are based on greater attention to similarity (the dominant vantage) or to difference (the recessive vantage). They are "points of view" of the conceptualizing subjects on a given category, which is the assembly of its vantages:

> A category is the sum of its coordinates: for example, a cool category is the sum of elemental green, elemental blue, a particular attention to similarity, and an attention to distinctiveness of converse strength. But a category also must consist of at least one vantage, which is an arrangement of the coordinates ... (MacLaury 1997: 180)

> Each arrangement is a vantage, which is but an aspect of a category. If more than one vantage of a particular category is conventional, they may be named separately. (MacLaury 1999: 15)

The process of vantage construction occurs in steps of figure-ground alignments, the conceptualizer emphasizing one at a time, while the others function as presuppositions. As either similarity or difference is emphasized more, each vantage type produces different entailments. It is these entailments that constitute aspects of observable behaviour and it is on their basis that the workings of hidden, subconscious, quick and neurally-expedited processes of vantage construction are postulated.

A category, then, may be named with more than one term, usually two, with various types of relationship obtaining between the categorical vantages: near-synonymy, coextension or inclusion. Complementation, a fourth relation, is one that obtains between dominant vantages of separate categories. Should a category embrace three vantages (each termed separately), they are unified into a coherent system by means of frames: Frame I (vantages 1 and 2) and Frame II (vantages 2 and 3). An important role is also played by mental approximation (called *stress*) of the conceptualizer to either fixed or mobile coordinates and the degree of subjectivity/objectivity of viewing (viewpoints). In common terms, vantages on a category are points of view, understood not as mere *locations* of the conceptualizer but *ways* of viewing the category. The sum of all the vantages taken on a category defines the category as a whole.

The notion of point of view constitutes a most vital issue in cognitive linguistics. It would appear, therefore, that Vantage Theory can offer a valuable insight into its nature and role in the analysis of language data. Further, the theory has the potential for contributing fruitful observations in three more general domains: subject-relatedness of meaning, speaker agency, and linguistic relativity. These are briefly discussed in the next chapter, the majority of which is devoted to specific linguistic analyses couched in terms of VT or its adaptations.

CHAPTER 2

Vantage Theory: linguistic applications

1. Introductory comments

Vantage Theory has been used in a number of non-linguistic domains, such as urban planning (María MacLaury 1989), the category of person (Hill and MacLaury 1995), or the notions of genus and species (Lansing 1995). Some of that work remains in the form of manuscripts or internally-circulated documents, such as MacLaury and Trujillo's (1989) report on literacy. Most studies, however, have only been presented as talks at conferences and symposia, mostly held in the 1990's, and have been concerned with biomedical and holistic views on health (Lauren Clark), Roman history (John P. Molloy), American Indian categories of tradition and self (Denis F. Viri), community college administration (Ellen L. Price), neo-racism (Kimberly Meyers), and vantages in connectionist networks (John W. Sherry). While the breadth of the topics shows VT's potential in domains outside language, I will be concerned here with linguistic applications of the model.

If the survey in this chapter seems too schematic and leaves many things either unmentioned or unexplained, I am asking to be excused: the goal of the chapter is mainly to show the variety and extent of VT-inspired linguistic analyses, some of which have little affinity with the analytic focus of this book, namely the English articles. The reader is also referred to a future publication (Głaz in preparation a), which will develop these themes more fully.

Critics of VT have pointed out that the theory faces the danger of being a yet another descriptive apparatus, heavily loaded with model-internal constructs but weak in straightforwardness, clarity of presentation or explanatory power. I hope to be able to show, however, that the model does offer insights into the nature of language and that adapting its descriptive framework for the purpose is well worth the effort. In the remainder of the chapter I will review a selection of the existing proposals of VT-based analyses of language, while in Chapter 4 I will offer a specific adaptation of the theory, which I will call Extended Vantage Theory (EVT).

As can be expected of a model designed to meet particular needs (the categorization of colour), VT has all the features of a custom-made product: it serves the purpose very well but its wider applicability "as is" is limited. Specific problems with VT-inspired analyses should become clear in the discussion below; in the next section let me address two general issues, the nature and details of two necessary transpositions: from categorization to conceptualization and from colour domain to language.

2. Category and concept. Colour and beyond

The necessity to move from categorization to conceptualization is mentioned by Keith Allan:

> VT is a theory of categorization, not a theory of conceptualization. A number of papers ... presuppose that MacLaury's VT is a theory of conceptualizations, which is but a small step from categorizing; but I do not believe that MacLaury viewed VT in that way. (Allan 2010: 159)

In fact, in an earlier study on the English number (cf. section 3.6.4 for discussion), the linguist took steps towards linking the two realms:

> [T]he grammar of number and quantification in English is exploited to reveal different points of view on the part of the speaker. The different points of view reflect different conceptualizations of what is spoken of... VT has hitherto been a theory of categorization, not conceptualization; but if VT is to apply more generally to language meaning, I believe it must tackle conceptualization. (Allan 2002: 684)

An affinity between categorization and conceptualization is visible from even a cursory glance at the psychological literature. Some sources seem to draw a rather close analogy between categories and concepts and in fact define the latter in terms of the former:

> A concept is a mental *category* that groups objects, relations, activities, abstractions, or qualities having common properties... The instances of a concept are seen as roughly similar; for example, *golden retriever*, *cocker spaniel*, *weimaraner*, and *german shepherd* are all instances of the concept *dog.* (Wade and Tavris 1990: 283; emphasis added)

> *Concept*: A way of *categorizing* items and demonstrating which items are related to one another. In a concept-learning task, certain attributes of the stimuli are related to one another according to a specified rule. (*EOP* 1994, vol. I: 284; emphasis added)

By analogy, in colour categorization there are the parameters of brightness, saturation and hue (attributes), correlated with reciprocally balanced emphases on the similarities and differences between them (the rule). In some other, now classic sources, it is possible to find formulations strikingly similar to the metalanguage of VT:

> *Concept generalization*: the process whereby concepts are widened to subsume classes. In valid concept generalization, the individual notes points of *likeness* and *difference* among the separate objects or experiences, and then tests by the method of varying the concomitants to check upon the logic of the common thread running through them. (*DOP* 1947: 80; emphasis added)

The experiential origin of concepts is obviously an idea with a long tradition. For John Locke (2008 [1690], Book II), "general ideas" (probably what we would refer to as concepts) emerge from finding and abstracting common characteristics from particular ideas. Similarly for John Stuart Mill, general conceptions are formed through abstraction: "[W]hen we form a set of phenomena into a class, that is, when we compare them with one another to ascertain in what they agree, some general conception is implied in this mental operation" (Mill 1843: 213). Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, in turn, point to the process of abandoning or neglecting the differences between the entities being thus juxtaposed: a concept is "drawn off from former images ... by dropping off their

differences" (Schopenhauer 2010 [1836]: 10); and "[e]very concept originates through our equating what is unequal. No leaf ever wholly equals another, and the concept 'leaf' is formed through an arbitrary abstraction from these individual differences, through forgetting the distinctions" (Nietzsche 1982 [1873]: 46).[1]

A refinement to these views has been the idea of pre-conceptual image-schemata (Johnson 1987), schematic concepts which constitute the foundation of the conceptual system and from which more specific concepts eventually derive. An extension of the approach is Jean Mandler's (1992, 2004, 2008) account of concept formation. In the latter work, the author proposes that earliest concepts derive from spatial primitives. The spatial base is subdivided and expanded (to which language may contribute and which it may guide), also by extensions of spatial concepts to non-spatial domains. Her view contrasts with Fodor's (e.g. 1998) theory of concept formation, for whom concepts are innate (psychological nativism) and the mind is modular.

But what are categories in relation to concepts? One property that brings them together is precisely their experiential basis. A manifestation of the view is Cohen and Lefebvre's assertion in the introduction to the book they have edited: "The philosophers in this volume ... appear to share the general view that concepts and categories are grounded in experience" (Cohen and Lefebvre 2005: 8). In the work of some authors, both in the volume and not, the distinction between categories and concepts is downplayed. For example, what Thagard and Toombs (2005: 245-246) discuss as the various theories of concepts, may well be – and indeed have frequently been – called theories of categorization (classical, prototype, exemplar, neurological and knowledge-based). Similarly, Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk (2007: 144) contrasts the Classical Theory of *concepts* with the Prototype Theory of *categories*. Goldstone et al. (2005), in turn, appear to be referring to concept learning and category learning interchangeably, their major point being that concept learning is not only influenced by the names of objects to categorize but also influences those names (i.e. representations of objects).

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[1] Such is not the position assumed by Kant, who distinguishes between *a posteriori* concepts that arise from experience, i.e. general representations of specific perceived objects, but also a priori concepts that originate in the mind – these are called categories (Kant 1819 [1800], 2004 [1786]). This is, however, a terminological mismatch: Aristotle's and Kant's categories are fundamental concepts, such as substance, quality or quantity – but this is not a usage common in psychology, where they designate classes of things.

Other authors present the two notions as interwoven in complex and inextricable ways. For Gärdenfors (2000), concepts and categories are employed for everyday action, they are tools of survival: "a concept can be seen as a decision procedure where the perception is categorized and the chosen category then determines a choice of action" (p. 122). A clearer distinction is proposed in Millikan's (2000, more succinctly in 2005) original account of why most nouns do not designate classes (categories). Contrary to a widespread assumptions, species (*dog*, *chair*) are not names of categories but of substances, in the Aristotelian sense. However, one can have a concept (an idea, a thought) of a substance by interacting with it, through reciprocal influence. If children and chemists have different ways of recognizing sugar, they thus form different concepts of it. If no interaction is possible, as in the case of dinosaurs or Socrates, language fills the gap by providing the speaker with names.

Despite my previous comments on Thagard and Toombs (2005; see above), the authors do offer a reasonably straightforward distinction between concepts and categories, one that can well be accepted for our further discussion:

> [A] category is a class of things in the world, for example the class of dogs. Concepts are mental representations that usually correspond to particular words and refer to classes of things in the world... Categorization is the process of dividing the world into categories, and usually involves constructing concepts that provide mental representations of those categories. (Thagard and Toombs 2005: 244)

Prinz (2005) offers a compatible approach, common to psychological accounts: concepts are tools for categorizing, they are based in perception and represent categories. Concepts are thus variable depending on the situation. Also for Barsalou (2005) the conceptual system is dynamic and experience-derived, it is a collection of category representations. Similarly to Goldstone et al. (2005), the author points out that the system supports categorization by making the knowledge in it available for the purpose of assigning further entities to categories.

There is then a progression of cognitive processes, in which object recognition gives rise to category formation, which then provides a fertile ground for the formation of concepts, i.e. of mental representations of categories. But one can also apply the notion of conceptualization to the whole sequence, in the sense that dealing with the world, mentally organizing it for comprehension, survival and action, is precisely what conceptualization is. The stages

of category formation and producing category representations (concepts) are sub-processes within this overarching complex mental procedure (or a series of procedures). In other words, I will say that people mentally organize (conceptualize) the world in many ways, and these involve the tendency to categorize it and store representations of these categories for further use.[2]

The second transposition, i.e. a step outside the colour domain, requires specification of what might constitute the primary fixed coordinate for a conceptualization. In colour categorization the role is played by hues, degrees of brightness or potentially by saturation, but what corresponds to them in linguistically encoded conceptualizations? MacLaury notes that inherently fixed coordinates

> can consist of any mental image of abstract concept, which enables any such entity to be categorized by these principles. Some categories, such as "reptile," "furniture," or "color," may not involve a specific image, although each is constructed around some sort of unifying idea. In those cases, this idea serves as the primary fixed coordinate of the vantage. (MacLaury 2002: 506).

In VT analyses, different kinds of images and concepts of varying complexity have been selected as fixed coordinates, e.g. single concepts like "phoneness", "two-ness", "film-ness" (Stanlaw 2002), the perceptual category of vertical extent (Taylor 2003b), complex grammatical relations like negation (Winters 2002), number (Allan 2002), time and action (Głaz 2007b), language comprehension categories at discourse level like coherence and grounding (Pishwa 2002), or social constructs like rank, persona or identity (Adachi 2002).

Next, before embarking on a survey of specific analyses, it is advisable to consider VT for its contribution to the study of language and cognition at a greater level of generality. The relevant issues are those of subjectivity, linguistics relativity/universalism and the agency of the conceptualizer.

Subjectivity is manifested in that the two types of vantage are different points of view on a category or different ways of conceptualizing the same entity or scene. Subjectivity, then, is a vital parameter of meaning, which results from the subject's dealings with the world, rather than residing in language units. For it is subjects who construct vantages with different emphases on similarity or difference: the latter are not objectively given but subjectively (though not haphazardly) projected.

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[2] A similar view is expressed in chapter 2 of Bartmiński (2009) but I owe this concise wording of the idea to Przemek Łozowski (p.c.).

The subjective nature of vantage construal is what both drives and limits the analogy between space-time and categorization. The conceptualizing subjects operate according to the same fundamental cognitive processes but enjoy a considerable amount of leeway in the process, which produces a variety of category types in world languages. For example, MacLaury (2000: 274-276) found that two speakers of Tenejapa Tzeltal who have both spent their entire lives in the same village, used the same colour terms but categorized the colours differently. The author quotes in this context the famous excerpt from Whorf:

> We are thus introduced to a new principle of relativity, which holds that all observers are not led by the same physical evidence to the same picture of the universe, *unless their linguistic backgrounds are similar, or can in some way be calibrated.* (Whorf 1956: 214; quoted in and italics added by MacLaury 2000: 289)

He then proposes to replace the italicized part with *not even if their linguistic backgrounds derive from one rural hamlet* (MacLaury 2000: 289, italics original). The essence of this reasoning is that conceptualizers are active agents who operate within certain broad cognitive constraints – their cognitive activity yields different results not *because of* the nature of the language spoken, but *regardless* of it:

> Within constraints imposed by visual neurology, people shape their categories in accord with their inclinations to subject the world to broad or constricted points of view. This argument *does not inveigh against relativity*, which is shown herein to pertain cross-linguistically and between individuals. Rather, the claim is that *language has no influence on the process*. (MacLaury 2000: 276; emphasis added)

Yet, it would probably be a dire simplification to claim that VT is a non-Whorfian or a quasi-Whorfian theory. For Allan (2010), a model that would integrate VT's account of categorization and one with a focus on conceptualization stands in a kind of dialectic relationship with linguistic relativity: they are "mutually compatible and mutually enlightening" (Allan 2010: 167). This is so because for Whorf, which Allan purposefully points out, "[t]he statement that 'thinking is a matter of language' is an incorrect generalization of the more nearly correct idea that 'thinking is a matter of different tongues'" (Whorf 1956: 239). But how does one reconcile this view with the idea that "language has no influence on the process" (see above)? The crucial role is played by a

reciprocally influential relationship between conceptualization and linguistic forms. The conceptualizations that speakers build constitute the frameworks for the emergence of linguistic forms, and it is only then that the forms facilitate expression of certain meanings. But the forms, as has been said, do not originate in the a-personal and disembodied language system but in cognition, so that there is a progression from cognition/conceptualization, via linguistic form to schematic meanings readily available to the speaker. The latter, however, merely facilitate rather than predetermine expression. Says Allan:

> I argue that the weak version of linguistic relativity preferred by Whorf allows that while language shapes cognizers to adopt a certain point of view it does not prevent them from adopting a different one, particularly if they become aware of different vantages: this is the route by which languages become mutually intelligible. (Allan 2010: 158).

A reconciliation is thus possible of the universal nature of cognitive process types with the diversity of cognition-based categories and linguistic conceptualizations in world languages. Meaning resides in conceptualization (Langacker 1991a: ix) but conceptualization leaves its doors open to speakers' individual choices.

3. The applications

Let me begin the survey of VT-inspired linguistic analyses with a few brief studies by the theory's author, presented in MacLaury (1995). His other proposals in that publication will be discussed in subsequent sections on the semantics of colour terms and on other aspects of lexical semantics.

3.1 MacLaury (1995) on aspects of conceptualization

3.1.1 Quintessential vs. representative prototypes

The dominant-recessive pattern, according to MacLaury (1995: 261), parallels the distinction between representative (typical) and quintessential (best) members of a category (Lakoff 1982: 27; 1987: 86-87), e.g. a typical soccer player vs. the best example of a soccer player. Typical cases (dominant vantage) include more members according to "looser" criteria, while the quintessential members

(recessive vantage) are chosen by connoisseurs, whose acuity is sharper and requirements more strict. It is suggested that similar reasons inform the choice of the robins or sparrows as representatives of the bird category in the Anglo-American world and the choice of eagles as quintessential prototypes among the Shoshoni, better experts on the subject (cf. Hage and Miller 1976).[3]

3.1.2 Asymmetries in conceptualizing

MacLaury's observations on unequal emphases on similarity and difference play a role in explaining asymmetrical judgements in comparisons (MacLaury 1995: 253-256). Research by Rosch (1975), Rips (1975) or Tversky (1977) shows that non-prototypical category members are judged more similar to their prototypes than the reverse (cf. also Hollingworth 1913). For example, Rips' subjects maintain that disease can be spread more easily from robins to ducks than from ducks to robins. They apparently construe non-prototypical birds such as ducks as more similar (cognitively "closer") to prototypical robins than *vice versa*, with smaller distance facilitating the spread.[4] The reason, MacLaury concludes, is that the selection of a prototype as the primary fixed coordinate and the construction of a vantage from the centre outwards (with a marginal member as a mobile coordinate) invokes similarity as a category-uniting feature. This is a dominant vantage. On the other hand, the selection of a peripheral member as the primary fixed coordinate, such as a duck, and an inward direction of the vantage-building process towards the centre invokes difference as a feature contrasting the prototype with other entities. This is a cognitively "harder" recessive vantage.

3.1.3 Metaphorization: time

MacLaury also reconsiders one of the fundamental areas of cognitive linguistic inquiry, i.e. metaphor. He analyses (1995: 262-264) Lakoff and Johnson's (1980) account of the metaphor of time as a moving object with a front-back

[3] While this parallelism is convincing, it seems that MacLaury is unnecessarily tentative by assigning the two vantages or prototype kinds to different groups of observers: laymen (typical category members as a manifestation of the dominant vantage) and experts (quintessential members, the recessive vantage). For nothing precludes the expert from making either choice, perhaps to meet an end or simply satisfy his or her fancy – this is, however, unavailable for a layman, only capable of projecting a dominant vantage.

[4] Robins, rather than ducks, are more often chosen as prototypes of the category BIRD (by speakers of American English) because the robin schema better matches the bird schema.

orientation. According to the latter authors, time can be conceptualized in reference to people (*face the future*, *weeks ahead*, *the time will come*) or in reference to other temporal frames (*the next week and the week following it*). MacLaury recasts this account as three vantages on time. In the first of these, *the days ahead*, the days are fixed objects and the present is an entity moving through or along these objects (Figure 2-1a). The expression *the coming days* is warranted by an inversion of fixed and mobile coordinates (Figure 2-1b). Finally, *the next week and the week following it* is accounted for in terms of the zooming-in process along the time line. At stage one, a "matching time unit" (e.g. *next week*) is established by coordinating its position relative to the present. Although it moves along the time line, it is treated as fixed in order to serve as a point of reference for other time (*the week following it*). "Matching time unit" is inherently mobile (never stops moving relative to the present) but becomes fixated at level 2 so that *the week following it* can be set against its background (Figure 2-1c).



Figure 2-1. Lakoff and Johnson's time metaphors recast as vantages (adapted from MacLaury 1995: 264; Figs. 9a-c)

3.1.4 Metaphorization: birds and people in Kaluli

A more complex case of metaphorization transpires though a comparison of English with Kaluli (or Bosavi), a Trans-New Guinea language of Papua New Guinea (MacLaury 1995: 265-266). In the former, anger is viewed as a storm and a storm as an angry person (Kövecses 1986: 117-120). Thus, the more accessible experience of an angry person serves as the source domain for the less immediate experience of storm. This, in turn, is more concrete than the internal, abstract and subjective aspects of anger (though these are accompanied by a person's more objectively accessible behaviour or appearance). In other words, "angry person" is a fixed coordinate against which the mobile "storm" is set. But "storm" can also be fixated to serve as the background for conceptualizing the mobile "anger".

In Kaluli (cf. Feld 1982) the nature of metaphorization is different: the people believe that the deceased are still present in the form of birds singing on tree tops ("birds are dead people") and the living can keep them company through a complex ritual of singing in a bird-like manner ("living people are birds"). So the less "accessible" dead people are conceptualized as birds and the more distant "birds on tree tops" are conceptualized in terms of the more accessible people with whom one lives.



Figure 2-2. Juxtaposition of English and Kaluli metaphors (adapted from MacLaury 1995: 266; Fig. 10)

In Figure 2-2, which juxtaposes the two metaphor types, the dominant English metaphors are portrayed as an example of "zooming in" towards the more analytic, abstract view,5 whereas the recessive Kaluli metaphors represent "zooming out" towards the more remote and less common experience of birds relative to people or of dead people relative to birds. The Kaluli actually "live by" these metaphors by engaging in rituals of elaborate dress and song,

[5] Also in the sense that, as Kövecses (1986) notes, the first-level "storm is an angry person" is a prosaic metaphor, while the second-level "anger is storm" is poetic.

a highly artistic activity. It is therefore not metaphorical but mythological (or animistic) thinking (for other examples of this kind of thinking cf. Bartmiński 2009: 34-35, 121).

3.1.5 Double constructions

MacLaury (1995: 256-258) also applies the method of vantage building to the so called "double constructions" (Dray 1987):

(2-1)
(a) Salad salad, not fruit salad.
(b) It's not cold cold, only cold.
(c) The sauce is spicy hot, not hot hot.
(d) I mean whales whales, not Wales.
(e) Julie Julie, not Julie.
(f) I have a headache, but not a headache headache. (a bride to her groom on a honeymoon)
(g) He had a headache at the airport, but not a headache headache. (about a foreigner with an invalid visa)

The constructions, although similar formally, select different entities (images or concepts) as reference points. Sentence (2-1a) refers to the prototype of a category (fruit salad being a peripheral member), (2-1b) augments the feeling of coldness by reduplication, (2-1c) selects the primary meaning of *hot* as a reference point, (2-1d) is an idiosyncratic juxtaposition of homophones (hardly interpretable in speech), (2-1e) mentions two people of the same name. Sentences (2-1f) and (2-1g) differ in that in (2-1f) the double expresses an "excuse" headache – the bride is in fact suffering from a real physical pain – whereas in (2-1g) it is the physical pain against which the meaning 'problem' of *headache* is juxtaposed. Each of these utterances is a vantage, with (2-1f) and (2-1g) involving reversed coordinates: physical pain is the figure in (2-1f), while in (2-1g) it is the ground for the figure of 'problem'.

MacLaury also reports on a personal experience, in which a Californian (C) and a person from Peru (P) drive along a three-lane Californian highway and intend to make a U-turn (to do that, one had to take the turning lane off the leftmost express lane, through a divide in the median). C, the driver, is well-familiar with three-lane thoroughfares, whereas two lanes is the maximum number in the experience of P, the navigator. They move along on the collector

lane. When P says "Take the middle lane" (meaning: the one from which one can make a U-turn), C obediently changes to the lane in the middle between the collector and the express lanes. P realizes the mistake and says: "No, the middle middle". C manages to change to the express and then the turning lane just in time to exit. Thus, each of the speakers constructs, from the same spatial location, a different vantage based on different individual experience. For the exchange to be successful, P first has to realize that C has chosen "middle" in reference to the three lanes in the same direction, while C has to construe P's "middle middle" (and, in retrospect, her original "Take the middle lane") as referring to the leftmost lane of the three. In other words, P construes her "middle" in relation to the whole boulevard, while C in relation to its one-direction lanes. But in a fraction of a second P learns to re-construct her vantage: her "middle middle" reveals a double grounding (not the middle in one direction but the middle of the boulevard).

3.1.6 Viewpoints as coordinates: spatial orientation

The examples that follow illustrate the role of viewpoints as coordinates in a vantage. MacLaury claims that for the conceptualizer to be objectified (and so for the asymmetry between the subject and object to decrease), the perceptual frame must involve more than one viewpoint. In other words, the increase in objectivity "requires implicitly that a second vantage be maintained on the outside from which to regard the inner viewpoint as 'on stage'" (MacLaury 1997: 279). As an illustration, MacLaury (pp. 281f) refers to Langacker's (1990: 6) example:

(2-2) The rock is in front of the tree.[6]

The position of the rock is located on the line connecting the speaker and the tree. According to Langacker, the speaker is included inside the expression's scope of predication: the sentence means "the rock is in front of the tree *from my point of view*". In MacLaury's framework, the conceptualizer projects a certain vantage on the situation, arranging the coordinates on four levels (Figure 2-3).

[6] Through inattention, MacLaury (p.c.) quotes Langacker imprecisely: the original sentence is in fact *The tree is in front of the rock*. This, however, does not significantly influence the line of argumentation. Indeed, it enables the author to add a note on cultures in which various objects, including trees, are deemed to possess inherent fronts and backs (1997: 495, note 6). Also, MacLaury's critique is at best tentative: "I am uncertain that I have done justice to Langacker or even understood him" (MacLaury 1997: 10).



Figure 2-3. Vantage on the situation portrayed as *The rock is in front of the tree* (based on MacLaury 1997: 282, Fig. 9.14)

First, on level ∅, the conceptualizer identifies the existence of the tree and "anchors" it relative to oneself by virtue of referring to it. (The vantage starts not with level 1 but with level Ø because the latter "includes the viewpoint itself, over and above the coordinates that compose it" (MacLaury 1997: 495).) However, in English-speaking cultures trees do not have inherent fronts or backs, which is why on level 1 the initially mobile coordinate 'tree', a fixed coordinate by that stage, serves as a reference point for identifying the tree's orientation. Its front is where the person looks at it: in this way the conception of the tree is endowed with a structure and a viewpoint (VP-2) to become the basis for further stages of vantage construction. One of the sides of the tree, in this case the front, is selected on level 2. Finally, on level 3, on which the tree's front is already a fixed coordinate, the position of the rock is identified relative to it. Crucially, the conceptualizer retains the more objective VP-3 throughout the process, from which he or she can observe and describe the whole scene. The more subjective VP-2, i.e. "the viewpoint of the tree" established relative to the conceptualizer, is viewed by the conceptualizer from the outside (should the conceptualizer assume VP-2, the situation might be described as *That's a rock in front of me*). One also experiences situations in which it is the more detached VP-3 that functions as a coordinate for the construction of a more involved VP-2 projection – consider driving through a terrain, which involves navigating from an engaged VP-2. However, if this is done following a map, the more objectified and detached overview afforded by the map (from "high above") is used as a coordinate for manoeuvring one's vehicle while being actually on the road.

3.1.7 Viewpoints as coordinates: contextualized and decontextualized thinking

A very peculiar case of viewpoints at work is what MacLaury calls contextualized thinking (in speakers of Mesoamerican languages) vs. decontextualized thinking (in speakers of English or Spanish). For example, while engaged in fieldwork, the scholar asked his Zapotec informants to provide Zapotec translations of Spanish sentences. The informants found it impossible to detach themselves from the context of the immediate situation and to the input sentence "I see you" they responded with the equivalent of "You see me". It appears that from a subjective and context-immersed VP-2 the Zapotec speakers viewed language as action with participants playing specific roles of speakers and hearers. English/Spanish speakers, on the other hand, readily attain a higher level of abstraction (a detached VP-4) from which they look at language as a "thing", regardless of which end of the channel they occupy in the actual exchange. The behaviours are modelled in Figure 2-4 (again, note that the vantages start with level Ø).

L	FC	MC	Entailments	
Ø	VP-2	Language	Language is action	a
	⇙			
1	Language	Speaker 1	*I see you*	
		Speaker 2 feedback	*You see me*	

Contextualized sentence processing (Zapotec speakers)

L	FC	MC	Entailments	
Ø	VP-4	Language	Language is a thing	b
	⇙			
1	Language	Speaker 1	*I see you*	
		Speaker 2 feedback	*I see you*	

Decontextualized sentence processing (educated English/Spanish speakers)

Figure 2-4. Views on language among (a) speakers of Zapotec and (b) educated speakers of English (based on MacLaury 1997: 282; Fig. 9.15)

A similar intimate connection of the speaker with his or her immediate situation can be exemplified by MacLaury's experience in Guatemala and Mexico, where while driving he was inquiring about the distance to his destination. The distance grew each time he asked, until the scholar eventually realized he

was heading in the opposite direction. He also inquired about the time needed to reach a place, which was judged to be "one day" – as long as it would take to cover the distance on foot. None of his informants was willing or able to transfer from his personal situation to that of the driver he was talking to, a radical instance of VP-2. This kind of behaviour is very different from that found experimentally by Tversky and Hard (2009), many of whose subjects, when asked to describe spatial relations between objects in pictures, did so from the perspectives of the persons in the pictures, rather than their own. Although haphazard conclusions must certainly be avoided, it is a telling fact that Tversky and Hard's subjects were either all Westerners or at least very much immersed in the Western culture (undergraduates of Stanford University and the University of Oregon).

3.2 Semantics of colour terms

The most straightforward application domain of VT is the semantics of colour terms, to which we now turn.

3.2.1 The French *marron* and *brun*

MacLaury (1995: 268) relates to Forbes' (1979) study of the French *marron* '(chestnut) brown' and *brun* 'brown, dark', identifying the former as the dominant and the latter as the recessive term in a coextensive relationship (*marron* covers more Munsell chips, while *brun* exhibits a polarized focus). MacLaury further claims that commonly a dominant term is applied to ordinary entities, whereas a recessive term is more frequent in literature, poetry or in expressing politeness. Or, the dominant vantage is popular, pragmatic and non-intellectual, whereas the recessive vantage is associated with reflective or intellectual stances (as has been proposed in MacLaury and Trujillo (1989: 5) in the context of literacy). In the case of the French words, the distinction is not so sharp, although perhaps the applications of *marron* (eyes, clothes, trees and food) are somewhat more frequent and mundane than those of *brun* (pain, human skin and an animal's coat, but also human hair, a straightforward application).

3.2.2 The Hungarian *piros* and *vörös*

A much more detailed analysis of colour semantics is that by MacLaury, Almási and Kövecses (1997), who deal with Hungarian "red" terms, *piros* and *vörös*, and

the dominant-recessive pattern they exhibit. Figure 2-5 portrays the results of the naming and focus selection interview with a native speaker of Hungarian.



Figure 2-5. Hungarian *piros* and *vörös*: naming and foci; female, age 22, Budapest 1992 (from MacLaury, Almási and Kövecses 1997: 69; Fig. 3. © Walter de Gruyter; reproduced with permission)

Not only is the range of *piros* broader but, a particularly interesting characteristic, it also embraces both foci. This indicates that one is dealing here with a single category construed from different perspectives, rather than two distinct categories.

The two words differ in their semantics. *Piros* is a basic and neutral term, more frequent and with no distinct connotations. If used metaphorically at all, it usually pertains to health, e.g. *piros mint az alma* 'red as an apple' (healthy). *Vörös* evokes more vivid images and associations and is richer in metaphorical and idiomatic usages. Etymologically deriving from *vér* 'heart', it is used more frequently for expressing strong emotions, cf. e.g. *vörös lesz a feje* 'his/her head gets red with anger', *vörösen lángol a szíve* 'his/her heart is flaming red', *elvörösödik* 'to blush', e.g. when ashamed. It also evokes associations with a cross (*vöröskereszt* 'the Red Cross'), communism (*vörös csillag* 'a red star', *Vörös Hadsereg* 'Red Army', *Vörös Tér* 'Red Square') and many other semantic domains. *Vörös*, as well as *piros*, can be used in reference to someone's well-being or health, but it either has negative connotations (someone may be *vörös* with fever) or suggests intense physical effort: *kivörösödik* (lit. 'to become red inside') refers to someone red in the face as a result of spending a long time out-of-doors in frosty weather or after an intense workout session. Thus, *vörös* is a marked term and more formal than *piros*. MacLaury et al. conclude that the RED category in Hungarian embraces the dominant *piros* and the recessive *vörös*, which covers a darker, blood-like region of the Munsell array (*vörös bor* means 'red wine', whose shade is definitely dark). They model the category as shown in Figure 2-6.



Figure 2-6. Hungarian *piros* and *vörös* in VT formalism (adapted from MacLaury, Almási and Kövecses 1997: 74, Fig. 13)

A wider range and greater frequency of *piros* results from stronger emphasis on S in the dominant vantage, whereas the metaphorical nature of *vörös* is entailed by stronger attention to difference, a factor which entails the word's semantic exceptionality and distinctness.

3.2.3 The Polish BLUE category

Another relationship, that of inclusion, is found by Stanulewicz (2009, 2010) to operate between two Polish terms for "blue": *niebieski* 'blue' and *błęktiny* 'sky blue'[7] (*niebieski*, a basic term, is in fact polysemous between 'blue' and 'heavenly'). *Niebieski* is a more frequent term but its related noun (*niebieskość*) is much more seldom than that of *błękitny* (i.e. *błękit*). On the basis of dictionaries, a questionnaire and an analysis of connotations, Stanulewicz identifies a complex relationship between *niebieski* and *błękitny*. Dictionaries identify the same prototypical reference point for the two terms, namely the sky, but *błękitny* may also be treated as a shade of *niebieski*. The results of the questionnaire (about 200 informants) show that *błękitny* is usually considered a paler but sometimes a more saturated shade of blue. As far as their connotations are concerned, *niebieski* is often used interchangeably with *błękitny* but is rather neutral, whereas the latter term is valuated positively and has a distinctive poetic flavour (e.g. in reference to the eyes or a dress). Negative valuation is usually expressed with another term, *siny* (e.g. "blue with cold").

Stanulewicz proposes to view the application of the two terms as a dominant-recessive pattern of either near-synonymy, where both terms have an approximately equal range of application, or of inclusion, where the recessive *błękitny* receives positive valuation, is less common and has a narrower application.[8]

[7] The author mentions over a dozen more terms in Polish.

[8] In the relationship of inclusion, MacLaury (1997: 195) proposes to call the vantages superordinate and subordinate.

3.2.4 Colour terms in grammatical constructions

An alternative study of colour terms is Anishchanka's (2010) analysis of the relationship between the colour property and the entity to which it belongs. The author considers the use of two types of construction, in which the concept of colour can be manifested as either an adjective or a noun: Colour Adjective + Noun (A_CN, e.g. *a green line*) and Noun of Colour-Noun (*N of* N_C, e.g. *the green of the sky*).[9] The study is based on painting descriptions from American art museum catalogues. For the sake of simplicity, the sample is limited to basic colour terms. Anishchanka models the two constructions as dominant (A_CN) and recessive (*N of* N_C) vantages on colour attribution viewed as an atemporal relation (in the sense of Langacker 1987).

A_CN is a conceptualization of colour as a property subordinate to and inseparable from its object. It is classified as a dominant vantage because of its commonality and a wide range of application. In *N of* N_C, in turn, colour is viewed as an entity. The construction is rare and has a limited scope of application: it typically refers to configurational two-dimensional entities in the pictorial world, i.e. *lines, shapes, passages*, etc., hardly categorized as objects in the real world. The vantage type here is recessive.

3.2.5 Japanese native and borrowed terms

A further study in this category is Stanlaw's (1987) work on Japanese native and borrowed colour terms.[10] Stanlaw found that Japanese speakers name each of the 36 colour categories he investigated with a native word *and* an English borrowing. He interviewed his informants with the Munsell set and subjected them to Osgood, Suci and Tannenbaum's (1957) semantic differential test. MacLaury (1997: 39) re-interprets his finding thus:

1. Native terms are darker in focus and broader in range.

[9] Other possibilities, such as *N of NC* (*a passage of green*) or *NC* (*the green*), are analysed only briefly.

[10] Because Stanlaw's and other authors' applications of VT to aspects of the Japanese language and culture (see the remainder of the chapter) encroach upon the domain of social meanings, they all require a more in-depth treatment (Barbara Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk, p.c.) – this cannot be afforded to them here for practical reasons. The reader is therefore advised to consider these sketchy reports as merely preliminary insights into how VT can be usefully applied in modelling linguistic behaviour in various culturally-bound settings. More details concerning the social context can be found in the relevant publications; however, the ethnic "softness" of this kind of analysis probably makes it impossible ever to conclude that a full-fledged account has been achieved.

2. Members of the pairs are non-synonymous: native terms are used in traditional, artistic and cultured contexts, whereas loanwords in reference to modern and new things (e.g. a purple kimono thread was described as *murasaki*, whereas the purple colour in a TV commercial as *paaupuru*).

3. Loan words have more conspicuous connotative features[11] and evoke stronger emotional reactions.

Therefore:

4. In the colour pairs, the native words are classified as dominant and loanwords as recessive.

In a later study, Stanlaw (2010) adopts a historical perspective on Japanese colour naming from c. 400 C.E. to the present. He proposes to resort to VT to explain some of the findings that challenge the Berlin and Kay (1969) sequence, e.g. the fact that colours appear at stages where they "should not". The author suggests, for example, that *pinku* and *momo-iro* ('peach-coloured') for 'pink' or *orenji* and *daidai-iro* 'orange' are related by coextension, whereas *ao* 'blue' and *kon* 'dark blue' by complementation (it is suggested that *kon* may be the twelfth basic colour term in Japanese). Furthermore, the split from early Japanese GRUE to *ao* 'blue' and *midori* 'green' is explained in terms of coextension, which eventually gives rise to category division.

3.2.6 Change in colour categorization

Finally, MacLaury (1991) deals with change in colour categorization and remains the only publication specifically devoted to the issue, although several observations are scattered throughout his work. Incidentally, despite VT being termed "primarily a diachronic theory" in its account of the development of types of category membership from near-synonymy, through coextension and inclusion to complementation (Winters 2002: 625), only a handful of studies have been made in this domain (Geeraerts 1997; Stanlaw 2010; Winters 2002 and 2010).

MacLaury (1991) considers why colour categorization became different in two closely related Mayan dialects. He draws on work by Rosch and others regarding prototypes (the recognition of prototype or periphery involving judgements of similarity and difference), but offers a novel observation, namely

[11] Such is the view expressed in traditional terms, though in fact for MacLaury there is "no divide between denotation and connotation", the two being placed "at opposite ends of a cline" (1995: 268). This is in line with the basic tenets of cognitive linguistics.

that an individual can attend to similarity and difference *at the same time*, and the interplay between the two is the driving force behind categorization, re-categorization and eventually change. An important factor in the process is a recognition of novelty: the direction of change aligns with increasing distinctiveness. In one of the dialects MacLaury studies, novelty transpires through the imprecision and individual variation displayed by different speakers of that dialect. Compared with speakers of other dialects, more tightly constrained by tradition and linguistic convention, the speakers of the individually diversified dialect had had more extensive contact with and had been more influenced by external factors. Exposure to those aided greater attention to difference and consequently reconfiguration and re-construction of categories.[12]

Colour semantics has been a springboard for a number of other VT-informed studies from various domains. I will proceed now to discuss analyses in lexical semantics outside colour.

3.3 Lexical semantics

3.3.1 Bird naming

MacLaury (1995: 261-263) looks at the naming of birds in Aguaruna (a Jivaroan language of Peru), reported by Berlin, Boster and O'Neil (1981). Two terms, *sawáke* and *dai*, are used to refer to six species of woodpecker: *Celeus spectabilis*, *Celeus elegans*, *Celeus grammicus*, *Chrysoptilus punctigula*, *Veniliornis passerinus* and *Veniliornis affinis*. Twenty five speakers of the language were asked to name the six bird species, each informant being shown the feathered skin of each species, one after another.

The most representative species (foci) are *Celeus elegans* for *sawáke* and *Veniliornis affinis* for *dai*. The choice of foci is based on "visual access", which seems to be a composite of size and frequency of occurrence: *Celeus elegans* is the largest

[12] However, Winters (2002) points to attention to similarity as another change-inducing force. Increasing attention to similarity is correlated with the processes of panning (zooming) out, in which language users extend their view from narrow to wide. Winters cites in this context the extension, in French, of the subjunctive mood after temporal subordination. The subjunctive (a non-indicative form) was earlier used after *avant que* 'before', which introduced a context of uncertainty. Now it is also used after *après que* 'after', where the speaker relates to the outcome of a given situation. Two kinds of similarity are suggested: between temporal expressions (even though only one is associated with uncertainty, typical of the subjunctive), and between the prosody of *avant que* and *après que* (a two-syllable, vowel-initial morpheme plus *que* as a subordinating conjunction).

of all six, while *Veniliornis affinis* is the second smallest but more commonly seen than the smallest *Veniliornis passerinus*. MacLaury suggests that the category is built coextensively, with two foci but partially overlapping and intermingled ranges of application (note that the two terms, *sawáke* and *dai*, are each used in reference to all the six species, i.e. no species is left out).

3.3.2 The Iberian Spanish "macho"

If the categorization of Aguaruna woodpeckers is in a large measure a cultural process, so is the conceptualization of the idea of "macho" by Iberian Spanish speakers, discussed by Grace and Głaz (2010). This VT-based account is juxtaposed with Lakoff's radial category model and Langacker's network model. The three are found compatible and mutually informing.

The study is based on interviews with three native speakers of Iberian Spanish, each from a different geographical and cultural background (the limitations of the study are noted). There is enough common ground for the speakers to share the basic core of the concept, but individual differences also play a role. The prototypical concept of "macho" is shown to be grounded in the idea of the (indomitable) bull and the derived modifications (construals) of the concept result from different configurations of the parameters of gender, bravery and the liking of women. Thus, the resulting complex vantage yields several entailments or models of who a macho is: a bullfighter, a womanizer, a warrior or a family man.

3.3.3 Autohyponymy

Another lexical semantic problem, that of autohyponymy, calls for recourse to VT constructs other than coextension. In Głaz (2007a), I propose to view the autohyponymy of the English word *animal*, also found in such items as *finger*, *man*, *drink* and others, as a relationship between three types of vantage: dominant, subdominant (my creation) and recessive.

The three vantages differ in their ranges and context of usage. The dominant vantage is the most extensive as a result of strong attention to similarity. This causes inclusion in the category of all creatures until the appearance of features like photosynthetic metabolism or the lack of the capacity for locomotion. These introduce difference, so that the category is curtailed. The subdominant vantage is only slightly smaller in terms of range through the exclusion of humans. The range of the recessive vantage is much more restricted: it

embraces only non-human mammals (but not e.g. fish, let alone creatures of lower order). The vantage "stands out" as recessive, compared to the rather closely linked dominant and subdominant vantages. Difference is stronger than similarity, so that non-mammals (and humans) are first seen as different and excluded. The remaining creatures, i.e. non-human mammals, constitute the range of the vantage.

Additionally, the three meanings of *animal* have different ranges of application. The dominant *animal* is a taxonomic term used in science. The subdominant *animal* frequently, though not always, has religious overtones: humans are construed as the crowning of creation, which differentiates them from other organisms, especially (non-human) animals. The recessive *animal* seems the most mundane and down-to-earth of all, which is also probably the reason why fish are excluded from the category. In everyday experience we do not deal with fish in the same way that we deal with other creatures: normally, even in fish ponds, they are not touched or even seen, nor do they walk or breathe in the same way as cats, dogs, cows etc. In short, they are "different".[13]

3.3.4 Dutch historical semantics

VT-inspired conclusions in lexical semantics have also been proposed by Geeraerts (1997: 171, 186-7), who in his study of 19th-century Dutch suggests a pattern "resembling" coextension for the verbs *vernietigen* and *vernielen*, both meaning 'destroy'. The verbs differed in the internal structure of their respective ranges, each term being centred around a different core sense. *Vernietigen* was perhaps dominant, as its range was broader and included abstract contexts.[14] Geeraerts notes that coextension is no longer the case, the two terms being now centred around their focal areas, a relationship resembling MacLaury's complementation. This seems to provide support for what MacLaury describes as a developmental sequence from near-synonymy, via coextension and inclusion to complementation, though the inclusive stage cannot be identified in this case.

[13] This is, admittedly, a construal inconsistent with the recessive *vörös* in the Hungarian red category. As the reader will recall, *vörös* is more of a metaphorical and "special cases" term. Somewhat perversely, the recessive *animal* (mammals) is also a "special cases" usage, though in the sense of being maximally grounded in first-hand experience rather than in the sense of metaphorical extensions.

[14] In fact, its prototype was abstract, which in some other studies is associated with the recessive term, one of the reasons why Geeraerts' suggestion of a coextensive pattern is merely tentative. Recall, however, the down-to-earth recessive vantage for *animal*.

3.3.5 Vertical extent/position

One of the most notable applications of the concept of coextension is John Taylor's (2003b) attempt to model the relationship between English *high* and *tall*. *High* is an unmarked term used neutrally, *tall* is a more subjective, marked descriptor (cf. *How tall is it?* vs. *How high is it?*). Taylor found that in the Lancaster-Oslo-Bergen corpus of 1 million words, *high* is much more frequent (579 tokens vs. 59 for *tall*),[15] it has more non-spatial uses (*high number*, *high social standing*), it designates both vertical extent (*high building*) and vertical position (*high ceiling*) with only the former being designated by *tall*, and is applied to all kinds of physical bodies but rarely humans, whereas *tall* mostly relates to people, trees, plants or buildings. The relationship between the items is, in Taylor's view, coextensive: *high* is said to be the dominant term, *tall* the recessive.

Taylor tries to replicate MacLaury's data elicitation procedures. The corpus data are parallel to the procedure of naming (the onomasiological approach), while questionnaires parallel the semasiological procedure of mapping. The scholar reports on two questionnaires, in which subjects were asked to judge where a collocation of the form *tall N* locates on a seven-point scale from "very good" to "extremely bad", or were presented with a list of 65 entities and asked how well the concept of "tallness" applied to each. The results show that subjects applied *tall* to a much wider range of entities than attested in the corpus, where it tends to be used with human nominals. The mismatch parallels MacLaury's finding that the mapping range of a colour term need not agree with its naming range. Taylor concludes that for *high*, emphasis on similarity entails a broad application across entities, while *tall* has a restricted application, "skewed" towards humans and emphasizing their distinctiveness vis-à-vis other entities.

Taylor's account corroborates MacLaury's dissatisfaction with prototype semantics. Apart from relating the usage characteristic of *high* and *tall* to different prototypes (a generalized conceptualization of vertical extent and the

[15] LOB is a small corpus but the findings are confirmed by searches of larger corpora, albeit in a rather crude fashion. For example, in the 1995 collection of *The Times* and *The Sunday Times* (about 42 million words) high is about twelve times as frequent as *tall* (17,177 vs. 1,395). Interestingly, the differences in frequency for the comparative and superlative forms are even bigger: 7,238 occurrences of *higher* vs. 176 of *taller* (over 41 times more!) and 2,649 of *highest* vs. 96 of *tallest* (27.5 times more). Additionally, a Google search (December 2011) yielded ca. 8 billion 230 m hits for high and ca. 520 m hits for *tall*, about sixteen times fewer. With the comparatives and superlatives the disproportion is again huge, e.g. *highest* is over 30 times more frequent than *tallest*. The numbers are telling even if the validity of the Internet as a reliable corpus of (native speaker) English is rightly disputed.

upright human body, respectively), VT helps specify "the range of permissible extensions from the prototype" (p. 282). However, contrary to MacLaury et al.'s (1997) findings on Hungarian *piros* (dominant) and *vörös* (recessive), the recessive *tall* lends itself to fewer metaphors than *high*. Taylor supposes that its range may be too restricted to engender more metaphorical usages. Interestingly, his finding is paralleled by Tribushinina's (2010) observations on the Russian *nizkij* 'low' and *nevysokij* 'not.high' – cf. below.

Taylor's analysis was welcomed with some satisfaction by MacLaury (2003c), who proposes formalisms of the coextensive relation but also lists a few unusual uses of *tall*, not considered in Taylor's work. These include *a tall rock* (translation of a Navaho myth), *a tall ceiling* (considered ill-formed by Taylor), *a tall baby*, *a tall duck*, *a tall coin* (fig.), *a tall microbe* (probably a sci-fi story or a tale) and even *a tall fetus*. This shows that we should not only make use of larger corpora, which in the electronic age is easy, but also approach speakers' judgements with caution.[16]

Having said that, the inadequacies in Taylor's data should not necessarily preclude one from analysing the *high-tall* relationship as coextension. An in-depth corpus study might reveal different details of the pattern but the suggestion of a coextensive relationship should be taken very seriously, especially because the relation can appear in several variants and need not exhibit all the typical features.

The opposite end of the verticality scale is tackled by Tribushinina (2010, cf. also 2008), who deals with Russian dimensional adjectives, specifically with the differences between lexical and morphological antonyms. Russian *vysokij* 'high'

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[16] Another example: tall hair is considered by Taylor's informants as "extremely bad" (the lowest position of all, with a 6.94 score out of the maximum 7 for "badness") but a Google search on Dec 17, 2009 yielded 13,100 hits for the collocation (excluding the medical tall hair cell(s)) and the following examples were easy to find:

> Man with **tall hair** standing in the window and facing right.
> (www.ghoststudy.com/monthly/jul04/tallhair.htm; accessed Jan 16, 2007)

> Get some heels and really **tall hair**. (advice to someone thinking of modelling;
> (http://forum.deviantart.com/devart/general/639110/?offset=30; accessed Jan 17, 2007)

Some other findings in Taylor's questionnaires or his LOB corpus search can be questioned along similar lines.

The caution with which one must approach respondents' judgements, due to the variable degreed of their metalinguistic awareness, also pertains to MacLaury's own procedures of data collection (see Chapter 1). However, as described, regular patterns of behaviour have been found in a multitude of languages with diverse genealogical backgrounds, which – together with the sheer amount of data collected – gives one right to assume that whatever inadequacies may have been present in the informants' decisions, they do not seriously affect the overall picture.

and *nizkij* 'low' are lexical antonyms, morphologically unrelated, but *vysokij* 'high' and *nevysokij* 'not.high' are morphologically related.[17] The antonyms to *vysokij*, i.e. *nizkij* and *nevysokij*, can in many contexts be used interchangeably but one of them is frequently considered to be more appropriate than the other.

Tribushinina draws her data from the Russian National Corpus (130 million words) and from an elicitation test, in which 174 native speakers of Russian were asked to give three nouns which "go particularly well" with a given adjective. There is an extensive area of overlap but also some characteristic differences (tendencies rather than absolute patterns). *Nizkij* is more frequent and more evenly distributed (*nevysokij* is usually used with human referents), it is a measurement relative to the ground, whereas *nevysokij* takes human vertical extent as the reference point. *Nizkij* is usually used with referents smaller than humans, *nevysokij* with those as tall as or taller than humans. *Nizkij* often has negative connotations and many extended uses, *nevysokij* has neutral connotations and is rarely used metaphorically. In contexts where either term can be used, the semantic difference may be attributed to *nevysokij* being skewed towards human referents. For example, *nevysokij rost* 'not.high height' (of a person) is "normal" usage, typical in reference to humans, whereas *nizkij rost* treats humans like other entities and can be applied to e.g. human skeletons in a scientific context.

On this basis the semantics of the two adjectives is modelled in terms of coextension, with *nizkij* being the dominant and *nevysokij* the recessive term. Neither is blocked because they are different ways of looking at the lower end of the verticality scale. However, Tribushinina's interpretation in many respects flies in the face of MacLaury, Almási and Kövecses's (1997) findings on Hungarian red terms, though is consistent with Taylor's (2003b) account of the English *high* and *tall*. For example, both *nevysokij* and *tall* are skewed towards human referents (recessive) but are rarely used in metaphorical contexts. Contrary to

[17] The phenomenon is more frequent in Slavic than in Germanic languages, though it obviously does appear in the latter, cf. the English *true* : *untrue/false* or *friendly* : *unfriendly/hostile* (but not *long* : **unlong/short*, where the morphologically related antonym is blocked). Thus, for example in Polish, the scale of verticality is more compartmentalized, with four stops along the axis (*wysoki* 'high/tall' – *nie wysoki* 'not high/tall' – *niewysoki* 'not.high/tall' – *niski* 'low/short'), compared with three in English (*high/tall – not high/tall – low/short*). Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk (1996: 51-52), following Zimmer (1964) and Boucher and Osgood (1969), mentions the phenomenon with regard to negatively evaluated terms; cf. Polish *niezły* or *niebrzydki* vs. English **unbad* or **unugly*. (Interestingly, cf. also *niedobry* and *niełady* vs. **ungood* or **unbeautiful*, where the negative affixation concerns positively evaluated words). Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk (1996: 47) gives a similar example from the domain of nouns, cf. Polish *nieprzyjaciel* vs. English **non-friend/enemy* (but cf. *unfriend*ly).

that, the recessive "red" term in Hungarian (*vörös*) is *more* readily extended to figurative contexts than the dominant term. Next, in the Hungarian "red" category it is the recessive *vörös* that receives a more vivid and marked valuation, whereas in the Russian data the same can be said about the dominant *nizkij*. There are two possible mutually contradictory explanations. Because attention to difference protracts cognitive distance, the recessive term is more appropriate in exceptional, poetic contexts: this explains the behaviour of the recessive Hungarian *vörös* but not that of dimensional adjectives. Alternatively, similarity may be said to reinforce commonality, which would account for the greater metaphorical extensions of the dominant *nizkij* and *high*, but not for the Hungarian *piros*.

Tribushinina tackles the problem by proposing to examine other groups of dimensional and non-dimensional scalar adjectives and to introduce two possible refinements to VT. On the one hand, if the pattern reported for vertical extent adjectives prevails, the criteria for identifying vantages may have to be revised (the literalness criterion may have to be discarded). On the other hand, if the pattern for vertical extent terms is unique for that category, perhaps they have a special (privileged?) status because of the intrinsic vertical orientation of the human body. Hence, of importance would be the nature of not only mobile but also fixed coordinates.

3.3.6 Demonstratives

The final lexical semantic study to be discussed in this section is Riddle's (2010) account of apparently paradoxical behaviour of demonstratives with proper nouns (*this Henry Kissinger*, *How's that oil?*, *these Brindles*, *those Munsells*, etc.). The author notes that they cease to be paradoxical if viewed as "shifting perspectives or points of view on the part of the speaker" (Riddle 2010: 225). They are, in other words, vantages based on the physical proximal-distal opposition, each involving sub-levels correlated with the speaker's epistemic and affective attitude. Riddle discusses several diverse cases of this usage – in general terms, *this*/*these* and *that*/*those* symbolically make the reference less unique. On the epistemic sub-level, *this* is used to decrease the recognition of a given entity (usually a person) on the part of the speaker, while *that* is used to augment it: the entity can be retrieved, though from a distance. On the affective sub-level, the demonstratives entail emotional distance from the referent.

3.3.7 Lexis in written discourse

Głaz (2007b) is an account of temporal viewpoint(s) in a short passage from George Orwell's *Coming Up for Air* (1961 [1939]). Modifications and adaptations of VT are proposed: the notions of *subvantage*, *subvantage complex* and an *integer* are introduced into the model, but an elaboration of these, only partially presented in Głaz (2007b), will have to wait until future study.[18]

Adverbials are here classified as MacLaury's viewpoints (cf. Chapter 1, section 2.11). VP-1 remains unexemplified because reference to time requires at least minimal detachment from oneself. VP-2 adverbials are such partial (vs. impartial) deictics as (*right*) *now*, *at present* or *nowadays*: the party on stage is the speaker. This contrasts with impartially deictic VP-3s, such as *today*, *yesterday*, *next year*, *last week* etc., in which the conceptualization is still anchored to the speaker but also to the concepts of day, year, week or any other time unit. The degree of detachment on the part of the speaker rises further as one moves on to absolute time descriptions, such as *April 5, 1999*. These are candidates for VP-4. "Real" VP-4, however, is probably impossible for humans to achieve because the notion of the calendar evoked by a date is very much tied to a particular culture (cf. Lakoff 1987: 68-69 for examples). Thus, *April 5, 1999* is better seen as a relatively objectified variant of VP-3, in which the notion of the calendar is anchored to those of the speaker or speech community. The four viewpoints are orientation points along a continuum rather than sharply delimited categories: *April 5, 1999* involves greater speaker detachment than *last year*.

Time adverbials such as *two days before*, *six hours after I swallow the pill* or *till we were nine* require a more complex treatment – a preliminary attempt is Głaz (2007b). Here I will only briefly look at time adverbials in an excerpt from Orwell's *Coming Up for Air*:

(2-3) Joe started going to Walton Grammar School **two years before I did. Neither of us went there till we were nine**. It meant a four-mile bike ride morning and evening, and Mother was scared of allowing us among the traffic, which by that time included a very few motor-cars. (Orwell 1961 [1939]: 55)

[18] Suffice it to say that a *subvantage* is vantage within a vantage, evoked as a pre-packaged whole. It is thus similar to what MacLaury calls a subroutine: "a prescribed procedure for performing a task or solving a problem, for example, deciding that the 'face' of a featureless object is the part closest to the viewer (as opposed to alternatives)" (MacLaury 1997: 534).

The clause *neither of us went there till we were nine* involves, in my view, the processes of vantage construction and blending (cf. Turner, "Blending and Conceptual Integration", or Coulson and Oakley 2000 and 2005). The blending process involves two input spaces, one for the speaker and one for Joe, because the reference to "us" (*till we were nine*) is distributive (*neither of us*), rather than collective. A person's age is placed at a point in time, relative to which that person's non-action (not going to school) is juxtaposed. This yields "I did not go there till I was nine" and "Joe did not go there till he was nine". These are the inputs for the blending process to operate and produce *neither of us went there till we were nine*; cf. Figure 2-7.[19]



Figure 2-7. Blending in *neither of us went there until we were nine*

The process of blending involves a change from the mappings between the protagonists (Speaker and Joe) into a homogeneous group, expressed as *neither of us* and *we*. Further, the temporal distance of the two years between reference points in the past (the speaker at the age of nine and Joe at the age of nine) is compressed and changed into identity: *we were nine*. However, in order to properly construe the meaning of the passage, one must concentrate on the blend but also include the inputs. It is only if the inputs are maintained as a portion of the semantic value of the expression that we can be sure of the different ages

[19] Generic space is omitted from the figure both for the sake of simplicity and because it has been subjected to some criticism. In several recent publications (e.g. Bing and Redish 2007) it is not included in diagrams.

of the two protagonists. In other words, vantage construction processes in the inputs feed the blend but do not disappear once the blend emerges.

VT aids this analysis by elaborating on the internal structure of each input space: Speaker input space ("I did not go there till I was nine") and Joe input space ("Joe did not go there till he was nine"). It is here that the notions of subvantage, subvantage complex and integer can be used with some benefit – but an elaboration on these here would unnecessarily engage the reader in theoretical divagation. It will only be said that VT and blending theory appear to be compatible and complementary rather than competing.[20] For the blend to be distributive, the value of each input must clearly transpire through the blend, in accordance with the proviso that all levels of a complex conceptualization (such as a vantage or a blend) maintain their import even if they recede to the background.[21]

3.4 The social dimension

One of the major areas of VT application are the social aspects of language use. In most of these studies, the social or interpersonal relationships (ethnic or national identity, speaker-hearer relation, social stereotypes) have been investigated in spoken language.

3.4.1 Styles in Japanese speech

Aoyagi (1995) proposes a dynamic model of styles in Japanese speech (*nihongo no kotobazukai*), ranging from polite to vulgar. His study enriches accounts based on objective knowledge and sociological dimensions of meaning with emphasis on the significance of individual viewpoints. He analyses interviews with five Japanese speakers, supplemented with data from daily conversations, drama and documents. Selection of speech style, the author contends, is based on three social criteria: power (authority), the distance between the agents, and formality (tense or relaxed conduct). The criterion of power includes three categories: *senpai* 'one who is ahead', *dooryoo* 'one who is at the same level' and *koohai* 'one who is behind'. Power is a fixed coordinate, stable and asymmetrical:

[20] MacLaury and MacLaury (2002) make a similar claim while analysing the lyrics of a love song (see section 3.5.1) but unfortunately do not report on the details of blending in the case at hand.

[21] Cf. *we didn't go there until we were nine*, which has a potential for collective meaning. Even so, the inputs also maintain their values apart from the blend, though to a smaller extent.

once established, it is applied to all circumstances and controls both social life and individual activity (but see the discussion of Adachi (2002) below for an alternative view). Then the speakers establish the distance between them: they can be *miuchi* 'family and relatives', *nakama* 'companions' or *tanin* 'strangers'. Finally, the interlocutors evaluate formality and add that evaluation to the so far established personal evaluations of the other. In other words, interlocutors *reveal* to each other their positions in the already existing hierarchy of power (a fixed coordinate), for them to be able to make decisions as to their relative distance and choose the style for its degree of formality (mobile coordinates).

The process involves loops and is reversible thanks to dynamic feedback. The greater role of personal cognition relative to context is illustrated with reference to cases in which a speaker may downgrade the evaluation of someone of a higher rank in a casual setting. However, this need not occur if the speaker holds the interlocutor in very high esteem.

Adachi (2002) goes a step further than Aoyagi and relates to certain counter-intuitive findings (by e.g. Ide and Inoue 1992) that Japanese female speakers select styles according to their own rank, rather than, as Aoyagi proposes, on the basis of their relationship to others. For example, Japanese women are more consistent in speech style selection than men, women in the workplace tend to respond in the same manner regardless of the interlocutor's status and those in management tend to be more polite than receptionists. Also, there is a discrepancy between the way women are *expected* to speak and the way they *do* speak (Shibamoto 1987). Adachi analyzes two sets of data: what she calls "manifestations of social power" among female workers and "resistance to subordination" among female students. She finds that women negotiate and interact in order to maximize power in a male-dominated milieu, rather than merely selecting styles from an available inventory.

The author models the process of negotiation by plotting the fixed coordinates of Rank and Persona (incorporating age, sex and gender – a proposal for extending the range of possible primary fixed coordinates) with the mobile S and D. Vantages characteristic of various speakers are grouped into frames, though the VT conception of frame is capitalized in Adachi's own idiosyncratic way. By coordinating Rank and Persona with strong or weak S and D, Adachi accounts for such social constructs and behaviours as central position of power, peripherality and weakness, male or female speech, long-winded or abrupt speech, tendency to assimilate, degree of politeness, refrainment from imitating others, desire to mark one's dignity etc.

3.4.2 Japanese *masu* forms

Social aspects of speech manifested as the speaker-hearer relationship are considered by MacLaury (2003b) in his re-analysis of Cook's (1998) account of the Japanese plain and *masu* forms. The plain forms are used among people of equal social status, or with friends and family, while the *masu* forms convey formality, politeness and deference, especially towards a stranger or someone of a higher social status. Cook, however, notes that the same speaker may combine the two types of speech while addressing the same person. Also, parents may use *masu* forms while addressing their children, who then respond in plain forms without showing disrespect. Cook proposes that *masu* be treated as polysemous and context-sensitive: markers of politeness and the interlocutor's higher status or of self-consciousness and objectivity regardless of rank. MacLaury (2003b) views them in terms of vantages and viewpoints.

Cook reports on and MacLaury reanalyses a rather unfriendly exchange between a tenant and his landlord regarding rubbish disposal. The landlord, enjoying a higher social status, uses plain forms throughout. He is engaged in the subject matter and rebukes the tenant by using short and harsh forms. The tenant, in turn, also starts with plain forms but upon realizing who his interlocutor is, switches to *masu* forms. However, he continues to occasionally use neutral language, such as "You are a little too unreasonable, aren't you?". He does not monitor his verbal behaviour or pay much attention to the forms used: the landlord deserves respect but the speaker maintains his own stance.

Another of Cook's examples is that of a TV interview during which both the interviewer and the interviewee, regardless of their status, consistently use *masu* forms (both monitor their speech, a VP-3), but the former occasionally switches to plain forms when recapitulating or commenting on the other's ideas. This function of plain forms is different from that exhibited by the landlord in the previous example. The landlord concentrates on the content and therefore distances himself from the tenant; the interviewer strives for intimacy and personalization of the interviewee: this is a case of the same vantage type producing different effects relative to a larger environment. In Cook's view, constant use of *masu* forms might be too tedious for the viewers and the default plain forms enliven the exchange.

Finally, Cook quotes an exchange between a father and his daughter, during which the father uses *masu* forms while telling the girl to finish her soup, while the latter responds with a plain "don't want". Clearly, at stake is not the relative rank of the interlocutors but, Cook suggests, an intrapersonal distance,

i.e. one between the inherent "ego" and the social position of a person in the father's case. The father views his own position of someone closely related to the child (VP-2) from a more detached VP-3. Plain forms, in turn, suggest inter- and intrapersonal proximity.

In sum, MacLaury's VT-based analysis supplements traditional accounts by modelling the cognitions involved in the use of both speech types, as well as in alternations between them, but is also enriched by those accounts through specifications of contexts.

3.4.3 Ethnic identity

In Adachi (2010), the author looks at ethnic images (mainstream social views) and ethnic identities (subjective self-images) of Japanese Brazilians, Japanese Brazilian temporary-worker (*dekasegi*) returnees, and Okinawans.[22] In her VT-based account, the author combines two apparently incommensurate approaches to the problem, namely the primordialist perspective (ethnic identity viewed in terms of physical similarity, common language, religion or history) and the social mobilizationist perspective (ethnic identity viewed in terms of situational social phenomena, such as geographical locations, people one socializes with, a desire to gain or strengthen political or social/economic power). Ethnic images and ethnic identities of the minorities in question are modelled as vantages in which the inherently fixed coordinates are *primordial elements*, i.e. a common language, citizenship of the host and/or home nations or physical features, and *cultural knowledge*, i.e. sentiments toward the homeland or cultural inheritance, shared historical memory and experiences among members. The image-identity relation is modelled as the dominant-recessive pattern, with strengths of S and D linking primordial elements and cultural knowledge in various ways. Crucially, ethnic identity is a cognitively dynamic construct: Adachi's account shows the dynamics as changes in vantage configurations (such as near-synonymy, inclusion, etc.).

The issue of ethnic image or "social representation" is also considered by Castel, Lacassagne and Salès-Wuillemin (2002), who define social representation as "all the social experience encoded in memory" (p. 667). The authors report on an association experiment and resort to VT in order to model several apparently incompatible images of the Maghreb people in France (French

[22] Okinawa is the biggest island in the Ryūkyū archipelago, south of the main Japanese island of Kyūshū. It has a troubled history of relationships with both mainland Japan and China, and boasts its own language, Okinawan.

maghrébin), such as *immigré*, *islamiste*, *clandestin*, *estranger*, *Nord Africain*, *beur* or *rebeu* (meaning 'Arab' in verlan, a teenage idiom in which words are invented by transposing sounds, *arabe* > *beur* > *rebeu*). Castel et al. propose that at least three types of image are projected on the concept: dominant, recessive and stereotypical. Special attention is paid to the word *beur* in comparison to other terms.

In the dominant, similarity-based vantage, *beur* is found to be similar to *bougnoul* and *maghrébin*, and to a lesser extent to *immigré* and *rebeu*, on the basis of the criteria of 'racism' and 'integration'. At level 3 of the vantage, however, there is search for difference, which helps identify the groups left out by the search for similarity (i.e. groups which do not possess some or all of the traits identified through emphasis on similarity). A conclusion is drawn that the *beur* group is a marginal and problematic national minority.

In the recessive, difference-driven vantage, *beur* is found to be different from *integriste* or *Muslim* because it lacks the features 'to pray', 'religion', 'believer' or 'respect'. On level 3 of the vantage, the term comes close to other groups lacking these religious connotations, such as *bougnoul*, *clandestin* and *immigré*, and is taken to mean 'non-believer'. This shows that the role of S here is to bring together the primary fixed coordinate and whatever else can be seen as different from the other coordinate.

Finally, there is a stereotypical vantage with its own architecture: the starting point is a stereotypical category, then the most outstanding property of the category is established and reality is surveyed for categories with this property. Finally, what is considered is precisely what the new categories (the regrouped configuration) contribute to the old one. For *beur* the trait is *banlieue* 'inner city': it links *beur* and *rebeu* (*re-beu*, a phonological inversion of *beu-r*(*e*)). What *rebeu* contributes to *beur* is the idea of delinquency.

Thus, there are three images or ways of looking at the Maghreb minority associated with the word *beur*: a marginal (and problematic) minority, non-believers or delinquents. The vantages may involve incompatible properties, which VT can reconcile in a coherent manner. Access to a single social representation (*beur*) is obtained through the vantage being activated.

3.4.4 "Folk linguistics" and an individual's national identity

A different problem is investigated by Preston (1993, 1994): the problem is that of "folk linguistics", i.e. the ideas on language entertained by the untrained. The author offers a detailed analysis of a conversation on African American Vernacular English (AAVE) and in doing so proposes a number of modifications

to VT. The conversation is an interview conducted by a Taiwanese graduate student with his friends, an African-American Detroit-based family: the father (a car mechanic with a degree in engineering), the mother (a teaching assistant) and their daughter (a college student). Preston's analysis mainly concerns the argument structure of the conversation, but also the speakers' goals and the associations they make.

The author models the conversation as chains of concepts ("vantage chains") and the speakers' "moves" as operations on these concepts. The concepts may function as grounds or figures, may be "suspended" (made inactive though still available) or "pruned" (deleted when too numerous and heavy on the memory). They can number as many as seven in a single vantage (or chain).

In a conversation, interlocutors may capitalize on possible interpretations of ambiguous grounds, which can lead to alternative chains of ideas: this is "chain shift". When a particular concept is introduced into the chain as a figure, it may but need not be grounded in standard VT fashion. A conversational "move" may also consist in *refocusing*, as when within a chain a speaker shifts attention from one pair of concepts to another. Refocusing can be accompanied by adding a new ground to the already existing configuration. When the chain becomes too long and "heavy" on the memory, some of its elements are pruned.

Preston's analysis also concerns the goals of speakers (as to how they want to be perceived) and the associations they make. Throughout the conversation, the family alternate between the dominant and recessive modes: the inclination to accommodate in a new environment is the dominant one, while the fact that they stand aside as a family and hardly participate in the AAVE social life is the recessive mode. On the whole, the dominant perspective seems to predominate. The author supplements his large-scale argument structure analysis with micro-analyses of low-level linguistic features, such as anaphora, tense-aspect configurations and discourse markers.

Preston also offers his own understanding of the relationship between the dominant and recessive vantages (modes). Whenever one of the modes is active, its "inactive parallel" is also constructed. The dominant-recessive pattern does not result from an inversion of coordinates but from different values given to the same coordinates (concepts). On the whole, as one can see, the author's modifications to VT are substantial enough for his proposal to be treated as a distinct, VT-inspired model (as is in fact the case with Allan's (2002) VT2, see below). However, neither Preston nor Fabiszak (2010), which will be the next study of discussion, actually do so.

Fabiszak follows Preston's modifications of VT to a large extent. Her study concerns the ascribed nationality of a one-year-old baby girl born in Great Britain of Polish parents, as it transpires through an interview with three Polish female speakers. Nine attributes of the prototype of the category "national identity" are found to be important (where "national identity", Fabiszak's term, refers to how the child is perceived by the others): place of birth, language, passport, place of residence, education, emotional bond with a country, family upbringing, values and parentage. An idealized prototypical exemplar of the category has all the attributes marked as "Polish", though the speakers differ as to the relative weights of the attributes. The goal of the study is to uncover the conceptual structure of the category in the speakers' minds.

The attributes function as fixed coordinates (though they can also be renegotiated as mobile) and the mobile coordinates are judgements on the baby's similarity to or difference from the idealized prototype with respect to the attributes. This in fact is a modification of VT: for MacLaury (2002) a fixed coordinate can be a prototype, while for Fabiszak fixed coordinates are prototype attributes. The author argues that her model better deals with the dynamics of category construal.

Similarly to Preston, Fabiszak models spoken dialogic discourse as progression from one fixed coordinate to the next, some of them being elaborated, some receding to the background, others being chained, dropped etc. Because the three speakers are subject to different environmental pressures and have different discursive goals, hierarchies of the socially-based fixed coordinates are constructed on-line for immediate purposes. This again is different from the colour domain, where all fixed coordinates, being physiologically determined, have equal status.

A major difference between VT as originally proposed and Fabiszak's account are the entailments of attention to similarity and difference. According to the latter author, the dominant vantage is represented by the three interviewees, who view national identity as a discrete category (the baby can be either Polish or English), whereas the recessive vantage is projected by the interviewer, for whom the category is continuous and the baby can be both Polish and English. This apparently flies in the face of standard VT, in which emphasis on similarity in the dominant vantage entails aggregation, while emphasis on difference in the recessive vantage entails analysis and separation. Fabiszak explains that her speakers' dominant vantages in fact result from stronger similarity *within* attribute clusters (English or Polish) when separated; the interviewer's reces-

sive vantage results from weaker similarity measure and admission of diverse features (hence the vague English-Polish double identity).

3.5 Song lyrics

VT has also been applied to more premeditated and structured kinds of discourse, such as song lyrics, a discussion of which follows.

3.5.1 VT and a love song

In a letter to the organizers of the Summer School on Blending and Context at the University of Southern Denmark in Odense (August 12-17, 2002), MacLaury and MacLaury (2002; henceforth also M&M)[23] present a VT-informed analysis of the lyrics of Ricardo Arjona's song "Ella y el", from his Sony International albums *Si el Norte Fuera el Sur* (1996) and *Vivo* (1999, also released in 2003 as *El Vivo*). (The poem "progresses through a sequence of internally contrasting she-he couplets", presenting the protagonists' encounter, love and departure, to end with "lines that refer to both actors simultaneously" (M&M 2002: 1). The protagonists are a Mexican woman and an American man. M&M model the poem as a progression of entailments from a dominant vantage, through a transitional stage to those of a recessive vantage, where the fixed coordinates are the themes of group (G) and individual (I).

At the beginning, the Group–Similarity (G–S) coordination, M&M claim, entails public symbols which identify each protagonist as a member of a given society. They include typical places, pastimes, occupations, political preferences, ambitions and opinions. Then, S is fixated and I (Individual) is introduced as a mobile coordinate: the general public symbols and choices give way to more local and individualized beliefs and preferences. These become even more individualized and particular when I is fixated and D (Difference) is introduced.

Thus ends the dominant vantage, followed by a transitional phase. As the importance of S diminishes and that of D rises, the protagonists are no longer in large cities (where S blurs distinctions between people) but in the remote and less densely inhabited Yukatan. They are contrasted through tan or its lack (mulatto vs. blond) and language (Spanish vs. English). They are also about to separate from their respective milieus, Fidel and Uncle Sam, but their future union is also anticipated.

[23] I received the letter from Robert E. MacLaury and, after his death, obtained permission from María MacLaury, as well as both addressees, to refer to it in publications.

The rest of the poem is modelled as a three-level recessive vantage. It starts with a coordination of Individual (I) with Difference (D), entailing individualized bodily acts, separate identities and different manners of speaking. At level 2, D–G (Difference–Group), the protagonists first separate from their backgrounds. Finally, G–S on level 3 entails a new consolidation in a new and distant place (Paris): the protagonists become not only united as a pair but also blend into the fabric of the society.

3.5.2 The father-son relationship

Next, I would like to report on my own (Głaz 2009c) attempt to reformulate some of the aspects of VT for the purpose of analysing Bruce Springsteen's song "My Father's House" (from his 1982 album *Nebraska*, Columbia Records). The song is a first-person poetic account of a turbulent relationship between the speaking ego and his father. In general terms, the lyrics are modelled in terms of the processes of zooming in and out between detached and close perspectives.

For the purpose of the analysis, the lyrics are divided into four "scenes". The speaking ego's dream in Scene 1 is followed by his reflections on the past (Scene 2), his journey to where his father (hopefully) lives (Scene 3) and more reflection (Scene 4). Parallelisms can be identified between Scenes 1 and 3 (dynamic, mental or physical journeys), and between 2 and 4 (static, detached reflections). There are also correspondences between Scenes 1 and 4. The four scenes are grouped in two "vantage complexes", each involving a zooming-in process (dominant) followed by a zooming-out process (recessive). In each complex a dynamic scene is followed by a static one. In Głaz (2009c) I also discuss several other characteristics of each vantage, vantage complex and links between them.

3.5.3 Statistics in punk and hip-hop

To close this section, I report on Niewiara's (2010) statistical breakdown of the lyrics of several Polish punk and hip-hop songs. The author identifies such factors as attention to detail, the actual number of detailed images and their "density". A comparison of frequency lists of the two corpora with those for general Polish reveals phenomena which can be linked to the point of view of the observer/interpreter of the world. By contesting the world (a high degree of negation), both subcultures expand the mental distance between themselves and the issues to which they refer. This, however, is the only similarity between them – the point of view and the field of vision are very different.

The punk observer focuses on fewer elements of the world (a smaller number of lexemes) than the hip-hop observer. However, the former regards them with greater acuity (a higher mean frequency of lexemes relative to the number of text words). The punk observer is mentally closer to what he or she observes, can see less but attempts to penetrate deeper.

Another difference is the distance between the speaking subject and other human figures within the purview of the observer. A conclusion is drawn that the hip-hop observer is more salient against the background of other figures in comparison with the punk observer. These observations allow one to view the punk and the hip-hop observers as constructing different vantages: dominant and recessive, respectively.

3.6 Miscellanea

I would like to bring the present survey of VT-inspired studies to its close by mentioning four other studies: Stanlaw (2002) on Japanese orthography, Pishwa (2002) on language learning, Winters (2010) on syntactic-semantic change in the history of English, and Allan (2002) on the English number.

3.6.1 Japanese orthographic conventions

Stanlaw (2002) relies on Vantage Theory to get to grips with the various ways of writing contemporary Japanese. For example, there are two orthographic katakana variants of the English loanword for 'telephone': *hon* (ホン)[24] and *fon* (フオン). These are analysed in terms of the dominant and recessive vantages, representing the traditional and innovative conventions, respectively. Further, VT is shown to shed light on the emergence of different innovative katakana (e.g. through its metaphor of spotlight effect), especially as the syllabaries are deemed to exhibit parallels with colour term systems. Finally, Stanlaw finds VT useful in at least partially addressing the question of why Japanese allows for such a great deal of orthographic indeterminacy.

3.6.2 Language learning

Pishwa (2002) is a study of the acquisition of English as a foreign language in eleven German pupils, aged 11-14, in years 2-5 of learning the language at the

[24] James Stanlaw informs me, however, that *hon* is more typically written in hiragana.

beginning of the study. The investigation was carried out over a period of 36 months.

A hypothesis is put forward that learning L2 consists in forming, manipulating and changing categories, which occurs via two cognitive principles: flexibility and process/change. Categorical cognition is both limited and flexible: the process of categorization is highly constrained but within the constraints it offers alternatives. Thus, as learners go through the learning process, they make choices following the principle "Determine your vantage according to the complexity of the phenomena". For example, through the dominant vantage a variety of language constructs are viewed as similar, whereas the recessive vantage is linked with greater analyticity of viewing and differentiation. Better language mastery results in a wider perspective and greater detachment of the learners' vantage points. In the process, the constructions they use become progressively more automatized.

3.6.3 From Old English to Middle English constructions

Winters (2010), in turn, is a comparison of the ways in which a specific case of language change can be handled within the frameworks of Langacker's (1987, 2008) Cognitive Grammar (CG) and Vantage Theory. Both theories, regardless of differences in focus and specific descriptive solutions, have a cognitive grounding, strive for psychological plausibility, see language change in terms of categorization and attribute it to the workings of the language user's point of view.

The change in question is a progression from later Old English "dative experiencer" constructions with certain cognition verbs (e.g. *me*$_{\text{dative}}$ *thinks/seems/likes* NOM AGENT) to Middle English nominative constructions (*I like*) or impersonal constructions (*it seems to me*). Within the framework of Cognitive Grammar, the data are handled in terms of subjectivity (the speaker being off stage) and objectivity (the speaker being on stage). In the late OE construction, the experiencer is a relatively passive (off-stage) observer, whereas in the nominative construction the degree of on-stage involvement is greater, with the participant being more of an agent. In the impersonal construction, on the other hand, off-stage subjectivity increases.[25] Within VT the change can be

[25] This is so in spite of the fact that, to quote Winters (2010), "virtually every impersonal expression in ModE of the kind which evolved from dative experiencer verbs has a competing personal version and ... may as an impersonal still be constructed with a dative experiencer" (p. 341).

viewed as modification of the distance from which the viewer regards a state or situation, involving the processes of zooming in and panning out, which in turn result from attention to similarity or difference. The change from dative to nominative experiencers results from panning out, which entails wider generalization and the loss of attention to certain grammatical details. Within the extended category there develops the impersonal construction, which also interacts with that category.

According to both CG and VT, change results from a combination of conventionalized patterns and basically unconscious human decisions. CG operates with the notion of construal, with the conceptualizer engaging in a relation to the given situation or action. In VT, the crucial parameter is the human decision as to the assignment of greater or lesser salience. Thus, in CG onus is put on the speaker's interaction with the world in terms of subjectivity and objectivity, whereas in VT it is the speaker's degree of attention to detail in the processes of zooming in and out. The theories are not identical but compatible and mutually reinforcing: both view change in relation to the language user (for a more comprehensive comparison of the two models, cf. Głaz 2009a).[26]

3.6.4 Number in English

I would like to close the survey of VT-inspired analyses of language data with Allan's (2002) reformulation of VT into what he calls VT2, used in his account of certain distinctions concerning the category of number in English. Although not directly linked to my treatment of articles in subsequent chapters, Allan's study also deals with conceptualizations of entities designated by nouns. The author considers pluralizing expressions of the type *three giraffes* or *the herd are* vs. the collectivizing ones of the type *three giraffe* or *the herd is*, or *coffee/wine*

[26] In another study, Winters (2002) attempts to trace the origin and development of the French negator *pas*, from Latin *passus* 'step', through French *pas* 'step', for a period of time an optional particle (apart from e.g. *mie*, *point*, etc.), and then obligatory and fully grammaticalized, i.e. identified with negation, rather than with physical movement. Winters claims that the process results from attributing progressively greater attention to difference. In Winters' diachronic vantage, the meaning of Latin *passus* 'step' is negated. This use loses its novelty in the pre-Old French period and makes way for contexts such as "He couldn't move, not even one more step". Next, *pas* appears as a negator in the Old French period and becomes associated with the older negator, *ne*, derived from Latin *non*. Finally, *pas* no longer reinforces negation but is a full negator in itself, totally dissociated from the meaning 'step' in the minds of native speakers: it has become fully grammaticalized. It must be noted, however, that this account is at best fragmentary, for it omits several factors that influence the use and development of negative markers, such as phonological and semantic prosody (cf. Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 1996, ch. 4) or language economy.

vs. *coffees/wines*, *four pieces of cake is* vs. *four pieces of cake are* and the like. These are different points of view (vantages), modelled as tables composed of frames, each of which includes a synthetic and an analytic subvantage. Synthesis is linked with a focus on similarity or aggregation (a subvantage of a dominant type), analysis with a focus on difference or separation (a subvantage of a recessive type). Or, in more appropriate terms, the synthetic subvantage involves zooming from attention to similarity (or aggregation) to analysis, while the analytic subvantage involves zooming from attention to difference (or separation) to synthesis. It must be noted that Allan's notion of subvantage is different from mine as proposed in Głaz (2007b), cf. section 3.3.7 above.

In contrast to VT, Allan's analytic subvantage is a successor to (not simultaneous with) a synthetic subvantage and a reverse step from an analytic to a synthetic subvantage produces a new frame of conceptualization, an element within a table. Thus, analytic and synthetic are subvantages and a vantage is "the array of frames that would be represented within a table" (Allan 2002: 688).

But how does VT2 represent the difference between VT's dominant and recessive outlooks? Are the collectivized NPs (*three giraffe*) recessive because they are marked or are they dominant because they express non-differentiation? Allan does not give a definitive answer but is more prone to treating the collectivized, unpluralized cases as recessive. This is at odds with the principle of constructing a simpler vantage with a simpler label for things more common. In the *giraffe/giraffes* case, it is the pluralized *giraffes* that calls for longer and a more complex table of frames, which suggests markedness (Allan 2002: 688-690). Consider the form *fishes*, which, although morphologically perfectly regular, is a less frequent, contextually restricted and therefore a marked option of the plural of *fish*. This lack of a consistent pattern in the arrays of conceptualization for each of the two VT vantage types is a weakness of VT2 its author readily acknowledges.

The details of VT2 are complex and the conceptualizations are explained by means of formal logical notation, which I will omit here. The table for *three giraffe* consists of three frames composed of a synthetic subvantage followed by an analytic subvantage. The table for *three giraffes* has one more conceptualization frame. The difference results from the fact that the conceptualization of the collectivized *giraffe* as opposed to the individualized *giraffes* does not involve analysis: the animals are viewed as constituting a homogeneous set. In the case of *giraffes*, in turn, the overt plural marker *s* is an expression of analytic viewing (subvantage) in a distinct frame.

4. Conclusion

In this chapter I have surveyed several studies of linguistic data modelled in terms of VT or modified versions of the theory. I have attempted to show that, first, VT has been used to a broad spectrum of data and, second, the theory has been subjected to several adaptations. Each of these two points requires a comment.

As far as the data are concerned, their variety obviously does not cover all aspects of language. If lexical semantic or sociolinguistic issues have been considered in several VT-inspired analyses, there have been only preliminary and tentative attempts to address phonological or synchronic syntactic issues in this way. I am aware of only one VT-inspired study that addresses phonology, namely Lazhar Zanned's (2007) presentation on the phonological structure of lexemes in Arabic. In the domain of synchronic syntax, I only know of an informal exchange of views through correspondence between Robert MacLaury and a few authors. No published work seems to have been produced in this area (Anishchanka 2010, cf. section 3.2.4 above, is a lexico-syntactic study, with emphasis of lexical semantics).

With regard to the modifications of VT, these have so far been proposed by individual authors for immediate purposes. It appears that VT as originally formulated can be seen as a "hub" from which extension and elaborations spring in all directions. Few authors have capitalized on the extensions of VT proposed by others, a notable exception being the work of Fabiszak (2010), who follows some of the ideas proposed earlier by Preston (1993, 1994).

It might be feared that the remainder of the present book actually contributes to the status quo. In Chapters 4-6 I offer an account of the use of the English articles in terms of an Extended Vantage Theory (EVT), a modification of VT not proposed so far in its present form.[27] However, I hope that the fears will be offset by the gains obtained from this proposal: I do believe EVT is a coherent model with the aid of which one can arrive at a systematic description and classification of article usage, together with an account of cases which evade easy classification. The description will be preceded, in Chapter 3, by a survey of approaches to the English articles.

[27] Despite my previous attempt in Głaz (2010b), cf. Chapter 4.

CHAPTER 3

The English articles: a background survey

This chapter surveys the literature relating to the use of the English articles. I start with the definite article, proceeding from proposals other than cognitivist to those offered within cognitive linguistics, and maintain the same order in surveys of the indefinite and the nil article (the reasons for using this term are explained in section 3).

1. The definite article

Judging by the extent of the literature devoted to the English definite article, its usage is probably the most complex and/or the most diverse. Accordingly, it will occupy most of our attention in the present chapter, although I do hope that the treatment of the indefinite and the nil articles will be sufficient as a background to the analysis proposed in Chapters 4 to 6.

This section will be divided into two major parts: I will first take a macro-view and present two classifications of the usage of *the*, later to zoom in onto a micro-view of some individual authors. I will begin, however, with an overview of the arguments for and against treating *the* as a word, discussed by Taylor (2003a: 205). These have little direct bearing on what follows but may assist the reader in obtaining a feeling for the kind of linguistic unit which is being investigated.

There are basically three arguments for the word-status of *the*. First, it may be separated from the next unit by a hesitation pause. Second, it is generally unstressed but may be stressed in appropriate contexts if the speaker desires it so. Third, it can stand in front of practically any part of speech (noun: *the boy*; adjective: *the big boy*; adverb/intensifier: *the very big boy*; numeral: *the two boys*; preposition: *We Are the In Crowd* (a pop punk band), etc.).

The arguments against this view are the following. First, *the* undergoes phonological integration with the following word (*the boy* vs. *the earth*). Second, it can only be moved around together with the rest of the NP of which it is a part. Third, sometimes its second occurrence can be omitted, as in *the men and women*. Thus, on these three counts it behaves rather like an affix. Nevertheless, Taylor concludes that it is more justifiable to treat *the* as a word, albeit an untypical one, which is also reflected in writing convention. For John Lyons (1968: 279), articles, demonstratives and personal pronouns exhibit several contrasts, when considered part of a system. This furhter points to the former's status as a word.

1.1 Two classifications of the

Out of several classifications of the usages of *the*, I will present those proposed by Christopher Lyons (1980) and Low (2005), not as the ultimate solutions, but as illustrations of very different attempts based on different criteria.

1.1.1 Classification 1: Christopher Lyons

Ch. Lyons (1980) identifies two major approaches to the definite article: *logical* and *functional/pragmatic*. Logical approaches (e.g. Russell 1905 or Strawson 1950) rely on truth conditions and, says Lyons, do not capture very well the variety of definite descriptions. Functional/pragmatic approaches, in turn, are grounded in the notion of appropriateness or in specifying when *the* is informative to the hearer (Searle 1969). *The* is considered with regard to its reference in the relevant situation, the referent being known to the speaker and hearer through prior mention, context or shared knowledge.[1]

The most common terms proposed to capture the nature of definiteness are *uniqueness*, *identifiability*, *unique identifiability* (a combination of the first two)

[1] An approach to definiteness in terms of reference is offered by, among many others, Karttunen 1968; Kempson 1975; Hawkins 1978, 1984, 1991; Ch. Lyons 1980, 1999; Grosz 1981; Hintikka and Kulas 1985; Löbner 1985; Fraurud 1990; Chesterman 1991; Ojeda 1991; Prince 1992; Wilson 1992; Chafe 1994; or Poesio and Vieira 1998.

and *familiarity* (other, less popular terms being *determinedness*, *individualization*, *concretization*, *actualization*, *specialization*, *particularization*, etc.; cf. Krámský 1972: 18-29). But there are problems with each of them.

To start with, *uniqueness* (used by e.g. Russell 1905 or Kadmon 1990) is a vague notion because "the parameters relative to which singular definite NPs refer uniquely" (Hawkins 1984: 650) are unclear. Prior mention is certainly one of them, but in many cases the parameters are difficult to pinpoint.

The notion of *identifiablity* (cf. e.g. Chafe 1976; Du Bois 1980) seems to be no better. Again, Hawkins is the *advocatus diaboli* when he somewhat pessimistically notes that "an adequate definition of identifiability covering every single use of a definite description is probably doomed from the start" (1984: 649). For most authors to identify means to distinguish, pick out or individuate an item[2] but these notions are equally vague. For others, a referent may not be identifiable but may be interpretable (or perhaps *weakly* identifiable). Such is the stance of Ch. Lyons (1999: 7: *I've just been to a wedding. The bride wore blue*) or Lambrecht (1994: 89: *I'm going to a meeting tonight*, which then can be referred to with *the/your meeting*, although nothing is known about the meeting apart from the fact that the speaker is going to it).

The parameters of uniqueness and identifiability can be combined: to *uniquely identify* the referent is to "distinguish [it] from all other individuals in the universe-of-discourse" (John Lyons 1977, vol. 1: 179; cf. also e.g. Givón 1984; Clark and Marshall 1981; Gundel, Hedberg and Zacharski 1993; Hawkins 1978, 1991; Lambrecht 1994; Lewis 1979). In short, the notion rests on the idea that definite NPs refer to "(the unique set which is) the maximal collection of things which fit their descriptive content" (Kadmon 1990: 274). In fact, some authors consider this parameter *sine qua non*, e.g. for Gundel, Hedberg and Zacharski (1993: 277), unique identifiability "is both necessary and sufficient for appropriate use of the definite article *the*". Also for Ch. Lyons (1999), identifiability is the origin of definiteness, which has arisen through grammaticalization and resulted in a variety of the uses of *the*.

The concept of (unique) identifiability rests on the assumption that speakers and hearers coordinate their mental efforts (Clark and Marshall 1981: 26-27) or that one mind has knowledge of another mind (Givón 1989: 206; cf. Epstein 2001: 371 in a similar vein). Notably, if the speaker wants to be understood, he "must constantly take into consideration knowledge of various kinds which he

[2] Cf. e.g. Birner and Ward (1998: 122): "[W]hat is required for felicitous use of the definite article (and most uses of other definites) is that the speaker must believe that the hearer is able to *individuate* the referent in question from all others within the discourse model".

assumes his hearer to have... If he fails to be sensitive to the hearer's assumed knowledge and the shared situation of utterance, communication will generally break down" (Hawkins 1978: 97).[3]

Finally, the notion of *familiarity* is also indicative of a hearer-oriented attitude: not only does the speaker know what he or she is talking about, but "supposes that the hearer knows it too" (Christophersen 1939: 28). Thus, familiarity is often treated as related to unique identifiability, though authors disagree about the nature of the relationship. For Birner and Ward (1994: 96), "an entity typically must be familiar in a given discourse in order to be identifiable", which means that all identifiable entities are familiar but not the reverse. In a somewhat contrary view, Low (2005: 43-44, following Ch. Lyons 1999) says that identifiability is a weaker notion than familiarity because familiarity is "knowing which", while identifiability is "knowing which" *or* being able to "work out which" – on this view, all familiar entities are identifiable but not the reverse. Other authors view uniqueness and familiarity as unrelated (Abbott 2004 offers a survey of relevant views). That there indeed is difference between the two is convincingly argued by Birner and Ward (1994), for whom familiarity is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for felicitous usage of *the*: in *Harold bought the/*a first house he looked at*, the house is not familiar but *the* is obligatory.

Nor is the very notion of familiarity immune to vagueness. For example, Heim (1982) defines it as accommodation, but that notion is itself poorly understood (as acknowledged by Heim herself). Objections to the familiarity theory have been raised by e.g. Abbott (1999), Fraurud (1990), Hawkins (1991: 415) or Löbner (1985: 291, 320-321).

1.1.2 Classification 2: Low

A different classification of the views on *the* is proposed by Low (2005), who identifies *anaphoric-oriented*, *accessibility-oriented*, *rule-based* and *psycholinguistic* approaches.

In the *anaphoric-oriented* theories, the construction of a definite NP is viewed as a discourse-driven process, i.e. one in which the language user seeks

[3] That this is not necessarily so is acknowledged by e.g. Epstein, who admits that the hearer's knowledge is but one factor and speakers may choose *the* actively and creatively, "even when they know that the hearer is not yet able to pick out the referent in question". In other words, article selection is an "active, dynamic process of referent construction" (2001: 371), a view which is central to Epstein's account of *the*, discussed in section 1.3.4.

motivation for the use of *the* in (previous) discourse. For Halliday and Hasan, anaphoric reference is "the only one ... in which *the* is cohesive" (1976: 72). However, frequently no such overt motivation (in the form of an antecedent) can be found (cf. Poesio and Vieira 1998; Gundel, Hedberg and Zacharski 2001; Epstein 1994, 1996, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002). When an antecedent is missing, hearers look for an intended referent in what the speaker and hearer share (Hawkins 1978; Clark 1992; Clark and Marshall 1981).[4]

In the *accessibility-oriented* approaches (based on the notions of familiarity or identifiablity, cf. above), at stake is to what extent the referent is known to the hearer. For example, Prince (1981) proposes a Scale of Assumed Familiarity, relative to which entities may be new (there is no assumption that the hearer is aware of them), evoked (the hearer should be aware because the entity is introduced somehow) or inferred (e.g. *kitchen – the door*). In Prince (1992), the author combines considerations of discourse (prior mention) with a focus on how the entity exists in the hearer's mind. Thus, the entity may be Discourse-Old and Hearer-Old, in which case it is "evoked". It may be Discourse-New but Hearer-Old: the entity is new but not "brand new", as in *reporters eager to tell the public*... (*public* is new in discourse but familiar to the hearer as a concept). It may be Discourse-New and Hearer-New, in which case it is "brand new" and therefore indefinite (e.g. *someone*). The last combination, Discourse-Old but Hearer-New, is only a theoretical option, since "hearers are expected to remember what they have been told" (Prince 1992: 7[5]). In this classification, inferables are ambiguous between Hearer-Old or Hearer-New (and Discourse-New). Should they be collapsed into either category or form a third category of their own? Do they perhaps occupy a middle position along a continuum of "information statuses" (Prince 1992: 307)?[6]

Another accessibility-oriented scale, proposed by Gundel, Hedberg and Zacharski (1993), is that of Givenness Hierarchy: there are six cognitive statuses, believed to exist in the hearer's mind, relevant to the form of referring

[4] Clark (1977, 1978) shows that the approach has psycholinguistic and computational dimensions: if a new entity is introduced with *the*, the hearer makes the so-called bridging assumption, which allows for the identification of the new referent. The idea played a role in later studies, such as Dell, McKoon and Ratcliff (1983), Walker and Yekovich (1987), Keysar, Barr, Balin and Paek (1998), Almor (1999), as well as in computational approaches, e.g. Grosz, Joshi and Weinstein's (1995) Centering Theory or Sidner's (1983a,b) idea of a default antecedent.

[5] Quoted from the online version, at ftp://babel.ling.upenn.edu/papers/faculty/ellen_prince/zpg.ps, page numbers different from the printed text.

[6] Cf. Low 2005: 29ff, 39ff for a comparison and critical account of inferables vs. uniquely identifiable referents.

expressions in natural language discourse, arranged according to the degree of familiarity. These are, from the most to the least familiar: in focus (*it*) – activated (*that*, *this*, *this* N) – familiar (*that* N) – uniquely identifiable (*the*) – referential (indefinite *this* N) – type identifiable (*a* N). Low (2005: 34) notes that the statuses are not mutually exclusive in that each is necessary for the use of the linguistic forms higher on the hierarchy.[7]

By *rule-based* approaches Low understands Centering Theory (Walker and Prince 1996; Walker, Joshi and Prince 1998) and its modifications (Grosz, Joshi and Weinstein 1995), which capture pronoun anaphoricity and antecedence, coupled with the use of definite NPs, in terms of a ranking scale for antecedents. The scale is based on the antecedents' grammatical status. In most general terms, subjects are more likely to be antecedents than objects, which in turn are more likely than other sentence elements. Grosz et al. (1995) enriched the theory by considering discourse factors, which may lead to violations in the ranking.

Finally, *psycholinguistic approaches* focus on the processing of information and the comprehension of discourse: when the hearer encounters a definite NP, he or she performs a mental search for the antecedent. Once a candidate is found, the hearer continues to process discourse with a view to establishing connections or inference between the antecedent and the definite referent. In one such study, Haviland and Clark (1974; cf. also Clark and Haviland 1977; Clark 1977, 1978) find that reading comprehension time is shorter in processing direct antecedents (*We got some beer out of the trunk. The beer was warm*) than in processing indirect antecedents (*We checked the picnic supplies. The beer was warm*). The process is called *bridging* (Clark 1978) and its function is a strategic one: the goal of the hearer is to arrive at the intended meaning of the speaker. For other authors (e.g. McKoon and Ratcliff 1992), the process is automatic: receivers have no time to plan and carry out strategies and for the purpose of immediate comprehension only the easily available and the necessary information would become part of their representation.[8]

I will now supplement this necessarily schematic survey with a chronological, author-by-author account. However, one must bear in mind that this

[7] The author launches a critique on identifiability, saying that if the referent is already identifiable, why redundantly mark it as such for the hearer? She claims that the function of *the* in "predictable" NPs is therefore not to communicate the existence of known entities but to iconically represent the language user's cognition (Low 2005: 153ff; see section 1.2.12 here).

[8] However, Vonk and Noordman (1990: 448) point to a vicious circle: comprehension is a graded concept and because it also depends on inferences, it cannot serve as a criterion in making these same inferences.

is also a selective treatment, both in the choice of the authors discussed and, to an extent, the ideas they propose.

1.2 Individual accounts of *the*

1.2.1 Russell

Russell's (1905) most famous and frequently quoted example is *The King of France is bald* (cf. an in-depth discussion in McCawley 1993:203ff). For Russell, it involves three aspects: (a) existence (there is a king of France), (b) uniqueness (there is only one king of France), and (c) predication (that king is bald). What makes the meaning of *the* special is uniqueness, for when one compares *The professor is drunk* and *A professor is drunk* (Hawkins 1991), the sentence with *the* entails the one with *a* but not the reverse; in other words, *a* is neutral with respect to uniqueness, whereas *the* is positively charged.[9]

Russell's theory has been criticized for various reasons, of which let me mention three (cf. Abbott 2004): presuppositionality, referentiality and the incompleteness of "non-unique" definite descriptions.

The problem of presuppositionality is raised by Strawson (1950), who observes that in Russell's interpretation of *The King of France is bald*, the existence and uniqueness are presupposed, and baldness is predicated (asserted) on the basis of these presuppositions. Because there is no king of France, "the question of whether it [the sentence] is true or false simply doesn't arise" (Strawson 1950: 330).[10]

Other authors (e.g. Donnellan 1966) raise the question of referentiality. For example, *Smith's murderer is insane* is ambiguous between attributive and referential uses: *Smith's murderer* is whoever murdered Smith or the murderer is known and happens to behave insanely. In the latter case, the expression is simply a way of referring to the individual (who may in fact be innocent) and is replaceable with *That guy* or *He*. Being a murderer is not essential to the propositional content of the utterance, whereas in the attributive use it is.[11]

[9] The notion of uniqueness is unclear and as such rejected by e.g. Heim (1982), though defended by Kadmon (1990). Hawkins (1991) defends uniqueness on discourse-pragmatic grounds.

[10] Abbott (2004) notes that Strawson's observations basically replicate Frege's (1892) long forgotten work. The latter author claims that "if anything is asserted there is always an obvious presupposition that the simple or compound proper names used have reference" (p. 69 in the English translation); therefore *The king of France is not bold* has the same presuppositions but a different assertion.

[11] This met with Kripke's (1977) critique, who proposes to distinguish between semantic reference and speaker reference, but this problem is not directly relevant to the article usage at hand.

Cognitive linguists (cf. Langacker 1991b: 73) view it as a special case of the type/instance distinction.

A third problem is that of incompleteness, manifested in "non-unique" definite descriptions, as when the descriptive content of a definite NP does not apply uniquely to the intended referent. Strawson (1950) notes that *The table is covered with books* may apply in a situation when there is more than one table; a similar problem obtains in *Towards evening we came to the bank of a river* (Christophersen 1939: 140). Much of Richard Epstein's work (see section 1.3.4 below) is concerned with "non-unique" definites; cf. also examples (6-15)–(6-17) in Chapter 6.

1.2.2 Christophersen

For Christophersen (1939), the understanding of *the* involves the pragmatic notion of the speaker's and hearer's *familiarity* with the referent: "The article *the* brings it about that to the potential meaning (the idea) of the word is attached a certain association with previously acquired knowledge" (Christophersen 1939: 72). However, the author admits that the condition is not sufficiently general: the entity itself may not be familiar but stand in "an unambiguous relation" to a familiar object, e.g. a certain book – *the author*. Ch. Lyons (1980: 82) relates to Christophersen's account with approval but points out that the notion of "unambiguous relation" must be elaborated.

1.2.3 Searle

Another major pragmatic approach to definiteness comes within Searle's (1969) Speech Act theory: definiteness is viewed in terms of its function in the speech act of reference. The account is based on two axioms: *the axiom of existence* and *the axiom of identification*. The axiom of existence means that there must exist one and only one object to which the speaker's utterance applies. The axiom of identification means that the hearer must unambiguously identify the object from the speaker's utterance, so that there "should no longer be any doubt or ambiguity about what exactly is being talked about" (Searle 1969: 85).[12] Searle's approach, however, met with criticism from e.g. Ch. Lyons (1980), who finds

[12] Also J. Lyons views reference as a matter of identifying objects: "If the reference is successful, the referring expression will correctly identify for the hearer the individual in question: the referent" (1977, vol. 2: 177).

fault with the former author's weak reliance on examples and failure to specify the conditions for identification in context.

1.2.4 Allan

A number of important observations relating to the use of *the* from the pragmatic point of view are offered by Allan (1980). His work concerns the far greater problem of countability, with the use of articles as one of its aspects.

Allan considers the correlation between countability and (in)definiteness: when the speaker assumes that the hearer can identify the NP reference and knows the countability status of the referent, *the* is chosen. The use of an indefinite marker, on the other hand, implies that the speaker assumes that the hearer cannot identify the referent and does not know its countability status, which must be made available to him or her through the use of *a/an* or the nil article.[13]

Allan also observes that the presence or absence of a determiner marks the status of the nominal as a common noun or a proper name: the former is the case in *I don't believe there's a management in this country that would accept such impossible conditions*, the latter in *Management reserves the right to dismiss staff who are persistently late*.[14] The principle also applies to regular proper names: in *Is there a Hermione in your class?*, *Hermione* is not used as a fully-defining proper name but exemplifies an appellative usage. In contrast, **Is there Hermione in your class?* is ungrammatical because *Hermione* has a definite and specific reading and therefore the existence of its referent cannot be questioned. What can be questioned is the location of the individual, as in *Is Hermione in your class?*. Similarly, "proper" proper names cannot be defined by a defining clause, hence the ungrammaticality of **London I am talking about is London, Ontario*.[15]

Another problem considered by Allan is that of generic NPs.[16] The author concludes that because they are formally identical with non-generic NPs (their only intrinsic characteristic being the scope of their reference), there are in fact "no generic NPs, only generic statements couched in generic sentences" (Allan 1980: 551). An interpretation of a given statement as generic rests on the

[13] Obviously, the author does not use the term *nil*. For the explanation of the term, cf. section 3.

[14] Recall also the famous *Computer says "No"* phrase from Matt Lucas and David Williams' *Little Britain* sketch series. Apparently, *computer/Computer* acquires the status of a proper name.

[15] However, Allan acknowledges, appositive clauses can occur in this role: *London, which for me is the greatest city on earth, was my home for many years*.

[16] For a discussion of generics cf. e.g. Vendler (1967: 56-59); Dahl (1975); Carlson (1977b); J. Lyons (1977, vol. 1: 193-197); Ojeda (1991); Radden (2009).

invocation of a certain body of knowledge, e.g. *The lion is carnivorous* is generic, whereas *The lion is hungry* is not because we *know* that certain species are characterized by being carnivorous, while none are by being hungry.

1.2.5 Heim

Heim (1982) proposes a model of "file-change semantics" (based on Karttunen 1969, 1976), in which articles are elements of mini-discourses. As discourse proceeds, entities are added to it on "file cards". In agreement with felicity conditions (Heim 1982: 369-370), an indefinite NP comes on a new card, while for a definite NP an old card is found with information matching the description of the NP. This approach, however, clearly fails to deal with those uses which do not involve previous mention or perceptibility (cf. Hawkins 1991: 415 or Epstein in section 1.3.4 below).

1.2.6 Löbner

Another pragmatic approach is that of Löbner (1985), who distinguishes between *pragmatic definites*, when the reference of the NP is tied to the pragmatic context of the utterance and dependent on the situation, and *semantic definites*, when the reference is established independently of the immediate situation or context and results from general constraints. Examples of the latter type are *the opera Gigoletto*, *the People's Republic of China*, *the weather*, *the time*, *the wife of ...*, *the clutch*. The last two are functional or relational concepts: *car* is unambiguously available due to the semantic property of the noun *clutch*, not the immediate circumstances of the latter's use.

1.2.7 Chafe

An interesting account of first-mention definites has been proposed by Chafe (1976, 1994, 1996). In his 1976 work, the author lists several ways in which definiteness can be established without prior mention of the referent. These include unique instance (*the moon* – may not be absolutely unique but the one we think of), contextual salience (*the blackboard* in the classroom), modifier-produced "ad hoc" category for identifiablity (*the mechanic with the red beard*) or mention of other entities (entailment of definiteness or identifiability: *a house – the kitchen*).

In later work, the author uses the notions of identifiability and inferrability as clues for various degrees of the referent's accessibility. In *Sometimes the gym's*

closed and … *and then you got to get the tags on it* (about car-buying) (Chafe 1996), the degree of accessibility is correlated with the position of the relevant NP in the sentence: subjects are typically "given", "active" or accessible referents, they are less frequently "occasionally accessible" or "semi-active", and very rarely new or "inactive" entities (this is called the Light Subject Constraint in English, Chafe 1996: 41). In the examples at hand, *the gym* is the grammatical subject and therefore can be assumed to express a referent that is given, "active", "light" or accessible. But *the tags* is an object, in the middle of its clause, which suggests that it is "newer" or less accessible to the addressee. Although both referents are situationally inferable, they are accessible to different degrees (i.e. have different information status).[17]

1.2.8 Givón

Talmy Givón's (1984) functionalist account of articles is based on the assumption that "speakers code a referential nominal as definite if they think that they are entitled to assume that the hearer can – by whatever means – assign it unique reference" (Givón 1984: 339). The author (pp. 339-405) comments on several grounds for definiteness. First, the referent may be *permanently available* to all members of the community through shared cultural knowledge (*the flag*, *the Senate*). Second, it may be *deictically immediately available* in a specific situation (*the hammer over there*). As a subtype of this category, Givón mentions *relative* or *contingent deictic availability*, in which case a trigger (e.g. *a house*) allows one to speak about *the roof* or *the door* of that house. Finally, the referent may have been *mentioned in prior discourse*.

Givón's relative/contingent deictic availability is one of the most extensively studied and variously termed phenomena in English article usage. Hawkins calls it *associative anaphora* (Hawkins 1978, cf. below) or *community knowledge* regarding *co-occurrence of entities* (Hawkins 1991). Clark (1977) and Clark and Haviland (1977) talk about *bridging inference*, Heim (1982) uses the term *accommodation*, while Givón's (2005) preferred term is *frame-based* referential access. A more detailed classification is proposed by Erkü and Gundel (1987), who

[17] For Chafe definiteness is graded. Other accounts involving graded accessibility are Ariel's (1990, 2001) Accessibility Hierarchy (cf. section 1.3.4) or Gundel, Hedberg and Zacharski's (1993) Givenness Hierarchy. Bolinger (1977), in turn, distinguishes grammatical definiteness vs. semantic definiteness. Of the five categories of definiteness (Bolinger's "knownness"), the weakest involves the use of *the* or even *this* but can hardly be considered definite semantically, cf. *There was the stupidest article on the reading list* (Prince 1992, ex. 5) or *There is this boulder sitting in the driveway* (Abbott 2004: 137).

recognize three types of *indirect anaphora* (the trigger sets a frame within which the anaphor is to be interpreted): inclusive, exclusive and created. The inclusive type comprises physical inclusion (*a box – the bottom*), semantic knowledge of words (*a protest march – the marchers*), shared knowledge of speaker and hearer (*I just talked to John. The arm is much better*), or, similarly to Hawkins, the knowledge shared by the community (*the Railroad Station*). In the exclusive type, the referent is part of a larger set implied or triggered by the antecedent (*The ant daubs part of her burden onto a cocoon and passes the rest to a thirsty larva*). Finally, in the created type, the antecedent is "created" by the whole proposition (*Karen took the train to Rome yesterday. The trip took 3 hours – the trip* is a "summary" of the event, Erkü and Gundel 1987: 535).

In the work of other authors, the phenomenon receives other names: *indirect sharing* (Chafe 1994), *indirect linguistic co-presence* (the speaker's and hearer's mutual knowledge of existence, Clark 1992), or culture-invoked *inferrability* (Prince 1981) involving stereotypic assumptions that things of specific kind go together (houses have doors, kitchens have sinks etc.). In Langacker's view of language, the phenomenon is described in terms of the hearer's awareness (of the thing), activation or mental contact (cf. section 1.3.1).

1.2.9 Fraurud

Considerations of pragmatic factors have led Fraurud (1990) to recognize a correlation between NP forms and ontological classes of entities they designate. Thus, *individuals* are conceived of in their own right; they are directly available, are usually called by proper names and so usually previous knowledge about them is necessary. *Instances*, or instantiations of types, are usually indefinites (*a glass of wine*). Finally, *functionals* are viewed in relation to other entities (*his/the nose*) – for those "relational knowledge" is required.

1.2.10 Hawkins and Christopher Lyons

Hawkins' (1978, 1991) and Lyons' (1980) approaches to *the* belong to the most elaborate and will accordingly be given more attention. Hawkins represents a pragmatic stance, based on the theory of speech acts. In his 1978 classification, the author proposes that the use of *the* involves three speech acts: it introduces a referent to the hearer (i.e. it codes the referent's *existence*, including the cases in which the speaker has no prior knowledge of the referent), it instructs the

hearer to *locate* the referent in a shared set of objects,[18] and it refers to the totality of the objects or mass within this set which satisfy the referring expression – *inclusiveness* thus understood covers plurals and mass nouns.[19] The speech acts can only work, however, if the following four conditions are met: (i) the set has to be shared by interlocutors, (ii) the set (not just the referent) should be identifiable to the hearer, (iii) the definite referent must exist in this shared set, and (iv) there should not be present any other entities which meet the conditions.

Once the referent is introduced to the hearer (the first speech act), it is located in a set shared by the speaker and hearer (the second speech act): the knowledge of the set results from previous or following discourse, from the immediate or larger situation or from association: the use of *the* enables the hearer to infer which set is invoked and to locate the referent in the set. This speech act embraces eight usage types of *the* (an extension of Christophersen's (1939) classification):

(1) The *anaphoric use*: the discourse antecedent acts as a trigger for identifying the entity. The antecedent may be lexically identical to the anaphor (*Bill was working at a lathe. Suddenly the lathe stopped*), it may be a different lexeme (*Bill was working at a lathe. Suddenly the machine stopped*) or not an NP at all (*Fred travelled to Munich. The journey was long and tiring*).

(2) The *visible situation use*: *the* points to something visible to both the speaker and hearer and the description is applicable to only one referent; e.g. *Pass me the book* implies that there is only one book in the vicinity or that for some reason only one book can be identified as *the book*.

(3) The *immediate situation use*: the referent is present but not necessarily visible to both parties, in which case *the* informs the hearer of the existence of the referent, e.g. *Beware of the dog*.

(4) The *larger situation use*, including first-mention definites, if these point to entities known to a community through a shared body of knowledge. Thus, in an English village there may be *the pub* and *the church*, the English people talk about *the Queen* and *the Prime Minister*, all people (at least potentially) know about *the sun*.[20]

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[18] In Hawkins (1991: 414, fn. 6) the author proposes a softer requirement, saying that the entity may only be *locatable* but not necessarily *located* in the set.

[19] Reference to a set is different from reference to all its members: *There are cracks in the paving stones* does not imply all stones but the set (so the requirement of inclusiveness holds). Cf. the EVT treatment of *The bathroom tiles are cracked*, footnote 21 in Chapter 4 here.

[20] Recall Chafe's (1996) idea of more or less accessible first-mention definites. For Prince (1992) this would be "Hearer-Old, Discourse-New" information. Poesio and Vieira (1998: 198) note that "anaphoric" and "larger situation" uses may act simultaneously: *For the Parks and millions*

(5) The *general knowledge use*: the speaker has general knowledge without specific knowledge, e.g. the reference to *the town clerk* is sensible because even though the specific town may not be known, the speaker has general knowledge of towns. This type can perhaps be viewed as a variant of type (4) (*the sun*): the larger situation is simply large enough to count as general knowledge.

(6) The *associative anaphora use* (cf. Givón 1984 above for other terminology). It involves a trigger and its associates; the associations must be known to both the speaker and hearer, e.g. *a/the book -> the author, the cover* etc. Hawkins distinguishes between a general associative relationship: *a car – the horn*, and a contingent fact in a situation: *go get the dog in my car*. Low (2005: 26) draws attention to the problems with differentiating between the two, though in principle the rule is clear: the triggers are, respectively, an NP or the larger situation as such.

(7) *Unfamiliar uses with explanatory modifiers*: a modifier identifies the situation or association set necessary for the use of *the*. These include relative clauses (*What's wrong with Bill? – The woman he went out with last night was nasty to him*), associative clauses with the trigger found in a modifier rather than in discourse (*the author/cover of this book*), complement appositive clauses, which permit the NP to function as a first-mention definite (*the fact that I'm going to retire*), or nominal non-clausal modifiers (*the colour red*, *the number seven*[21]).

(8) "*Unexplanatory*" modifiers, some of which (e.g. *same*, superlatives) simply require *the*. Hawkins considers these separately in terms of *inclusiveness*. Inclusiveness, contained in the third speech act identified by the author, plays a role when the speaker refers to the totality of the objects or mass to which *the* applies. It covers plurals (*the kings of Europe*) and mass nouns (*the oil of Kuwait*).

Hawkins (1991) supplements his earlier account with a continuation of the line of reasoning proposed by Russell (1905) and defending the latter's notion of uniqueness on discourse-pragmatic grounds. Thus, *the professor* is unique by virtue of only one professor being introduced into the discourse (even if the speaker knows other professors). There are, for Hawkins, several sources of uniqueness: a given entity might be a member of the "previous discourse set" (i.e. it has already been talked about); it may be a part of the immediate situation of utterance (cf. *Pass me the bucket*, when there is only one in the field

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of other young Koreans, the long-cherished dream of home ownership has become a cruel illusion. For ***the government****, it has become a highly volatile political issue*. Larger situation and shared knowledge tell us that Korea (evoked through *Koreans*) has a government.

[21] But *on page seven*. For an EVT account of this apparent inconsistency cf. Chapter 6, section 4.10.

of vision); knowledge about it may be shared by people in the same physical location (e.g. the same town, hence *the mayor*); co-occurrence of entities may be predictable (*a class – the professor, the textbook, the final exam*); the relevant information may be provided within the NP itself, e.g. through a relative construction (*the professor that we were just talking about*). Against the backdrop of his earlier accounts, Hawkins (2004: 84-86) discusses the major stages in the evolution of definite determiners from deictic demonstratives.

A rather thorough survey and evaluation of Hawkins' (1978) work is proposed by Ch. Lyons (1980). Lyons does not elaborate on Hawkins's parameter of *existence*, but views the semantics of *the* as being grounded in the notions of *familiarity* (Hawkins's *location*) and *inclusiveness/uniqueness* (the latter, says Lyons, is not part of the meaning of *the*, though many definite references must indeed be interpreted as inclusive).

The two authors differ in their treatment of syntactic frames. For example, for Hawkins the frame *This is the ...* actually determines the usage type, namely the visible situation use (*This is the steering wheel* (in a car) or *This is the pub* (in a village)). He claims that only after such an introductory phrase can a description of something unknown to the hearer be used. However, for Lyons *this is the dog* (in a village) is inappropriate, even though it is the "visible situation" context. Therefore, *this is the steering wheel* is general knowledge use and *this is the pub* is either a larger situation or a general knowledge use. Also, *this is the author* is ambiguous in terms of usage type: it can be either anaphoric (the author just mentioned) or associative anaphoric (the book just mentioned). Therefore, Lyons (1980: 86) concludes, the syntactic frame does *not* determine the usage type.

Lyons also takes note of the assumptions required of the hearer for first-mention definites. In *When you arrive in Mexico City, make your way to the Zócalo*, the hearer must be prepared to assume that it is an important feature of Mexico City or of Mexican cities. Naturally, the hearer may question the appropriateness of the use of *the*: *This is the goosh-injecting tyroid – The what?*; *People are often surprised by the fact that Cromwell was half Eskimo on his mother's side – I didn't know that!*; *The first person to swim the Irish Sea was a Cossack – I didn't know the sea had been swum*; etc. Similarly, the hearer may accept or reject the speaker's "affective" use of nouns with *the*, as in *Bill was here last night and the bastard wouldn't go until we threw him out* (*– Oh, you did well* or *Don't call Bill a bastard!*). In conclusion, Lyons (1980: 90) states that when shared knowledge cannot be presupposed, acceptability is a matter of degree. In other words, rather than be-

ing a question of the semantic complexity of *the*, shared knowledge is a matter of communicative competence.

Lyons (1980: 91) also relates to Hawkins' notion of inclusiveness claiming that it is a *consequence* of the meaning of *the*, not a *part* of its meaning. While Hawkins (1978) claims that *I met three students. The two students were drunk* is unacceptable because *the* means 'all the', Lyons notes that there exist definite references which are not inclusive but successful through immediate situation use, e.g. *Close the door* (the one that is open, even though more can be around) or *Put out the light* (that light which is on).[22] Since it is the verb that disambiguates the reference, inclusiveness need not apply.[23] In short, *the* indicates that the referent is unambiguously identified due to being made salient by another linguistic element (e.g. a verb), due to the referent satisfying the description or due to the speakers' understanding of the situation.

To summarize Lyons' major points, when *the* is used, the referent is a part of a pragmatically established, restricted and shared set of entities, constituted by previous discourse, current situation or an association set. The speaker may appeal to the hearer's knowledge of the set or in fact inform the hearer about the set. Within that set, the reference is unambiguous because the referent is linguistically or situationally made salient (more salient than other elements which satisfy the description) or the reference covers everything that satisfies the description.

1.2.11 Katz

An original reference-based approach to the definite article is offered by Katz (1991). Besides the traditionally recognized usage types, the author identifies a "middle" reference, which has properties of "both generic and specific references, but is distinct from them" (p. ix):

(3-1) The goat has long, matted fur. Its udders are full of milk as its kids suckle. It grazes on the grass and clover in the field, as well as on leaves and twigs on nearby bushes. The goat eats in an area until it is stripped of greenery,

[22] However, cf. Lyons' example *The students seemed to be asleep* (in class) and a possible response: *No, not all of them; some were wide awake*. The response comes because, for lack of other clues, the expression is interpreted as referring to all the students.

[23] Cf. also *Open the door for me, please!* (the street door, not the bathroom door, if the speaker is standing dressed and with a suitcase in the hand).

though it eats almost anything – even the garbage that drifts across its path. In the hot afternoon, the goat lies in the shade. (Katz 1991: 34)

The description is that of a goat schema but there is a significant number[24] of details which are peripheral to the schema (udders full of milk, eating of leaves, twigs and garbage), rather than central (suckles its young, eats almost anything). The typical and peripheral details in interplay create an impression of a "middle" perspective, characterized by a notion of "timelessness", a kind of "timeless present" (Katz 1991: 179-180, 186).

1.2.12 Low

In Low's (2005) account of *the*, the article has different functions in "predictable" and "unpredictable" definite NPs and therefore requires separate explanations. The author identifies three major types of motivation for the use (or non-use) of *the*: *communicative* (in unpredictable contexts), *iconic* (in predictable contexts) and *economic* (when *the* is omitted, although expected).

The communicative motivation in unpredictable NPs has a pragmatic aspect: the speaker uses *the* to tell the hearer what the latter does not know and thus brings about a cognitive effect in the latter's mind. Low (p. 11) quotes a user's opinion of a microwave:

(3-2) Since the family has flown the coop, we went into a nice smaller size. It is rated 900 watts. Good enough. And special food menus are already preset. I like **the simple math** already inserted for me. My old Kenmore was a dummy. You had to figure pounds and ounces for cooking or thawing. This Sharp just wants to know 'how many'. And it has that great little carousel which circulates for even cooking or heating leftovers. I like to grab **the frozen rolls or buns** from the freezer, right before a cookout, and just touch "Frozen rolls/buns" and that is it. In a hurry, and forget to put frozen chicken or beef out? Just touch the thaw pad for each individual 'meat' selection...

In *the simple math* or *the frozen rolls or buns*, the definite article is unpredictable but it coherently links these fragments to the discourse: *the* tells the hearer that the referent is "unique" or "identifiable" in the discourse world, though

[24] Of course, it remains vague what number is "significant".

it does not specify *how* this identification is to be performed, which must be achieved by other factors.

The iconic motivation (a representation or mirroring of cognition) underlies predictable NPs, when *the* in fact seems redundant: it is used to semantically link the current mention with another entity already present in the mind. This usage of *the* does not provide new information and may be viewed as uneconomical. But the speaker's intention here is to "express" (the state of the mind), not merely to "communicate" (Low 2005: 298). Its use is also motivated by the desire to avoid conflicting interpretations resulting from alternative choices.

Third, there is the economic motivation, when *the* is omitted where it is expected (cf. Croft 1990), with recipes being a typical genre.

Two other types of motivation are a semantic compatibility of *the* with the semantics of the noun and the parameter of grammaticalization and frequency. As to the former type, Low (ch. 7 and p. 299) notes that some items are more likely to occur with *the* than others. For example, there are so called "semi-predictable" uses, when *the* is favoured unless in a marked situation. Thus, the nominals *kitchen* or *dining room* usually function as locations or backgrounds and therefore occur with *the* (*in the kitchen*) but may function as topics introduced with *a* (*Yes, his small apartment actually has a kitchen and a dining room*).

In a nutshell, for Low *"the usage of the* in English ... illustrates the linguistic dynamics among semantic knowledge, syntactic environments, and the pragmatic conventions of usage" – they all "take part in motivating the use of the article and helping the interpretation of the referent" (2005: 300). What *the* does is tell the hearer to "link its referent uniquely to somewhere *beyond* its close proximity ..., but still within the current discourse context" (Low 2005: 104), in relation to other knowledge, entities, propositions etc. In this vein, one may refer to their own kitchen, unfamiliar to the hearer, as *the kitchen*: the speaker signals his or her perspective and tells the hearer to conceptualize the entity in terms of the former's world. This requires a "synchronization" of the two worlds: the hearer will "pretend" that the referent is familiar and identifiable to him or her.

1.3 *The* in cognitive linguistics

Not all major cognitive approaches to language appear to give the articles their due. For example, in his monumental two-volume work, Talmy (2000) only states that *the* specifies "the speaker's assumption of ready identifiability for the addressee" and *a/an* "specifies the opposite of this" (vol. 1, p. 161). Four

major accounts of the definite article in cognitive linguistic will be considered: Ronald Langacker's Cognitive Grammar approach, Construction Grammar (in a rather cursory fashion), Gilles Fauconnier's account in terms of mental spaces and Richard Epstein's treatment in terms of viewpoint. Although any cognitive linguistic treatment involves the notions of viewpoint, perspective and suchlike, it is in Epstein's work that these notions are especially pronounced.

1.3.1 Cognitive Grammar

Langacker constructs his theory around the notion of *grounding* (effected by articles, demonstratives and some qualifiers) within the context of broad epistemic issues of reality, existence or speaker/hearer knowledge. The ground can be evoked explicitly (*I*, *you*, *we*) or implicitly (e.g. through the use of tense). Articles establish a relationship between the content of the utterance and the speaker/hearer as elements of the ground. A conversation is unlikely to begin with *I just found the quarter* because the quarter (or any quarter) does not figure in the hearer's awareness (cf. Langacker 1991b: 98). The use of a determiner (*a cat*, *the cat*, *some cat* etc.) indicates an instance of the type and the extent to which the speaker and hearer have established mental contact with that instance (1991a: 321).

In his struggle to propose a unified account of language, Langacker suggests that articles share their basic value with nouns, pronouns and demonstratives, in that all of these can be said to "profile a thing" (in Langackerian sense).[25] The semantic pole of the definite article is [DEFINITE THING], where DEFINITE is the unprofiled grounding relationship and THING is the schematic characterization of its profile (1991b: 182). The schematic nature of articles is clear from the fact that they do not behave as free-standing nominals (*I like this*/**the*) nor do they identify the referent, for which they have to rely on co-occurring elements (Langacker 2008: 122, 286).[26] This is perhaps due to their semi-clitic phonological status (1991b: 93) or to the existence of demonstratives (*this* for *the*) and numerals (*one* for *a*), which forestall the use of articles as full nominals.

[25] A grounding predication profiles the grounded entity, rather than the grounding relationship (Langacker 1991a: 122).

[26] In this, Langacker's approach follows that of Halliday and Hasan: "*the* ... is a specifying agent, serving to identify a particular individual or subclass within the class designated by the noun; but it does this only through dependence on something else – it contains no specifying element of its own" (1976: 71). However, recall that for Langacker *the* has a semantic pole, if only schematic, whereas for the latter authors, "[t]he definite article has no content" (p. 71).

Thus, for Langacker *the* is a grounding predication (1991a: 122). It specifies the relationship of the given element to the ground, i.e. to the speech events and participants: to what extent the speech act participants can locate the thing in the mass of objects populating their conceptual universe. If a nominal is a grounded expression that profiles a thing, the speaker and hearer have established mental contact with that thing (when an entity is "singled out for individual conscious awareness in the conceptualizer's current psychological state" (1991b: 97). In other words, the meaning of *the* for Langacker consists of three aspects:

(1) there is an instance of a type, the instance being "unique and maximal in relation to the current discourse space" (1991b: 98) or "already evident in the discourse context and ... the only instance [of the type] with this status" (2008: 497);
(2) the speaker has mental contact with that instance;
(3) the hearer also has mental contact with it or the contact is established through the use of the nominal.

However, the very fact of establishing mental contact with the entity being referred to is not enough to warrant the use of *the*: the use of *a/an* also establishes mental contact with the hearer – but it is insufficient for the hearer to identify the entity as unique in current discourse space (which is exactly what *the* does27). Both *a* and *the* profile regions: *the* differs from *a* in that it profiles a bounded, rather than an unbounded region and in that the hearer identifies its nominal as unique (cf. Langacker 1991b: 104). In discourse, the definite nominal is retrospective in that "it carries the expectation of there being just one salient instance" of a given object in the current discourse space (2008: 497). Crucially, the referent need not have been in the focus of attention in previous discourse, nor does it have to be unique in the absolute sense: *the moon* is unique in a practical sense (the only one that counts in normal circumstances). The referent may also be introduced through associative anaphora: reference to a computer or a car activates its parts and peripheral devices (2008: 285).

In this approach, the definite article is viewed as the weakest form among definite grounding elements (the strongest being demonstratives; cf. Langacker

[27] Current discourse space is a mental space that "comprises those elements and relations construed as being shared by the speaker and hearer as a basis for communication at a given moment in the flow of discourse" (Langacker 1991b: 97). On pp. 99-101, Langacker notes that the hearer may be put in mental contact with the nominal through the use of the latter alone: cf. *the letter between P and R in the alphabet* (there is only one alphabet) or *the tip of Fred's nose* (again, Fred only has one nose and we assume we know "which Fred" is being talked about).

2008: 286). Historically, it comes from a demonstrative through a process of grammaticalization that embraces three more detailed processes: semantic attenuation, phonological attenuation and a neutralization of the proximal/distal distinction. Semantic attenuation involves elimination of directive force: within the relevant scope there is "only one evident instance of the specified type" so there is no need to distinguish it from others by pointing physically or verbally. Thus, *the* is a degenerate case of mental pointing because it is pointing to the type, which is sufficient to identify a unique referent.[28] Furthermore, when the definite article operates on the previously identified mass, it is the entire mass rather than its subpart that is covered by *the*: in *She has seventeen cats and a vicious dog. The cats are very much afraid of the dog*, all seventeen cats are referred to (2008: 291). Phonological attenuation involves an unaccented, neutral vowel with a tendency to cliticize to the following word (e.g. [ðə] in *the big dog*).[29] Finally, *the* also neutralizes the proximal/distal distinction (2008: 284-5), overtly marked in *this* vs. *that*.

1.3.2 Construction Grammar

The treatment of articles in various models of Construction Grammar is far from extensive (e.g. Croft (2001) says that articles function in constructions but offers little insight into how) and only a few comments will be offered here pertaining to the definite article.

The case at hand is an interesting, though a marginal report by Michaelis (2004: 84-85) on her private conversation with Charles Fillmore concerning two sentences: (a) *I couldn't get the cat out of the windshield*, and (b) *I threw the pudding on the table*. *The cat* and *the pudding* can be either count or mass although the sources of mass interpretation in (a) and count interpretation (a can of pudding) in (b) are claimed to be mysterious. A solution is offered according to which

[28] Hawkins (1978) notes that demonstratives do not imply uniqueness but involve pointing (in the abstract sense or accompanied by a physical gesture), articles the reverse: **The cat is friendlier than the cat* is unacceptable because there cannot be two different unique cats in the same "local" discourse space, whereas *This cat is friendlier than that cat* is fine, since one may point to any number of distinct (non-unique) entities in the space (examples from Langacker 1991b: 102). The definite article is more schematic semantically, so in fact a demonstrative may be described as "incorporating the meaning of *the* together with certain gestural components" (Langacker 1991b: 103).

[29] Langacker (2008: 180-181) notes that when *the* in *the big dog* is phonologically reduced to [ðə], the article is phonologically associated with *big* but semantically with *dog*. Thus, phonological attenuation is "truly phonological", as it takes place at the phonological pole only (*the* receives a unipolar characterization as a clitic).

we are dealing with two definite constructions: a shift construction for (a) and a concord construction for (b) (details of what these are need not concern us here). Each is a distinct variant of coercion: count-to-mass coercion in (a) and mass-to-count coercion in (b), coercion being understood as a process in which the semantics of a lexeme is reinterpreted under the influence of grammatical context or in which sentence meaning is derived from both words and inferences that fill semantic gaps in its morphosyntactic structure.

It should perhaps be added that while the solution in relation to these examples does not refer to it overtly, it is certainly strongly linked to the speakers' world knowledge in a given culture (as is made clear for many other cases in e.g. Goldberg 1995 or Bergen and Chang 2005). Given the understanding of coercion above, an inquiry into the sources of the inferences involved in the process take us to the speakers' extralinguistic knowledge. In Michaelis and Fillmore's examples, it is the knowledge of what can happen to an inattentive cat walking on the road or how pudding is sold.

Similarly, coercion is responsible for deriving a count noun from a mass noun (Michaelis 2004: 48), so *beer* can occur with the indefinite article. For other comments on the indefinite article in Construction Grammar cf. Bergen and Chang (2004) in footnote 45, and on the absence of an article cf. Croft (2001) in 3.2 below.

1.3.3 Mental Spaces

A coherent approach to linguistic conceptualization is offered by Gilles Fauconnier (chiefly 1994, 1999) in terms of his Mental Spaces theory: while producing and understanding discourse, speakers construct hierarchically organized and interconnected cognitive domains called mental spaces. Their configurations are constantly updated as the discourse progresses. The use of articles within the theory is specifically discussed by Epstein (1996, 1999, 2001).

In Mental Spaces theory, the concepts of base space, viewpoint space and hearer's space are postulated. Base space is "the starting point of the discourse representation" (Sanders and Redeker 1996: 295), a space that "anchors the interpretation of all deictic, referential and evaluative relations" (Epstein 1996: 101). Viewpoint space is the one from which other spaces can be accessed: it is "the centre of conceptualization and consciousness of the self to whom an utterance is attributed" (Cutrer 1994: 73). Initially, viewpoint coincides with the base space but may be shifted to other spaces later. Hearer's space is constructed by the hearer on the basis of what he or she receives in discourse.

Epstein (1999) explains that *the* signals the speaker's intention to set up an "access path" through a configuration of mental spaces. For the addressee, *the* is an "instruction on how to build and retrieve mental spaces, referents and conceptual connections in discourse" (1999: 55). The word *instruction* is not used without reason: *the* is "no more than a guide leading the addressee toward the intended interpretation ..., specifying only that a nominal designates an accessible referent" (1999: 67), in concord with Fauconnier's (1994: xxii) view of language as something that "does not carry meaning" but "guides it". In other words, linguistic forms, being themselves underspecified, act as prompts for meaning construction.

In more precise terms, the definite article and other grammatical morphemes are instructions for: (i) the configuration of spaces, (ii) the introduction of elements into the spaces, (iii) the distribution of information over a set of spaces, (iv) the establishment of connections and relationships between spaces, and (v) the accessibility of knowledge in a given space with respect to other spaces (Epstein 2001: 341). All these processes can be captured under the umbrella term of the conceptualizer's viewpoint. The next section presents and illustrates Epstein's understanding of viewpoint with regard to the functions of the definite article.

1.3.4 Viewpoint (Epstein)

For Epstein, Mental Spaces theory is the starting point but the author extends Fauconnier's approach in a fuller account of article usage. His cognitive linguistic account (specifically of the definite article) is richly exemplified with naturally occurring data (1994, 1996, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002).

Epstein approaches the English definite article in terms of *accessibility*, which subsumes *identifiability*, and in terms of Mental Spaces:

> [T]he basic meaning of *the* is to signal to the addressee the availability of an "access path", i.e., the article indicates that the knowledge required for interpreting an NP is accessible – that is, either already active or, if not, then currently available and able to be activated – somewhere in the dynamic configuration of spaces. (Epstein 2001: 345)

The author refers to the work of Morgan (1978), for whom all uses of *the* are characterized by a "convention of language" (i.e. convention based on the knowledge of English), whereas each specific function of *the* is characterized by a "convention of usage", i.e. "a cultural convention about the use of language,

not part of the language itself" (Morgan 1978: 268).[30] In Epstein's terms, each specific function of *the* must be determined in each local context, grammatically and pragmatically, the global meaning being simply a signal of (low) accessibility (cf. Epstein 2001: 348).

The idea of *the* indicating low accessibility is taken from Ariel's (1990, 2001) accessibility theory, in which four accessibility-affecting factors are identified (Ariel 1990: 22-30):[31]

(i) recency of mention: the more recent the last mention, the more accessible the entity;
(ii) physical or discourse salience;
(iii) competition (the salience of an entity relative to that of other entities of that kind in a given context);
(iv) unity (whether the antecedent is in the same paragraph/frame/point of view as the anaphor).

Ariel proposes an accessibility hierarchy, in which definite descriptions are markers of relatively low accessibility (proper names are the lowest). In the words of Abbott (2004: 137), "the more accessible a referent is, the less the descriptive information which needs to be included in the NP".[32] On this account, definite descriptions, which mark low accessibility, trigger complex access paths because they involve many elements, mental spaces and connections between them, whereas descriptions of high accessibility, such as pronouns, are shorter and more direct (with the limiting case of zero pronouns, as in *Open ø in case of fire*). With definite descriptions, the information necessary for the identification of the referent usually has to be sought beyond the NP. For example, the identification of *the book* in *I bought the book* relies on the context, situation or broader discourse,[33] whereas in *I bought a book* no such knowledge is required (Epstein 2001: 345).[34]

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[30] Cf. the difference between the English *Cows are useful animals* and Spanish *Las vacas son unos animales utiles* (I thank Agnieszka Bryła-Cruz for this example) or *Mary likes sharpened pencils* vs. the French *Marie aime les crayons bien taillés* (Abbott 2009). The differences between the articles in English vs. in Spanish and French are discussed in Bolinger (1975: 182-185) and Ch. Lyons (1999: 192-193), respectively.

[31] The conception of *the* as an accessibility device is not new (cf. Garrod and Sanford 1982; Givón 1992; Gundel, Hedberg and Zacharski 1993; Kempson 1986; McCawley 1979: 387) but Epstein exemplifies it with natural data, representing various communicative and rhetorical purposes.

[32] The idea of the degrees of accessibility is also capitalized on by Chafe (1994), who talks about activation levels in discourse: given information is the active level, accessible information is the semi-active level, and new information is the inactive level.

[33] Expressions of the type *the richest man in America* are exceptional in that the relevant information is actually contained in the NP itself.

[34] The importance of the notion of accessibility can be seen in the following account.

The bulk of Epstein's work, however, concerns the use of *the* in situations when speakers introduce a new discourse referent, associated "on the fly" with a certain frame in an *ad hoc* manner. Thus, the notions of unique identifiability and familiarity "are neither necessary nor sufficient for felicitous use of the article" (Epstein 2001: 334). This parallels Hawkins' (1991: 413) statement that "the existence and uniqueness of a definite referent … should always be mutually manifest in actual language use, but not necessarily mutually known in advance". In other words, inferences must be made by the hearer, who is given little choice and has to "buy" what is offered: the presence of *the* means that there must be a connection "between the discourse entity set up by the NP and other less highly activated assumptions" (Epstein 2001: 346). Since the nature of these connections is not provided by *the* itself but by the broader context, different access paths and consequently different interpretations are possible. As an example, consider a fragment of a review of the film *Genesis* (1986) by Mrinal Sen (in Epstein 2001: 368, for an EVT account cf. Chapter 5, example (5-28)):

(3-3) The film's setting and the story both have a mystic simplicity. In the aftermath of a drought that leaves most people surviving by selling themselves into lifelong servitude, a farmer and a weaver escape and set up residence in a desert ghost town. Their only contact with the outside world is a trader who keeps them in debt to him while also keeping them supplied with essentials.

Then **the woman** arrives, like a fleeing animal. Her family has been killed in a flood. She doesn't ask to stay, but they feel guilty after they rebuff her ("our first sin", they call it) and invite her to share their refuge ... And so begins the slow spiral toward a disaster as ineluctable, no doubt, as the eternal cycles of drought and flood. (*Spectator*, Raleigh, NC, 14 Feb 1996, pp. 11-12)

Christophersen (1939: 29) observes that there is "a certain aversion to the use of the *the*-form immediately after the word is introduced ... The greater the distance between the first mention and the resumption of a word, the easier it is to use it in *the*-form the second time". Thus (examples from Epstein 2001: 340), (a) *There is a cat in the yard. It's eating a mouse* is natural, whereas (b) *There is a cat in the yard. *The cat is eating a mouse* is not. The referents of both *it* and *the cat* have just been introduced into the discourse and are uniquely identifiable and familiar but *the cat* is the topic of the initial sentence and so highly accessible. This is why the second sentence sounds better if it contains a high-accessibility element, such as a pronoun, not a low-accessibility *the*. Epstein (2001: 340) concludes that neither unique identifiability nor familiarity are sufficient for determining when *the* will be appropriate. (But cf. Epstein's (2001: 345) other example: *There's a cat and a dog in the yard. The cat is eating a mouse.* The presence of *a dog* weakens the accessibility of the cat, hence the definite article is natural and it is the pronoun *it* that would be inappropriate or ambiguous here.)

Epstein lists four interpretations of the discourse-initial *the woman*:

(i) a highly topical or prominent entity in subsequent discourse (i.e. the importance of that character is anticipated);
(ii) the role "woman" in the story of creation (cf. the film's title, the reference to sin, the fall of men), originally realized by the biblical Eve);
(iii) a combination of the two interpretations: a discourse-prominent role;
(iv) no link to the biblical story, the role emerges from the use of *the* solely in current discourse (this interpretation, however, seems unconvincing, for one would have to assume that there is a role of "the woman" as such, which is dubious).

The reason why these different readings arise even when there are not any structural ambiguities is that although *the* allows one to set up an access path through a configuration of mental spaces, "the exact nature of the path is underspecified" (Epstein 2001: 367). The way in which spaces are constructed and accessed is "through the attribution of differing degrees of *prominence* to elements or through the use of viewpoint or viewpoint shifts" (Epstein 1999: 68).

Crucially, then, speakers select *the* for a number of reasons. They

> do not establish the existence of discourse referents in a neutral and homogeneous fashion. Rather, they attempt to induce addressees to accept entities into the discourse under distinct conceptual guises. These guises represent a variety of functions that speakers manipulate for their own specific communicative and rhetorical goals ... The choice of determiner... is an important means by which speakers achieve these goals. (Epstein 2001: 347)

An issue in itself is the already mentioned concept of *role* (Barwise and Perry's (1983: 150-151) "value-free" interpretation). Consider the examples in (3-4):

(3-4)

(a) The President is elected every four years. (role)
(b) The President is giving a speech tonight. (value)
(c) The President has a hard job. (role or value)

In all three cases, *the* is rendered possible on first mention through shared cultural knowledge. Langacker (1991b: 72) talks about roles as being characterized with respect to a world type. In examples above, (3-4a) relates to the type of the world which involves the existence of the office of president, whereas (3-4b) expresses a value with respect to a world instance (this particular instance

of the type). *The* is appropriate in either case: uniqueness is specified relative either to type or to instance.[35]

Epstein (2000) also quotes Ojeda's (1993) examples *A dog bit me on the finger* or *Johnny wrote on the living-room wall*. These are frame-based role NPs, i.e. non-unique entities (I have five fingers, rooms have four walls) but felicitous as long as the identity of the precise values of these roles (which finger? which wall?) is irrelevant for the addressee. Therefore, according to Du Bois (1980: 233), the sentence **Mary scribbled on a living-room wall* is "unnaturally imprecise" and seems to imply that the hearer might potentially care which wall it was. The definite descriptions in *The bank of the Thames is the personal property of the Queen* (Birner and Ward 1994) or *She shot herself in the foot* (Abbott 2009: 186), contrary to their appearance, are not locations but identifying descriptions. The use of *a* there would bring too much attention to location (Du Bois 1980); cf. Chapter 6, examples (6-15)–(6-17).

Roles invoked by *the*, according to Epstein, can be linked to frames via stereotypes, as in (3-5):

(3-5) Like sex, crime can be brief and messy: more about building and aftermath than event and arrival. So **the gun** is fired, **the police officer** dies, and **the diamonds** are stolen. So what happened afterward and how did the relevant players get there, in what kind of car, and did they wear clean underwear? (*New York Times*, 11 Sep 1994, sec. 2 p. 27)

These are indirect anaphora: the trigger is *crime*, new information is linked to it via stereotypical associations with *the gun*, *the police officer*, *the diamonds* (certainly, these elements are not necessary). But the linking to a frame need not involve a stereotype; cf. (3-6):

(3-6) Conservatives never really liked or trusted Nixon the way they did, say, Ronald Reagan. And many liberals already feel disappointed, if not betrayed, by Clinton. But there is more to the distrust than ideology. A lot of it is purely personal. With Nixon, **the joke** was, "Would you buy a used car from this man?" With Clinton, it's endless variations on, "I didn't inhale." (*Los Angeles Times*, May 1, 1994, p. M6, Epstein 2000: 61)

[35] The role/value distinction is a special case of type/instance distinction but not equivalent to it (Langacker 1991b: 73). Langacker also notes that Donnellan's (1966) attributive vs. referential use of definite descriptions (see section 1.2.1) is a special case of the role/value distinction.

The joke sets up an ad hoc role "standard joke about the current President". The frame does not exist outside the current discourse: it is created in the local context in order to compare the two presidents (the role can have different values, e.g. Nixon, Clinton etc.).

There are also creative uses of *the* not linked to roles. Thus, *the* may convey the prominence of the referent or establish the viewpoint of a participant (without regard to the hearer's viewpoint). In practice, they are often correlated, though in principle they need not be. Prominence is closely related to point of view because a discourse entity can only be conceptualized as prominent from someone's perspective (Epstein 2001: 373). On the other hand, the reverse is not necessarily true: entities introduced from a non-canonical point of view need not be constructed as discourse-prominent – hence are treated as distinct though related functions. Consider example (3-7):

(3-7) The decision by FoxVideo to go with a widescreen format doesn't, however, satisfy Gary Reber, editor and publisher of Murrieta, Calif.-based Widescreen Review. "Mohicans," he said, is in a widescreen format, but not **the widescreen format** – meaning the so-called letterbox format. (*Los Angeles Times*, March 12, 1993, p. F27; Epstein 1998: 193)

The *a* vs. *the* distinction marks the relative importance of widescreen formats (arbitrary representative vs. superior quality): *the* is emphatic, used next to *a* for contrastive purposes (Epstein 2001: 352; but cf. much earlier accounts in Christophersen 1939: 111 or Jespersen 1949: 406). *The* does not mark the format as uniquely identifiable: the writer has to specify it for the reader (cf. *so-called*) so prominence is a more significant factor here than unique identifiability.[36] The use of *the* signals here "speaker reference", i.e. "what the speaker has in mind" (Donnellan 1978: 48), related by Donnellan in the following manner: "the speaker intends to refer to something and intends his audience to recognize his reference in part through his having used that definite description" (Donnellan 1978: 53). But speaker reference is in a sense speaker's viewpoint,

[36] This analysis is different from Abbott's (2004: 125) account of *That wasn't **a** reason I left Pittsburgh, it was **the** reason*. For that author, "the stress on each article brings forward a contrast between uniqueness vs. non-uniqueness". Epstein admits that *the* often marks *both* prominence and unique identifiability, as in *You met* the *Bill Clinton?* I would say, however, that this in fact is not the case: *the* in the last example is redundant for unique identifiability since the individual is sufficiently identifiable through proper name. Rather, *the* assigns prominence or importance to the individual, marks him as significant in the eyes of the speaker and/or hearer. Thus, the example in effect augments Epstein's point.

against which the hearer does not protest, recognizes the speaker's intentions and accepts the referent into the discourse (Epstein 1998: 197).

Epstein (1998: 194) also notes that *the* is used to mark prominence of a referent which plays an important role in subsequent discourse, e.g. in initial fragments of literary narratives, as in H. G. Wells' *The Invisible Man*: *The stranger came early in February* (cf. Christophersen 1939: 29). Clark and Haviland (1977: 7-8) call it *addition* and the use is sometimes attributed to literary convention (Lambrecht 1994: 197). Discourse-initial *the* is by no means limited to literary contexts or beginnings of narratives. Consider example (3-8):

(3-8) In other countries, soccer is **the sport**. If the national team loses, there could be a coup. (*Los Angeles Times*, May 6, 1994, p. C9; Epstein 1999: 64, emphasis original)

The sport is here the only sport worth knowing or taking interest in, the sport of great prominence or importance. This for Epstein (1996) is an *expressive* function of *the*, expressivity being "the foregrounding of a speaker's own involvement in an utterance, including subjective evaluation, special emphasis, surprise, admiration etc." (Hanks 1992: 49-50). Thus, it is an indication of the speaker's viewpoint in speaker-oriented discourse.[37]

Another example of speaker-oriented discourse is (3-9):

(3-9) ... most Los Angeles drivers regard the sight of a person standing in a crosswalk as an optional stop, not a required one. They might stop, but only if they are feeling especially gracious and aren't too busy putting on lipstick, checking their hair plugs in the rear-view mirror or chatting on the car-phone.

I have no idea what **the guy in the Mercedes** was doing when we entered the crosswalk.

On the day in question, we were plodding westward and were halfway across the intersection when a black southbound Mercedes seemed as if it were going to barrel right through the crosswalk, and – by extension – us.

[37] Abbott (1999: 3) treats this usage as prominent through hyperbole. *The* suggests uniqueness: soccer is the only sport. Because this is not true, there is a reclassification of *the sport* as a highly prominent sport.

> At the last minute, the driver slammed on his breaks. The nose of his car came to a stop rather too close to our calves for comfort. (*Los Angeles Times*, June 5, 1994, p. E1; Epstein 1996: 104-105)

The speaker foreshadows the importance of the driver in subsequent discourse so again *the* has expressive function (speaker's personal attitude) and is a marker of prominence. The hearer must accept the speaker's viewpoint and await explanation.

A characteristic context for the use of *the* with unfamiliar referents is modern poetry. Epstein (1998: 204; 2001: 351) refers to the work of Katz, who says that "[m]odern poets' use of definite NPs to refer to objects that are unfamiliar or obscure to the reader has become a canonical part of poetic language" (Katz 1991: 3). An example is the poem *Bonus* (1985) by A. R. Ammons, cited in Katz (1991: 143):

(3-10)

> **The hemlocks** slumped
> already as if bewailing
> the branch-loading
>
> shales of ice, the rain
> changes and a snow
> sifty as fog
>
> begins to fall, brightening
> the ice's bruise-glimmer
> with white holdings:
>
> the hemlocks, muffled,
> deepen to the grim
> taking of a further beauty on.

Katz (1991: 147) observes that the use of *the* upon first reference to hemlocks puts them in focus. The use of indefinite NPs would imply that the poem will be about a scene "of which the trees are only a part". Here, new information is introduced with a definite NP without readers expecting the poem to explain the usage.

Thus, *the* codes prominence, while *a/an* or nil – do not. Although both *the* and *a*/nil may be used to introduce a new entity, with *the* the hearer expects that entity to be the focus of subsequent discourse (the hearer forms an incomplete mental representation of the entity but expects it to be elaborated as the discourse develops). (3-11) is an example of a lack of prominence, resulting from the use of *a*:

(3-11) With lust in his heart for a Nobel Prize, Jimmy Carter undermined Bill Clinton's resolve and turned a triumph of American strength in Haiti into a fiasco of wimpish indecision ... Carter, with no authority, offered the junta a broker, then enlisted Sam Nunn and Colin Powell, then confronted **a** [the?] **President panicked by the prospect of using force**; the passive Clinton permitted the negotiation of major concessions while pretending he was permitting only "modalities" of eviction. (*New York Times*, Sep 22, 1994, p. A19; Epstein 1996: 108)

The expression *a President panicked by the prospect of using force* can have a role or a value reading. A role reading results from the fact that it resembles new information; the value interpretation results from the use of the past tense *confronted*, which suggests a specific individual, Clinton, topical and mentioned before. However, although he is uniquely identifiable, *the* would be strange because being panicked is a non-permanent (i.e. non-prominent) property of Clinton's character. The use of *a*, i.e. the lack of prominence, does not allow access to the figure of Clinton previously set up in the discourse.

A somewhat different case is (3-12):

(3-12) In supporting the positions of the Christian right, Bush seemed to be stepping out of character. It was hard for anyone to believe that **a** [the?] **Connecticut-born, Yale-bred Episcopalian** wanted to wage religious war against fellow Americans. (*Los Angeles Times Magazine*, Nov 29, 1992, p. 30; Epstein 1996: 108)

Here, too, there is new information and role-or-value reading but *the* is in fact possible: the phrase is a description of a prominent aspect of Bush's character. This allows access back to the figure of Bush set up before in the discourse. Thus, it is prominence (or lack thereof) rather than unique identifiability (which obtains in both (3-11) and (3-12)), that is the driving force behind the use of *the* or *a/an*.

Other viewpoints marked by the use of *the* include the viewpoint of the protagonist or the narrator. The former case can be exemplified with the beginning of Hemingway's *Big Two-Hearted River*:

(3-13) **The** train went up **the** track out of sight, around one of **the** hills of burnt timber. Nick sat down ... ("Big Two-Hearted River", in Hemingway 1986 [1925]: 133)

The elements marked with *the* are identifiable to the protagonist, Nick, but not to the reader. Chafe (1994: 283-284) remarks that "[t]here is evidently no point in asking with whom the knowledge of the train or the track was to be shared": it is "protagonist-oriented identifiability". Epstein analyses the passage in terms of Mental Spaces: Nick's space is set up and embedded under the base space (the space of the story) – the train, the track and the hills belong to Nick's space as part of his perception. They are also linked to their counterparts in B (the base space) since they also belong to the world of the story. (A fuller account of this use is Głaz 2009b; in Chapter 5 here I offer an EVT modelling.).

Another instance of a protagonist's viewpoint is example (3-14):

(3-14) The young people working the potato fields ... seem to be learning the value of money.

Jonah Alexander, 14, whose father is a doctor from Brooklyn, said picking potatoes was helping to pay for **the cow he bought** recently for $300. (*New York Times*, Oct 7, 1994, p. A9; Epstein 1996: 107)

Jonah's viewpoint is indicated through the use of *the* and tense shift in *the cow he bought*. Similarly in example (3-15):

(3-15) But when she [Barbara Wolfe] talks about life in Cobb County, she has mostly good things to say. She loves **the hills** and **the trees**, **the friendliness** of **the people**, **the good schools**, **the affordability of housing**, even to a point **the Sunday-school manners** and well-scrubbed sensibilities. (*New York Times*, Aug 1, 1994, p. A10; Epstein 1996: 107)

Barbara Wolfe's viewpoint is indicated not only through *the* but also the evaluative expressions *friendliness*, *good* and *Sunday-school*.

In (3-16) below, which exemplifies a non-referential use of *the*, the article has a dual function: it identifies the viewpoint of the protagonist (the penguin

design is identifiable only to him) and is used expressively to mark the importance of the blanket to that protagonist:

(3-16) Sierra Madre resident Andy Dotson might not have needed to breach security barricades to return to his threatened home. He had forgotten his tattered, 19-year-old blanket with **the distinctive penguin design**.

"The kinds and the animals are my security blanket, they come first," he said. "But my family didn't get [the blanket], so I went back there. It means something to me. I was gonna bust through the barricades if I had to ... (*Los Angeles Times*, Oct 30, 1993, p. A10; Epstein 1996: 107-108; 2001: 365)

It is instructive to note, therefore, that the viewpoint of the protagonist is conveyed not only through the definite article but also via other means: demonstratives, lexical choices, etc., i.e. "different kinds of grammatical, lexical, and pragmatic information" (Epstein 2001: 366-367).

Finally, there are examples of *the* marking the narrator's viewpoint. For Stanzel (1981: 11), the definiteness "suggests that the first mention of a thing, event or person already presupposes familiarity; this is justified only if they are looked at from the point of view of a reflector-character [i.e., a narrator], but not from the reader's angle of vision". Consider (3-17):

(3-17) In the late summer of **that year** we lived in a house in a village that looked across **the river** and **the plain** to **the mountains**. (Hemingway, *A Farewell to Arms*, 1929, opening sentence)[38]

This referential use of *the* marks the viewpoint of a fictional narrator (cf. Cutrer 1994, ch. 7), rather than of the protagonist, although it is a first-person narration. But this can happen only in concert with other elements of the text, notably the use of *that year*, which marks a detached temporal position. In other cases, the use of *the* and other diction marks a merged narrator-protagonist viewpoint, as in Ezra Pound's *In a Station of the Metro*:

(3-18)

The apparition of these faces in the crowd;

[38] Detailed discussions of the use of articles in this opening passage are provided by Gibson (1966: 28-41) and Ong (1975: 12-15).

Petals on a wet, black, bough.
(first published in *Poetry*, 1913)

Katz (1991: 36) suggests that the speaker might be on a moving train looking at the faces of the people on the platform; the faces appear suddenly, they are indistinct and pale against the darker background of the station. Recall, similarly, that the use of *the* in the beginning of *Big Two-Hearted River* (example (3-13) above) is a manifestation of the protagonist's viewpoint, as well as, possibly, the third-person narrator's.

To conclude, Epstein's preoccupation with untypical, apparently illogical or otherwise surprising first-mention definites aims to show that any comprehensive theory of definiteness must involve the notion of viewpoint as an important element. In short, *the* does not only indicate who, what or which (cf. Searle 1969: 27) but also how (a referent is construed) or why (it is construed that way). Definite referring expressions involve "pragmatic or rhetorical purposes beyond reference" (Epstein 1998: 191).

This rather comprehensive account of Epstein's views on the roles and functions of *the* concludes the section on the definite article. The next section will offer a somewhat more succinct survey of the approaches to the indefinite article in English.

2. The indefinite article

In this section, preliminary comments on the status of the English indefinite article *a/an* will be, similarly to the above, followed by a somewhat more detailed approach represented by selected authors.

The literature on indefinites is much less extensive than on definites. But indefiniteness, similarly to definiteness, is far from homogeneous and, quite naturally, very often the two are considered together. However, views on the distinction differ. According to e.g. Leech (1983: 20), it is basically pragmatic in nature, whereas for Hawkins (1991) it is pragmatic *and* logical (centres around the notion of uniqueness): pragmatic implicatures operate on logical representations.

The English indefinite article may be ambiguous between specific and non-specific readings, both being indefinite: definiteness and specificity are distinct criteria. Consider Karttunen's (1969, example 20a) *I talked with a logician*. On the specific reading, the sentence says something about *who* the speaker talked to,

whereas on the non-specific reading, it says something about the *kind of person* the speaker talked to.

The two interpretations are often discussed in relation to sentences of the type *John would like to marry a girl his parents don't approve of* (cf. a brief survey in Partee 1970). For example, Fillmore (1967) suggests the existence of two indefinite articles, [+ specific] and [- specific]; Donnellan (1966) talks about a *referential* vs. an *attributive* use; other authors attribute the ambiguity to the scope of the existential quantifier. For Ludlow and Neale (1991), the difference results from whether the speaker has a particular individual in mind or not. Partee (1970) notes that the ambiguity is also related to the use of the verb in the sentence (*would like to*) and basically disappears if another verb or a different tense is used (*John married a girl his parents don't approve of* – a specific reading only).

Relating to a different example, Fodor and Sag (1982) talk about a *quantificational* vs. *referential reading*. Thus, the sentence *A student in the syntax class cheated on the final exam* considered in quantificational terms is about the set of students who cheated: the set is not empty. Considered in referential terms, it is an assertion relating to a particular student (who, however, remains unidentified): the assertion that that student cheated. (Ambiguities of this kind are dealt with in terms of EVT in Chapter 4).

Below I survey the views on the English indefinite article offered by selected authors. This will be followed by a similar overview of cognitive linguistic approaches to the problem.

2.1 Individual accounts of *a/an*

2.1.1 Russell and Ludlow & Neale

A most influential account of indefinites is a quantificational (non-referential) interpretation by Russell (1905, 1919), later supported by Ludlow and Neale (1991). Thus, *a man from York* is non-referring but *Jones* (assuming that Jones is a man from York) is. *A man from York* need not be understood as referring to the same individual as *Jones* (*I met a man from York last night* is different from *I met Jones last night*) or to anyone (if there are no men from York). In fact, Ludlow and Neale modify Russell's account slightly and say that indefinites are not *always* referring but can have referring *uses*. More precisely, these can be quantificational, referring, specific *or* (sic!) definite.

A purely quantificational use is e.g. *An auditor is coming to see me today*. A referring use may be *Look! A man is uprooting your turnips.* (Crucially for the

argument, it is not a referring *expression* because it is perfectly well understood even if the hearer has no clear view of the garden.) A specific use may be the already mentioned *An auditor is coming to see me today*, when I have in mind the same auditor as last time, which the hearer need not know about and which is irrelevant for what I want to communicate.[39] Finally, a definite use (of an indefinite marker!) is e.g. *A jewellery thief paid me a visit this morning*, spoken in a situation when there have been cases of jewellery thefts in the neighbourhood by an unknown individual.

Similar conclusions are drawn from considerations of indefiniteness and scope (cf. Kripke 1977 or Higginbotham 1988). In *John thinks a student of mine cheated*, *a student of mine* has wide scope (an unknown student) or narrow scope (x is a student of mine and that individual cheated). For Ludlow and Neale, these, again, are merely *uses* of the indefinite. The authors devote much attention to the refutation of Fodor and Sag's (1982) arguments that indefinites have semantically distinct referential interpretations. They argue that indefiniteness and various types of anaphora also speak for Russell. The authors conclude (p. 200) that indefinites need not involve a semantic referential interpretation but referential *uses*.

2.1.2 Hawkins

Hawkins's (1978, 1991) account of indefinites is opposed in spirit to Russell and Ludlow and Neale above, as it proposes what those other authors reject: semantically-driven interpretations of indefinites, including referring (or non-referring), specific vs. non-specific, wide-scope vs. narrow-scope or generic vs. non-generic interpretations.

A/an is most naturally interpreted as referring to a member of an immediately available set: *Pass me a bucket* (i.e. one of those here) or *A senator resigns* (if in a US newspaper: a US senator). However, in a category of uses (e.g. *Fetch me a bucket*) there is an implication of movement from a distance and the implicature does not hold (Hawkins 1991: 417). *A/an* may also be linked to association sets, as in *Fred lost a leg*, i.e. his leg. The immediate associations may be cancelled, as in *Fred lost a leg in the war – not his own, he was the camp doctor!* Indefinites may even exist within a previous discourse set. The mini-discourse *I met some students before the class. A student came to see me after class as well* is vague

[39] Ludlow and Neale further distinguish between strongly and weakly specific uses of the indefinite; cf. Chapter 6, section 2.

as to whether this was the same student or not. But it can be disambiguated: *In fact, it was the same student*. (For an EVT account of this mini-discourse cf. Chapter 5, example (5-8).)

Hawkins (1991: 421) compares the indefinite and the definite articles in parallel contexts: *England has a prime minister, and America has a president* (membership within the universe of discourse) vs. *England has the prime minister, and America has the president* (unique offices in the countries mentioned or specific individuals, currently holding the offices – recall the role vs. value distinction).

Furthermore, Hawkins (1991) proposes an account of articles in terms of Grice's (1975) maxims and Levinson's (1987a,b) conversational implicatures: while *the* entails uniqueness, *a* and *some* implicate the opposite in a conversational setting. Hawkins (1991: 436) gives two alternatives for the explanation of the *the/a* contrast: one is a grammatical mechanism (a generativist solution) which prevents *a* from occurring in e.g. *The/*A wisest king of France*, the other is a pragmatic account, according to which both options are generated by grammar and then conversational implicatures reject *a* in performance. The author is more satisfied with the latter solution: what grammar allows may be disallowed by pragmatic factors, so it is in fact ungrammatical rather than merely unacceptable (Hawkins 1991: 438). With this approach, Hawkins strives to propose an integrated account of language levels, in which pragmatic factors are in effect grammatical ones.

2.1.3 Leech

Leech (1983) treats *the* and *a/an* as an example of a pair of operators introducing a strong or a weak proposition, respectively, linked by entailments. For example, *Sally is the secretary* entails *Sally is a secretary* (p. 90) but not the opposite. But also, as has been stated above, the author's account of the articles is part and parcel pragmatic: he points to the various implicature and maxim-flouting mechanisms (Grice 1975) in the workings of *the* and *a/an*. If *the* is definite, *a/an* is defined negatively in opposition to *the* by the absence of the feature of 'definiteness'. Hence in the following exchange, everything works logically but not pragmatically (unless with an intended humorous or misleading effect), i.e. it involves the breaking of the Maxim of Quantity (too little information) but not the Maxim of Quality (the information is strictly speaking correct):

(3-19)

Steven: Wilfrid is meeting **a woman** for dinner tonight.

Susan: Does his wife know about it?
Steven: Of course she does. The woman he is meeting is his wife.
(Clark and Clark 1977: 122)

One might add that the inappropriateness of referring to Wilfrid's wife as *a woman* results from the adoption of a specific point of view. The individual *is* a woman objectively but for Wilfrid she is *his wife*, perhaps *his woman*, though the latter is also problematic, cf. a possible exchange: *Wilfrid is meeting his woman for dinner tonight – I didn't know he was seeing a woman!/I didn't know he had a lover!* Thus, Steven's half-jocular utterance involves a play on two viewpoints: that of Wilfrid and that of an objective external observer, unfamiliar with the relationship between Wilfrid and the woman being invoked.

If the example above involves the adoption of *someone's* point of view, the indefinite article may also indicate point of view in the sense of the speaker's judgements of and attitudes to a given situation. Consider example (3-20):

(3-20)
Mary: I've lost **a diamond ring**.
Bill: Well, Julie was wearing **a diamond ring** this morning.
(Leech 1983: 93)

Leech points out that by not co-referring to the ring, Bill superficially violates the Maxim of Quantity. Apparently, he is loath to implicate Julie directly but nevertheless does suggest she might have something to do with Mary's ring by merely mentioning the fact of her wearing *a* ring. He thus adopts a seemingly objective and detached position, which nevertheless reveals his unexpressed suspicions. Leech concludes his divagation with a very apt remark that the use of articles involves "a close inter-relationship between referential pragmatics … and interpersonal pragmatics" (p. 93).

2.2 *A/an* in cognitive linguistics

The essence of the cognitive linguistic enterprise it to seek cognitive motivation for the use of specific linguistic forms. The motivation for the use of *a/an*, to put it in general and perhaps somewhat simplistic terms, is sought in the speaker's intention to mark the lack of mental access to the identity of a given entity. That lack may result from the speaker's situation, the speaker's emphatic

adoption of the hearer's position, or the desire to downplay the access, which may be objectively attainable. These schematic observations will now be made more specific with reference to Cognitive Grammar and Mental Spaces theory.

2.2.1 Cognitive Grammar

Within Langacker's Cognitive Grammar it is claimed that in English there are more indefinite grounding elements than definite: *a/an*, *some* [səm] and Ø are all indefinites. Of these, the indefinite article is a diagnostic for determining the status of a noun as a count noun (Langacker 2008: 129) – so the article is an element in the system of determiners, which in turn is a method of testing for countability (cf. the discussion on Allan's work in Chapter 2, section 3.6.4). In Cognitive Grammar, *a/an* is said to profile "a schematically characterized bounded region (equivalent to the semantic pole of the count-mass schema)" (Langacker 1991b: 103). Thus, *a/an* profiles a discrete thing; the nominal establishes mental contact between the given entity and the hearer but the nominal itself is insufficient for the choice of the entity to be unique (cf. Hawkins 1978) (cf. above for an account of *the* in terms of mental contact).

Langacker (2008: 287) takes the grammatical terminology to be non-arbitrary and agrees that *indefinite* means "not definite" so that the characterization of indefiniteness rests on a prior characterization of definiteness. More specifically, the author claims that *a* is used when the conditions for using *the* are not satisfied, i.e. *the* indicates that "just one eligible candidate is available" and *a* that "this is not the case" (Langacker 2008: 287).[40] He nevertheless admits that "the availability of just a single eligible candidate is often purely contingent", depending on the context or prior discourse (Langacker 2008: 288). The context plays the major role in *Be careful not to step on a/the snail*: *the* is used in a situation when only one snail is visually evident, whereas *a* when the condition is not fulfilled (e.g. there are multiple snails or no snails are visually evident). Prior discourse, in turn, is decisive in *In the room were a puppy and three kittens. She picked up the puppy* – only one puppy is available. **The frog* is inappropriate because none is available and **the kitten* because there is more than one. Furthermore, the distinction sometimes results from our general knowledge (Langacker 2008: 287), as in *I can't use my computer – the keyboard is malfunctioning* vs. *I can't use my*

[40] However, judgements vary. For example, Langacker (1991b: 104) treats *Hand me a wrench*! as the only option when there are several of those lying about (**the wrench* being inappropriate), but for Ch. Lyons (1980) *Pass me the spanner, will you?* (e.g. one out of three) is acceptable in the sense 'the one that fits the nut I'm dealing with'.

keyboard – a key is malfunctioning. As clause-external topics, only definites are possible: *The puppy/*A puppy, it's shaking*, unless the clause pertains to something other than an individual: *A kitten, I really want one* (Langacker 2008: 289).

The definite-indefinite distinction is correlated with *actual* vs. *virtual/fictive* referents, respectively, when considered *locally* vs. *provisionally* (Langacker 2008: 289-290). (A local application of an article is when it applies to the nominal itself, regardless of the clause containing it or a larger structure; whereas a provisional application is when the referent's status as actual or virtual can be overridden at these higher levels of organization.) Definite descriptions are usually actual (*She wants the puppy*) unless actuality is overridden and virtuality ensues (*If a girl sees a puppy and she wants the puppy, she can usually find a way to get it*). Conversely, indefinite descriptions are virtual by default (*She wants a puppy*; *My brother doesn't have a car*) but may have an actual meaning when virtuality is overridden in context (*She wants a puppy. She saw it at the animal shelter*; *She found a puppy*) (Langacker 2008: 36).[41]

In Langacker (1991b: 69-71) the author contrast the indefinite singular, indefinite plural and generic nominals in terms of identity. Thus, *A wombat is a mammal* involves an identity relation in physical space between an arbitrary instance of each of the two categories (of wombats and mammals) – this involves indefinite and specific instances. In *Wombats are mammals* it is sets rather than instances that are selected for identity. Next, *The okapi is a mammal* involves an identity relation pertaining to the type space associated with *mammal*: the animal called *okapi* is a certain type of animal (definite because unique) found in the type space of *mammal* – it is one of the types, an arbitrary instance, therefore indefinite. Finally, *The okapi and the wombat are two mammals* designates a set of types (okapi and wombat, each being definite because unique), not single types or arbitrary instances of the mammal category.[42]

[41] Cf. the *date a Norwegian* example (4-30) in Chapter 4, where either interpretation is possible. In Langacker 1991b (103-104) this is treated as *specific* vs. *non-specific* interpretation. If specific, the speaker has some pre-existing mental contact with the thing, if non-specific, it is an arbitrary instance of the type, conjured up for an immediate purpose and without any status outside that mental space. For example, in *A beaver builds dams* (Langacker 1991b: 106), *a beaver* designates a representative, perhaps an imaginary instance of the type, conjured up for a generic statement: a mental space as a part of the conception of "how the world is structured" (so the statement can be continued within the same space, e.g. *... it normally needs three weeks to finish one*, but not in reality space: **... It finished one last night*). (Some authors regard this usage as ungrammatical because it is not sensible to make a proposition about a virtual entity as subject.)

The non-specific use of *a* is similar to *any*, which is necessarily a non-specific and an arbitrary instance of the type (Langacker 1991b: 138). The two usages are contrasted in my EVT analysis in chapter 4.

[42] This contrasts with Halliday and Hasan's *The snail is considered a great delicacy in this region*,

If Langacker uses the notions of physical or type space in a selected portion of his theory, mental spaces constitute the very essence of Fauconnier's approach to language, including the use of the indefinite article.

2.2.2 Mental Spaces

Fauconnier defines the function of the indefinite article thus: "The noun phrase *a N* in a linguistic expression sets up a new element *w* in some space, such that "N"(*w*) holds in that space" (1994: 20). The resolution of a possible ambiguity between specific vs. non-specific interpretation depends on factors other than the article itself (cf. Partee 1970 above), as in Fauconnier's French examples (which, nevertheless, well parallels the English usage): *Marie veut que Gudule mette* (subj.) *une robe qui soit* (subj.) *jolie* (approx. 'Marie wants Gudule to put on a dress that would be nice/that would make her look nice') vs. *Marie veut que Gudule mette* (subj.) *une robe qui est* (ind.) *jolie* ('Marie wants Gudule to put on a dress that is nice') (p. 33). The use of the subjunctive throughout places the indefinite *une robe* in the "want" space and endows it with a non-specific reading, whereas the indicative mood places it in the reality space (specific reading). The indefinite article itself "preserves the same semantic function (introduction of a new element in discourse) in all cases" (Fauconnier 1994: 33). Similarly, in sentences of the sort *Ursula wants to marry a millionaire* (p. 57), *a millionaire* is either a role (in Ursula's "want" space) or a value (in reality space) (cf. the EVT account of examples in section 3.1.2d of Chapter 4).

A discussion of *a* vs. *the* in terms of the Mental Spaces theory is also offered by Sanders and Redeker (1996), who operate with the concept of perspectivization. Consider example (3-21):

(3-21) The police lost track of the car with the kidnapped girl. In the woods near Apeldorn, a policeman saw a man who had a girl with him. The kidnapper had released her on a nearby street. (Sanders and Redeker 1996: 303; the authors' translation of a report in Dutch from *de Volkskrant*, April 24, 1989)

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where *the snail* is said to refer to an individual snail as "a representative of the whole class"; it is homophoric reference, contrasted with "the situationally specific type" (1976: 71). However, as the authors themselves show, the contrast need not be absolute; in their constructed example *Look at the moon! The daytime moon always seems so sad*, the second *the* enjoys a triple classification: anaphoric to the moon, situationally exophoric (a specific object of attention) and homophorically exophoric (there is only one moon) (1976: 73-74).

This is an example of implicit perspective, restricted viewpoint, and embedded mental space: the wording and content are determined by the narrator but the indefinite *a girl* is an embedded perspective of the policeman. *The kidnapped girl* is first introduced by the narrator (Base space); *a policeman* sets up a new, "belief" space and from that space as viewpoint *a girl* is construed. The reader can suspect but cannot be certain of an identity relation between *the kidnapped girl* and *a girl*. One may add, supplementing Sanders and Redeker's somewhat incomplete analysis, that *the kidnapper had released her* is construed again from the narrator's perspective, by means of which the matter is resolved.

Example (3-22) illustrates the writer's choice of one perspective (a given mental space as viewpoint) over another:

(3-22)

a. Two suspected IRA members were arrested after being caught in a shooting exercise by armed Belgian civilians near the Belgian-Dutch border.
b. A third man, who managed to escape, is still wanted.
c. On Saturday afternoon, the police were called by a man who owns a house in the neighbourhood of Hoogstraten.
d. He had heard shooting in the woods near his house.
e. Accompanied by his son, the man went out to investigate, armed with a shotgun.
f. On their way they met three English-speaking tourists.
(Sanders and Redeker 1996: 306, 308; the authors' translation and adaptation of a report in Dutch in *de Volkskrant*, June 18, 1990)

In f the writer uses indefinite description, which indicates the mental space of the man, rather than the base mental space (the narrator's reality) as viewpoint. The narrator's perspective would have yielded a definite description, such as *On their way they met the three (suspected) IRA members*.

With these comments I conclude the brief survey of approaches to the indefinite article and move on to the nil article.

3. The nil article

The basic problem with the nil article or the non-use of article is the terminology: which of the terminological solutions best expresses its nature? Berezowski (2009) is a comprehensive critique of the term *zero article*,[43] a critique I basically accept. Sullivan (forthcoming) contributes to the argumentation from the perspective of the relational network approach. Both authors propose instead to talk about the absence of an article. While this is a theoretically well-supported option (cf. his justification below), it is rather awkward to use. Therefore, for convenience, I will consistently refer to the "nil" article, so as to avoid the non-neutral "zero" term, but will in fact understand by that the lack of an article. Contrary to Sullivan, however, I will assume that the notion of the nil article covers both bare singular and bare plural nouns (Sullivan talks about a zero allomorph with plural nouns). The reasons for this should become clear in Chapter 4, where nil-article (bare) plurals and nil-article singular nouns are shown to be manifestations of the non-discriminatory viewing mode, albeit of various strengths (SS, SS-, SS+).

Berezowski surveys the history of the zero-article approach and identifies the factors that have led to its relative popularity (authors who talk about bare nouns, the lack of an article etc. are less numerous, though they include the giants of linguistics, such as Sweet (1898), Poustma (1914-1929) or Bloomfield (1933), others being Christophersen (1939), Carlson (1977a), Berry (1993), Stvan (1993, 1998) or Huddleston and Pullum (2002)[44]). The major of these factors is a structuralist drive towards a neat system of oppositions and the conviction that every nominal must be preceded by an article. Thus, where no article appears, structuralists postulated a phonologically empty form that contrasted with the definite and indefinite forms. Berezowski then shows that the approach breaks down under the weight of data and proposes to dispense with the zero-approach altogether. I will now review some of the major views on the problem, basically following Berezowski's account, and close the section with the latter author's model of incomplete grammaticalization.

[43] Or, even more radically, *the zero article*. In a private conversation, Bill Sullivan has suggested that especially confusing is the *the* in *the zero article*: it suggests the actual existence of "that very thing".

[44] Jespersen (1949) is a terminologically confusing case, since he used the term "the bare word" but also "zero article", the latter mainly due to Nils Hailsund, who posthumously completed Jespersen's work (cf. Berezowski 2009: 4).

3.1 Individual accounts of the nil article

3.1.1 Jespersen

Jespersen's (1949) account of the article system in English rests on the notion of three degrees of familiarity (cf. Christophersen 1939) with the entity talked about, from (i) complete unfamiliarity, via (ii) nearly complete familiarity to (iii) complete familiarity. The indefinite article is used in the first case, the definite article in the second case. The account, however, is confusing in the sense that the zero article is claimed to be used in the two extreme cases, i.e. for both complete unfamiliarity (plural countable nominals) and complete familiarity (proper names, members of the family, meals etc.). It is hard to imagine a viable and non-arbitrary explanation of why and how this is the case.

3.1.2 Hewson

Hewson (1972), relating to the work of Gustave Guillaume, proposes a view of articles based on a contrast between the zero article and the overt articles. Articles are devices that obligatorily mediate between "the pure potential of *la langue* and its actualization in *la discours*" (Berezowski 2009: 28, Guillaume's terms). Thus, the surface absence of an article is evidence for its hidden presence. The zero article renders the given concept "a formless, non-numerical entity" (Hewson 1972: 77). How to account, however, for the use of the zero article with indefinite plurals such as *three kings*, which designate numerical entities having a specific form?

The account is also problematic because the zero article is obviously used with proper names, which usually, too, designate entities very far from formless. Hewson's solution is that because proper names in and by themselves maximally restrict their denotations, no further restriction (the primary function of the overt articles) is possible or desired, unless appropriately modified. But this leaves cases of the regular use of *the* with some proper names (*the Arctic*, *the Amazon*). In effect, the author deals with proper names in a rather inconsistent manner: they are claimed to be actualized by *the* with the exception of article-less names, treated as bare nouns (although these exceptional cases are in fact exemplary for proper names). In short, Hewson's approach poses a number of questions difficult to reconcile with the notion of the zero article.

3.1.3 Chesterman

Chesterman (1991) proposes a richer system of obligatorily used articles, consisting of two overt (*a*(*n*)/*the*) and two covert ones: the indefinite zero article (*music*, *milk*, *boys*) and the definite null article (*Trafalgar Square*, *Christmas Island*). The system rests on three variables (introduced by other authors, notably Hawkins and Guillaume, cf. Berezowski 2009: 33): locatability (the speaker's and hearer's ability to locate the referent in a shared set), inclusiveness (whether all or some members of the set are meant) and extensivity (whether the referent is abstract/schematic or concrete). The referent of a zero article nominal is a non-locatable set of at least two members, whereas that of the null article is a locatable one-member set. Both kinds of nominals are abstract, i.e. extensive. Thus, the major difference lies in the locatability of the set members: in the case of the zero article locating the set does not guarantee locating any of its members, whereas in the case of the null article it does, since there is only one member to locate.

Chesterman's approach is problematic because proper names, typically used with the null article, can also take the overt definite article, and often do so when the referent is unbounded in any clear way: *the English Channel*, *the Indian Ocean*. Faced with an intuition that the null article would be more appropriate here, the author acknowledges defeat: "It is a reasonable assumption that the various occurrences of null have something in common, although it is difficult to state precisely what this shared semantic feature is" (Chesterman 1991: 86). Also unexplained are cases when the null or the overt definite are used with cardinal or ordinal numbers, respectively: *on page six* vs. *on the sixth page* (cf. the EVT account in section 4.10 of Chapter 6). It is precisely the otherwise unexplained cases that are specifically addressed in Berezowski (2009), to which we now turn.

3.1.4 Berezowski

Berezowski (2009) presents a historically-grounded approach which he calls the incomplete grammaticalization model. Its basic premise is that articles arise through grammaticalization of lexical elements, which in English are the Old English numeral ān for the indefinite and the distal demonstratives *se*, *seo*, *þæt* for the definite article. The processes take place in stages and are implicational, i.e. at each stage the article gains a new function but preserves the previous functions. Grammaticalization is characterized by relaxing the usage

requirements, semantic bleaching and phonological erosion of the linguistic units undergoing the process. Crucially, it may or may not occur, can proceed at various rates or be halted at any stage (Heine, Claudi and Hünnemeyer 1991: 244, Hopper and Traugott 1993: 95, in Berezowski 2009: 42).

The English articles are a case in point: both the indefinite and the definite articles have not (yet?) reached the end of the scale and thus do not apply in many contexts with a number of nominals (Berezowski refers to grammaticalization stages proposed by Heine (1997) for the indefinite and Hawkins (2004) for the definite article). The indefinite article, for example, is not used with plural or uncountable nominals, as it is in Spanish, Catalan or Portuguese.[45] The definite article, in turn, is not used in contexts when the referent is known to the speaker but unidentifiable to the hearer (as it is in Samoan or Tongan) or for marking the noun class irrespective of whether the referent is identifiable or not (as in Swahili). The absence of an article, then, is a certain gap, a (yet) unfulfilled potential for either of the articles to realize it, should historical developments proceed further along the path. Quite naturally, it cannot be expected for these remaining usages to constitute a coherent category because they are a category through what they are *not* – although historically the gaps are non-accidental. Berezowski discusses in detail one specific subcategory of the no-article usages, namely predicate nominals designating functions performed by single individuals (*they elected him president*, *she was crowned queen*).

3.2 The nil article in cognitive linguistics

Berezowski's (2009) comment that the absence of an article receives little treatment in linguistics also applies to cognitive linguistics. In fact, the only mainstream theoretical cognitivist model that offers a systematic and comprehensive treatment of the phenomenon is Cognitive Grammar, other models either neglecting or only mentioning it in passing, perhaps in brief comparisons with *the*. For example, within Construction Grammar, Croft (2001: 124) merely hypothesizes that the absence of an article with mass nouns and in bare plurals

[45] It is interesting to consider in this light the treatment of *a* proposed by Bergen and Chang (2004) within their model of Embodied Construction Grammar. In *Mary tossed me a drink*, the article is treated as "semantically and formally inseparable from the referring expression", i.e. "tied to the context in which it precedes some category-denoting expression", a common noun. It then "refers to an individual of the specified category" (p. 161). Its bond with the noun is thus a construction-related manifestation of (a degree of) its grammaticalization. In fact, three underlying constructions are postulated for *a drink* (Bergen and Chang 2004: 161-162), the details of which are not relevant here.

requires a postulation of a null article or a view of some nouns as non-referring. The present section, therefore, is limited to the discussion of the nil article in Cognitive Grammar.

Langacker sides with those authors who posit the existence of a covert element, unrealized phonologically, marked as Ø. Berezowski's (2009: 37) finds it disappointing, given the former author's non-structuralist conception of language. Indeed, Langacker's idea of the linguistic sign (unit) as a symbolic assembly of phonological and conceptual content requires that the phonological pole be here left empty.[46] For Langacker, Ø is in fact one of the markers of indefiniteness, along with *a/an* or the reduced form of *some* [səm]. [səm] has an individuating force (a chunk, portion or unit: *[səm] water* = e.g. a puddle, **The formula for [səm] water is* H_2O), whereas Ø is unrestricted (*water* could be a puddle or an ocean). Perhaps reference to maximal extension is default, unless the context specifies otherwise, e.g. *I saw {[səm]/Ø} {fruit/apples} on the counter* – "the profiled instance of *fruit* or *apples* is limited to a quantity that fits on a counter" (Langacker 2008: 290-291). Both [səm] and Ø profile an unbounded region, equivalent to the semantic pole of the mass-noun schema, but while [səm] also has a quantity specification and designates a limited portion of the entity, the portion designated by a Ø-nominal can be of any size (Langacker 1991b: 103).

In relation to these phenomena, Langacker (1991b: 101) asks the question why *the* with a non-count or a plural noun (*The girl loves the cheese*; *The boy hates the cats*) cannot refer to the maximal extension of the given substance or all items in the class, as is the case in French (*le chats*, *le fromage*).[47] His explanation is that mass is ambivalent as to definiteness and English and French capitalize on different options for its full generic reference. In English, no portion of the mass is singled out, and singling out some portion or instance for individual awareness is a crucial aspect of definiteness. Hence the nil article for indefiniteness marks mass of any size, with the full size as the limiting case. In French, in turn, the full mass is also the maximal instance of the type, so definite construal is conventionalized for full mass.

However, especially disappointing for Berezowski is Langacker's failure to distinguish bare proper names with those that are grounded by the definite article. It remains unexplained, in other words, why some names avoid

[46] Somewhat paradoxically, Langacker is sometimes taken to be a structuralist in his thinking (Przemysław Łozowski, p.c.), which is manifested not only in his indebtedness to Saussure's conception of the linguistic sign but also in his conception of language as a symbolic *system* (non-autonomous or self-contained but nevertheless a system, cf. Langacker 1991a: 1, 61, 291, 343 etc.).

[47] Or Spanish: *Las vacas son unos animales utiles*, cf. note 30.

redundancy, since they convey "the essential content of *the* as part of [their] own semantic structure" (Langacker 1991b: 101), while others do not avoid that redundancy.

The discussion above has, I believe, corroborated Berezowski's impression that it is the definite article that draws most of the researchers' attention, with the indefinite being covered not as often, and the nil receiving a comparatively scarce treatment. Subsequent chapters have the ambition of somewhat remedying this situation by providing a coherent account of all the three article types in English.

4. Final comments

In this chapter, I have surveyed what appear to be the most influential approaches to the English articles, including those proposed in cognitive linguistics. The approaches constitute the necessary backdrop for the account that will be proposed in the subsequent chapters, couched in terms of Extended Vantage Theory. While the EVT approach relates to and capitalizes on many specific ideas proposed by other authors, it also, I believe, offers a unique perspective on the use of the English articles, grounded in human cognition.

Before the EVT analysis proper will be presented, in Chapter 4 I will begin by surveying previous attempts to account for some of the uses of the articles. This, I feel, will help the reader form a picture of the theoretical developments that have led to the present framework.

CHAPTER 4

(E)VT and the English articles

In this chapter I first survey my previous attempts to account for some aspects of the use of the English articles within the framework of Vantage Theory. Next, I proceed to present the Extended Vantage Theory (EVT) framework, which arose out of the earlier attempts, and model several examples of article use. By doing this I hope to draw a skeletal picture of the model, to be supplemented in subsequent chapters with more complex and less predictable data.

1. (E)VT and articles: framework development

In dealing with the modelling of article use in terms of VT, I have proposed, over the last decade, to introduce several modifications to the theory. The overview I propose below, rather than being chronological, will proceed from the more straightforward applications of VT to those in which the modifications of the descriptive apparatus have been more substantial.

1.1 Case 1: *the/a house* in Doris Lessing

In Głaz (2006) I analyse the use of articles in the opening sentences of a literary text, Doris Lessing's *The Good Terrorist*.[1] The excerpt, example (4-1), is a descrip-

[1] I thank Elisabeth Okasha of the University College Cork for helpful comments regarding the analysis.

tion of a house as an element of scenery. As will be shown, the description is characterized by a certain dynamics and an interplay of vantages.

(4-1) The house was set back from the noisy main road in what seemed to be a rubbish tip. A large house. Solid. Black tiles stood at angles along the gutter, and into a gap near the base of a fat chimney a bird flew, trailing a piece of grass several times its length. (Lessing 1985: 5).

In the first three orthographic sentences, the building being described is referred to first as *the house,* then as *a house*, which is *large* and *solid*. Thus, the reader's familiarity with it is first taken for granted but then it is viewed as a mere member of its category with certain characteristics. It is set against the background of the road and the rubbish tip, several other details being also mentioned (the tiles, the gutter, the chimney). I propose to model its conceptualization as a succession of three vantages: recessive – dominant – recessive (Figure 4-1).



Figure 4-1. HOUSE in Lessing's *The Good Terrorist*, example (4-1): a succession of vantages

This is a relatively orthodox application of VT: no major modifications are proposed, except the status of the primary fixed coordinate in each vantage. The coordinate in Vantage I is a schematic image of a house, marked here as HOUSE. The definite article in the first sentence (*the house*) reflects the conceptualizer's attention to the building's distinct character: it is delimited from its surroundings, *the noisy main road* and *a rubbish tip*. This is why the vantage is of the recessive type: stronger emphasis on difference brings to the fore the boundary between the house and its background. On level 2, when D is fixated, the boundaries and the distinctness of the house are taken as given. D is coordinated with S, which entails that the building is viewed as a singular object set against its background: in agreement with the definite article's most common function, *the house* means 'this house I am talking about'.

Then, in the dominant Vantage II, *house* is used with the indefinite article and through emphasis on similarity the building is viewed as a homogeneous *large* and *solid* body, a uniform structure of a certain type, a member of a class. Notably, Vantage II "inherits" its primary fixed coordinate from Vantage I, marked as HOUSE (Vt I). In this way, Vantage II is anchored to Vantage I, as is expected of coherent discourse.

In the next step, Vantage III inherits *its* primary fixed coordinate from Vantage II (HOUSE (Vt II)) and fosters analyticity of viewing with emerging detail: *black tiles, the gutter, a gap near…the base of…a chimney, a bird trailing a piece of grass*. However, on level 2, S entails homogeneity of viewing and ensures that all these details are seen against the same background of the house.

Notice that although Vantages I and III are both recessive, they produce different entailments, which results from anchoring each vantage to a different starting point and directing emphasis on difference at either the entity's boundaries (so that it is seen as distinct from the background, Vantage I) or at its internal structure (so that one can isolate details within it, Vantage III).

To recapitulate, Vantage I concretises an initially abstract conception by establishing its boundaries, Vantage II ascribes homogeneity to the conception and Vantage III focuses on details within the image thus drawn. Rather than merely following one another, each of the vantages "feeds" the one that comes next.

1.2 Case 2: *the* in Ernest Hemingway

In Głaz (2009b) I model the use of the definite article in the initial fragment of another literary text, Ernest Hemingway's short story *Big Two-Hearted River* (cf. Epstein's account in Chapter 3, section 1.3.4):

(4-2) **The train** went up **the track** out of sight, around one of **the hills** of burnt timber. Nick sat down on the bundle of canvas and bedding the baggage man had pitched out of the door of the baggage car. ("Big Two-Hearted River", in Hemingway 1986 [1925]: 133)

Epstein (2002) notes that the definite article in *the train*, *the track* and *the hills* cannot be explained in terms of traditional notions of uniqueness, identifiability or familiarity. The referents of these expressions are known to the protagonist of the story, Nick, but not to the reader. An account of the except in terms of perspective is proposed by Chafe (1994); Epstein proposes a mental spaces analysis, which involves the base mental space B and Nick's space N. The base space B is also the space of the story-world, so that elements in N are also present in B, rather than being Nick's fantasies (Figure 4-2).



Figure 4-2. Base mental space and Nick's mental space in the beginning of *Big Two-Hearted River* (based on Epstein 2002: 364, Fig. 3)

According to Epstein,

> [i]n mental spaces terms, the articles prompt the reader to set up an alternate base space N, representing the reality of the character Nick. ... The entities

> introduced in the first sentence … (*the train*, *the track*, *the hills*, etc.) are set up in N, rather than B, because they are part of Nick's perceptions. The articles prompt *a shift in viewpoint* from B to N because at this point in the discourse, access to these entities is restricted to space N – Nick is the only one who knows about them. (Epstein 2002: 364, emphasis mine, A.G.)

Instead of Epstein's *shift* in point of view, I suggest it is better to recognize the existence of two *simultaneous* points of view (cf. Uspensky 1973 for other examples). The reader, on the one hand, is placed in the position of the protagonist, but on the other hand holds on to his or her reader-like perspective, as the protagonist has not yet been identified. The reader, it could be stated, remains disoriented (cf. *out of sight* – whose sight?) until Nick surfaces as the protagonist in the second sentence. The tension then subsides and the reader can assume a wider perspective with greater placidity. But not totally so, because Nick's perspective continues to be shared by the reader throughout the story. The reader, then, entertains two points of view, a different one coming to the fore at different times: that of the yet unidentified protagonist in the first sentence and that of the more detached and objective viewer in the second.[2]

This analysis corroborates MacLaury's idea of the co-functioning of more than one level of conceptualization in a vantage. Crucially, however, only one of those figure-to-ground arrangements is in focus at any one time, while the others function as the necessary presuppositions for the level focused upon. The more detached and objective viewpoint of the reader, VP-3, co-exists with the more involved Nick's VP-2: either in the dominant or the recessive arrangement. The story starts with a recessive vantage, which, being marked and rarer, is responsible for the initial reader-protagonist tension. The beginning of the second sentence is a dominant vantage (Figure 4-3; note that the initial level is marked as ∅, for the reasons explained in Chapter 2, section 3.1.6).

In the recessive vantage of the initial sentence, Nick's more engaged VP-2 (manifested through *the*) precedes the appearance of Nick himself and it is only when this happens that VP-3 is established. In the next sentence, a more "stable" situation of a dominant vantage, Nick appears first as a figure viewed from a detached VP-3, whereas other objects appear on stage later.

[2] A similar use of articles and demonstratives can be found in *A Farewell to Arms* by the same author, except that the first person narrator is identified in the very first sentence: *In the late summer of that year we lived in a house in a village that looked across the river and the plain to the mountains*. The tension is therefore weaker and the reader does not have to wait to learn why there are references to *the late summer of that year, the river, the plain* and *the mountains*. An interesting analysis of the passage is proposed by Gibson (1966). For an EVT account cf. example (5-37) in Chapter 5.

Recessive vantage

	L	FC	MC	Entailments
The train went up the track out of sight, around one of the hills of burnt timber.	∅	VP-2	the train/track/ hills	close-up, involvement
		⇙		
	1	the train/ track/hills	VP-3	zoom out
		⇙		
	2	VP-3	Nick	detachment

Dominant vantage

	L	FC	MC	Entailments
Nick sat down on the bundle of canvas and bedding the baggage man had pitched out of the door of the baggage car.	∅	VP-3	Nick	detachment
		⇙		
	1	Nick	VP-2	zoom in
		⇙		
	2	VP-2	bundle of canvas and bedding etc.	(involvement)

Figure 4-3. The beginning of Hemingway's *Big Two-Hearted River* modelled as vantages involving coordinate viewpoints

1.3 Case 3: articles and capitalization

In Głaz (2001) I resort to VT in an analysis of the apparently inconsistent use of articles and capitalization with the English lexeme *earth*, in the sense 'planet earth', in journalistic writing. The lexeme may but need not be capitalized and may occur with the definite or the nil article.[3] This yields four variants: *earth – the earth – Earth – the Earth*. All the uses below come from the same 1995 collection of *The Times* and *The Sunday Times*:

(4-3) Legislation aimed at reducing pollution is necessary, but a delusion that stems from President John F Kennedy's commitment to putting a man on the moon and returning him safely to **earth** is that anything is possible. (*The Sunday Times*, Jan 1, 1995, Eric Dymock, "California waits for a battery car miracle")

[3] Recall (Chapter 3, section 3) that by *nil* I understand what other authors call the zero article or the non-use of article.

(4-4) Saturn is on the border of Pisces and Acquarius, +1 magnitude and setting by the 31st. Later in 1995, Saturn's rings will for a time be edge-on to **the earth** and then to the Sun. (*The Times*, Jan 3, 1995, Michael J. Hendrie, "Guide to the night sky in January")

(4-5) The events of 65m years ago, we believe, involved the break-up of a large comet as it swerved past Jupiter. Large pieces collided with **Earth** and caused the extinction of dinosaurs and 75% of all living species. (*The Sunday Times*, Dec 24, 1995, Roger Dobson, "Seabed crater may hold secret of why dinosaurs disappeared")

(4-6) This is the Lagrangian Point, called L1, a region where the gravitational pull from **the Earth** and Moon equals that from the Sun. (*The Times*, Nov 27, 1995, Nigel Hawkes, "Shedding light on the Sun")

Example (4-3), *return to earth*, may be a conventionalized fixed expression, similar to *come back/down to earth* or to the adjective *down-to-earth*. However, non-capitalized, nil-article *earth* can appear, though not very frequently, in other contexts:

(4-7) But with the exception of Georg Joachim Rheticus (1514-74), who had been seduced by the harmony that an exchange of **earth** and sun could bring to the sequence of planetary periods, the Lutheran circle inspired by Philip Melanchthon (1497-1560) played down the cosmological aspects of *De revolutionibus* no less than Catholic observers. (BNC Simple Search (http://sara.natcorp.ox.ac.uk/lookup.html), J. H. Brooke, *Science and religion*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993; accessed Jan 15, 2007)[4]

The basic distinction one is invited to draw is that between the nil and the definite article, examples (4-3) and (4-4), respectively. The former suggests

[4] The usage is easier to find in literary contexts:

A unique configuration of **earth**, moon and sun will cause hemispherical flooding. (Martin Amis, 1989, *London Fields*, London: Jonathan Cape, p. 118)

This person, I thought, is what a woman should look like: this figure sitting opposite me ... manages to represent ... the very essence of femininity, ... the sweetness which belongs to the rhythms of **earth** and moon and song and dance, the ideal which tempers the brutishness and vulgarity and wanton egotism of man as he plunders our planet.... (BNC Simple Search (http://sara.natcorp.ox.ac.uk/lookup.html), Dennis Potter, *Hide and Seek*, 1990, London: Faber and Faber; accessed Jan 15, 2007)

that the object being viewed is a substance or mass, whereas *the* reflects the mental distance of the viewer from the object, which is treated as a distinct and distinguishable entity. The nil article (*earth*) is an entailment of a dominant vantage, while *the* of a recessive vantage. In *earth*, the object is conceptualized in close-up and fills the purview, whereas in *the earth* it is viewed from a greater distance as an entity distinct from its surroundings. In the dominant vantage the primary fixed coordinate EARTH is correlated with S: this contracts the mental distance between stimuli, which fill the purview. In the recessive vantage, EARTH correlates with D and therefore acquires a clearer boundary and holistic distinctiveness.[5]

The other two uses, *Earth* and *the Earth*, require recourse to the conception of viewpoint. The uses *earth* and *the earth* are VP-2s and differ from VP-3s *Earth* and *the Earth* in stress, i.e. the proximity of the conceptualizer to the fixed coordinate EARTH (cf. Chapter 1, section 2.10). Capitalization, suggesting a proper name, results from greater detachment from the coordinates (VP-2 becomes VP-3), whereas the difference between the nil and the definite article (*earth – the earth*, *Earth – the Earth*) is entailed by a change from a dominant to a recessive vantage. Additionally, within each vantage type, S is stronger relative to D. Figure 4-4, illustrating this, was proposed by MacLaury in an e-mail of November 4, 1999.

	Dominant vantage	**Recessive vantage**
VP-2	stress ↓ EARTH SS+ D- earth	stress ↓ EARTH DD- S+ the earth
VP-3	EARTH SS- D+ Earth	EARTH DD+ S- the Earth

Figure 4-4. The *earth – the earth – Earth – the Earth* paradigm modelled as vantages, viewpoints and stress

Thus:

[5] It remains unclear why the recessive vantage is much more frequent than the dominant vantage, a finding that is both counter-intuitive and in contrast to what MacLaury et al. (1997) establish for the Hungarian *piros* and *vörös*; cf. Chapter 2, section 3.2.2. MacLaury suggests (e-mail of Nov 3, 1999) that the reason might be a special status humans attribute to the earth so that "normal" references to it are marked as recessive by default. It may also be pertinent to the issue that the dominant vantage is not the same as the *dominating* vantage.

1) *earth* suggests a conceptualization of the mental object as mass (the viewpoint is placed close to the fixed coordinate EARTH, S is strong, the difference between EARTH and its surroundings is minimized);
2) *the earth* results from viewing the object as a distinct entity (the boundary is established early) but the viewpoint is also closer to EARTH, so that the boundary is marked weakly;
3) *Earth*, like *earth*, is an image of the object as substance (S precedes D) but one which nevertheless constitutes a distinct entity (the boundary is established late but emphasized more strongly than S);
4) *the Earth* indicates the most detached viewing position: first and foremost the distinction between EARTH and its surroundings is established; the holistic and "distinct" status of the object is double-marked through capitalization and *the*.

Note that the use of articles is correlated with *attention to* and the resulting *position of* S and D in the vantage formulae (the nil article is entailed by the primacy of S, *the* by the primacy of D). Viewpoint, in turn, is correlated with the relative *strength* of S or D: VP-2 results from stronger S, VP-3 from stronger D, regardless of what position they occupy in the arrangement.

A more detailed account is offered in Figure 4-5 (proposed by MacLaury in an e-mail of December 14, 1999). Viewpoints are linked into frames; entailments (the use of ∅ or *the*; capitalization or its lack) are specified for each level of each arrangement of coordinates.

			Dominant vantage			**Recessive vantage**			
	Entailments		**FC**	**MC**	**L**	**FC**	**MC**	**Entailments**	
Frame I: VP-2	*earth*	∅	EARTH	S	1	EARTH	D	*the*	*the earth*
		small		S+	D- 2	D-	S+	small	
Frame II: VP-3	*Earth*	∅	EARTH	S	1	EARTH	D	*the*	*the Earth*
		Cap		S+	D- 2	D+	S-	Cap	

Figure 4-5. Entailments of the *earth – the earth – Earth – the Earth* paradigm modelled as vantages, viewpoints and stress

The four pictures of an entity are linked by the degree of subjectivity and objectivity of viewing. Greater emphasis on similarity in VP-2 aids contraction of the mental distance between stimuli; greater emphasis on difference in

VP-3 aids protraction of the distance.[6] As a result, *earth* is the most subjective (involved) perspective, *the earth* and *Earth* are intermediate, and *the Earth* is the most detached and objective. Establishing a precise arrangement of the two intermediate cases is especially difficult. MacLaury observes (e-mail) that on the one hand the primacy of difference in DD- S+ points to the objectivity of *the earth*, but on the other hand, *Earth* is also objectified through lack of stress on the fixed coordinates and stronger emphasis on difference in SS- D+ (the usages *earth* and *the Earth* seem to be less controversial as examples of, respectively, extreme subjectivity and objectivity).

A fuller account of these phenomena, it seems, requires an analysis of a wider range of uses in more contexts, such as (4-8) below:

(4-8) Until now, all solar observations have been made either from **Earth** or from equipment in orbit around **the Earth**. (*The Sunday Times*, Nov 5, 1995, Roger Dobson, "Probe to reveal sun's secrets")

If the analysis above is correct, we are dealing with VP-3s in both *Earth* and *the Earth*. The first of them results from a dominant, more involved vantage, the second from a recessive, more detached vantage. Indeed, the conceptualizer is at first located (in the physical and mental sense) on the surface of the planet so he/she regards it from a close perspective (*observations have been made ... from Earth*), but later departs from it mentally and occupies a location on the planet's orbit (*from equipment in orbit around the Earth*).

Similar observations can be made of a larger context of example (4-6) above, expanded thus:

(4-9) When SOHO finally does get off the pad at Cape Canaveral in Florida, it will begin a four-month journey towards a point in space about a million-and-a-half kilometres from **Earth**.

This is the Lagrangian Point, called L1, a region where the gravitational pull from **the Earth** and Moon equals that from the Sun.

[6] In saying "aids" rather than "causes" I follow MacLaury's e-mail of December 14, 1999. The scholar notes that viewpoint and stress sometimes cannot be correlated with the S/D cline in a straightforward manner. Strong attention to S always results in VP-2, but there exist somewhat mysterious cases of colour categorization in which one also deals with VP-2 despite strong attention to D.

First, again, the planet is regarded from its surface (*Earth*) and the distant point in space is conceptualized relative to it. In the second paragraph, however, the Earth, the Moon and the Sun are conceptualized as if from the Lagrangian Point, the mental transfer being signalled by the use of the definite article.

1.4 Case 4: articles and translation

My most recent attempt to deal with the problem of articles within the VT framework is Głaz (2010b). The study was planned as mapping the road for future developments – however, the present proposal seems to have followed a different path. I will report, nevertheless, on the major ideas proposed in that earlier publication, especially as both the 2010 article and the present model are grounded in the conception of the three major types of viewing mode: non-discriminatory, analytic and synthetic.

In Głaz (2010b) I recognize three parameters of a vantage: from *where* it is projected (the conceptualizer's STANDPOINT), what kind of PERSPECTIVE is projected, and *how* the actual object is conceptualized (the MODE OF CONCEPTUALIZATION or the VIEWING MODE). The architecture of a vantage is presented in Figure 4-6, which shows that each of the parameters is internally further differentiated.



Figure 4-6. The architecture of a vantage in an earlier version of EVT (from Głaz 2010b, Fig. 4, p. 266; reproduced with permission)

Thus, within STANDPOINT, I recognize location (where the conceptualizer is) and viewpoint (the conceptualizer's degree of engagement in the conceptualization). Within PERSPECTIVE, there are other two sub-parameters: the mental distance of the conceptualizer from the object being conceptualized and the purview (or breadth/angle of viewing) projected on a specific occasion. Finally, what in standard VT is called a vantage is here captured under MODES OF CONCEPTUALIZATION, i.e. configurations of non-discriminatory, analytic or synthetic viewing.

The data analysed are two informal English translations (I refer to them as Eng1 and Eng2) of a fragment of prose by a Polish SF writer, Stanisław Lem (*Wizja lokalna*, "Observation on the Spot"), so far not officially translated into English. The data is derived from a study by Elżbieta Tabakowska (1993), who compares the two English versions with regard to the use of articles – since there are no articles in Polish, it is interesting to see how the translations interpret and render the original in English. I agree with some of Tabakowska's findings but disagree with others. Here, instead of replicating my arguments, I would like to illustrate the various parameters of vantage with my own examples for the first two parameters and with an example from Lem's passage for the third parameter.

STANDPOINT subsumes *location* and *viewpoint*. Consider someone viewing a landscape: the person may be standing in the middle of a meadow or by the window of their bedroom: these are different *locations*. Crucially, from each location various *viewpoints* may be projected. For example, while standing by the window, the viewer might refer to the scenery *outside the window* (a detached VP-3) or *there, in front of me* (an engaged VP-2).

The parameter of PERSPECTIVE embraces (mental) *distance* and *purview*. Distance is related to but not totally dependent on location. For example, when located by the window and conceptualizing a scene, the viewer may say *the scenery out there* (a bigger distance) or *the scenery right here in front of me* (a smaller distance). Purview, in turn, specifies how broadly and with what viewing angle the scene is viewed. A broad purview affords a view of the whole or a substantial portion of the scene, whereas a narrow purview allows one to see its limited portion – the latter frequently results from a certain configuration of the terrain or from using an aid, such as a telescope. Purview, location and viewpoint influence one another in a variety of ways.

For the difference in the MODES OF CONCEPTUALIZATION, consider the following two fragments of the translations:

(4-10a)
Eng1:
Well, you wake up in the morning and go slippered to the window. In **the alpine meadow** you see **mauve cows** with enormous letters MILKA branded on their flanks.

(4-10b)
Eng2:
You get up in the morning, you go up to the window in your slippered feet, and there you have **alpine fields**, **lilac cows** with MILKA in big letters on their sides.

The two passages differ in their MODES OF CONCEPTUALIZATION in the following ways. Eng1 portrays cows as being in the meadow, whereas Eng2 provides a scenery with both fields and cows as its equipollent elements: even though it is understood that cows are *in* the fields, Eng2 does not portray them in this way. The definite article in *the alpine meadow* in Eng1 marks the "given" entity, against which (indefinite) cows are introduced as "new". In contrast, the nil article in Eng2 (*cows*, *fields*) introduces both entities as "new". In both cases, the view afforded by the window is the ground for the whole scene. Eng1 is therefore the final stage of the recessive vantage: it is the synthetic mode (the meadow and the objects on it constitute a "system"). In contrast, Eng2 is the initial stage of that vantage, the analytic mode, with all the objects being regarded as distinct in a non-systemic manner.

The proposal in this book to an extent capitalizes on these ideas in that it makes use of the same aspects of the theory: the non-discriminatory, analytic and synthetic viewing modes. The details of the present version of EVT, however, are different and I believe that they offer a coherent and viable analytical toolbox.

2. EVT: the current framework

After an overview of previous approaches to the semantics of the English articles, I would now like to present the recent modifications of the theory and an application of the framework to data. The data analysed in the present chapter come from four grammars of the English language, published in the last quarter of a century (Biber et al. 1999; Greenbaum 1996; Huddleston and Pullum 2002; Quirk et al. 1985), supplemented with examples from other sources. Rather than proceeding from one type of article usage to another, I will let myself be guided by the theory and discuss the data according to the viewing modes or vantages which underlie them. The reason for putting "theory first" is that I hope with the present book not only to provide a viable account of

the English article system but offer a version of VT applicable to other forms of linguistic data.

Extended Vantage Theory, EVT, grows out of VT as originally formulated but capitalizes on some of VT's constructs more than on others. The crucial notions are those of *viewing modes* or *modes of conceptualization*. Recall that these are cognitive operations resulting from varying degrees of attention to similarity or difference, which function as building blocks of vantages. The three types of viewing modes, i.e. *non-discrimination*, *analysis* and *systemic synthesis*, are correlated with one another in the ways presented in Figure 4-7 (repeated Figure 1-7, Chapter 1, for convenience).

	DOMINANT VANTAGE		**RECESSIVE VANTAGE**	
non-discrimination	SS	1	DD	(autonomous) analysis
(grounded) analysis	D	2	S	systemic synthesis

Figure 4-7. Viewing modes in vantages

Greater attention to similarity results in a contraction of the cognitive distance between the entities being conceptualized: the entities are amalgamated into a homogeneous mass. On level 2, emphasis on difference yields analytic thinking: some of the entities "stand out" from the homogeneous background. This is the dominant vantage.

Initial greater attention to difference, in turn, results in a protraction of the cognitive distance between the objects within the conceptualizer's purview and produces autonomous analytic viewing, so that distinct entities and their different kinds are identified. This is level 1 of the recessive vantage. Level 2 involves a shift to an emphasis on similarity and a contraction of the cognitive distance between the entities. Because the contraction takes place against the background of distinct entities (DD), the entailment of DD S is a synthesis or a system (entities are grouped, relationships between them established).

To summarize, non-discrimination, grounded or autonomous analysis and systemic synthesis result from the relative degrees of attention to or emphasis on D at the expense of S or vice versa. Thus, the emphases on either S or D are reciprocally balanced. Non-discrimination is, as it were, an "incomplete" dominant vantage, its first level. Grounded analysis results from attention to D operating against the background of SS. Autonomous analysis (DD) is, again, an "incomplete" recessive vantage, a viewing that results in an identification of an unconnected element or a body of unrelated elements. Systemic synthesis

is attention to S against the background of DD. Figures 4-8 a-d should help visualize the above.



Figure 4-8. Viewing modes and vantages: (a) non-discrimination (attention to similarity rules supreme); (b) the dominant vantage, analysis grounded in non-discrimination (attention to similarity gives way to attention to distinctiveness); (c) autonomous analysis (attention to distinctiveness); (d) the recessive vantage, synthetic-systemic viewing against analytic viewing (attention to distinctiveness gives way to attention to similarity)

Figure 4-8 requires two comments and a proviso. The first comment concerns the different status of S and D depending on their relative positions in the assembly. In Figure 4-8a, attention to similarity stands "on its own" and entails non-discrimination, whereas, on level 2 of the recessive vantage (Figure 4-8d), S operates against an analytic background. Being less pronounced than DD, it does not have the strength to entail non-discrimination; instead, it entails synthesis. Similarly, D on level 2 of the dominant vantage entails analysis (an identification of an element) because it operates against a homogeneous background, whereas on level 1 of the recessive vantage, the stand-alone DD is powerful and entails a maximal distinctiveness of the elements. Thus, cognitive entailments do not result from either S or D but are correlated with the position of these in the whole arrangement of coordinates.

The second comment has to do with one-level viewing modes (Figures 4-8a and c). Only the first levels of either the dominant or the recessive vantage may function as one-level modes ("incomplete" vantages). This is because level 2 is by definition a figure against a ground in a coordinate assembly. Thus, in the dominant vantage it only makes sense to talk about analytic viewing if

the analysis operates on a previously established (more or less) homogeneous ground; in the recessive vantage it only makes sense to talk about synthetic-systemic viewing if there is something that the conceptualizer can synthesize, namely a collection of relatively loose elements identified prior to synthesis. In either case, the disappearance of level 1 leaves level 2 in a no-ground vacuum, which makes it impossible for the latter to function as a figure. A ground, however, is imaginable without a figure.

The proviso, in turn, concerns the comprehensiveness of the diagram. In short, it is far from comprehensive, as it only presents, in a rather simplified manner, but four of the possible viewing mode types. Recall that coordinates may assume variable strengths (Chapter 1, section 2.6) – we will mark them as "regular", "strong" (+) or "weak" (-). Given that additional parameter, there are twenty-four theoretically possible formulae, listed below:

SS regular-strength non-discrimination
the distance between the conceptualized entities is contracted, the resulting image being a homogeneous mass

SS+ strong non-discrimination
its augmented value allows the conceptualizer to view as homogeneous the entities which are conventionally not viewed as such

SS- weak non-discrimination
weakened attention to similarity contracts the distance between the entities being conceptualized − but not maximally so, so that the existence of individual items is recognized

SS D the default dominant vantage, regular-strength non-discrimination followed by regular-strength grounded analysis
an individual item or items are isolated against a homogeneous background (shift of attention from SS to D somewhat protracts the cognitive distance between items, which allows for their individuation)

SS D+ regular-strength non-discrimination followed by strong grounded analysis
the item(s) isolated against a homogeneous background receive greater focus

SS D- regular non-discrimination followed by weak grounded analysis
the item(s) isolated against a homogeneous background receive reduced focus

SS+ D strong non-discrimination followed by regular-strength grounded analysis
greater focus is placed on the homogeneous background, against which an item/items are isolated

SS+ D+ strong non-discrimination followed by strong grounded analysis
focus is placed on both the homogeneous background and the item(s) isolated against it

SS+ D- strong non-discrimination followed by weak grounded analysis
the strengths of the non-discriminatory background and the analytic figure are balanced, with augmented focus on the background and a reduced role of the figure

SS- D weak non-discrimination followed by regular-strength grounded analysis
weakened homogeneity in the background (a set of "identical" items rather than a mass) serves as the basis for a recognition of an item or items

SS- D+ weak non-discrimination followed by strong grounded analysis
weakened homogeneity in the background (a set of items rather than a mass) serves as the basis for a recognition of and a focus on an item or items

SS- D- weak non-discrimination followed by weak grounded analysis
weakened background homogeneity (a set of items rather than a mass) serves as the basis for a recognition of an item or items with reduced focus

DD regular-strength autonomous analysis
attention to DD protracts the cognitive distance between items being conceptualized and allows for their individuation

DD+ strong autonomous analysis
an item is/items are individuated and in focus

DD- weak autonomous analysis
an item is/items are individuated but receive reduced focus

DD S the default recessive vantage: regular-strength autonomous analysis followed by regular-strength synthesis
individuated items serve as the background for attention to S, which results in synthetic-systemic viewing: the individuated items are combined into a system

DD S+ regular-strength autonomous analysis followed by strong synthesis
the system emerging from an analytic background is in focus

DD S- regular-strength autonomous analysis followed by weak synthesis
the system emerging from an analytic background has a reduced focus

DD+ S strong autonomous analysis followed by regular-strength synthesis
within the dyad of analytic background-synthetic figure, the analytic background is in focus

DD+ S+ strong autonomous analysis followed by strong synthesis
both the analytic background and the synthetic figure are in focus

DD+ S- strong autonomous analysis followed by weak synthesis
within the dyad of analytic background vs. synthetic figure, the former receives focus, while the role of the latter is reduced

DD- S weak autonomous analysis followed by regular-strength synthesis
the analytic background for synthetic viewing has a reduced focus

DD- S+ weak autonomous analysis followed by strong synthesis
within the dyad of analytic background vs. synthetic figure, the focus on the former is reduced, while the focus on the latter is augmented

DD- S- weak autonomous analysis followed by weak synthesis

the focus on both the analytic background and the synthetic figure is reduced

These are the theoretical possibilities of combining degrees of attention to similarity with the degrees of attention to difference, each of the coordinates being subject to modification by the variable of strength. However, only a portion of them have been identified in the English article system.

First, at least at the present stage of research, it is unfeasible to postulate the existence of vantages with both S and D receiving either augmented or reduced strength: the formulae SS+ D+, SS- D-, DD+ S+ and DD- S- do not seem to represent viable conceptualizations. This is because an augmentation or a reduction of both S and D brings forth no change to the default vantage formula, either SS D or DD S (if both are augmented/reduced, then neither is stronger/weaker relative to the other). Rather, the augmentation of one coordinate is coupled with either a weakening or a regular strength of the other, so that a contrast between them is created. This is one of the departures from VT proposed in EVT: in VT as originally formulated, only balanced coordinate strengths within a vantage are claimed to arise and an augmentation of the strength of S necessarily entails a reduction in the strength of D and vice versa. However, scrutiny of linguistic data has revealed a need for non-balanced coordinate strengths, hence in EVT the limitation is not upheld.

Second, data have revealed that some theoretically possible conceptualizations do and others do not arise in the use of the English articles. Those that do not may perhaps emerge in the determiner systems of other languages, which requires further research. Those that do are listed below, fewer than a half of the original list:

SS regular-strength non-discrimination
SS+ strong non-discrimination
SS- weak non-discrimination
SS D the default dominant vantage, regular-strength non-discrimination followed by regular-strength grounded analysis
SS+ D- strong non-discrimination followed by weak grounded analysis
SS+ D strong non-discrimination followed by regular-strength grounded analysis
SS- D weak non-discrimination followed by regular-strength grounded analysis
SS- D+ weak non-discrimination followed by strong grounded analysis

DD S the default recessive vantage: regular-strength autonomous analysis followed by regular-strength synthesis
DD+ S- strong autonomous analysis followed by weak synthesis
DD- S+ weak autonomous analysis followed by strong synthesis

The list constitutes the skeletal range of conceptualizations which entail article uses in English. It is to these that I devote most of the present chapter, although I will also introduce a few formulae of a different nature, such as [SS] D, [SS-] D, SS > SS- or [SS > SS-] D. Naturally, contextual forces cannot be captured in a mere handful of frames. Therefore, more complex, ambiguous or otherwise "special" cases that require more complex formulae will be dealt with in Chapters 5 and 6 – and those too can hardly be called exhaustive. Explanations must, for the time being, remain illusive.

3. EVT and articles: a first classification

3.1 Similarity predominating

The first major class of article usages are those resulting from predominating similarity. Within these, the non-discriminatory mode constitutes a class of its own.

3.1.1 Non-discrimination: SS, SS+, SS-

The regular-strength non-discriminatory mode (SS) is associated with the use of the nil article. Typical examples are words such as *bread*, *music* or *honesty*, which portray progressively more abstract entities conceptualized in a non-discriminatory fashion, as undifferentiated, homogeneous masses. When a speaker maximally emphasizes similarity, what is being conceptualized becomes conflated into an indistinguishable, homogenous substance (bread, water, etc.). By extension, the process also pertains to less tangible entities (music, time) or to abstract ones (honesty, democracy, etc.). Thus, "mass" is used here in a technical sense: it is a way of conceptualizing or *con*ceiving of, rather than *per*ceiving an entity (where "entity" need not be something accessible through the senses).[7]

[7] I base my account here on Langacker's (1991b: 18) notion of a mass noun profiling a region

In some usages, however, a greater cognitive effort is necessary on the part of the conceptualizer to arrive at the homogeneous concept of mass. Such is the case, for example, in (4-11 a and b) and, for a different reason, in (4-12):

(4-11)
(a) Henry became **treasurer**. (Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 409) SS+
(b) How to Run for **President** of the United States. (http://www.ehow.com/how_2165709_run-president-united-states.html; accessed Jan 3, 2011) SS+

(4-12) After the accident, there was **cat** all over the road. (Taylor 1993: 218 and many other sources) SS+

The augmented value of SS+ is necessary because treasurers or presidents are individuals not normally conceptualized as masses. The conceptualizer has thus to overcome the conventionalized conceptualization of an individual and recategorize the image into a mass-like homogeneity (the role of treasurer or president, i.e. an implication that all treasurers or presidents have basically the same functions).[8] In (4-12), in turn, an extra cognitive effort is required to overcome the conventionalized meaning associated with the word *cat*. Although several parallel usages enjoy a conventionalized "item" or "mass" status (e.g. (*a*) *chicken*), *cat* does not. If *chicken* in the sense of 'meat' is SS, *cat* requires an extra cognitive effort, hence SS+.

An additional cognitive effort in an emphasis on similarity also underlies collective nouns such as *audience*: the effort is necessary to override the real-life awareness of "plurality" and portray it as a mass: SS+. Naturally, *audience* is usually used with the indefinite or the definite article (*an*/*the audience*) and may be used in the plural ((*the*) *audiences*). An account of those is offered in Chapter 6 (section 4.3), for the reasons that will then become apparent.

A modification of the SS non-discriminatory viewing mode can also take the form of a reduced strength of similarity, SS-, typical of plural usages such as *lions*, *Italians*, *fractals*, *medieval mystery plays* or *boyfriends*. These are not fully

bounded in its domain of instantiation. The latter can be physical space but also time or a social or abstract space.

[8] Referring to German material, Porzig (1924) sees here a substantivizing force of the article. In *er war König*, the last word has an adjectival nature (what *kind* of person was he?), whereas in *er war der König* it is a genuine substantive (the king of a specific country) (p. 148, quoted after Bühler 1990 [1934]: 345). But of course, Bühler notes (p. 353), substantivization need not involve an article, as in *Envying is petty*.

homogeneous because they are conceptualizations of sets consisting of individual items. In other words, although *lions* reflects a conceptualization of lions which are all "the same" (hence SS), they are not conflated into an internally undifferentiated "mass" (the *-s* suffix, hence the weaker SS-).

Figures 4-9 a-b diagram the three degrees of strength in the stand-alone level 1 of the dominant vantage.



Figure 4-9. The non-discriminatory viewing mode: (a) regular-strength or strong non-discrimination (with the same result but greater cognitive effort required for some conceptualizations); (b) weak non-discrimination

In SS no specific item is distinguished as a distinct entity (hence no role is attributed to D). Once D enters the scene, a "loose", "free-floating" mode becomes a full-fledged vantage.

3.1.2 The dominant vantage with variations

The dominant vantage is typically associated with the indefinite article. Following Otto Behagel's classic statement that it "singles out one entity from a number of entities of the same kind" (1923, vol. I: 38; in Bühler 1990 [1934]: 347), I say that the article usually points to a portion of a mass or an item within a set, although this statement will be qualified below. Within the SS D formula, the strengths of SS and D may vary, such that the vantage has balanced and non-balanced values of coordinate strength.

3.1.2a The default dominant vantage: SS D

What happens when the initial non-discriminatory viewing mode, SS, is followed by a degree of emphasis on difference, D, is that a portion or an aspect of otherwise homogeneous mass is being identified or isolated. Thus, instead of the homogeneous *bread*, *music*, *time* or *honesty*, there are usages as in examples (4-13) to (4-19):

(4-13) Panforte, the traditional fruit cake of Sienna, is neither a conventional cake nor **a bread** but pressed dried fruits with cinnamon, coriander, cloves, nutmeg and white pepper. (BNC simple search, http://bnc.bl.uk/, H06 2628: *BBC Good Food*, London: Redwood Publishing Company, 1991; accessed Nov 4, 2010) SS D

(4-14) The 1960s saw some hectic Australian searching for **a music** that was 'ours', not 'theirs'. (BNC simple search, http://bnc.bl.uk/, ABE 627: *The Economist*, 1991; accessed Nov 4, 2010) SS D

(4-14) It was **a time** when he was immensely drawn to panache. (BNC simple search, http://bnc.bl.uk/, FRH 2652: *Nobody's business* by P. Gilliat, London: Virago Press Ltd, 1990; accessed Nov 4, 2010) SS D

(4-15) She says so with **an honesty** which is enough to break the formal interview structure, prompting me to fold away my preconceptions of a feisty female rapper. (BNC simple search, http://bnc.bl.uk/, ACP 1524: *The Face*, London: Nick Logan, 1990; accessed Nov 4, 2010) SS D

(4-16) Jill has **a good knowledge of Greek**. (Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 339) SS D

(4-17) I have **a high regard** for them. (Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 339) SS D

(4-18)

(a) **A dry heat** is so much more bearable than **a damp heat**. (Allan 1980: 559, his example (73)) SS D

(b) Einstein was responsible for the development of **a new physics**. (Allan 1980: 559, his example (73)) SS D

(4-19) Sean's is **an English** full of the lilt of the Western Isles. (Allan 1980: 559, his example (73)) SS D

These are all cases of the default variant of the dominant vantage, SS D: a homogeneous mass (SS) constitutes the background for an isolation of a "kind" of bread, music, time, honesty etc. as a result of analytic thinking (D).

3.1.2b The other balanced variants: SS+ D-, SS- D+

Apart from the default type, there are vantages with balanced but unequal coordinate strengths, in which the augmentation of one coordinate is coupled with a weakening of the other: SS+ D- and SS- D+. The first of these, with strengthened similarity, is represented in examples (4-20) and (4-21):

(4-20) I'd always been interested in ancient history and I'd always wanted to write **a historical novel**. (Greenbaum 1996: 244) SS+ D-

(4-21) Jill is **a doctor**. / As **a doctor**, Jill should know better. (Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 372) SS+ D-

In these examples, the conceptualizer does not select any particular member of the set of novels or doctors but refers to the nature of the set (hence SS is augmented as SS+). Accordingly, the role of D- is not to isolate a specific member of the respective set but merely to distinguish it from other sets, i.e. to endow it with a boundary. I follow here Epstein's (2001: 357) conception that "NPs that designate roles are used to refer to a fixed property, not to a particular individual". Consider example (4-22):

(4-22) **A 77-year-old Nebraskan** who lives in a house he bought in 1958 and reimburses his company for personal telephone calls might make an unlikely candidate to be the most revered capitalist of our day. Yet that's what Warren Buffett is. (*Time* 171-20, May 19, 2008, p. 19) SS+ D-

Although the context describes a specific individual, the description focuses on the person's characteristics, such as his age or habits. Alternatively, on a somewhat forced interpretation, one might claim that the use occasions an idiosyncratic category of "77-year-old Nebraskans who live..." etc., with Warren Buffett as its one and only member. On either account the formula is SS+ D-, with the augmented strength of the properties of the person or set.[9]

[9] A similar conceptualization takes place in this excerpt from an SF novel (referred to is the mother of the main protagonists):

> But in the word not of an atevi lord's whimsy, one had to deal with **a mother** who didn't answer the phone, didn't answer telegrams, didn't answer messages on the island-wide system, and hadn't been in communication with Toby since his message. (C. J. Cherryh, *Invader*, Legend Books, 1995, pp. 245-246)

The third balanced variant of the dominant vantage is the more analytic SS- D+, typical of those usages with the indefinite article in which the noun phrase has a specific (though indefinite) reference.[10] Consider examples (4-23) and (4-24):

(4-23) She has just bought **a new car**. (Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 372) SS- D+

(4-24) **A student** has complained about it. (Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 372) SS- D+

The conceptualizer "zooms onto" a specific car or student (not any car or student: she owns this vehicle and that student is a real-life person, distinct from all others). The process is induced by an augmented D+, which operates against the weakly homogeneous SS- background (a set of cars or students). But D+ is nevertheless too weak for the specific item to become unambiguously identified by means of the definite article.

3.1.2c The non-balanced variant: SS- D

In another variant of the dominant vantage, the strengths of the coordinates are not-balanced: SS- D. Consider examples (4-25) and (4-26):

(4-25) Bring me **a ladder**! (Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 371) SS- D

(4-26) I'm looking for **a millionaire**, she says, but I don't see many around. (Biber et al. 1999: 260) SS- D

In (4-25) and (4-26) reference is made to a random member (D) of the sets of ladders or millionaires (SS-): no member is viewed as being more salient than any other.

Alternatively, the noun may be qualified by an attribute and/or a modifying clause (ex. (4-27)):

[10] Bill Sullivan proposes to call these definite but unspecified (p.c.) or particular but unspecified (Sullivan forthcoming). Bill agrees that it is somewhat counter-intuitive to refer to indefinite NPs as having definite reference but that is because the terminology is flawed from the start: indefinites are in fact non-definites. There are undoubtedly good reasons to follow this proposal but because the changes in the terminology would have to be rather radical, I will continue to use "indefinite but specific").

(4-27) Although I publish quite a lot I discovered a couple of years ago that no mainstream publisher wanted to publish **a negative analysis of the British monarchy that I've written**. (Greenbaum 1996: 244) SS- D

The speaker adopts here the point of view of the hearer and/or the publishers. The status of the relative clause *that I've written* is interesting: it is a defining clause but from the point of view of a publisher it is more important that that analysis has certain characteristics than that it is a specific study produced by a specific author. Notice also the use of the Present Perfect (*I've written*) where one would have expected Past Perfect (*had written* as prior to *I discovered a couple of years ago*). The Present Perfect suggests that the analysis referred to has a permanent characteristic of being "negative" (i.e. of being that *kind* of work), and that the characteristic still obtains, as opposed to the temporally more limited Past Perfect reference. Hence, SS- D.

3.1.2d SS- D vs. SS- D+

The value of a descriptive model of language lies, among others, in its ability to differentiate between semantically close usages. The value of a cognitive linguistic model lies in how these usages are correlated with the cognitive processes involved in their production and/or comprehension. I suggest that EVT scores high in this respect – it is instructive to juxtapose examples (4-28) and (4-29):

(4-28) I'm looking for **a tall man aged between 25 and 35 who has a similar personality and interests**.
(http://newcastle.gumtree.com/newastle/17/36687717.html; accessed March 26, 2009) SS- D

(4-29) Police are looking for **a scruffy man aged 17 to 21**. (Biber et al. 1999: 260) SS- D+

In traditional accounts, (4-28) would be classified as a non-referring, (4-29) as a referring indefinite expression. In EVT they can be explained in terms of viewing modes. In both cases the background for analytic viewing is a weakly homogeneous set of men, but if in (4-28) any man with the characteristics specified would do, in (4-29) the police are interested in a specific individual and would not be satisfied with a random male whose looks and age fit the

description. In other words, the conceptualizer starts with a set and projects an analytic outlook on the set with either the intention to isolate a random member in (4-28) (the regular strength of D is enough to entail that) or a specific member in (4-29) (where the augmented D+ is necessary for concrete identification).

Interestingly, a context larger than a sentence may be necessary to select one of these interpretations or the sentence will remain ambiguous, as in (4-30) and (4-31):

(4-30) I intend to date **a Norwegian**. (Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 404) SS- D or SS- D+

(4-31) I had intended to take them dancing and to hear Colin sing but they wanted to see **a film** so I was outnumbered. (Greenbaum 1996: 245) SS D- or SS- D+

On the SS- D interpretation, any Norwegian or film is good enough. On the SS- D+ interpretation I know (though you probably don't) which Norwegian I want to date, and they had a specific film in mind (which information might have been known to me but is not known to you and basically irrelevant now when I'm telling you this).[11] Similarly in (4-32), the friend's identity may be unknown (a non-referring use, SS- D) or known (a referring use, SS- D+):

(4-32) I think Ed's CD player was stolen by **a friend of his**. (Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 403) SS- D or SS- D+

Interestingly, the ambiguity does not obtain in (4-33), which, by contrast to (4-32), is an instance of SS+ D-:

(4-33) If it be desired to obtain power over someone else, the oganga must be given by the applicant, to be mixed in the sacred compound, either crumbs from the food, or clippings of finger nails or hair, or (most powerful!) even a drop of blood of the person over whom influence is sought. These represent the life or body of that person. So fearful are natives of

[11] Cf. Fauconnier's (1994) *Ursula wants to marry a millionaire* in Chapter 3, section 2.2.2. The "any Norwegian" interpretation has been described as indefinite non-specific, whereas the "some Norwegian" interpretation as indefinite specific (cf. e.g. Kasher and Gabbay 1976 or Bache and Davidsen-Nielsen 1997: 375). The distinction becomes clearer in negative contexts: *I do not intend to date any Norwegian* vs. *I do not intend to date some Norwegian*.

power being thus obtained over them, that they have their hair cut only by **a friend**; and even then they carefully burn it or cast it into a river. (http://www.sacred-texts.com/afr/fiwa/fiwa08.htm; accessed March 26, 2009) SS+ D-

The quality brought to the fore is that of being a friend (SS+), not of being an individual, though the former does not make sense without the latter. But the notion of individuality (entailed by attention to difference) is weak, as symbolized by D- in the formula, and that of "friendness" is strong, symbolized by SS+. This usage is thus parallel to *a historical novel* in (4-20) or *a doctor* in (4-21).[12]

The four variants of the dominant vantage are represented diagrammatically in Figure 4-10.



Figure 4-10. The dominant vantage: (a) SS D *a bread*; (b) SS+ D- *Jill is a doctor*; (c) SS- D+ *She has bought a car*; (d) SS- D *Bring me a ladder!*

In 4-10a the conceptualizer isolates a portion (quantitative or qualitative) of a mass for closer attention; in 4-10b the onus is on a property or properties of the entities being conceptualized; in 4-10c it is a specific but indefinite (unknown) entity; in 4-10d any random member of the set is appropriate.

[12] SS- D+ (indefinite but specific) also contrasts with negated SS- D (random indefinite): *My sister has a car* illustrates the former, whereas *My sister doesn't have a car* the latter. We are dealing here with a juxtaposition of counterfactual mental spaces, in the sense of Fauconnier (1994), i.e. a space in which my sister has a car and one in which she does not. The two spaces are thus incompatible with regard to relations between corresponding elements in them. Cf. Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk (1996: 20-21) for a view on counterfactual spaces vs. counter-spaces in the context of negation.

3.1.2e SS vs. SS D

Worth considering is also a comparison of usages entailed by the non-discriminatory SS with those resulting from the full dominant vantage:

(4-34)
(a) Society must be changed by **revolution**. SS
(b) Society must be changed by **a revolution**. SS D
(Quirk et al. 1985: 286)

Revolution in (4-34a) is a non-discriminated homogeneous concept (the type of event called revolution), whereas *a revolution* in (4-34b) is a reference to a individual (though hypothetical) instance of that type of event, singled out from the conceptual homogeneity. Similarly in (4-35 a and b):

(4-35)
(a) the nasal retina actually sees **light** SS
(b) At the beginning death was seen as **a light**, now he seems to be praising it as **a darkness**. (Greenbaum 1996: 99) SS D

The homogeneous, undifferentiated conception of light in (4-35a) is in (4-35b) narrowed down to a "sort" of light (and darkness).

An even more abstract context can be found in examples (4-36 a and b):

(4-36)
(a) One loses **interest** in everything ... SS
(b) I mean Thames and Hudson have expressed **an interest** and it's possible I would be able to publish something out of that but you know all that takes a very long time. (Greenbaum 1996: 99) SS D

Compared to (4-36a), (4-36b) is a conceptualization of an "instance" of interest on a particular occasion, in reference to a particular entity in a specific (though indefinite) situation.

3.1.3 Synopsis of similarity predominating

Greater attention to similarity results in seven distinct but related article usage types (recall that the eighth type, SS+ D (e.g. *an audience*), is introduced in

Chapter 6). They are related through the initial or sole level of doubled similarity, SS, and distinguished by (i) the strength of that level (regular-strength, weak or strong non-discrimination); (ii) the absence or presence of the second, analytic level (which yields a full-fledged dominant vantage); and (iii) the strength of the grounded analytic D on the second level. The seven types of cognitive procedures that have been identified, together with their corresponding article usage types are brought together in Table 4-1.[13]

Table 4-1. Seven types of cognitive procedures with predominating similarity manifested in English article usage types

Formula	Viewing mode(s)	Article	Article usage	Example
SS	non-discrimination	nil	with mass or abstract nouns	*bread, music, honesty*
SS-	weak non-discrimination		with plural nouns	*lions, Italians, fractals*
SS+	strong non-discrimination		with count nouns	*president (office)*
			with count > mass	*cat (as mass)*
SS D	default dominant vantage	indefinite	with mass or abstract nouns	*a bread, a music, an honesty*
SS+ D-	strong non-discrimination followed by weak grounded analysis		with count nouns	*I've always wanted to write a historical novel.*
SS- D+	weak non-discrimination followed by strong grounded analysis		with count nouns	*She's bought a new car.*
SS- D	weak non-discrimination followed by regular-strength grounded analysis		with count nouns	*Bring me a ladder!*

Note that there are two major categories of article usage here: the nil article, entailed by SS(+/-), and the indefinite article, entailed by SS(+/-) D(+/-). Within each category, the usages represent distinct conceptualizations as a result of variable strengths of the coordinates.

If predominating similarity entails the use of the nil or the indefinite article, predominating difference entails the use of the definite article. It is to a discussion of this that I now proceed.

[13] The fact that certain coordinate arrangements, such as SS D+ or SS D-, have not been identified in English does not preclude their existence in other languages.

3.2 Difference predominating

As proposed in VT (and inherited by EVT), the conceptualizer enjoys leeway in emphasizing similarity at the expense of difference, or the reverse. Increasing emphasis on difference yields progressively greater analyticity of viewing, which results in a progression from the non-discriminatory SS to the full-fledged dominant vantage SS D, where D is a grounded analytic mode. But in the dominant vantage, D still plays a secondary role relative to SS. When the balance shifts, with a greater emphasis on D, the vantage changes from dominant to recessive, DD S, in which the first level is autonomous analytic viewing, and the second level is synthetic-systemic viewing. Naturally, the recessive vantage also comes in variants, depending on the strength of each coordinate.

Generally, the recessive vantage is correlated with the use of the definite article. Autonomous analysis (DD) allows for an unambiguous identification of a certain entity, while systemic synthesis (DD S) locates the entity in a broader context. The various variants of the vantage, with varied strengths of DD and S, reflect the kinds of relationships between the entity and its context.

3.2.1 The default recessive vantage: DD S

The default variant of the dominant vantage, DD S, represents a kind of conceptualization in which the conceptualizer makes a specific reference to an entity but the reference also has a recognizable generic aspect. For example, in (4-37) the unique reference to the (this) sun is grounded in our folk view of the universe with one sun, entailed by the synthetic-systemic S:

(4-37) Today is Sunday 14th April, it's mid-afternoon and **the sun** is shining. (Greenbaum 1996: 244) DD S

Similarly, in (4-38) the reference to the forehead is specific (Mary's forehead) but also systemic (again, the "kind of thing" that can be called *the forehead*, against the domain of the human body):

(4-38) Mary banged herself on **the forehead**. (Quirk et al. 1985: 270) DD S

In the same vein, *the president* in (4-39) or *The Vice-Chancellor* in (4-40) refer to specific individuals (DD) but the individuals are identified via their offices

as president or Vice-Chancellor against the political system (S) of a country, organization or university:

(4-39) **The president** has been assassinated! (Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 370) DD S

(4-40) **The Vice-Chancellor** is that guy over there by the piano. (Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 402) DD S

The same formula applies to appositive contexts, such as (4-41), which is as much a reference to "me" as an individual, as it is to my (systemic) role as president:

(4-41) I, **the president**, declare the meeting open. (Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 374) DD S

It is perhaps also justified to analyse example (4-42) in the same vein:

(4-42)
"What do you look for in a role?"
"I look for **the echo** inside me."
(10 questions to Sir Ben Kingsley, *Time* 170-7, Aug 20, 2007, p. 4) DD S

The context is a peculiar extension of the "body" context illustrated in (4-38) above: there is this specific voice (echo) inside a specific person (me) but it is conceptualized in synthetic-systemic terms as the "kind" of voice inside every person (on a par with the forehead, the heart, the liver etc. – for generic *the* cf. 3.2.3 below).

3.2.2 The balanced DD+ S- variant

The recessive vantage has two non-default variants identified for the use of the English articles, both of them involving a balanced D-to-S relationship, namely a strongly analytic DD+ S- and a strongly systemic DD- S+. The former option is typical of a number of usages in which the noun referent is unambiguously identified due to contextual or situational knowledge shared by the speaker and hearer. Consider examples (4-43)-(4-45):

(4-43) I shall probably look in at **the College** once or twice during the autumn, and hope to see you then. (Greenbaum 1996: 244) DD+ S-

(4-44) Where did you park **the car**? (Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 368) DD+ S-

(4-45) Could you do something about **the hum**? / Does **the draught** worry you? (Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 370) DD+ S-[14]

A particular college, car, hum or draught is meant – the place of that entity within the overarching context of entities related to it (a "system") is downplayed.

Unambiguous reference can also be achieved through verbal context, specifically a prepositional phrase (4-46) or a relative clause (4-47):

(4-46) **The Door** to Your Heart [the title of a song by Taylor Dayne] DD+ S-

(4-47) They are interviewing **the man** who mows her lawn. (Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 370) DD+ S-[15]

Interestingly, the two kinds of post-modification may also occur with the indefinite article and be attributed to various types of vantage – these are discussed in Chapter 6, examples (6-4) and (6-5).

3.2.3 The balanced DD- S+ variant

The other major non-default variant of the recessive vantage is the strongly synthetic-systemic DD- S+, typically associated with generic reference:

(4-48) **The human brain** has fascinated me ever since I was a child. (Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 407) DD- S+

[14] Similar usages are *Beware of* ***the dog*** or the announcement *Mind* ***the gap*** on the London underground. These are all specific and definite, although the dog/gap is either not known to the hearer (in fact, it is introduced as new information) or the hearer is reminded of its presence. Halliday and Hasan (1976: 71) refer to them as exophoric immediate situational instances. Löbner (2011: 285) interprets *dog* as a sortal noun shifted to a unique concept.

[15] Cf. also *He brought home* ***the picture*** *that he mentioned yesterday* (Low 2005: 190) or ***the little money*** *that remains* (Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 394) (*little* locates the amount on a scale, below the expected level).

(4-49) The invention of **the hydrogen bomb** was the next step. (Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 407) DD- S+

(4-50) This chapter describes **the English noun phrase**. (Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 407) DD- S+

(4-51) Wolfgang can play **the piano** / **the violin** / **the drums**. (Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 408) DD- S+

(4-52) Hilda can dance **the waltz** / **the rumba**. (Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 408) DD- S+

(4-53) Mary took **the bus**/**the train** to London. (Quirk et al. 1985: 269) DD- S+

References in examples (4-49)-(4-53) are to the kind of device/structure/activity/means of public transport, i.e. a certain type of entity within a larger context of other entities of other kinds: the human brain vs. animal brains and/or vs. other human organs, the hydrogen bomb vs. other bombs, the English noun phrase vs. noun phrases in other languages and/or vs. other kinds of phrase in English, the piano vs. other kinds of instrument, the waltz vs. other kinds of dance, the bus vs. other means of public transport. Hence the formula involves a strongly synthetic-systemic S+. (Recall that *the sun* in (4-37) and *the forehead* in (4-38) are different in that although systemic, they are also references to the specific celestial body and to Mary's forehead, the formula being the default DD S rather than the generic DD- S+.) Similarly, consider sentence (4-54):

(4-54) I intended to write **the definitive study** of the present British monarchy. (Greenbaum 1996: 245) DD- S+

DD is weak because the study is non-specific: it does not yet exist. However, it is definite in the sense of my expected, potential achievement, it occupies the uppermost position on the scale of "studies of the present British monarchy" (S+). In other words, any product that would satisfy these criteria could be described in this way, but through systemic viewing focus is placed on the *type* of product, not on its concrete realizations. Similarly, Abbott's (2009: 187) example *She gave the wrong answer and had to be disqualified* may simply be

described as "idiomatic", as the author proposes, but with recourse to EVT it may be considered a strongly systemic generic statement: an unknown answer but one that qualifies as *the* wrong one in a series or on a scale of answers. It seems, too, that we need not agree with Abbott's (2009: 188) treatment of *There was the nicest young man at the picnic* as a formally definite description with an indefinite meaning. Instead, *the nicest young man* can be viewed as a prime example of the category "nice young men", regardless of who the person actually is.

The hypothetical nature of a systemically portrayed referent is also found in negative contexts such as (4-55):

(4-55) I don't have **the slightest idea**. (Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 405) [DD- S+]–NEG

The idea cannot be definite specific because it does not exist. It can only be viewed as a systemic "highest value" of "slight ideas". I propose to model it with the formula [DD- S+]–NEG.[16]

3.2.4 Logical definites

A somewhat distinct subcategory of definites are those one can call "logical".[17] They allow no possibility other than the definite article by virtue of the meaning of the head noun or its modifying attribute, and come in two variants: the unambiguous specific-plus-systemic DD S or the hypothetical systemic DD- S+. Consider examples from (4-56) to (4-58):

(4-56) This is **the only remaining copy**. (Quirk et al. 1985: 270) DD S

(4-57) Of the three newspapers we have in this city, this is **the best**. (Quirk et al. 1985: 270) DD S

(4-58) When is **the first flight to Chicago** tomorrow? (Quirk et al. 1985: 270) DD- S+

[16] This involves a juxtaposition of counterfactual mental spaces, in which "I" have or do not have an idea, even the slightest one – cf. note 12 above.

[17] I have the impression the term comes from someone else's work but I have been unable to establish the source, despite efforts to do so.

The "only" copy is this one copy and there is no other;[18] the newspaper I'm pointing at is the one I consider the best of the three. Thus, both (4-56) and (4-57) are referentially specific and unambiguous, but also systemic (the only remaining copy vs. those that have not remained, the best *of the three*): DD S. In (4-58), in turn, *the first flight* is not referential in the real-world sense but in a systemic sense: there must be some flight we call *the first* and I want to know what time it is: a synthetic-systemic DD- S+.[19]

Note, however, that through context modulation, the definite article need not occur where its "logical" use might be expected. Consider (4-59 a and b):

(4-59)

(a) We are looking for **the shortest distance** between these two points. (http://www.miragesys.com/support/instructions/harness-measuring-guide/; acc. Nov 22, 2011) DD S

(b) I'm sure there is **a shortest distance** between two points. (Hawkins 1991: 435) SS+ D-

Although there is only one such line among many other lines between two points (and so 4-59a is modelled as DD S), in (4-59b) it is not conceptualized as such. Instead, it is viewed as an unknown and indefinite entity, where foregrounded is a quality of that line (being the shortest), rather than an unambiguous "identification" of the distance. Hence, it is modelled as SS+ D-.

3.2.5 Synopsis of difference predominating

The recessive vantage, based on the predominating role of attention to difference, is an assembly of cognitive procedures entailing definite construals of entities, notably the use of the definite article. Table 4-2 presents them in summary fashion, and Figure 4-11 helps visualize the conceptual processes involved.

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[18] Usages such as *an only child* are possible but *only child* functions here as a complex lexical head (cf. Langacker 2008: 287 and his examples *the only only child* or *another only child*).

[19] Low (2005: 175) treats both types as grammaticalized uses, standard phrases, similarly to e.g. *the world* or *the Universe*. I propose, nevertheless, to maintain the distinction between DD S logical definites and DD- S+ logical definites. *The world* and *the Universe* belong to the first category in that they designate entities that "unambiguously exist" and that constitute their own systems: they cannot be mistaken for other "worlds" or "Universes" because there are none (except perhaps in a philosophical or cosmological sense). In contrast, *the first flight* is in fact a potential event, not yet actualized, which just happens to be the first in a series.

Table 4-2. Three types of cognitive procedures with predominating difference manifested through English article usage types

Formula	Viewing mode(s)	Article	Entity conceptualized as	Example
DD S	default recessive vantage	definite	both individuated and systemic	*the sun*
DD+ S-	strong autonomous analysis followed by weak systemic synthesis		individuated	*Where did you park the car?*
DD- S+	weak autonomous analysis followed by strong systemic synthesis		systemic	*the human brain*



Figure 4-11. Conceptualizations entailed by the recessive vantage: (a) balanced focus on the individual and systemic nature of the entity; (b) an individuated entity against the backdrop of other entities of the same and different kinds; (c) this *kind* of entity in relation to entities of different kinds

A tension thus arises between a definite specific construal, with augmented DD+, and a synthetic-systemic construal, with augmented S+. When the two strengths are equal (in the default recessive vantage, DD S), DD still predominates by virtue of being the first activated mobile coordinate, but S also contributes its systemic entailment: the resulting interpretation of the use of *the* is an interplay of specific and systemic meanings.

As a somewhat special case, consider instances of what Katz (1991) calls "middle" reference (cf. Chapter 3, section 1.2.11). The term "middle" may be inappropriate, for it suggests a value between the endpoints, whereas the conceptualization here actually embraces both ends of the cline, its generic and specific aspects, at the same time. In Chapter 3 we looked at an artificially constructed example, here let me quote the opening lines of John Clare's poem *The Badger* (in Katz 1991: 66):[20]

[20] Some of Katz's views seem inconsistent: he regards the "middle" usage as particularly

(4-60)

The badger grunting on his woodland track
With shaggy hide and sharp nose scrowed with black
Roots in the bushes and the woods and makes
A great hugh burrow in the ferns and brakes
With nose on ground he runs an awkward pace
And anything will beat him in the race
The shepherds dog will run him to his den
Followed and hooted by the dogs and men
The woodman when the hunting comes about
Go round at night to stop the foxes out
And hurrying through the bushes ferns and brakes
Nor sees the many holes the badger makes
And often through the bushes to the chin
Breaks the old holes and tumbles headlong in
[DD+ S-]–[DD- S+]

Katz suggests that the animal being described is a typical badger but the degree of minute detail adds a "feeling of particularity" (1991: 66) to the description. Therefore, it might be symbolized by a complex formula [DD+ S-]–[DD- S+].

3.3 Definite plurals: [SS-] D and [SS] D

At this point it is possible to deal with an obvious gap in the account above, namely the use of the definite article with plural nouns. It has been left until now because it lies somewhat outside the dominant-vantage or the

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appropriate in, although not limited to poetry. Poetic language is claimed to be unique and different from everyday conversational language (pp. 13, 43, 44) but somewhat mysteriously "the same kinds of usage" are found in the two domains (p. 40).

A differentiation of texts into types with regard to the use or non-use of articles is a broader question. Some (pragmatic) accounts of articles seem to be stretching the point, e.g. Wolf and Walters (2001) consider the relationship between the use of *the* and the artistic quality of text: the higher the quality, the smaller the percentage of *the*. (The authors also comment on the percentage of *the* in scientific and journalistic writing.) Wolf and Walters' is an interesting account but their squib contains too many short-cuts to be taken as totally reliable. First, the notions of "artistic quality" and "reputation" are vague. Second, the authors seem to suggest (p. 967) that the artistic quality of texts actually *results from* a parsimonious use of *the*, an idea which is as much controversial as it is original. Third, the criterion of the subject matter of texts is disregarded (e.g. Verne's *From the Earth to the Moon* has two *the*'s in the title alone due to its subject matter). Fourth, Wolf and Walters relate their findings to the writer's "orientation", which sounds attractive but vague without further elaboration.

recessive-vantage paradigms and requires distinct notation: [SS-] D or [SS] D. The formula means that coordinate D operates against the whole of SS as a conceptual unit, rather than in tandem with SS within a vantage. For example, recall that uses such as (4-25) *Bring me a ladder!* are modelled as SS- D, i.e. a weakly homogeneous set of ladders, from which the conceptualizer picks out a random member. In contrast, in [SS-] D the role of D relative to SS- is different: D endows the weakly homogeneous set with a boundary. In doing so, the conceptualizer distinguishes that set from everything outside it: such is the case with definite plurals, such as *the ladders*. An important caveat is that the set of elements which is endowed with a boundary may be a subset or the total set. In other words, what lies beyond the set may be entities of the same type but for some reason not included in it, or they may be entities of different kinds. In either instance, what lies beyond the boundary is less important than the boundary itself. Figure 4-12 represents it diagrammatically.



Figure 4-12. The different roles of D in relation to SS-: (a) specific indefinite singular *Bring me a ladder!*; (b) definite plural *the ladders* or *the Italians* (a specific group); (c) *the Italians* (all Italians, Italians as a nation as opposed to other nations)

Example (4-61) represents a case in which the definite article marks a boundary to a portion of the set of performances (Figure 4-12b), whereas in (4-62)-(4-64), appositive constructions, the complete set of the individuals being mentioned falls within the boundary (recall example (4-41) with an appositive singular):

(4-61) Uhm < , > a couple of people can't make **the performances** but the majority of them yes. (Greenbaum 1996: 165) [SS-] D

(4-62) You, **the students**, should form a society. (Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 374) [SS-] D

(4-63) They, **the poets**, are our guides. (Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 374) [SS-] D

(4-64) We, **the supporters of a federal Europe**, will eventually win the argument. (Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 374) [SS-] D

(4-62) is a relatively clear example of the complete-set conceptualization: the students are juxtaposed against "us", e.g. the professors, in the academic milieu. Arguably, *the poets* in (4-63) is in fact ambiguous between the complete-set and the partial-set conceptualization: although a complete set is perhaps more readily construed, *the poets* may in fact refer to a specific group of poets, the poets of a particular epoch etc.[21]

A rather typical context for a definite plural usage, [SS-] D, are relative clauses (*the mistakes they made*; *the people who came*) or other kinds of postmodification (*the steps to the swimming pool*, Greenbaum 1996: 244). There may also be pre- and postmodification at the same time, as in (4-65 a and b):

(4-65)
(a) **The few mistakes they made** were relatively trivial. [SS-] D
(b) **The few people who came to the meeting** all supported the proposal. (Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 394) [SS-] D

They are internally homogeneous sets of *mistakes/people*, made definite through *the – they made/who came to the meeting*, while *few* locates them on the scale of quantity below an expected standard.

A subcategory of the definite plural constructions are nominal uses of adjectives, as in (4-66) and (4-67):

(4-66) ... the treatment of **the handicapped**, the fate of **the senile** and **the terminally ill** (Greenbaum 1996: 246) [SS-] D

(4-67) **the pure in heart** (Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 418) [SS-] D

These are elliptical structures (*the handicapped/senile/terminally ill people*, *the people pure in heart*) with the nominal element missing. Formally, then, there is

[21] A similar ambiguity arises in ***The bathroom tiles*** *are cracked* (Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 370). We can assume that only some tiles are actually cracked (cf. *The bathroom tiles are all cracked*) but, as Huddleston and Pullum observe, the impression is that of the whole of the wall/floor being cracked. On either interpretation, the formula is [SS-] D, but the final D delimits (i) the set of cracked vs. good tiles, (ii) the set of tiles in this bathroom vs. other tiles, or (iii) the set of tiles in the bathroom vs. everything outside the set.

no plural marker but a conceptual link is established with a set of individuals. Alternatively, the usages may be viewed as instances of ADJ > N recategorization, which results in viewing the handicapped/pure etc. (people) as distinct from the healthy or "impure". The formula [SS-] D symbolizes the viewing of a set, SS-, as well as the establishment of a boundary on that set, D.

A comparable formula can be proposed for modelling the use of *the* with mass nouns, such as *bread* or *music*. The non-discriminatory SS conceptualization is endowed with a boundary and hence *the bread* or *the music* (meaning 'this portion/kind of bread' and 'this kind of music', respectively[22]) are entailed by [SS] D.

3.4 Pluralized mass nouns

Mass nouns can also be pluralized, e.g. *breads*, *teas* or even, surprisingly, *musics*.[23] These involve a conceptual recategorization of a homogenous mass into a homogeneous set consisting of "things of the same kind" (of bread, tea, music etc.). More precisely, the mass must be first conceptually segmented and then the portions are grouped into a uniform assembly (rather than one of them being selected for individual attention, which is the case in *the bread*/*the music*, cf. above). Recall that plural count nouns (*lions*, *Italians*) are modelled as SS- (attention to similarity for a conceptualization of a homogeneous set, but not mass – hence the similarity is weakened). By analogy, plural mass nouns are symbolized as SS- but recategorized form SS, hence the formula: SS > SS-. When these are made definite (*the breads*, *the teas*, *the musics*) the conceptualization is endowed with a boundary: [SS > SS-] D.

3.5 A few comparisons

It is instructive at this point to juxtapose several types of article usage, together with their underlying conceptualizations.

3.5.1 Predominating similarity vs. predominating difference

Consider sentences (4-68 a to d):

[22] This is unaffected by the somewhat mysterious title of a TV talent show "Must be the music". Here the question is "why *the* (meaning what it does)" rather than "what does *the* mean".

[23] A Google search for *different musics* on Nov 24, 2011 yielded an amazing 151,000 hits.

(4-68)
(a) **Lions** are ferocious beasts. SS-
(b) **The lions** are ferocious beasts. [SS-] D
(c) **A lion** is a ferocious beast. SS- D
(d) **The lion** is a ferocious beast. DD- S+ or DD+ S-
(Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 407)

Lions in (4-68a) are all lions viewed as a homogeneous class, hence SS-. *The lions* in (4-68b) can only have specific reference, so the (smaller and homogeneous) set of lions ([SS-]) is distinguished from other lions by means of the boundary-setting D (cf. Figure 4-12b). In (4-68c), *a lion* refers to any lion in the set of lions, a random animal (cf. Figure 4-12a).[24] Finally, *the lion* in (4-68d) is ambiguous between generic and strongly systemic DD- S+ (the species) and definite specific, strongly analytic DD+ S- (this lion). Abbott's (2009: 186) example *The elevator will take you to the top* is probably ambiguous in the same manner.

A similar, though not identical, paradigm can be observed in examples (4-69a) to (4-69d):

(4-69)
(a) Nora has been studying **medieval mystery plays**. SS-
(b) I think that genre is the issue for studying **the Medieval Mystery Plays**. [SS-] D
(c) Nora has been studying **a medieval mystery play.** SS- D+
(d) Nora has been studying **the medieval mystery play**. DD- S+ or DD+ S-
(all from Quirk et al. 1985: 281 except b, which comes from http://perusingthebear.blogspot.com/2007/07/medieval-texts.html, accessed Jan 7, 2011)

(4-69a) is clearly SS- and (4-69b) is [SS-] D. (4-69b) is nevertheless different from *the lions* in (4-68b): *the medieval history plays* encompasses (potentially) all medieval history plays, the plays as a genre, whereas *the lions* can only refer to

[24] Epstein (1994: 72, 2001: 373-374) notes that examples like this one would by some authors be considered unacceptable. For example, if in the initial fragment of a newspaper article *When the Northridge quake struck, **the woman** was terrified*, one replaces *the woman* with *a woman*, the sentence would be non-informative. Similarly, for Perlmutter (1970: 238) and Lambrecht (1994: 167) the sentence **A boy is tall* is ungrammatical because to predicate tallness of an unidentified subject referent violates the condition of relevance. Note, however, that in a EVT analysis *a boy* in this sentence is SS- D+, whereas *a lion* in (4-68c) is SS- D, which shows that restrictions on one usage need not apply to the other.

a subset of lions (these lions but not those).[25] Furthermore, *a medieval mystery play* in (4-69c) is different from *a lion* in (4-68c) because it can only be interpreted as a reference to a specific (though indefinite) play, rather than to *any* play – this is entailed by strong grounded analytic D.[26] Example (4-69d), similarly to (4-68d), is ambiguous between generic and definite specific interpretations.

The construals in the set below represent a yet another paradigm:

(4-70)

(a) **Fractals** are wiggly lines which look equally wiggly whatever scale you examine them at. SS-

(b) **The fractals** are wiggly lines which look equally wiggly whatever scale you examine them at. [SS-] D

(c) **A fractal** is a wiggly line which looks equally wiggly whatever scale you examine it at. SS- D

(d) **The fractal** is a wiggly line which looks equally wiggly whatever scale you examine it at. DD- S+
(Greenbaum 1996: 245)

Although the SS- in (4-70a) is the same as in (4-68a) and (4-69a), *the fractals* in (4-70b) can only have a generic interpretation. Also, *the fractal* in (4-70d) can only be interpreted in the generic sense (the specific interpretation would mean that this particular fractal is different from the others – not the meaning intended). The ambiguity characteristic of *the lion* in (4-68d) does not arise here. This happens through contextual modulation and the content of the predicate: while ferociousness is a characteristic feature of lions, it is by no means necessary (gentle lions are thinkable), while (4-70d) in fact predicates of fractals what is their inherent and inalienable nature.

As the final set let us consider examples (4-71 a to d):

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[25] Cf. *The medieval mystery plays, or pageants, entertained audiences for over two hundred years, throughout the country, for two or three days over the Whitsuntide period*. (http://www.production-scripts.com/mitchell-yorkshire-mystery-plays-p-145.html; accessed Nov 16, 2010). The meaning is clearly 'all plays we call medieval history plays'.

[26] Quirk attributes this specific interpretation to the non-subject position of the noun phrase. This is not convincing, for consider the following example, in which the position of the phrase is non-subject and its interpretation is neither SS- D (*a lion*) nor SS- D+ (as in (4-69c)), but SS+ D-: *This was the first time I've seen* ***a medieval mystery play*** *performed* (http://www.goldstar.com/events/washington-dc/the-second-shepherds-play.html; accessed March 30, 2009). Analogous to my interpretation of example (4-21) *Jill is a doctor*, a single play was seen, but more important is the (medieval) "type" of play.

(4-71)
(a) **Italians** like pasta. SS-
(b) **The Italians** like pasta. [SS-] D
(c) **An Italian** likes pasta. SS- D or SS- D+
(Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 407)
(d) **The Italian** likes pasta. DD+ S-

Italians in (7-71a) is a familiar case of non-discriminatory SS- (all Italians). *The Italians* in (4-71b) is a conceptualization of the set of all Italians (the generic sense) or a specific group of Italians: in either case the role of attention to D is to endow the set with a boundary (cf. Figure 4-12b). Finally, *an Italian* in (4-71c) is ambiguous between an indefinite non-specific (any random Italian, SS- D), and an indefinite specific reading (a certain Italian, known to me though not to you, SS- D+).[27] Finally, (4-71d) can only have specific definite reference.[28]

3.5.2 Nil vs. definite articles

Consider the two pairs of examples below, (4-72 a and b) and (4-73 a and b):

(4-72)
(a) **Winter in 1963** was not like this last winter. SS
(b) **The winter of 1963** was an exciting time. DD+ S-
(Quirk et al. 1985: 279)

(4-73)
(a) Hedgehogs hibernate **in winter**. SS
(b) Hedgehogs hibernate **in the winter**. DD- S+
(Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 408)

In (4-72a), winter is conceptualized as a homogeneous "mass": the type of season one calls winter, characterized by certain kinds of weather etc. – thus, it is SS (non-discriminatory viewing). Interestingly, even the *in 1963* modification does not stop it from being an undifferentiated mass: it simply happened that

[27] This last usage, admittedly, is somewhat forced, a more natural option being e.g. *There's an/a certain Italian who likes pasta*.

[28] It deserves, naturally, to be considered why *the lion* can have generic meaning, whereas *the Italian* cannot. A correct but probably insufficient observation is that the latter is not a genus in the sense in which the former is.

in that year the season was different from last year's.[29] In contrast, (4-72b) makes a reference to a specific time span in history, hence DD+ S-. In (4-73a), *winter* is also conceptualized in a non-discriminatory fashion, SS, but (4-73b), rather than being a specific definite construal, is a generic (synthetic-systemic) construal, DD- S+: the winter as opposed to the other seasons in the yearly cycle.

It is in examples such as these that one can see the role of individual preferences of the conceptualizer and the non-deterministic nature of contextual modulation. Recall (Chapter 2, section 2) MacLaury's claim that "people shape their categories in accord with their inclinations to subject the world to broad or constricted points of view" (2000: 276). We are thus talking about individual choices and speaker agency, which, although constrained by physiology and steered by linguistic convention,[30] is a major (perhaps *the* major?) driving force behind conceptualizations.

3.5.3 Non-default balanced recessive vantages: DD+ S- vs. DD- S+

The relationship between the two non-default variants of the recessive vantage can be illustrated with examples (4-74) and (4-75):

(4-74) The appearance of the Moon from Sydney low in the west just before moonset **on the morning of 17** August 2008. (http://www.sydneyobservatory.com.au/blog/?p=1100; accessed March 31, 2009) DD+ S-

(4-75) I take my nap **in the morning**. (Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 408) DD- S+

The formal difference between these examples is that, apart from the use of a different preposition, *on* vs. *in*, in (4-74) there is an *of*-genitive construction relating to *the morning*. The reference is thus to a specific morning at a particular point in time, DD+ S-. In (4-75), in turn, the reference is generic, i.e. to the morning as a time of day in contrast to the afternoon, evening or night: DD- S+.

The distinction can also be identified in logical definites (section 3.2.4 above), i.e. examples such as *the only remaining copy* (4-56), *the best* (*of the three newspapers*) (4-57) or *the first flight to Chicago* (4-58), modelled as DD+ S-. This usage, however,

[29] It is certainly possible but irrelevant to the analysis to read that example as referring to aspects of winter other than the weather, e.g. the good/bad time we had, what happened at work etc.

[30] It is to convention that Abbott (2009: 187) attributes the difference between *on TV* and *on the radio*.

may be entailed by a different conceptualization. Compare (4-76) with (4-77) below, both of which involve the same structure *the first X to INF*:

(4-76) **The first person to run the mile in under four minutes** was Roger Bannister. (Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 368) DD+ S-

(4-77) Several people wrote in to tell us that DiscreetFX has started a fund for ***the first person to*** **port Mozilla to Amiga OS**. (http://www.mozillazine.org/talkback.html?article=3199; accessed March 30, 2009) DD- S+

These examples show that constructions may involve multiple meanings (in a polysemic fashion) and give rise to ambiguities.[31] If (4-76) is a definite reference to a specific person (DD+ S-), (4-77) expresses a certain potential: the person is only identified through what may happen in the future (porting Mozilla to Amiga OS). Thus, *the first person to INF* in (4-77) is an expression of a potential of a certain hypothetically existing individual among many (all?) individuals, therefore DD- S+. A similar conceptualization underlies example (4-78), which, again, refers to a certain potential, a "kind of thing" which is utterly (i.e. maximally) impossible and additionally involves the process of recategorization from ADJ to N:

(4-78) We are going to attempt **the utterly impossible**. (Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 417) DD- S+

Ambiguities may also arise within single sentences. The interpretation of each of the examples (4-79)-(4-81) alternates between referential specific DD+ S- and hypothetical non-specific DD- S+:

(4-79) Everybody wants to be a member of **the most popular team**. (Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 370) DD+ S- or DD- S+

(4-80) **The boy who wrote this e-mail** must be expelled. (Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 403) DD+ S- or DD- S+

[31] To show that they *do* have meanings to begin with, i.e. that they are "stored pairings of form and function" (Goldberg 2003: 220; cf. also Lakoff 2007: 95), is a major goal of cognitive constructionist approaches to language.

(4-81) I want to meet **the genius who can solve this equation**. (Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 404) DD- S+ or DD+ S-

(4-79) means that we either know which team is on top and everybody wants to belong to it (DD+ S-) or that whichever team is on top is the most popular one (DD- S+). Similarly in (4-80), the speaker may know the boy (DD+ S-) or they may not (DD- S+) and refer to whichever person wrote the e-mail. In (4-81) it is probably safe to assume that the default interpretation is hypothetical non-specific: the equation has so far proven unsolvable (whoever can solve it in the future, I want to meet that person, DD- S+). The other formula applies to a situation in which the equation has been solved and I want to meet the one who did it: a referential specific DD+ S-.[32]

Another kind of ambiguity modelled as a distinction between DD+ S- and DD- S+ is that between the definite specific and the generic construal (recall that the DD- S+ formula symbolizes either a hypothetical non-specific construal, e.g. *the first person to* port Mozilla to Amiga OS or a generic one, e.g. *the human brain*). Consider example (4-82):

(4-82) Tanya appeared quite relieved as **the telephone** rang. (Greenbaum 1996: 244) DD- S+ or DD+ S-

The telephone can involve a definite specific construal, a reference to a particular (possibly the only) device of this sort in the home. But it may, perhaps even more readily, be construed as a *kind* of device called *the telephone*, as opposed to other equipment, regardless of how many individual pieces of that kind of equipment there are: DD- S+. Similarly, there is example (4-83):

[32] A somewhat amusing, similar example is discussed by Devitt (2004: 286):

> Several of us see a strange man in a red baseball cap lurking about the philosophy office. Later we discover that the Encyclopedia is missing. We suspect that man of stealing it. I go home and report our suspicions to my wife: "A man in a red baseball cap stole the Encyclopedia." Suppose that our suspicions of the man we saw are wrong but, "by chance," another man in a red baseball hat, never spotted by any of us, stole the Encyclopedia.

According to Devitt, the statement is false because the identity of the man I have in mind does not match that of the man who actually did it. For Russell (Ostertag 2009: 198), it would be true in the sense of correctly describing the kind of person involved. But these are philosophical questions, relating to the nature of truth and falsehood, and their treatment depends on the framework adopted.

(4-83) My sister goes to **the theatre** every month. (Quirk et al. 1985: 269) DD- S+ or DD+ S-

The theatre as a kind of entertainment (vs. *the cinema*, *the opera* etc.) has generic reference and is symbolized by the strongly systemic formula DD- S+. When a specific theatre is meant (e.g. the one in the neighbourhood), the formula is the one for the strongly analytic variant DD+ S-. Finally, consider example (4-84):

(4-84) I think there's somebody at **the door** now. (Biber et al. 1999: 264) DD+ S- or DD- S+

The door may be construed as a role, the entrance to the house or apartment, a generic systemic usage, DD- S+. But it may also be construed as "this door, the one we're at", in contrast to the other doors – a specific definite construal, DD+ S-. Admittedly, the two construals need not be seen as disjointed: under normal circumstances the door is both the (main) entrance (as opposed to other attributes of the house, such as the windows, the roof etc.) and the specific door we have in mind. (In this sense, the example is parallel to (4-38) *Mary banged herself on the forehead*, modelled as DD S, with both coordinates receiving regular strength.) Interestingly, a similar use in (4-85) involves metaphorical extension:

(4-85) Every Tuesday I stood there by **the door** expecting you to come. (Greenbaum 1996: 244) DD+ S- or DD- S+

I stood there by the door is more readily construed as 'I was waiting for you to come, ready and eager to welcome you', even though I might not have been physically standing by the door. The metaphorical sense is triggered by *every Tuesday*, with the physical standing as a secondary possibility (*the door*: DD+ S- or DD- S+).[33]

This kind of triple ambiguity is clearly the case in (4-86):

(4-86) 'I've got to take out **the dog**,' he said as finally as he could. (Greenbaum 1996: 244) DD+ S- or DD S or DD- S+

[33] I thank Bill Sullivan for help with analysing this example.

The default and preferred interpretation is probably specific referential, a specific dog here and now (DD+ S-). But *the dog* may also be interpreted as a role within a typical, idealized structure of a household, where frequently (though by no means always) there is a dog (one dog). Thus, the specific and the generic (systemic) usages would coalesce into DD S. Moreover, the systemic aspect may undergo extension onto a pure "role" interpretation, in which *taking out the dog* is, perhaps, an excuse for not staying in. The dog may not even exist, with the resulting humorous effect, e.g. *OK, I think I'll leave you two quarrelling and will take out the dog* (i.e. I simply want to go out for any reason good enough to do so). In such cases, the vantage formula would be strongly synthetic-systemic, DD- S+.

4. Synopsis

In this chapter I have proposed a rather schematic EVT account of a number of usages of the English nil, indefinite and definite articles, organizing them by the type of conceptualization associated with a particular usage. These conceptualization types are expressed as EVT formulae, some of which symbolize full-fledged vantages, while others symbolize attention levels in vantages, called viewing modes. Vantage and viewing-mode architecture obeys certain principles, regulating ground-to-figure (fixed-to-mobile) arrangements and relationships between coordinates (degrees of attention to similarity or difference) plus relative coordinate strength. Thanks to the latter variable, the types of viewing modes recognized (non-discrimination, analysis and synthesis) may assume various values: regular, weak (reduced) or strong (augmented).

Table 4-3 juxtaposes the different major types of conceptualization, examples of usage and EVT modelling in summary fashion.

Table 4-3, as any arrangement of data, highlights some aspects of the data and their classification, while downplaying others. This particular arrangement, for example, shows that each of the three major types of article usage, nil, indefinite and definite, is associated with a certain array of modes of vantage types. The nil article is entailed by the non-discriminatory mode, the indefinite article by the dominant vantage, while the definite article by the recessive vantage. However, the table does not show very clearly the relationship between plural indefinites and plural definites. Plural definites are in a way exceptional in that they do not follow the recessive vantage patterns typical of other definites. Rather, they are based on the conceptualization of plural indefinites – plus a boundary-setting emphasis on difference.

Table 4-3. EVT formulae, article usages and conceptualizations

Formula	Viewing mode(s)	Article	Entity conceptualized as	Example*
the nil article				
SS	non-discrimination	nil with mass or abstract nouns	homogeneous mass	*bread, music, honesty*
SS-	weak non-discrimination	nil with plural nouns	homogeneous set	*lions, Italians, fractals*
SS+	strong non-discrimination	nil with count nouns	a category or kind	*president (office)*
		nil with count > mass	homogeneous mass derived from an individuated item	*cat (as mass)*
		nil with a collective noun	homogeneous mass derived from many items	*audience*
the indefinite article				
SS D	default dominant vantage	indefinite with mass or abstract nouns	a portion or kind of an otherwise homogeneous mass	*a bread, a music, an honesty*
SS+ D-	strong non-discrimination followed by weak grounded analysis	indefinite with count nouns	individuated hypothetical representative	*I've always wanted to write a historical novel.*
SS- D+	weak non-discrimination followed by strong grounded analysis	indefinite with mass or abstract nouns	individuated and specific, though indefinite	*She's bought a new car.*
SS- D	weak non-discrimination followed by regular-strength grounded analysis	indefinite with mass or abstract nouns	individuated but random	*Bring me a ladder!*

the definite article

DD S	default recessive vantage	definite	both individuated and systemic	*the sun*
DD+ S-	strong autonomous analysis followed by weak systemic synthesis	definite	individuated	*Where did you park the car?*
DD- S+	weak autonomous analysis followed by strong systemic synthesis	definite	systemic or hypothetical non-specific	*the human brain the genius who can solve the equation (but no one yet has)*
[SS-] D	weak non-discrimination limited by attention to difference	definite with plurals	homogeneous set endowed with a margin	*the performances, the students*
[SS] D	regular-strength non-discrimination limited by attention to difference	definite with mass nouns	a portion or "kind" of a mass	*the bread, the music*
SS > SS-	regular-strength non-discrimination reconceptualized into weakened non-discrimination	nil with plural mass nouns	portions of mass in a homogeneous set	*breads, teas*
[SS > SS-] D	regular-strength non-discrimination reconceptualized into weakened non-discrimination and limited by attention to difference	definite with plural mass nouns	portions of mass in a homogenous set endowed with a margin	*the breads, the teas*

* Typical examples only. They should not be taken as defining but merely illustrating a vantage or viewing mode.

The prevailing majority of data analysed in the chapter come from contemporary comprehensive English grammars: in this way I hope to have arrived at a reasonably coherent picture of the conceptualization of the English articles. In the next chapters, I extend the scope of analysis by dealing with more data from several sources other than grammar books (though these will also be used). In Chapter 5 I will inquire into the influence of discourse context, whereas in Chapter 6 I will analyse a number of ambiguous, non-standard or unusual cases.

CHAPTER 5

EVT and articles in discourse

1. Introductory comments

I have so far attempted to draw a skeletal classification of the basic usages of the English articles within the EVT framework. The present chapter has the ambition to extend that classification onto more complex, contextually modified cases. Special onus will be placed on the role of discourse in shaping the environment in which articles operate. The discussion here is based on the hypothesis that speakers attempt to make their discourse coherent and that the predominant method to achieve this involves cohesion.

Let us begin with a few illustrations of relatively clear and unproblematic forces operating in discourse, such as (5-1) to (5-4) below.

(5-1) They have **a cat** and two dogs. **The cat** is over fifteen years old. (Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 370) from SS- D+ to DD+ S-

In (5-1) the conceptualization of the cat involves a progression from viewing it as specific but indefinite (SS- D+) to specific and definite (DD+ S-).

(5-2)

A: When is the, **the sale** in <unclear>? Is it next Sunday?
B: Which sale?
A: Well **the big sale**, you know, **with the furniture and everything**. (Biber et al. 1999: 264) DD+ S-

(5-3)

A: Could you get me from **the shelf** the black felt pen?
B: Which shelf?
A: **The big one with all the** <unclear> **on top**. (Biber et al. 1999: 264) DD+ S-

In (5-2) and (5-3) the sale/shelf is at first unidentified by the hearer, though it is portrayed as definite and specific by the speaker (DD+ S-). Its conceptualization as definite specific on both sides of the exchange channel only occurs when additional clues are provided in the discourse (*the big sale … with furniture*; *the big one with all the … on top*). Discourse releases the tension built through the use of *the*, tension that arises at the interface of two out of the three basic categories of usage of the definite article identified by Wackernagel (1924, in Bühler 1990 [1934]: 350) for Greek, German and Romance languages, but easily applicable to English. The two categories are both deictic: in one, the article indicates something that has already been mentioned, in the other, it indicates something given for both the speaker and hearer.[1] As discourse develops and it turns out that the latter usage cannot be relied on, speaker A in both (5-2) and (5-3) resorts to the former category.

A somewhat different situation is illustrated in (5-4):

(5-4) A woman and a child had a narrow escape yesterday when their car left the road. **The accident** happened at about 9.25am at Marks Tey, near Colchester. (Biber et al. 1999: 264) DD+ S-

The example involves a reconceptualization of an event, first invoked through reference to its participants in a series of actions (*a woman*, *a child*, *a narrow escape*, *their car left the road*) and then by means of a noun phrase (*the accident*), DD+ S-.

The forces found in discourse can, however, be much more complex and require an introduction of additional theoretical and descriptive solutions to the EVT framework. The specific discourse-related problems discussed in the present chapter include: coreferentiality of nominal phrases, the reference point phenomenon at the level of sentence, the level of discourse, in associative links and in situational scripts, encyclopedic knowledge, the conceptualization of

[1] The third category covers generic (*das Pferd*) or abstract (*die Philosophie*) uses, of which the latter does not belong to the convention of English.

discourse-initial *the*, the hearer's unfulfilled expectations as to article use, and the functioning of articles on the lexical vs. the discourse level.

Before I proceed to these, let me note that the division into sections proposed below is of necessity an oversimplification. Specifically, why should a discussion of encyclopedic knowledge be included in a distinct section if, in accordance with a major tenet of cognitive linguistics, encyclopedic knowledge lies at the very heart of meaning? The reason is a practical one: the need to ensure that the chapter has a relatively clear structure. This must be borne in mind whenever the content appears unduly compartmentalized.

2. Coreferentiality

I begin a survey of discourse-related problems of article use with an exemplification of coreferentiality of noun phrases. For Halliday and Hasan (1976) coreferentiality (their term: coreference) is related to reiteration, which is

> a form of lexical cohesion which involves the repetition of a lexical item, at one end of the scale; the use of a general word to refer back to a lexical item, at the other end of the scale; and a number of things in between – the use of a synonym, near-synonym, or superordinate. (Halliday and Hasan 1976: 278)

The repetition of a lexical item can be found in the already discussed examples (5-1) and (5-2), and will be further illustrated in (5-6) and (5-7). The use of a synonym (*motorcycles – bikes*) is the case in (5-5) below, and in (5-13) we have the use of a superordinate (*her blue Ford Escort – the vehicle*). It appears, then, that of Halliday and Hasan's categories of cohesive repetition, not obviously illustrated in this chapter is the use of a general word or a near-synonym. A possible candidate for the former is example (5-30), although the relationship between *Ampofo* and *the new champion* is somewhat more complex. The lack of nearly-synonymous expressions in examples is purely accidental and in no way affects the line of argumentation presented.

Thus, if (5-1) above is a straightforward operation of NP repetition, example (5-5) involves the use of a synonymous item:

(5-5) Though car-accident fatalities are declining, the number of Americans killed on **motorcycles** has risen dramatically. Strong sales, boosted by **the bikes**' *fuel efficiency and baby boomers' desire to relive the two-wheel*ed

glory days, have increased the number of **motorcycles** on the road. (*Time* 172-9, Sep 1, 2008, p. 7)

motorcycles	SS-
the bikes [SS-]	D
motorcycles	SS-

First, there is reference to *motorcycles*, which is an instance of SS-, i.e. of a nearly homogeneous set (or any subset) of motorcycles. Then, *the bikes* is coreferential with *motorcycles*: the definite article results from a final D, which operates on the previously mentioned set: [SS-] D. Finally, the second use of *motorcycles*, which one might expect would be treated as a familiar concept, is, as it were, introduced anew into the discourse, again SS-. What matters are motorcycles as such (as a total, internally undifferentiated set) rather than their specific subset. The writer seems to be deliberately forgoing the possibility of capitalizing on an anaphoric link, and thus of adding a boundary to the set, in order to remain at a more general level.

A forced and undeniably artificial, though an instructive case is illustrated in (5-6):

(5-6) Yesterday **the dog**(1) got into a fight with **a dog**. **The dogs** were snarling and snapping at each other for half an hour. I'll have to see to it that **the dog**(2) doesn't get near **that dog** again. (McCawley 1979, ex. 21, in Abbott 2004: 131)

the dog(1), (2)	DD+ S-
a dog	SS- D+
the dogs	[SS-] D
that dog	DD+ S-

An easy way out of the forced ambiguities would be to use such expressions as *another dog* – *that other dog* etc. and it is probably only to make a linguistic point that McCawley does not resort to those. Both *the dog*(1) and *the dog*(2) are DD+ S-, made definite through shared knowledge or possibly from immediate situational context, as well as through prior mention. *A dog* is SS- D+, an indefinite but a specific dog. *The dogs* is [SS-] D, an internally homogenous set made definite through the final D. Finally, *that dog* is modelled as DD+ S-. It can be coreferential only with *a dog* for two reasons. First, no other option is available: the coreferentiality of *the dog*(1) and *the dog*(2) has already been established (earlier in text). Second, the definite article in *the dog*(1) is a signal of the speaker's

greater familiarity and empathy with the creature than is the indefinite article in *a dog*. Thus, the low-familiarity and low-empathy marker *a* corresponds to the distal demonstrative *that*. (For a discussion of articles vs. demonstrative determiners in anaphoric NPs cf. Maes and Noordman 1995.)

Examples (5-7) and (5-8) show changing interpretations and conceptualizations which take place as discourse develops.

(5-7) I met **a student** before class. **A student** came to see me after class as well. (Hawkins 1991: 419) SS- D+

On default interpretation, these are two different students, each being (independently) conceptualized as indefinite but specific SS- D+. Hawkins, however, notes that this interpretation is cancellable:

(5-8) I met **a student**$^{(1)}$ before class. **A student**$^{(2)}$ came to see me after class as well – in fact, it was **the same student** I had seen before. (Hawkins 1991: 419)

a student$^{(1)}$	SS- D+
a student$^{(2)}$	SS- D+
the same student	DD+ S-

On first encounter, both *a student*$^{(1)}$ and *a student*$^{(2)}$ are SS- D+ and refer to different individuals – such is at least the perspective of the hearer. For the speaker, however, the two are coreferential. But the speaker chooses to withhold that interpretation and portrays *a student*$^{(2)}$ as unrelated to *a student*$^{(1)}$: the link is only revealed in the final clause. To explain the rationale behind it requires some guesswork. Most probably, the fact that the student was the same individual is secondary; what matters is that the speaker was approached on two occasions by a random (though specific) member of the set of students (a possible hidden message: these students never give me a break, neither before nor after class). In order to achieve this effect, the linear development of the discourse is non-iconic with respect to the knowledge of the speaker.

A possible definite reading of a formally indefinite NP is exemplified by Kasher and Gabbay (1976: 149):

(5-9) I talked with **a magician** and so did Uri.

The authors point out that on one reading the sentence ascribes "to Uri a talk with the very same magician", in addition to the ambiguous reading

that ascribes "to him a talk with some magician, either the one with whom I talked or another" (from Schwarz 2004: 350). By analogy, *a student*(2) in (5-9) is ambiguous in the same way until the ambiguity is resolved in what follows.

3. Reference-point phenomenon

It is common in discourse for some elements to rely for their conceptualization on other elements as reference points. This may be achieved through explicit mention of both sides of the relationship or the reference point may remain covert (such is the nature of the so called associative anaphora, cf. Chapter 3, sections 1.2.8 and 1.2.10). I will discuss various instances of the reference-point phenomenon, beginning with the sentence or phrase level, through the discourse level, then moving on to creative associative links and finishing with the role of scripts.

3.1 Sentence/phrase level

Examples (5-10) to (5-13) illustrate the reference-point phenomenon (marked as ►) at phrase or sentence level.

(5-10) **The father of one of my students** rang me up last night. (Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 368) STUDENT ► DD S

The father is conceptualized relative to the speaker's student. The reference is specific and definite but the definiteness is systemic (in relation to the student) rather identifying the person in an unambiguous way, hence DD S. The complete formula is STUDENT ► SS D. Such is also the case in (5-11) and (5-12), with *the parents* and *the patterns* being modelled as [SS-] D:

(5-11) **The parents of one of my students** rang me up last night. (Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 369) STUDENT ► [SS-] D

(5-12) **The patterns of industrial development in the United States** are too varied to be categorized easily. (Biber et al. 1999: 264) INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT ► [SS-] D

I propose that *industrial development in the United States* be treated as one conceptual unit, an undifferentiated, internally homogeneous case of SS.[2]

A somewhat more complex case is illustrated in (5-13):

(5-13) He married **the daughter of his bank manager**. (Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 369) BANK MANAGER ▸ DD+ S-

In this example, *the daughter* may be the only one that the bank manager has or the one we all know and have possibly been concerned with: BANK MANAGER ▸ DD+ S-. Notice that this is a different interpretation than that proposed for the superficially equivalent *the father of one of my students* in (5-10). The reason is that the set of fathers in the family contains, at least in canonical situations, one member only. Therefore, *the father* always refers to a single individual as a result of the family structure (or "system"). In contrast, the number of daughters is potentially unlimited and a family with one daughter is such due to "local" circumstances. Therefore, *the daughter* is strongly analytic and identifies a specific individual.[3]

It is interesting to note that a similar example is discussed by Löbner (2011: 299):

(5-14) **The father of a student** came to my office hours.

Löbner makes a distinction between NPs and maximal NPs, a maximal NP being that which is not a proper part of another NP. Thus, *the father* and *a student* are just NPs, whereas *the father of a student* is a maximal NP. He also proposes that "[r]eferential maximal NPs carry absolute determination" (2011: 299) or reference type (absolute being basically non-relational, e.g. non-possessive). Naturally, such is the case with *the father of a student*, as opposed to the two non-maximal NPs. Examples (5-10)-(5-13) can be subjected to the same kind of account.[4]

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[2] ***The*** *industrial development in the United States* might be modelled as [SS] D, where [SS] symbolizes industrial development, and D the delimitation of that in the context of the US (cf. *the bread* or *the music*).

[3] One might perhaps defend the interpretation that *the daughter* is at least weakly systemic by virtue of expressing a family relationship. The case is open.

[4] Löbner's proposal is obviously far richer than the cursory report here. The author justifies his maximal NP constraint by saying that "the utterance meaning of an NP cannot be determined as long as there is an open possessor argument. If the possessor is not explicitly specified, the possessor argument must be taken care of by some way of coercion" (2011: 299). The details of

A sub-kind of the reference-point phenomenon are relative clauses (cf. Chapter 4, sections 3.2.2 and 3.3). A discussion of related problems, i.e. indefiniteness in elliptical verb-phrase structures, some of which involve relatives, is offered by Schwarz (2004). Schwartz's study is not directly concerned with articles and falls outside the scope of the present work, but it is instructive, however, to first consider an example such as (5-15) (in fact, Schwarz is more interested in the scope of the indefinite *some woman* than the interpretation of *the cookies* (*some woman had brought*), although the two issues cannot be separated):

(5-15) Tom ate the cookies some woman had brought. Bill didn't. (from Schwartz 2004: 348)

The author notes that the second sentence can be assigned a definite reading (the same woman is meant) or an existential one (there is not a woman like that). The former interpretation has the logical form *Tom*$_1$ [t_1 *PAST* [$_{VP}$ *eat the cookies f*(1) *had brought*]]. *Bill*$_1$ [t_1 *did not* [$_{VP}$ *eat the cookies f*(1) *had brought*]], whereas the latter's logical form is [*some woman*] [*Tom PAST* [$_{VP}$ *eat the cookies* t_1 *had brought*]], *not* [*some woman*] [*Bill did* [$_{VP}$ *eat the cookies* t_1 *had brought*]]. On the basis of several other examples of verb-phrase ellipsis, Schwarz proposes that indefinites in these contexts not be assigned a referential interpretation. The elliptical structures he discusses bring us to the problem of the reference-point phenomenon at discourse level.

3.2 Discourse level

The reference-point conceptualization can at the level of discourse assume various forms; examples (5-16) to (5-21) illustrate some of those.

(5-16) He found her blue Ford Escort in the car park. **The vehicle** was locked and **the lights** were off. (Biber et al. 1999: 264) VEHICLE ▸ [SS-] D

In (5-16), first the vehicle is construed as definite and specific thanks to its identification, through encyclopedic knowledge, with the blue Ford Escort (in Halliday and Hasan's (1976) terminology this is coreferential cohesive

Löbner's models need no concern us, suffice it to say that he proposes to distinguish four noun types (sortal, individual, relational and functional), which correspond to logical types and concept types, and four nominal determination types (singular definite, indefinite, absolute and relative). There are, furthermore, interactions of noun type and determination type.

reiteration by means of a general word). Then a reference-point relationship is established between the lights and the vehicle: VEHICLE ▸ [SS-] D.

Examples (5-17) and (5-18) involve encyclopedic knowledge as a prominent parameter of their semantics (more on encyclopedic knowledge in section 4):

(5-17) In April 1980, oil prices went stratospheric, peaking at about $100 a barrel, adjusted for inflation. Some of **the causes** might sound familiar. (*Time* 170-20, November 19, 2007, p. 13) EVENT ▸ [SS-] D

(5-18) I appreciated Nancy Gibbs' column about several recent warnings delivered on the state of the environment [Sept. 24]. Yet even with an awareness of the crisis, I am at a loss to know what **the solutions** might be. (letter from Claudia Schaer, Calgary, Alta., Canada, *Time* 170-15, Oct 15, 2007, p. 8) STATE/SITUATION ▸ [SS-] D

The causes and the solution are associated with the price rise and the state of the environment, respectively. One simply *knows* that a somewhat unusual occurrence (as in (5-17)) has its causes and that in the context of warnings and crisis one would possibly look for solutions (as in (5-18)).

What the speakers know about the world can also result in ambiguity, as in (5-19 a and b):

(5-19)

(a) I bought a book and spoke to **the author** about it.
BOOK ▸ DD+ S-

(b) I bought a book and spoke to **an author** about it.
(Hawkins 1991: 418)
unrelated author: SS- D+
one of the book's authors: BOOK ▸ SS- D+

(5-19a) is an obvious "default" case of the book's only author: BOOK ▸ DD+ S-. Other interpretations are clearly forced or only possible in larger discourse (e.g. some other author, mentioned previously). But (5-19b) lends itself to two interpretations: an unrelated author (someone who is an author of books but not of this one) would be symbolized as SS- D+, whereas one of the book's many authors is a reference-point conceptualization BOOK ▸ SS- D+.

Example (5-20), in turn, illustrates the speakers' choice of projecting a reference-point relationship between entities or its lack:

(5-20) It is through education that whole populations develop respect for the rule of law, without which there is no hope of prosperity. In South Africa, by no means a basket-case country, more than 80% of **the schools** don't have libraries, some don't have running water or electricity, and many teachers aren't properly qualified. (*Time* 172-10, Sep 8, 2008, p. 8, a letter from Paul Hoffman, Cape Town)
SOUTH AFRICA ▸ [SS-] D

One could easily imagine a nil article in this context but the author of the letter chose to tie his conceptualization of South African schools to the name of the country with the definite *the*. This is, importantly, not referential narrowing: the set of schools being referred to would be the same regardless of whether one uses the nil or the definite article. But to use the nil article would be to view the schools as a "free-floating" weakly homogeneous set (SS-), whereas the definite article imposes on them a conceptual boundary: SOUTH AFRICA ▸ [SS-] D. The example shows that language is not used to describe or talk "about" the world as it is, for in either case there is a certain number of schools in South Africa and all of them are included in the set. What matters is the speaker's cognitive configuration of the elements of the world (a focus on the link between the country and its schools), which is projected by means of a certain configuration of cognitive viewing modes.

The reference-point relationship may be more complex and involve three (or more?) levels, rather than merely two. Consider example (5-21):

(5-21)
"How is your experience on **the stage** different from your movie sets?"
"I love **the chemistry** that can be created onstage between **the actors** and **the audience**."
(10 questions to Glenn Close, *Time* 170-2, July 16, 2007, p. 4)
the stage DD- S+
the actors STAGE ▸ [SS-] D
the audience STAGE ▸ [SS+] D
the chemistry STAGE ▸ ACTORS/AUDIENCE ▸ DD S

This example involves a generic systemic usage *the stage*, a definite plural *the actors*, a collective noun *the audience* and the definite construal of an abstract concept, *the chemistry*. The EVT modelling of these individual elements is secondary in the case at hand: *the stage* is DD- S+, *the actors* is [SS-] D, and *the*

audience is [SS+] D (the latter receives a more in-depth interpretation in Chapter 6). There is a reference-point relationship STAGE ▸ ACTORS/AUDIENCE and the incorporation of *the chemistry* into the whole conceptualization requires an additional level of conceptual dependence: STAGE ▸ ACTORS/AUDIENCE ▸CHEMSITRY. I propose to model *the chemistry* as generic-plus-specific DD S because it is something that is claimed to arise in a particular scenario of the stage (cf. the role of frames/scripts in section 3.4) but also something experienced by the speaker. It is something hypothetical (*can be created*) but also specific (*I love*).

In the examples above speakers recognize the associative links between entities, readily accepted by the hearers. However, they can also construct these links in a more creative fashion, as I illustrate in the next section.

3.3 Created associative links

The degree of "readiness" which allows for the connection between the First Mention Definite and its anchor is described by Clark (1977; cf. also Hawkins 1978) in terms of a cline from "absolutely necessary" to "quite unnecessary" parts of larger wholes, e.g. *I entered the room. The ceiling was high* vs. *I entered the room. The chandeliers sparkled brightly*.[5] (5-22) is an example of a secondary, though perhaps a typical connection:

(5-22) When you design a building, what are the three most important factors that you consider?

Firstly, I consider the memory of the place and what has happened in its history. I also consider **the light**. And I think about what this building can become in the future. (Shell advertisement, *Time* 172-13, Sep 29, 2008, p. 9)

BUILDING ▸ DD- S+

The associative link between a building and the light (the light cast by the sun on the building? the light in the building?) emerges here from the text itself rather than being intrinsic to our experience or general knowledge of buildings. Although it should not, and does not, come as a surprise that buildings are lit with natural or artificial light, in a neutral context the association

[5] These are obviously typical or prototypical situations. Globetrotters report that in less developed places a hotel room might lack a ceiling/roof altogether (let alone a chandelier) and sometimes even walls. "Room" in such cases would be a conventionally agreed upon concept (a place to sleep) rather than a physical enclosure.

would probably not appear at the top of the list: the material, the colour(s), the solidity of the structure etc. come to mind more readily. Otherwise phrased, the relationship is modelled as BUILDING ▸ DD- S+, but the "▸" is *established through* the use of the light in connection with a building rather than *resulting from* a stereotypical conception of a building. However, once the association is evoked, the reader can relate to it with no major objection.

Unequal strengths of the conceptual links between a concept and its anchor are illustrated in (5-23):

(5-23)

(a) Don't go near that house. **The dog** will bite you.
HOUSE ▸ DD+ S-

(b) Don't go near the car. **The dog** will bite you.
CAR ▸ DD+ S- or HOUSE ▸ CAR ▸ DD+ S-

(c) A car went by. **The dog** was barking.
DD+ S-

(Erkü and Gundel 1987, in Low 2005: 119-120; numbering changed)

The strongest link is that between *the dog* and *that house* in (5-23a): referred to is most probably the dog that belongs to the tenant of the house, a typical situation: HOUSE ▸ DD+ S-. A less obvious link obtains in (5-23b): is it the dog that guards the car or the one that belongs to the person who lives in the house and also owns the car? In other words, is it CAR ▸ DD+ S- (a rather dubious and unconventionalized link) or HOUSE ▸ CAR ▸ DD+ S-? The trickiest usage is that in (5-23c). The dog being mentioned may be travelling in the car but it would imply that dogs are typically (stereotypically?) associated with cars – this is far less acceptable than their being associated with houses, or actually, households. The dog may also be unconnected with the car but re-constructable from the immediate context. On that interpretation, the dog is modelled simply as DD+ S-, without an anchor. One may construe this as a fragment of a larger whole, e.g.: *What was going on?– I was standing there doing nothing. A car went by. The dog [my dog] was barking. The cat was running wild. It started to rain*, etc. Low (2005: 123-124) suggests to analyse it in terms of perspective. Due to the use of the past tense (which for Smith (2003) marks an endpoint of the "car event"), the link between the car and the dog is severed – from an external "pedestrian" perspective the observer is not likely to associate the two. In contrast, in (5-23b) the imperative allows one to construe the situation in the inclusive *hic et nunc* manner, with both the car and the dog in view.

In some cases the associative link is perhaps somewhat too far-fetched and forced, as in (5-24):

(5-24) We bought **a new car**. **The color** is beautiful. I like **the smell**. **The telephone** is convenient. **The toothpaste** is painful. (Erkü and Gundel 1987)
CAR: ► DD+ S-

As the discourse develops, the link becomes progressively weaker, from obvious and readily recognized to hardly interpretable.[6]

3.4 Scripts

The reference-point associations may derive from the scripts, scenes or frames (cf. Chapter 1, section 2.9) that people routinely invoke when a contextual prompt triggers them, i.e. from the degree of stereotypical assumptions about what things go together (Prince 1981; cf. Epstein 2000). Consider examples (5-25) to (5-28).

(5-25) In the closing days of a campaign, every day is Halloween, because **the hobgoblins** are all real and they genuinely are trying to scare you. (*Time* 172-18, Nov 3, 2008, p. 29) HALLOWEEN ► [SS-] D

The formula for *the hobgoblins* is HALLOWEEN ► [SS-] D (the hobgoblins are a typical or an expected element of Halloween).[7] This time, additionally, we have an instance of an analogy between two associative links: hobgoblins are to Halloween as (probably) certain people are to the closing days of the

[6] Whether the link between the smell and the car is stronger than that between the telephone and the car is, I suppose, a matter of individual preference, experience or technological development. Erkü and Gundel (1987) note that the link may also depend on the focus or topic of what is being talked about. Consider their example: *We stopped for drinks at **the New York Hilton** before going to **the Thai restaurant**. **The waitress** was from Bangkok*. The waitress referred to is the one who served us at the Hilton because the hotel is "in focus" or "the topic of the sentence". Therefore, the following is odd because the baby orangutan is linked to the zoo frame, which is not in focus: ?*We stopped for drinks at **the New York Hilton** before going to **the zoo**. **The baby orangutan** was really cute*.

[7] How to model Halloween and other proper names is a separate issue, not directly relevant to the case at hand. Proper names are, when referring, conceptualized as definite unique. However, in this context *Halloween* is not any specific day but a special "category" of day in the year (against the "system" of the calendar), so DD- S+. Such would also be the case with *Christmas*, *Easter* etc., unless their textual reference is to a specific occurrence (*the Christmas of 2010*). But proper names and EVT still remain an unexplored avenue; cf. Chapter 6, section 4.6.

2008 US presidential campaign, from which context the example is taken. (For a discussion of analogical thinking and the use of articles cf. example (6-37) in Chapter 6.)

A clear instance of a script as the reference point is example (5-26):

(5-26) In **the horror movie** you kill **the monster**, and **the hand** re-emerges. And if you're not looking, **the hand** grows back and **the monster***'s there again*.' (Rudy Guliani, former New York City Mayor, insisting that the Bush Administration should focus on al-Qaeda's resurgence in Pakistan and Afghanistan; *Time* 170-5, Aug 6, 2007, p. 12)

the horror movie	DD- S+
the monster	HORROR MOVIE ▸ DD- S+
the hand	THE MONSTER ▸ DD- S+
	full formula: [HORROR MOVIE ▸ DD- S+] ▸ DD- S+

The associative anchor is *the horror movie*, a generic (synthetic-systemic) DD- S+. Linked to this is *the monster*, another generic DD- S+ usage. The next relevant NP, *the hand*, is at the immediate level modelled as THE MONSTER ▸ DD- S+, but in a global setting it is a case of a three-level reference-point anchoring: [HORROR MOVIE ▸ DD- S+] ▸ DD- S+, i.e. the hand is that of the monster, which in turn functions within the frame of the movie.[8]

The next two cases come from the work of Richard Epstein (1999). Example (5-24) illustrates the script (Epstein's term: frame) of MOURNING or FUNERAL:

(5-27) So we lost the Rams and the Raiders. Lost our innocence. But hold **the flowers**. Put away **the handkerchiefs**. Stop **the sobbing**.

We still have the Rose Bowl, don't we?! (*Los Angeles Times*, Dec 31, 1995, p. C1; in Epstein 1999: 58)

the flowers, the handkerchiefs	MOURNING ▸ [SS-] D
the sobbing	MOURNING ▸ DD- S+

The flowers and *the handkerchiefs* are relatively straightforward cases of MOURNING ▸ [SS-] D. A more interesting case is *the sobbing*, which I propose to model as MOURNING ▸ DD- S+. The generic DD- S+ formula means that

[8] The various levels of the reference-point phenomenon are aptly explained by Langacker (1991a: 7-8) in terms of the scope of predication and illustrated with the now classic examples *A finger has three knuckles* vs. ?*An arm has fourteen knuckles or the still worse* ??*A body has fifty-six knuckles*.

the sobbing does *not* in fact occur (nor are there any flowers or handkerchiefs, for that matter): it is "merely" a typical element of the MOURNING script.

The conception of frame or script plays a major role in (5-28), a review of the film *Genesis* (1986), directed by Mrinal Sen (already quoted in Chapter 3, example (3-3)):

(5-28) The film's setting and the story both have a mythic simplicity. In the aftermath of a drought that leaves most people surviving by selling themselves into lifelong servitude, a farmer and a weaver escape and set up residence in a desert ghost town. Their only contact with the outside world is a trader who keeps them in debt to him while also keeping them supplied with essentials.

Then **the woman** arrives, like a fleeing animal. Her family has been killed in a flood. She doesn't ask to stay, but they feel guilty after they rebuff her ("our first sin," they call it) and invite her to share their refuge ... And so begins the slow spiral toward a disaster as ineluctable, no doubt, as the eternal cycles of drought and flood. (*Spectator,* Raleigh, North Carolina; 2/14/96 pp.11-12, in Epstein 1999: 59)

CREATION ▸ DD S

Note that *the woman* is a first-mention definite. One could imagine the indefinite article being used in this context, *a woman*, which would symbolize a new figure in the story, with the underlying formula being SS- D+ (a specific woman, known to the author, but as yet new to the reader). The motivation behind the definite *the* is that this is *not only* a reference to an individual. Epstein suggests that *the woman* is a role in the "creation story frame" from the biblical Book of Genesis (cf. the film's title): the woman causes the fall of man (here: of the men). The frame is shared knowledge of the writer and reader, so both in a way "expect" or "anticipate" the emergence of its typical elements. However, *the woman* at the same time *is* a reference to a specific (and definite) individual, a character in the story. Therefore, the augmented synthetic-systemic reading is counterbalanced by the specific reference, so that the formula is CREATION ▸ DD S (cf. (4-38) *Mary banged herself on the forehead* in chapter 4)).

Scripts and frames are constructs inherent in and deriving from the encyclopedic knowledge of the world on which the speaker and hearer can capitalize. In the next section we look at more examples of the role of encyclopedic knowledge in the motivation for the use of the English articles.

4. The role of encyclopedic knowledge

As mentioned above, the confinement of the role of shared, common-sense, implied or encyclopedic knowledge to a separate section is warranted only by the desire to obtain a greater clarity of presentation, as it can hardly be considered absent from any example we have discussed so far. However, in the uses below I believe it is especially pronounced.

As the first case, consider (5-29):

(5-29) What shall we eat tonight? – Well, there's **the pizza** in the fridge, **the cake** in the pantry etc. (Hawkins 1991: 421) DD+ S-

The identification of *the pizza* and *the cake* as DD+ S- rests on the mutual awareness of the speakers that these items can be found in the places mentioned. Rando and Napoli (1978) call these "list" readings but I agree with Hawkins in that a list need not be involved or it may be a one-item list. While the shared knowledge here has an immediate, local character, in (5-30) it extends beyond the immediate context:

(5-30) Ampofo was being outboxed, but then amazingly put his opponent down in the third and fifth rounds. **The new champion**, who lost the title to Regan a year ago, said: ... (Biber et al. 1999: 264) DD+ S-

Ampofo and *the new champion* are both strongly analytic DD+ S-. Their coreferentiality rests on the hearer's ability to draw on encyclopedic knowledge and to infer that a champion is someone who "puts his opponent down" and what it entails for the result of the match. Thus, more general knowledge is applied to a local context.

An interplay of broadly contextual, synthetic-systemic knowledge with contextual knowledge is perhaps more readily identifiable in (5-31):

(5-31) A Massachusetts court rejected a couple's proposal to build a windmill, highlighting **the steep odds** such plans face nationwide.
(*New York Times*, http://www.nytimes.com/pages/science/index.html; Sep 14, 2009, "Turning to Windmills, but Resistance Lingers" by Abby Goodnough) DD S

The steep odds is definite through wider contextual knowledge (such plans normally face steep odds nationwide) but also through specific reference in a local context of that couple's proposal (a reference-point relationship): DD S.

The next case is one in which access to a certain aspect of background historical and cultural knowledge is an asset but is not indispensable:

(5-32) It is not right or fair for leaders within Europe to threaten to isolate Ireland from the European Union. Ireland may be a small country, but as history has proved, it has never been one to shrink from **the bigger and stronger bully**. (*Time* 172-4, July 28, 2008, p. 6, a letter from Niamh Cooke, Cork, Ireland) DD S

The bigger and stronger bully does not identify Ireland's major enemy in unambiguous terms but through the use of *the* and comparatives it nevertheless does locate that country in relation to Ireland. In other words, if the reader can identify the enemy on the basis of their cultural background, it definitely facilitates understanding – but even if not, the expression presents a two-element systemic arrangement of Ireland and its "bully", whichever other country is meant. The author, thus, refers to a specific country (DD+) but also to a peculiar relationship between that country and Ireland (S+). The augmented values of DD+ and S+ are thus neutralized, the resulting formula being DD S.

Finally, example (5-33) illustrates tension between verbal context and its encyclopedic interpretation:

(5-33) Whatever stereotypes you have about the Hoosier State, they're likely to scatter like sand in the wind in this unique region. Sprawling some 15,000 acres along the lake between Gary and Michigan's southwestern border, the Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore and State Park are the diamonds in the rough in this otherwise dreary industrial region. Love **the dunes**? Join the party: The Duneland Harvest Festival draws several thousand dune enthusiasts each fall.
(*Chicago Tribune*
http://www.chicagotribune.com/travel/midwest/indiana/chi-indiana-dunes-tourism-storygallery,0,1786075.storygallery; Sep 14, 2009)
[SS-] D

Recall that bare plurals, such as *dunes*, are modelled as SS-, i.e. as homogeneous sets, consisting of "identical" items (but nevertheless not mass-like, hence

a weaker emphasis on SS). The definite article endows the set with a boundary, the conceptualization being modelled as [SS-] D. In (5-33), although there is an extensive description of a specific terrain, *the dunes* refers not a specific subset of dunes but to dunes as opposed to other entities (cf. (4-69b) *the medieval mystery plays* in Ch. 4) – otherwise inviting the reader to "join the party" would be nonsensical. Although the example does not contribute anything to the actual modelling of definite plurals (cf. Chapter 4, section 3.3), it shows the tension between context itself (specific) and common-sense, knowledge-based interpretation of that context: it is the latter that prevails.[9]

5. Discourse-initial *the*

Although far from being limited to literary contexts, many of the occurrences of discourse-initial *the* come from literature. An example from journalistic writing is *the woman* in (5-28) above and the present section deals with both non-literary and literary contexts. In fact, this convention is part of a broader phenomenon, which Halliday and Hasan call *imaginary texture* (1976: 297), as when a form is used that would normally be linked with another element through an anaphoric relationship. As a result, "the narrative begins as if one was already in the middle of it; it appears to presuppose a great deal that has gone before, but in fact nothing has gone before so we have to supply it for ourselves" (p. 298). Typical cases involve the use of pronouns with no antecedents; cf. Halliday and Hasan's most dramatic example: *So we pushed him under the other one*. Discourse-initial *the* creates a similar effect.

In (5-28), the use of *the* was attributed to the invocation of a particular frame or script. But a frame need not be so easily identifiable, if indeed it is invoked at all. Consider (5-34):

(5-34) There never is anything a boy can do! David pressed his nose close to **the pane** and scowled disapprovingly at the rain which beat against **the window** and in the deserted little courtyard just without. ... (Low 2005: 92)[10] SITUATION ▸ DD+ S-

[9] A separate issue is the conceptualization of *the party*, modelled as DD+ S-. This strongly analytic (identifying) conceptualization marks a shared context, which in this case is actually created by the NP *the party* itself (i.e. our party, the party we're enjoying etc.), rather than being dependent on it (cf. a similar problem with discourse-initial *the* in examples (5-34) *the pane* or (5-35) *the fire*).

[10] Low does not provide the sources of her examples.

Since this is the beginning of the story, *the pane* and *the window* are relational concepts without apparent anchors for them. To model them, I propose a general formula SITUATION ▸ DD+ S-. SITUATION is the anchor in the broadest possible sense, invoked here through reference to David (it is "his" pane and "his" window). The central character in the story is thus the pivot around which other concepts revolve. Such is also the case in (5-32):

(5-35) He [Elias Ayuso] had been an academic gypsy ever since **the fire**. It was third grade, and the drug dealer living below him had reneged on a debt. Arsonists were sent to teach the dealer a lesson, and in the process, half the high-rise was rendered homeless. (*New York Times*, 8 Jan 1995, p. B11; from Epstein 1999: 65, ex. (10), or 2001: 354, also ex. (10)) AYUSO'S LIFE ▸ DD+ S- (speaker's point of view)

By analogy to (5-34), I propose to model *the fire* as AYUSO'S LIFE ▸ DD+ S-. It symbolizes a definite, specific fire, which text-wise seems unanchored. It is not clear to what it is linked other than the general knowledge that fires happen in people's lives and that they can be non-trivial events. The mentioning of the fire invokes the background frame of the person's life in which that event was significant. The use of *the* is speaker-oriented and/or protagonist-oriented (the speaker and the protagonist have access to the knowledge about that particular fire) but not hearer-oriented. However, the background "life" frame is invoked for the sake of the hearer: it shows the hearer that the speaker knows all about Ayuso's life, controls the story and can decide in what way it will be told.

Finally, we will consider two examples of discourse-initial *the* in the writings of Ernest Hemingway, both of which have already been mentioned. First, recall example (4-2) in Chapter 4, repeated here as (5-36):

(5-36) **The train** went up the track out of sight, around one of **the hills** of burnt timber. Nick sat down on the bundle of canvas and bedding the baggage man had pitched out of the door of the baggage car. (Ernest Hemingway, *Big Two-Hearted River*, in Hemingway 1925/1986: 133)
Nick's point of view: DD+ S-
reader's point of view: NICK ▸ DD+ S-

Recall also that Epstein's (2002) account of this use in terms of mental spaces was in Chapter 4 recast in terms of vantages with viewpoints (VP-2 and VP-3) as coordinates. This allowed me to propose that the use involves not so much

a shift in point of view (Epstein) as a co-occurrence of points of view: the protagonist's and the reader's. I cannot add anything that would invalidate that analysis, rather, the present proposal in terms of EVT has a complementary character. Both for the protagonist and for the reader, *the train* cannot be anything other than the definite specific DD+ S- and *the hills* can only be [SS-] D. Crucially, the reader's access to the definite entities is obtained through Nick as a reference point: NICK ► DD+ S- and NICK ► [SS-] D. This, however, is only possible in the second sentence, when Nick enters the stage. In the first sentence the reader receives the mysterious DD+ S- and [SS-] D as if "hovering in the air", without the intermediary role of the protagonist. An expectant tension is built up, to be relieved in the second sentence. The co-occurrence of the two viewpoints is thus hierarchically structured and withheld for a time, as illustrated in Figure 5-1.



Figure 5-1. The relationship between the protagonist, the reader and elements of the scene in Hemingway's *Big Two-Hearted River*, example (5-36)

The figure shows that in fact it is only Nick who has direct access to the train and the hills, the reader's access being indirect and mediated through the protagonist. Thus, if Nick, being an element in the world of the story, conceptualizes the train and the hills relative to himself, the reader receives that configuration as a whole. The tension arises because the package comes in bits, with the least accessible elements first.[11]

[11] Bonomi (2005) proposes to analyse certain samples of discourse in terms of speaker's and hearer's points of view and the strategy of discommodation (vs. accommodation) on the part of the hearer. This is when the hearer suspends his/her point of view in the face of some information that he/she is not willing to take for granted. Consider: *The man wearing an elegant hat is a poet. – I'm glad to hear that Leo is a poet. But his hat is not elegant*. The hearer may in fact omit the second sentence in order to act cooperatively and thus the speaker's (false) assumption remains

The second example is the beginning of *A Farewell to Arms* in (5-37) (cf. footnote 2 in Chapter 4):

(5-37) In **the late summer of that year** we lived in a house in a village that looked across **the river** and **the plain** to **the mountains**. (Hemingway, *A Farewell to Arms*, 1929)

This use is parallel to the one in (5-36) in the sense that the reader is granted only indirect reference to *the late summer of that year*, *the river*, *the plain* and *the mountains*, but in contrast to the previous example, the protagonists (*we*) have direct access to those, before the tension has had a chance to build up (the only "loose" definite reference before the introduction of *we* is *the late summer of that year*).

The fact that the use of *the* in the examples above is initially somewhat surprising, and appears as motivated thanks to the reconceptualization of the scene, shows that the hearer/reader usually has a degree of expectation as to the application of a given article in a specific context. The next section deals with cases where those expectations are not fulfilled, with the resulting tension and a need for greater cognitive effort, or with cases of an interplay between the speaker's various construals of the scene. Two specific oppositions will be discussed: the definite vs. the indefinite article and the nil vs. the indefinite article.

6. Hearer's unfulfilled expectations

6.1 Definite vs. indefinite article

The reader will have so far built an image of the typical uses of the indefinite and definite articles, as well as the conceptualizations they result from. In a nutshell, the indefinite article arises from the construction of the dominant vantage (SS D), whereas the definite article from the construction of the recessive vantage (DD S), each occurring in several variants depending on coordinate strengths. A comparison of the respective conceptualizations is best effected in similar or better in identical contexts. Let us first consider the possible nature of the ungrammaticalities in (5-38):

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in force. Note, incidentally but curiously, that these processes are unaffected by the change of the indefinite into the definite article, at least in the present case: *The man wearing the elegant hat*...

(5-38)
(a) I recalled **the** / ***a sweet little child** that Harry used to be. // **the**/***a name Algernon** DD+ S-
(b) I recalled **a sweet little child** that Harry used to be like. // **a name like Algernon** SS+ D-
(Hawkins 1991: 423, 435)

Obviously enough, the examples illustrate the distinction between the recessive vantage for *the* and the dominant vantage for *a*. Both *the sweet little child* and *the name Algernon* are recessive, though the former is strongly identifying DD+ S- (a definite child, at a specific moment in time), whereas the latter is strongly systemic DD- S+ (this name as opposed to others in the whole set of names). In contrast, *a sweet little child* and *a name like Algernon* are both strongly non-discriminatory dominant SS+ D-: what matters most are the qualities of a sweet little child (the qualities which Harry possessed), not the identification of Harry. This is why it does not occur with *that Harry used to be*, which is a reference to Harry as a specific child at a specific time. Similarly, *a name like Algernon* is "a kind of name" like Algernon, a representative of the category of names. Although this interpretation is tentative for lack of broader context, it shows why **a name Algernon* is ungrammatical: *a* suggests an instance of a class (hence it may occur with *like*), whereas *the* is either a definite reference or a generic usage (therefore it goes with the actual name but not with *like*, which creates an opening for a property). Thus, one might see the distinction above as that between "instance" (recessive construal) vs. "property" (dominant construal).

Consider now a context in which the regularly used *the* is replaced with a somewhat unexpected *a*:

(5-39) A javelin plunged into Roman Sebrle's shoulder during a bizarre and horrible training session in 2007. ... To the delight of many admirers, Sebrle recovered and won **a gold medal** at the world championships that same year. Winning **the title** was the most dramatic event in a career of superlatives. (*Time* 172-5, Aug 4, 2008, p. 34)
a gold medal SS+ D-
the title DD- S+

The gold medal, possible though not actually used,[12] would be systemic (i.e. the gold medal as opposed to the silver and bronze medals in the tripartite "medalling system"). The indefinite *a gold medal* is a strongly non-discriminatory SS+ D-, i.e. an achievement of a certain kind (cf. *I've always wanted to write a historical novel*). Importantly, it is not an indefinite specific usage (*She's just had a baby*), which puts onus on the actual medal as a physical item. Although the athlete most probably did receive the physical item, this is secondary (even though rewarding for that athlete). Of primary importance is Sebrle's position in the final standings: one would still call him a gold medallist even if for whatever reason (shortage of gold medals resulting from poor planning) the actual medal had not been presented to the sportsman. Hence, a strong non-discriminatory plus weak grounded analytic usage: SS+ D-.

Another definite NP in this passage, *the title*, is a case of synthetic-systemic DD- S+, textually related to *a gold medal*. The connection provides an additional reason for treating *a gold medal* as a "kind of achievement" (winning the title), not as a physical object.

The unfulfilled expectation of the definite article may result from a portrayal of the actual entity as a type, in a situation where contextual clues suggest item construal. Consider (5-40):

(5-40) Shakespeare's birthday on April 23 will be marked by an extraordinary relay. Over 24 hours, 60 groups of youngsters from New Zealand to Hawaii will enact excerpts from his plays. As part of this project, a Serbian youth group will perform Romeo and Juliet. How will they respond in **a country** so scarred by its own history of tribal division? (*Time* 171-17, April 28, 2008, p. 68) SS+ D-

The expectation of the definite unique *the country* (DD+ S-) is triggered by a rather specific context, including references to Serbia (*Serbian*) and theatrical events to take place there at a specific time. But the indefinite *a country* involves a focus on a certain *type* of country (*scarred by its own history and tribal division*), hence SS is amplified at the expense of D: SS+ D-.

[12] That the definite usage seems more probable is to an extent corroborated by statistics. A Google search of February 16, 2011 yielded 7,448,000 hits for *win/won/wins/winning the gold medal* and 5,320,000 hits for *win/won/wins/winning a gold medal*. The difference is not overwhelming but easily noticeable. (Options with other verbs were not tried.)

6.2 Nil vs. indefinite article

Example (5-41) illustrates textual tension between the nil article, the indefinite article and a numeral:

(5-41) It isn't **morning** in Paris without coffee and a croissant. And if it isn't **a good morning** in Paris without coffee and a pain au chocolat, I have just had **one great morning**. (*Time* 170-10, Sep 10, 2007, p. 54)

morning	SS
a good morning	SS+ D-
one great morning	SS- D+

Upon first mention, *morning* is a conceptualization of a homogeneous, undifferentiated "mass" (SS): a span of time, a fragment of the temporal domain, something extendable and continuous (on a par with *music* or *bread*). Then, *a good morning* is a hypothetical, qualitatively distinguished portion of that mass: SS+ D- (augmented emphasis on quality). Finally, *one great morning* involves a strengthened analytic D, for the emergence of SS- D+. In the sequence SS > SS+ D- > SS- D+, the position of S relative to D weakens as the discourse progresses: from sole SS via SS+ D- (stronger than D- but with D- already present) to SS- D+. In other words, the conceptualization of the concept MORNING develops from a "mere" mass-like concept, via a hypothetical portion of the mass to a specific, though still indefinite occurrence.[13]

As the final problem in this chapter, we will consider the tension involved in an interplay between different levels in discourse: the lexical and the textual level. Although not directly linked to Karl Bühler's conception of language, the interplay does invoke the author's recognition of words and sentences as the fundamental structures of language. Says Bühler: "One or the other terms alone must not be elevated to the rank of a category, rather both belong together and can only be defined correlatively" (1990 [1934]: 81).[14] It is such correlative action from both sides that we look at below.

[13] In this sense *one great morning* is equivalent to *a great morning*. The use of the numeral is apparently dictated by the desire to clearly mark the distinction between the conceptualization of a hypothetical morning "type" (*a good morning* SS+ D-) and a factual morning "instance" (*one/a great morning* SS- D+).

[14] Bühler's contribution to linguistics and psychology (e.g. his conception of gestalts) has had a major impact on the development of cognitive linguistics, though the contribution is not always duly acknowledged.

7. Lexical vs. discourse level

Consider the two levels, lexical and textual, in example (5-39):

(5-42) **Coffee**, **tea**, **soft drinks**, **confectionery**, **sandwiches**, **fruit** and **other food and drink** do not mix well with **computing equipment**. (Greenbaum 1996: 245)
LEXICAL LEVEL: coffee, tea, confectionery, fruit, food and drink SS
soft drinks, sandwiches SS-
DISCOURSE LEVEL: coffee, tea, confectionery, fruit, food and drink, soft drinks, sandwiches (as a set): SS- vs. computing equipment SS

On the lexical level, *coffee*, *tea*, *confectionery*, *fruit* and *food and drink* are each (and separately) conceptualized as SS, whereas *soft drinks* and *sandwiches* are each SS-. Notice, however, that on discourse level they together constitute a set, contrasted with *computing equipment*. The set, then, consists of elements of different statuses as individual units. In other words, although these are distinct categories of items, they are nevertheless treated as homogeneous enough to be included in one set. Recall that a set is symbolized by SS-, a non-discriminatory viewing mode of reduced strength. But also recall that the formula symbolizes a set composed of elements viewed as homogeneous. In the case at hand, the set is *not* homogeneous, for – as has been said – it consists on the lexical level of two types of elements: SS and SS-. Why, then, is the set symbolized by SS-? The answer lies in discourse: the set is contrasted with computing equipment (SS). On discourse level, then, we are dealing with a juxtaposition of a set conceptualized as SS- and a homogeneous mass-like SS (Figure 5-2). It is through the discourse-based opposition that the otherwise heterogeneous set acquires its (relative) homogeneity.



Figure 5-2. SS- vs. SS on discourse level

8. Conclusions

In this chapter I hope to have credibly extended the EVT framework, applied to article use, to its skeletal form as discussed in Chapter 4. We have looked at how, in general terms, discourse influences the use and interpretation of articles, and in specific terms at how that use contributes to the understanding of discourse. But more importantly, the textual level is an entailment of the hidden cognitive processes of vantage formation, subjected to contextual forces.

In the chapter, a number of specific areas have been explored. The discussion began with the problem of coreferentiality and the speaker's decision to capitalize on the possible coreferential links between discourse elements or not. Much attention was then devoted to the various manifestations of the reference-point phenomenon at the level of phrase or text, including the novel associative links actually created in discourse or the role of larger frames or scripts. The latter are directly linked with the significance of encyclopedic knowledge, one of the fundamental tenets of cognitive linguistics. Attention was then shifted to the peculiar conceptualizing processes in discourse-initial uses of the definite article. Examples of a contentious encounter between the hearer's/reader's expectations and the speaker's production were then analysed, with alternate construals being engaged in a peculiar cognitive interplay. Finally, vantage construal was shown to operate at two levels in discourse: the lexical and the textual.

One specific area, namely the reference-point phenomena, required a specific treatment, and thus a new ▸ symbol was added to the EVT formula. More extensions (to the already extended VT) will be proposed in Chapter 6, to model more complex or "special" cases of article use.

CHAPTER 6

EVT and articles: a further extension

1. Introductory comments

Chapters 4 and 5 were devoted, respectively, to a skeletal account of textbook-like examples of article usage in terms of EVT and an extension of that framework onto contexts with a stronger, more clearly identifiable influence of discourse. The present chapter constitutes a step forward and a deeper insight into the problem, in that it deals with cases which are either less predictable or result from more unique or idiosyncratic conceptual processes. They constitute a major challenge and a testing ground for the theory proposed here: it is always frustrating to observe language use disobey even the neatest theoretical model. Nevertheless, I hope that the account of the rather diverse instances of article use will in fact augment the credibility of EVT as a descriptive model.

I will begin by elaborating on the idea of conceptual units larger than words, will then move on to the phenomenon of conceptual replication, and then to a gamut of cases classified as "special".

2. Conceptual units larger than words

The idea that a conceptual unit need not be equal to a word is not new and has in fact found its way into literature. Consider an excerpt from Peter Watts' (2006)

Blindsight, a science-fiction novel in which a group of neurologically-enhanced humans and pseudo-humans establish linguistic contact with an alien intelligence. The intelligence is a non-sentient artefact, deprived of consciousness but its computational power allows it to fake communication in the "Chinese room" manner: for a time it passes the Turing test. As is typical of such exchanges, the artefact gives very little specific information, managing to maintain conversation at a very general level. Humans wonder how this is possible:

> "Given that it picked up the language entirely via passive eavesdropping, it's remarkably fluent. In fact, from what I can tell they're more efficient at processing speech than we are."
> "Gotta be efficient at a language if you're going to be so *evasive* in it, eh?"
> "If they were human I might agree with you," James replied. "But what appears to us as evasion or deceit could just as easily be explained by a reliance on smaller conceptual units."
> "Conceptual units?" [...]
> James nodded. "Like processing a line of text word by word, instead of looking at complete phrases. The smaller the units, the faster they can be reconfigured; it gives you very fast semantic reflexes. The down side is that it's difficult to maintain the same level of logical consistency, since the patterns within the larger structure are more likely to get shuffled." (Watts 2006: 103)

The "smaller conceptual units" are the size (or length) of words, which means that "larger" ones extend beyond word boundaries.[1] In what follows, I am going to make use of the idea that a conceptual unit need not correlate with a text word. Specifically, the idea will help account for some instances of article use.

However, because two examples illustrating the idea will involve bare plurals, it is instructive to note a potential ambiguity in the interpretation of the latter. Chierchia (1998) relates – but opposes – the views of Gerstner-Link and Krifka (1993), Wilkinson (1991) or Diesing (1992), for whom bare plurals may denote kinds or function as weak indefinites. Weak indefinites are those that do not "presuppose the existence of individuals satisfying their restriction"

[1] What is problematic here is that formal (syntactic) processing is equated with conceptual processing, but this is not relevant to the problem at hand. Somewhat more relevant is the problematic nature of the very notion of "word". A brief characterization of the major relevant issues can be found in e.g. Crystal (1991: 379-381), Akmajian, Demers, Farmer and Harnish (2001: 11ff.) or Saeed (2009: 55-59).

(Chierchia 1998: 341, on the basis of Milsark 1974), for example *dogs* in **Dogs were barking in the courtyard. Others were not* is a weak indefinite, whereas in *Some dogs were barking in the courtyard. Others were not* it is a strong indefinite. The view proposed in the present book is similar: bare (nil-article) plurals are modelled as SS- (weak non-discrimination) and denote sets composed of individuals. The sets can indeed be kinds in the sense of comprising all of its potential members (*Lions are ferocious beasts*) or weakly indefinite (*We could hear lions in the distance*). Some context, however, do not seem to distinguish the two readings in an unambiguous manner (*Lions can generally be heard*).[2]

Ambiguity in bare plurals is also addressed by Cohen and Erteschick-Shir (2002): the plurals are claimed to be generic (*Boys are brave*) or involve an ambiguity between a generic and an existential reading (*Boys are hungry*) (cf. also Jäger 1999). The authors propose that the interpretation depends on the sentences' focus structure and a distinction is made between topic and focus bare plurals. Topics are obligatory, focus is something that expresses a predication over the topic (p. 131). Topic bare plurals are interpreted generically (specifically, as kinds), while focus bare plurals are interpreted existentially (cf. also Laca 1990). Thus, in *Boys are brave*, *boys* is the topic and its reference is specific, that is, generic (to a kind).[3] In *Boys are present*, along with the generic interpretation, the existential interpretation is also possible. The subject *boys* can be interpreted as focus and the verb *present* (in the temporary sense, not as a permanent property) introduces a non-overt spatio-temporal topic: somewhere – boys are present (formally: $\exists\text{TOP}_t$ [*Boys are present*]$_{\text{FOC}}$).[4]

The instances of bare, nil-article plurals I am going to discuss now also involve ambiguity or, better, an apparent lack of clarity: since the reader might expect the definite article in these contexts, the nil-article plurals require a reconceptualization of the scene. Consider example (6-1):

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[2] Contrary to the authors mentioned, Chierchia proposes a "Neocarlsonian view" of bare plurals (cf. Carlson 1977b), i.e. claims that they only refer to kinds and no ambiguity is involved (her arguments come from cross-linguistic comparisons in the light of the Universal Grammar approach).

[3] Note that in the present work the notions of specific and generic are used differently (are manifestations of different modes of conceptualizations). For Cohen and Erteschick-Shir, genericity is a kind of specificity.

[4] Among other related studies, Nickel (2010) addresses the problem of generic comparisons involving bare plurals (*Men are taller than women*) by proposing to reconfigure the logical form of generic sentences.

(6-1) When I started teaching school, I was convinced I would change the world and touch **children who needed love**. My first job was in the inner city. It was a turbulent time – fathers away at war, mothers trying to cope raising families alone. Racial strife and poverty were rampant in the neighborhood.
(*The Christian Science Monitor*, Sep 8, 2009, "A lesson for the teacher", by Sharon Carper; http://www.csmonitor.com/2009/0908/p18s01-hfcs.html; acc. Sep 14, 2009) SS-

The passage abounds in exemplary, almost dictionary-type examples of article usage, unproblematically modelled in terms of EVT. These are: *the world* (DD S), *the inner city* (DD- S+), *a turbulent time* (SS D), *fathers*, *mothers*, *families* (SS- each), *racial strife* and *poverty* (SS each), *the neighbourhood* (DD+ S-) and *children* (SS-). But why is it not *the children*, [SS-] D, if contextual conditions are favourable (the author's own experience, localized in space and time)? My answer is that we are operating here with a larger conceptual unit *children who needed love*, composed of a noun and its relative clause. At the level of discourse this is a representation of a (weakly) homogeneous set of "children who needed love", SS-.

Similarly, consider (6-2):

(6-2) As **wars** in Afghanistan and Iraq have stretched the U.S. military to the breaking point, the Pentagon has quietly okayed the use of antidepressants by stressed-out troops. (*Time* 171-24, June 16, 2008, p. 32) SS-

Again, instead of the expected [SS-] D (*the wars*), where *wars* is delimited by the boundary-setting D, one is faced with the nearly homogeneous SS- *wars* alone. What is hidden behind this conceptualization? The absence of the boundary-setting D suggests that the conceptualizer does not pay attention to the distinctive nature of the two wars. In fact, the contrary is the case: the boundary is intentionally removed with a dual effect: first, the Iraqi and Afghan wars are typical wars, just like any others; second, *wars in Afghanistan and Iraq* functions as an internally undifferentiated conceptual unit, SS-, although structurally it is a case of $_{NP}$[*wars* $_{PP}$[*in Afghanistan and Iraq*]].

If in the two examples above the expected definite article gives way to the nil article, in other cases it does so to the indefinite article. Consider (6-3):

(6-3) Sean Combs has trashed as "baseless" a Los Angeles Times report alleging that he was linked to **a 1994 shooting and robbery of Tupac Shakur in New York City**, an attack that sparked the deadly feud that resulted in Shakur's death. (*Time* 171-13, March 31, 2008, p. 18) SS+ D-

Because the event is unambiguously identified (time, place, name of the victim), the default portrayal would be to construe it as a strongly analytic recessive vantage, DD+ S- (*the shooting and robbery*). Instead, however, the writer decided to portray it as "an instance of shooting and robbery" (one of many), and endowed the instance with certain incidental characteristics: it happened in 1994 in New York City and involved a victim called Tupac Shakur. Thus, it is conceptualized as SS+ D-, a dominant vantage with an augmented value of similarity, and the event's spatial and temporal setting are downplayed.

The notion of larger conceptual units is useful in distinguishing between similar but non-equivalent conceptualizations:

(6-4)
(a) **The house** on the corner is for sale. DD+ S-
(b) **A house on the corner** is for sale. SS+ D-
(Quirk et al. 1985: 272)

(6-4a) is an example of an unambiguously identified entity, DD+ S-, as in *He handed me the clock on the table* (Low 2005: 190). In example (6-4b), although a single house is meant, reference is in fact made to a "type" of house, more than to an individual building. It can be said by e.g. an estate agent to a potential buyer who the agent knows has been willing to purchase a house on the corner (e.g. *OK, Mrs. Johnson, you've been looking for a house on the corner. A house on the corner is* [*in fact*] *for sale*). I therefore propose to treat *a house on the corner* as a complex conceptual unit and model it as SS+ D-, on a par with examples such as (4-21) *Jill is a doctor* (has the qualities of a doctor).

Examples (6-5 a and b) illustrate an ambiguity involved in very similar data:

(6-5)
(a) **The bicycle** John bought has been stolen. DD+ S-
(b) **A bicycle John bought** has been stolen. SS+ D-
(Quirk et al. 1985: 269)

The bicycle in (6-5a) is an example of DD+ S- (strong autonomous analytic viewing: a uniquely identified bike), whereas (6-5b) is potentially ambiguous between a specific but indefinite bike (SS- D+; better: *one of the bikes that John bought*) and a larger conceptual unit *a bicycle John bought* (SS+ D-). Within the larger unit, the emphasis is on the bike's qualities (the main quality being, admittedly, a rather accidental feature of "having been bought by John").

Although the notion of a conceptual unit and its relation to that of a word requires a more precise specification, it is in fact a rather good candidate for explicating certain usages of articles which do not otherwise lend themselves to an easy analysis. I will now move on to another phenomenon identified in article use, namely that of conceptual replication.

3. Conceptual replication

A conceptualization of a given entity may involve replicating that entity in time or space. In fact, some of the examples discussed previously represent just that, e.g. (4-68c) *A lion is a ferocious beast*, where a randomly selected single instance of a lion is "replicated" mentally over the whole class of lions. An apparent similarity of this to denotation and extension as the set of possible designata (J. Lyons 1977) is, however, misleading.

The first and most vague difference is that designata are usually taken to be objects in a world, whereas replication operates in the mental world of the conceptualizer. Naturally, designata can be abstract, imagined or fantasized, but these are also worlds.[5] Replication, in contrast, takes place in conceptualization – a relationship between the "worlds" and conceptualization is an issue in itself, one of the probably irresolvable problems in an ongoing debate in cognitive linguistics.

Second, replication suggests a certain mental procedure absent from the concept of denotation. If denotation is a relationship between a linguistic form and its extension, i.e. the set of all its (possible) designata,[6] replication is better thought of as a "multiplication" of the conceptualizer's single choice. Even if

[5] "Denotation is the relation between language expressions and things or events in worlds – not just the world we live in but any world that may be spoken of" (Allan 2001: 46). Denotation has also been treated as related to "aboutness": "a representational relation between mental state or word and world" (Baker 2009: 437).

[6] "To say that a language expression *e* has extension in a world w_i at a time t_i is equivalent to saying *e* denotes something that exists in the world w_i at time t_i" (Allan 2001: 47).

the final set is "the same" or comparable (which it need not be, see below), the paths that lead to it are different. In denotation, all designata are taken as a set, out of which any can be taken at random. In replication, mental contact with a single conceptualized entity is multiplied: the same entity may be replicated in time or its type may be in space.

From this follows the third difference: mental contact with an entity may be replicated in time so that there are multiple instances of the same (kind of) event. Denotation and extension as its result do not cover these cases – if they were to, the notions would have to be substantially reformulated.

Fourth, a consequence of the above is that an expression's extension as the set of its designata and the set of mental objects in replication need not be parallel. Extension collects all designata that meet certain conditions, i.e. a complete set, whereas in replication the set may but need not be complete. Indeed, in replication over time, there is a multiplied one-element set (cf. e.g. example (6-8) below)!

In EVT formulae, replication will be marked by an S or D operating on the whole of the conceptualization performed prior to the process: S when the same entity is (mentally) replicated, D when different exemplars of the same type are involved. To formally distinguish replication from the boundary-setting D, the symbol x is used for the former – see below.

3.1 Replication through the indefinite article

Both the indefinite and the definite article can be entailed by mental replication; examples of the former will be discussed first.

(6-6) Whenever Hetty gobbles down **a cake**, her diet "starts tomorrow". (Allan 1980: 546, ex. (17))
a cake SS- D
whenever – a cake [SS- D]xD

(6-7) I smoke **a cigar** after dinner. (Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 406) [SS- D]xD

In (6-6) *a cake* is a random member of the class of cakes, i.e. SS- D,[7] replicated each time Hetty has it: [SS- D]xD (a different cake on each occasion). In (6-7), a random instance of a cigar is replicated as many times as there are "dinners".

[7] It is not a portion or kind of *cake* as mass (SS), a possible usage in other contexts.

The role of the formula-final D is to symbolize the different (random) choices made on each occasion.[8]

Example (6-8) is more complex.

(6-8) I usually have lunch with **a colleague**. (Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 406)
same though unidentified: [SS- D+]xS
random and different every time: [SS- D]xD

On one interpretation, a meeting with a specific though indefinite colleague, SS- D+, is replicated each time lunch is consumed, and the colleague is always the same person, symbolized by the final S: [SS- D+]xS. Or, it need not be the same colleague but simply whoever happens to be lunching at the same time or does not mind lunching in my company – in this case a random choice, SS- D, is replicated with a potentially different result each time: [SS- D]xD. Interestingly, the latter option does not preclude meeting with the same colleague on more than one occasion or even on all occasions – any specific colleague, including the same one as before, can be accidentally picked anew each time at lunch.

Example (6-9) allows for three interpretations:

(6-9) Each of them wants to marry **a film-star**. (Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 405)
random, choice not made yet, and different for each: [SS- D]xD
specific, choice made, but different for each: [SS- D+]xD
specific, choice made, and the same for each: [SS- D+]xS

The first construal is expressed by the formula [SS D]xD: a good candidate for a spouse is any person who belongs to the category of film stars, SS- D, but a different one for each of "them" (the final D). The second construal is [SS- D+]xD: this is when each of "them" may want to marry a specific (though indefinite) person ([SS- D+]) but a different one in each case (the final D).[9] Third, the person sought is a specific indefinite individual, the same for all of "them"

[8] In a hypothetical but not very likely case of the same cigar being smoked each time, the formula would be [SS- D+]xS, i.e. a specific cigar is picked once and then I continue to smoke it on one occasion after another.

[9] A similar case, also [SS- D+]xD, is *Some students have **a boyfriend*** (Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 405). The final D allows for an identification of a different (specific but indefinite) boyfriend for each of the students. (I am considering here only *a boyfriend* and disregarding the nature of *some students* as different from e.g. *all students*.)

(they have all made the same choice though keep the person's identity secret from us): [SS- D+]xS.

As the last example in this series, let us consider the problem of the so called "donkey-sentences":

(6-10) Any man who owns **a donkey** beats it. (Geach 1962: 117, ex. 12)
[SS- D]xD or [SS- D+]xD (unlikely)

The problem is of a logical nature (cf. McCawley 1993: 367-369) and partly has to do with the interpretation of *a donkey*, whereas partly with that of the definite pronoun, which – in predicate calculus terms – is neither a referring expression, nor a bound variable (Seuren 2009). Logicians have found it problematic to assign to it an existential quantifier (on a par with sentences such as *A student has arrived*) or a universal quantifier (both for *any man* and *a donkey*). The latter option is "ad hoc" (Abbott 2004: 133) and if adopted, the sentence *A student has arrived* would be given the unintended interpretation "Every student has arrived". Heim (1982; following Karttunen 1969 and 1976) proposes to deal with the problem within her model of "file-change semantics" (cf. Chapter 3, section 1.2.5). Both this attempt (incidentally, abandoned by Heim herself (1990)) and others proposed in the logical tradition (Kadmon 1990, Ludlow and Neale 1991, Kanazawa 1994, Chierchia 1995, Lappin and Francez 1994, Dekker 1996, Seuren 2009) need not occupy us unduly because "standard logical analyses are inadequate for natural language" (Seuren 2009: 271).[10] Also, the problem in fact need not be seen as a logical one: Kamp and Reyle (1993; cf. Seuren 2009: 271) propose that the linguistic forms in these kinds of sentences need not refer to entities in the world but invoke mental representations at a mediating level. Along similar lines, I propose that the problem consists in there being an ambiguity in the conceptual relationship between *a donkey* and *any man*. Thus, I approach it on conceptual terms and propose, if not a solution then an account of the ambiguity in terms of two modes of conceptualization.

On one interpretation, *the donkey* is conceptualized as SS- D, i.e. any of the possible donkeys, any concrete, physical but non-specific and indefinite donkey. This is then replicated to cover all the "men" involved (each man owns a different donkey): [SS- D]xD. On the second interpretation, there is one specific, concrete though indefinite donkey, and that donkey is owned by each of the

[10] Admittedly, non-standard logical analyses have also been proposed, such as Groenendijk and Stokhof's (1991, 2009) dynamic predicate logic.

men: [SS- D+]xD (there is a replication of owners but not of the donkey). This interpretation, however, cannot involve distributive ownership: it is difficult to imagine how several individuals can own *the same* animal "distributively". If there are several owners, the distributive reading requires that there also be several donkeys (one man – one donkey) or that they own one donkey "collectively" (as a group or commune). In the latter case, however, one would probably say e.g. *Each of the men who own a donkey*. On a certain level, therefore, the problem seems to be an artificial one: Geach's *donkey*-sentence is certainly an intriguing logico-philosophical quagmire but might not be the preferred choice by language speakers.

3.2 Replication through the definite article

We will now look at replication which entails the use of the definite article. Example (6-11) is best considered in relation to (4-39) *The president has been assassinated!* (Chapter 4).

(6-11) **The president** has been assassinated three times. (Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 406) [DD- S+]xS

In (4-39) *the president* is modelled as DD S: a specific individual who is nevertheless perceived through his or her role in the political system. In (6-11) we are dealing with multiple instances of assassination, each affecting a different individual – but in each case the individual referred to holds the same office (the systemic role of S). Pragmatic factors block a referential interpretation: an individual cannot be assassinated more than once, but the president, in the systemic understanding, can. Therefore, the formula is [DD- S+]xS: there have been three distinct events (and therefore three different individuals) but they all had the same "systemic" function. A replication of an individual, as three different individuals, would be entailed by a final D – but this here is not the case. The final S, thus, replicates not individuals but the office.[11]

Note an apparently parallel use in (6-12). The parallelism is nevertheless only apparent – the use of a different verb yields different construals:

[11] Note that ??*The man has been assassinated three times*, symbolized by [DD+ S-]xS, is unlikely because *the man* is not normally a systemic role. (?)*A man has been assassinated three times* is unlikely if the reference is to the same, unspecified though specific individual ([SS- D+]xS), but possible if it refers to different unspecified individuals ([SS- D]xD).

(6-12) **The President** visited the country on two occasions. (Peter Vale, "Prisoner of the past? The new South Africa Abroad", *Southern Africa Report* vol. 10, no. 5; July 1995, p. 7; www.africafiles.org/article.asp?ID=3937; accessed Feb 24, 2011)
[DD S]xS or [DD- S+]xS

The sentence is ambiguous between two interpretations. On one, it might have been the same individual in the capacity of president, [DD S]xS (such is, in fact, the sentence's intended meaning).[12] On the other, the emphasis is on the office, regardless of whoever happened to hold the office of president at either time, [DD- S+]xS.

A different kind of replication operates in example (6-13):

(6-13) Many patients in the hospital suffered from a disease of **the liver**. (Quirk et al. 1985: 271) [DD S]xD

Many patients in this case is a distributive rather than a collective usage. *The liver* is both uniquely and systemically construed: systemically it is an organ in the human body (cf. *the heart*, *the stomach* etc.), uniquely it designates the organ of any of the "many patients". Hence, *the liver* is modelled here as DD S (cf. *Mary banged herself on the forehead*). This is then replicated onto all the different cases of "many": [DD S]xD. Note that a sentence such as *Mary banged herself on the forehead three times* would be symbolized by a different formula, [DD S]xS, as it would refer to the same forehead on each occasion.

A similar, though not identical, instance of replication can be found in (6-14):

(6-14) Most people got **the salary they deserved**. (Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 405) [DD+ S-]xD

The salary they deserved is definite specific, *the salary* being restrictively modified by *they deserved*: DD+ S-. However, *most people* is clearly distributive rather than collective: it does not refer to an undifferentiated group of "most people" but to each person in the group, with several payments distributed across its members. The distribution is represented by the final D: [DD+ S-]xD.

A somewhat different construal is exemplified in points (6-15) to (6-17):

[12] The text moves on: *Nevertheless, President Mandela continues to make conciliatory noises towards the island* [of Hong Kong]. *Indonesia is a slightly different case. The President visited the country on two occasions.*

(6-15) She grabbed me by **the arm**. (Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 370) [DD S]xS

(6-16) My mother complains of a pain in **the hip**. (Quirk et al. 1985: 271) [DD S]xS

(6-17) The doctor diagnosed a fracture of **the collarbone**. (Quirk et al. 1985: 271) [DD S]xS

These are modelled as [DD S]xS. It is irrelevant which arm, hip or collarbone is meant, as long as it is *that* body part (in relation to the rest of the body). The recessive vantage [DD S] identifies the relevant part within the structure of the whole body (this is both specific and systemic), while the final S entails lack of discrimination between the two options available in each case (cf. comments on similar examples in Chapter 3, section 1.3.4).

Replication is also recognized and discussed in certain special cases below.

4. Special cases: novel conceptualizations and formulae

In this section I will deal with several usages of the English articles which in one way or another depart from or extend the solutions proposed so far. Some of them also require novel formal modelling, with additional levels of complexity.

4.1 Unique but not the only one

Although the first case in the series does not involve a novel formula, it does involve a rather peculiar conceptualization. There is a special usage of the English definite article with a proper name plus an expression that locates the name in some kind of setting, usually a nationality term. This is exemplified in (6-18):

(6-18) William Hogarth, **the 18th c English painter and printmaker**, called the S-curve the "line of beauty". (*Time* 171-11, March 17, p. 57) DD+ S-

The implied set against which a given individual is portrayed is often the whole nation – a typical example is (6-19):

(6-19) The new exhibition at London's Tate Modern features three heavy hitters, **the Frenchmen Marcel Duchamp** and **Francis Picabia**, and **the American Man Ray**. They are associated with the Dada and Surrealism movements, but they were friends before these existed, and after they ended. Of the three, Duchamp is the towering genius. (*Time*, 171-10, March 10, 2008, p. 49)[13] DD+ S-

In cases like this, there is an apparent clash between the (implied) reference to the set of "English painters and printmakers" (or all French and American people, respectively), which most certainly contains more than one member, and the use of *the* in reference to a specific individual. The individual referred to is perhaps someone famous, if not in "objective" terms then "in the eyes of the speaker" (Alan McMillion, p.c.). It is in usages such as this that the difference between the "objective" world and the speaker's projection of it comes to the fore. The unambiguous identification of the individual is modelled as DD+ S-, in which the strongly analytic DD+ is a projection of the speaker's portrayal of the individual as the "ultimate" representative of the category.

4.2 Nationality nouns

No major formal innovations are proposed for the modelling of nationality nouns. Allan (1980: 555) distinguishes three classes of those, two of which come in two variants each: with or without the definite article.[14] One class includes fully inflecting nouns: (*the*) *Greeks*, (*the*) *Russians*, (*the*) *Italians*. The option with the nil article is modelled in EVT as SS- (cf. Chapter 4). The definite-article usage is modelled as [SS-] D. Recall that the formula holds regardless of whether the expression refers to all representatives of a given nation (the final D sets the margin against other nationalities) or to a specific subset (against other groups of people in a local context).

Another class includes nouns such as (*the*) *English*, (*the*) *Welsh*, (*the*) *Irish*, (*the*) *Dutch*, (*the*) *French* etc. In the nil-article usage there is a homogeneous set, portrayed as an undifferentiated mass. Importantly, the emphasis on similarity must have an augmented value, SS+: although in reality the set consists of many people, it is conceptualized and formally portrayed as a homogeneous

[13] Incidentally, *the towering genius* is an instance of DD- S+, i.e. a synthetic-systemic usage in a local context: Duchamp is the one that rises above the three.

[14] Berezowski (2010) offers a classification and analysis of nationality terms with respect to their nominal and adjectival uses, plural endings or the existence of *-man*/*-woman* forms.

mass without plural marking. The definite-article option is modelled as [SS+] D: again, the final D introduces a boundary from other nationalities or, with specific reference, from other groups of people.

Allan's third class consists of nouns ending in *-ese* (*the Chinese, the Japanese*). They are distinguished as a separate class because as nominals they only allow for the definite-article usage. But because in EVT terms they are also modelled as [SS+] D (cf. *the English*, *the French*), I propose to include them in the second class (perhaps as a subclass of their own). Allan's three classes can thus be collapsed into two EVT classes, inflecting and non-inflecting, each in two variants. The non-inflecting class is internally differentiated, some of its members being used with the definite article only (Table 6-1).

Table 6-1. Nationality nouns and articles in EVT

	INFLECTING	NON-INFLECTING
nil	*Greeks*, *Russians*, *Italians* SS-	*English*, *French*, *Dutch* SS+
the	*the Greeks*, *the Russians*, *the Italians* [SS-] D	*the English*, *the French*, *the Dutch* + *the Chinese*, *the Japanese* [SS+] D

Against this backdrop, consider how discourse can add to the nuances in the conceptualization of nationalities in example (6-20):

(6-20) I was happy to read your assertion that "Nobody takes culture more seriously than **the French**." That's right. Cultural creativity is alive and well in France – and in **French**. (*Time*, 171-2, Jan 14, 2008, p. 28; Craig R. Stapleton, U.S. Ambassador, Paris, in a letter to *Time*)
the French [SS+] D
French SS

The French is modelled as [SS+] D, a homogeneous category of "French people" delimited from other categories, whereas *French* is a homogeneous mass conceptualization, SS: although the mass consists of individuals, this is downplayed. Why are these two options used in this way? I propose that, at first, *the French* are juxtaposed against other nationalities (*Nobody takes …*), whereas later, *French* marks an emphasis on the nature of the mass (being French, living in France, being culturally creative etc.), rather than on its delimitation from other

nationalities. Naturally, both aspects play a role in both usages but either may be brought to the foreground at the expense of the other.

4.3 Collective nouns

Collective nouns, e.g. *audience*, *committee*, *crowd*, *gang*, *police*, *team* and others, are characterized by a mismatch between their form (singular) and conceptual content (composed of many). To add to the their conceptual complexity, most of them can be used with the indefinite or definite articles: *an audience – the audience*. (A somewhat exceptional case is *police*, which usually occurs with the definite article and not normally with the indefinite article (**a police*)).[15] As such, they require a special treatment in EVT, although they exhibit many parallelisms to some of the nationality nouns.

How would a noun such as *audience* be modelled in EVT? It was suggested in Chapter 4 (section 3.1.1) that the "pure", "articleless" conceptualization *audience* requires an augmented value of emphasis on similarity to override the real-life awareness of "plurality" and portray it as a mass: SS+. The indefinite article usage, *an audience*, results from conceptually selecting a portion or a kind of that mass, i.e. a variant of the dominant vantage: SS+ D. Note that this is parallel to "regular" mass nouns, such as *bread* vs. *a bread*, i.e. SS vs. SS D. The definite article usage results from setting a boundary to the SS+ conceptualization for specific reference, [SS+] D. This, in turn, is parallel to such nationality nouns as *the French*, *the Dutch*, which also involve a homogeneous conceptualization endowed with a boundary, as well as definite plurals (*the students*), modelled as [SS-] D. The various conceptualizations are juxtaposed in Table 6-2.

Table 6-2. *Audience – an audience – the audience* juxtaposed

Usage	Parallel to	Common conceptual ground
audience SS+	*bread*, *music*, *honesty* SS	homogeneous mass, SS+ requires extra strength to overcome the real-life notion of plurality
an audience SS+ D	*a bread* SS D	portion or kind of mass
the audience [SS+] D	*the French* [SS+] D *the students*, *the Greeks* [SS-] D	mass or set endowed with a boundary for definite conceptualization and/or specific reference

[15] Most of them can also take the plural *-s* ending: *audiences, the audiences* (though not normally *(*the*) *polices*).

Modelling such usages as *audiences* and *the audiences* remains somewhat problematic. Recall (Chapter 4) that plurals such as *lions* or *Italians* are symbolized by SS-, a weakened similarity. But this is not the case in *audiences*, which involves first a reduction of plurality into singularity, and then a replication of the latter. Importantly, the same audience is not replicated over time, but rather the concept of audience in space (different audiences are involved):

(6-21) The Berkman Center will host a conversation about the challenges of reporting international stories to US and Global **audiences**. (website of Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard University, http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/node/6927; acc. Nov 17, 2011) [SS+]xD

Thus, the proposed formula for example (6-21) is [SS+]xD. By analogy, *the audiences* can be modelled as [[SS+] D]xD: an augmented attention to similarity is endowed with a boundary (which entails the definiteness of the audience), and is then replicated through xD to mark the different specific audiences, as in example (6-22):

(6-22) We will do our best to minimise the consequences [of budget cuts], but they will inevitably have a significant impact on **the audiences** who use and rely upon the relevant services, as well as on those of our colleagues who work on them.
(*The Telegraph*, Jan 25, 2011, "The World Service can survive these cuts" by Mark Thompson; http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/tvandradio/bbc/8281797/The-World-Service-can-survive-these-cuts.html; acc. Nov 17, 2011)
[[SS+] D]xD

As hinted above, an even more "special" case within the category of special cases, is the noun *police*, with its frequent plural usage *the police are* but also a possible singular *the police is*. The common core of both cases is the [SS+] D conceptualization, an augmented attention to similarity endowed with a boundary. The difference lies in how, at an additional level of conceptualization, the "one-composed-of-many" aspect of the meaning is represented, i.e. whether the onus is on "one" or on "composed of many". In *the police are*, plurality is emphasized, represented by the formula-final D: [[SS+] D] D. In *the police is*, the onus is on the unity of the institution, hence the similarity between its members: [[SS+] D] S.

But the conceptualizations become even more complex depending on whether *the police* is used in a definite-specific or in a generic-systemic manner, which gives us four usages, exemplified in (6-23) to (6-26):

(6-23) He said the police would not compromise with the civilly disobedient and maintained that **the police were** acting with restraint. (http://newsgroups.derkeiler.com/Archive/Soc/soc.culture.israel/2005-08/msg01418.html; accessed Nov 14, 2011)
{[[SS+] D] D}–{DD+ S-}

(6-23) emphasizes the plurality of the police and is definite-specific. The formula to model it is {[[SS+] D] D}–{DD+ S-}. The additional level of conceptual complexity is marked with braces and the dash represents a ground-to-figure relationship. That is, the ground conceptualization [[SS+] D] D is capitalized on for further conceptual elaboration as a definite specific construal, DD+ S-. The same ground serves as the basis for a generic (synthetic-systemic) construal in (6-24), modelled as {[[SS+] D] D}–{DD- S+}:

(6-24) **The police are** *persons empowered to enforce the law ...* (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Police; accessed Nov 24, 2010)
{[[SS+] D] D}–{DD- S+}

Example (6-25) rests on a different ground, emphasizing the singularity of the police, and involves a definite specific construal of the figure:

(6-25) The RCMP has its beginnings in the North-West Mounted Police (NWMP). **The police was** established by an act of legislation from the Temporary North-West Council, the first territorial government of the Northwest Territories. (http://www.answers.com/topic/royal-canadian-mounted-police#cite_note-finalsession-7; accessed Nov 24, 2010)
{[[SS+] D] S}–{DD+ S-}

Hence, its formula takes the shape {[[SS+] D] S}–{DD+ S-}. Finally, (6-26) emphasizes the police's singularity in a generic-systemic usage, whose reference is not to any specific police force but to the police "as such":

(6-26) **The police is** a personification of the state designated to put in practice the enforced law, protect property and reduce civil disorder in civilian matters. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Police; accessed Nov 13, 2011)[16]
{[[SS+] D] D}–{DD- S+}

The formula of (6-26) is thus {[[SS+] D] D}–{DD- S+}.
All the four options are juxtaposed for convenient comparison in Table 6-3.

Table 6-3. The four conceptualizations of *the police* as modelled in EVT

	definite specific	synthetic-systemic
plural	*the police are/were* ex. (6-23) (specific) {[[SS+] D] D}–{DD+ S-}	*the police are/were* ex. (6-24) (generic) {[[SS+] D] D}–{DD- S+}
singular	*the police is/was* ex. (6-25) (specific) {[[SS+] D] S}–{DD+ S-}	*the police is/was* ex. (6-26) (generic) {[[SS+] D] S}–{DD- S+}

But these already rather complex conceptualizations may become even more complex as a result of replication. Consider (6-27), parallel to the now classic examples of the sort *The wells get deeper the further down the road they are* (Talmy 2000, vol. 1: 71):

(6-27) **The police are** getting younger. (Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 406)
{[[SS+] D] D}–{DD+ S-}xD

The reference here is definite specific: even when the speaker does not have specific (generations of) police officers in mind, (s)he nevertheless refers to people, rather than to the institution. And, rather than mentally replicating the same people over time, the speaker mentally accesses different individuals at different times (what links the individuals is the fact that they are members of the same institution). Hence the complexity of the formula: {[[SS+] D] D}–{DD+ S-}xD, the final D symbolizing the different police officers.

As the final case in the category of collective nouns, I would like to propose a tentative solution to a different kind of replication, illustrated in example (6-28):

[16] Note, as a curiosity, that this example comes from the same Wikipedia entry as (6-24) above (*The police are persons empowered to enforce the law...*) but was accessed a year later.

(6-28) There was **the usual crowd** at the beach. (Prince 1992, ex. 5)

crowd	SS+
the crowd	{[[SS+] D] S}–{DD- S+}
the usual crowd	{[[SS+] D] S}–{DD- S+}xS

The meaning of *the usual crowd* is, intuitively speaking, not "there were the same people as usual on the beach" but "the beach was crowded as usual".[17] Thus, replicated are not the actual people but the quality of being crowded. I propose therefore to model *the crowd* here as generic-systemic usage, i.e. a "type of thing" (similarly to *the human brain*): {[[SS+] D] S}–{DD- S+}. This is then replicated over time and its generic nature stays constant (entailed by the final S): {[[SS+] D] S}–{DD- S+}xS.[18]

4.4 (*The*) *sandflats*

Sandflats, also spelled *sand flats*, constitutes a category not only distinct from the category of collective nouns such as *audience* or *police* but, in a sense, reverse to it. If collective nouns are formally singular, referentially sets and conceptually uniform bodies, *sandflats* is formally singular, and referentially a region. But what is it conceptually? I propose that the conceptualization involves augmented emphasis on difference, DD+, whereby a homogeneous terrain is conceptualized as a multiple entity. In other words, the conceptualizer views something (relatively) homogeneous and undifferentiated as if it consisted of parts. The augmented value of DD+ is necessary to overcome the "objective", real-life homogeneity, very much like the augmented value of emphasis on similarity, SS+, is needed to overcome the "objective plurality" of collective nouns such as *audience* or *police*. When that conceptualization is endowed

[17] Such was at least the intention of the linguist who proposed the original analysis of this sentence (Prince 1992). This is reported by Abbott (2004: 148), who, curiously, allows for either interpretation.

[18] Carlson and Spejewski (1997) discuss a broader problem, namely that of generic passages. These are passages that express "generalizations over events" (p. 162), with one parameter of genericity being the use of articles and other determiners. Interestingly, "universal" readings can be ascribed to indefinites, such as bare plurals (*dogs*), mass terms (*hot air*), indefinite singulars (*a troublemaker*), but also definites (*She used to go to the orchard*). The interpretation of whole passages as generic rests on a variety of lexical and discourse factors (the kind of verb used, the use of time or frequency adverbials, the presence of a generic first sentence etc.). Otherwise they are interpreted as episodic. Naturally, since Carlson and Spejewski's study concerns generic *passages*, their understanding of genericity is different from that in the present book: here it is ascribed to certain uses of the definite article in a singular NP (*The fractal is a wiggly line which looks like...*) or a plural NP (*The Italians like pasta*) (cf. also footnote 3 above for a complementary comment).

with a boundary, through, again, attention to difference at a higher level, the linguistic manifestation of that is the definite article: *the sandflats*. This usage may be either definite specific or generic systemic. The former is exemplified in (6-29), the latter in (6-30):

(6-29) In years when their [sea cucumbers] populations were low (natural fluctuations, people pressure etc.), areas of **the sandflats** became deoxygenated just below the upper couple of millimeters ... (www.seaslugforum.net/find/289; accessed Nov 25, 2010). [DD+]–[DD+ S-]

(6-30) **The sandflats** are regarded as the province of marine biologist, while the dunes are investigated by terrestrial biologists. (Greenbaum 1996: 165) [DD+]–[DD- S+]

I propose to model the two examples with the novel formulae [DD+]–[DD+ S-] for the specific usage in (6-29) and [DD+]–[DD- S+] for the systemic usage. Recall that a dash represents a ground-to-figure alignment. Thus, the two conceptualizations differ in the variant of the recessive vantage construction imposed on the [DD+] ground: either the definite specific DD+ S- or the synthetic-systemic DD- S+.

However, usages such as *a sandflat* can also be found, cf. example (6-31):

(6-31) **A sandflat** is regarded as the province of the marine biologist, while a dune is investigated by the terrestrial biologist. (Greenbaum 1996: 165). SS+ D-

This is a conceptualization which is markedly different from that of *the sandlfats*: I propose to model it as SS+ D-, on a par with *I'd always wanted to write a historical novel* (example (4-20) in Chapter 4): *a sandflat* is not an individuated entity but a *type* of entity, hence strong non-discrimination and weak analysis. The formula is very different from those proposed for *the sandflats* because the latter does not refer to a collection of individual "sandflats".[19] Rather, both

[19] This point, admittedly, is debatable, for consider the following:

She was in the midst of the stream, standing upon **one of the** sandflats, steadying herself with difficulty, while she supported the whole form of William Edgerton, who lay, seemingly lifeless, and half buried in one of the sluices of water which ran between the sandrifts. (one of the contexts from http://www.wordnik.com/words/sandflats, "Confessions, or, the Blind Heart; a Domestic Story")

expressions may refer to the same kind of terrain but represent different conceptualizations of that terrain.

4.5 *Oak*

Consider the following two examples:

(6-32)
(a) **An oak** is deciduous. SS- D
(b) **Oak** is deciduous. [SS-] S
(Allan 1980: 546, ex. (18))

An oak in (6-32a) is any random oak tree. But *oak* in (6-32b) is more problematic. The nil article singular form suggests that it is a mass – but not mass in the sense of oak timber, which would be SS (cf. *bread*, *music*, *honesty*). Rather, it is individual trees that are deciduous. Therefore, I propose to model it as [SS-] S, a homogeneous set reconceptualized into a mass. SS- symbolizes the set (of oak trees), which through the final S obtains a unique mass-like status.

4.6 *Only one Himalaya*(*s*)

Apart from nationality nouns above, no systematic account of proper names within the EVT framework can at the present stage be proposed. A possible direction of research might proceed along the lines marked out by Geurts (1997), who follows Kneale (1962) (but against Kripke 1977 and 1980), in arguing that proper names are definite descriptions. The name *N* is thus claimed to mean 'the individual named *N*'. Admittedly, the account met with criticism from Abbott (2002), who shows that Geurts's examples do not illustrate similarities in the behaviour of proper names and definites. However, Abbott does not reject Geurts's "metalinguistic" or "quotation" theory of names (though this might ultimately prove necessary) but disagrees with his interpretations of data. What is especially appealing in the quotation theory is that it is "about the mental processes involved in the interpretation of an utterance, and about the mental representations that they give rise to" (Geurts 1997: 343). This, it seems, is the path to follow for EVT, if it is to integrate an account of proper names with that of articles, or more broadly, NPs.

While this area awaits a fuller elaboration, we will extend the present analysis somewhat beyond the scope of articles – perhaps a welcome break – and

consider now the use of the numeral *one* with the proper name *Himalaya*(*s*): *one Himalaya* vs. *one Himalayas*. This is justified by the etymology of the English *a/an*, which derives from Old English numeral *ān* 'one', and the analysis doubtless contributes to our understanding of the present-day article. But we must begin with modelling the proper name as such.

Himalaya is a Sanskrit word meaning 'abode of snow', hence it is a mass-like conceptualization, SS. The English name *the Himalaya* endows this mass-like region with a conceptual boundary and can be modelled as [SS] D (cf. *the bread/the music*). But the more frequent *the Himalayas*[20] reconceptualizes the region into a set/range of individual summits, i.e. [SS-] D, or more precisely [SS > SS-] D. Now consider the use of the name with the numeral one:

(6-33) ... since there's only **one Himalaya** on this earth and that precisely is our core workable asset. (http://www.edgeindiaagrotech.com/slide-1; accessed March 14, 2011) [SS] D+

The conceptualization here does not differ from that of *the Himalaya*, with the exception that the (mental) boundary around the region is strengthened: [SS] D+. But in *one Himalayas* there is additionally one more level of reconceptualization:

(6-34) There is only **one Himalayas** – nowhere else like it. (Allan 1980: 561, ex. (93)) [SS > SS-] D+

If *the Himalayas* is [SS > SS-] D (mass reconceptualized into a set/range), and if *one Himalaya* is a uniquely identified region/mass, [SS] D+, *one Himalayas* can be modelled as [SS > SS-] D+, i.e. mass reconceptualized into set, uniquely identified through strengthened D+.

4.7 *A British Isles*; *a United Nations*

A formally similar but conceptually distinct case is exemplified in (6-35):

(6-35) To read Dickens you would never know there could exist **a British Isles** that is not fogbound. (Allan 1980: 561, ex. (93)) [SS-] D-

[20] A December 2, 2010 Google search yielded ca. 563,000 hits for *the Himalaya* and 2,070,000 for *the Himalayas*.

Again, *British Isles* is a set, symbolized by SS-. Note, however, that it does not consist of several "British Isles" (in the sense that there is no single "British Isle") but of Isles (islands), which "happen to be" British. *The British Isles* is thus [SS-] D, though in contrast to *the Himalayas* it does *not* involve a re-conceptualization of SS > SS-, as it does not begin with a mental image of a mass (as *Himalaya* does). *A British Isles* is [SS-] D-, i.e. that set of isles is viewed as a possible one, one out of the hypothetical choice of many (D- endows the conceptualization with a weakly demarcated boundary). An apparent paradox is involved here. If *a* historically means 'one', why do expressions with *one* and *a* receive different treatments? This is because *one* in *one Himalayas* means 'that one; the only/unique one', whereas *a* in *a British Isles* means 'a hypothetical *kind of* British Isles' with such and such qualities.

A still different range of conceptual processes can be recognized in (6-36), again despite the formal similarity of that example to the ones above:

(6-36) It isn't really **a United Nations**, but **a Disunited Nations**. (Allan 1980: 561, ex. (93)) [SS- // SS+] D-

In the context of a proper name, it makes little sense to consider distinct conceptual units such as *Nations* (*nations* as a common noun is modelled as SS-) or *United Nations*, because they do not function outside the name *the United Nations*.[21] *The United Nations*, on a par with *the Himalayas* and *the British Isles*, is modelled as [SS-] D: a definite and bounded collective body of nations. On top of this mental construction, the change of the article from *the* to *a* has a double effect: it (i) renders that collective body indefinite and (ii) reduces (though does not invalidate – cf. the capitalization) the term's proper-name status. Through that, strengthened is the notion of being united/disunited: the adjectives come into focus and acquire a descriptive function, rather than an identifying function as part of the proper name. Thus, I propose a novel formula to model them: [SS- // SS+] D-. SS- symbolizes the internal plurality of the group of nations, SS+ entails focus on a certain quality of the set (being

[21] *A united nation* obviously has a different meaning and is not capitalized. However, one could analyse *United Nations* as a problem in its own right. The role of United here is to render the expression collective (a body of nations, which is united) rather than distributive (a body of nations, each of which is united). Thus, in the collective usage there is perhaps a somewhat bigger emphasis on SS than in the distributive usage, but not sufficiently so to produce a mass conception (it is still a group of nations, not a mass). It would appear, then, that we might need a finer distinction between degrees of strength of a coordinate than a strong-regular-weak trichotomy, a point to consider for future elaborations of EVT.

disunited), and the double slash // stands for "both at the same time". The final D- entails a weakly imposed boundary and indefinite characterization. Thus, *a United/Disunited Nations* is portrayed as a *kind* of organization (*a*, entailed by D-) whose *members* (SS-) have the property of being united/disunited (SS+).

4.8 Viewing modes in analogies and blends

My next two examples come from the context of linguistics and both involve aspects of conceptual blending. Although it is claimed that blending lies at the very heart of language and cognition and constitutes "the way we think" (Turner and Fauconnier 2002; though cf. Underhill 2011: 48ff. for criticism), in some cases it is more pronounced and readily identifiable than in others. It is two such more obvious cases that I am analysing here.

First, consider example (6-37), a statement attributed to Bronislaw Malinowski:

(6-37) Rivers is the Rider Haggard of anthropology; I shall be the Conrad. (from Firth 1957: 44, in Senft 2009: 223) DD- S+

The conceptual construction produced by the speaker involves analogies, mappings and blending of the kind represented in Figure 6-1 (I am omitting the generic space for the sake of simplicity)



Figure 6-1. Blending in Malinowski's (attributed) statement *Rivers is the Rider Haggard of anthropology; I shall be the Conrad* (example (6-37))

The speaker establishes an analogy between the fields of anthropology and literature, as well as two mappings between their elements: Rivers – Haggard and *ego* – Conrad. One obviously needs a certain body of encyclopedic knowledge to recognize the projection to the blend, i.e. the knowledge that Sir Henry Rider Haggard was an English writer whose adventure novels depict exotic geographic locations and are rather light in tone, whereas Joseph Conrad's writings are more demanding and more serious in tone but rewarding in their literary value and the depth of the penetration of human nature. There is thus a clear opposition between what is "light", "entertaining", probably "not very ambitious" and therefore perhaps "poor", and that which is "serious", "intellectually advanced" and "of high quality". That opposition is mapped onto the field of anthropology, in connection with which one must know that William H. R. Rivers dealt with sell-shocked soldiers during WWI and produced work on kinship following a Torres Straits expedition. By establishing a mapping between Haggard and Rivers, the speaker evaluates the work of the latter, "light" and therefore not very valuable, as well as his own work – serious and penetrating. The evaluative overtones constitute the emergent aspect of meaning. In the blend, the field of anthropology is endowed with a structure analogous to that found in literature, where there are: "light" and "serious" contributors. In other words, Rivers and the *ego* (Malinowski himself) occupy the "slots" (or play the roles) which in literature are occupied by Haggard and Conrad, respectively. It is precisely the notion of a role (a "slot") that is crucial to the use of the definite article *the*. The speaker says: every field has its Haggard(s) and Conrad(s) – this is the datum; in anthropology, I judge Rivers to be value for the "Haggard role" and myself for the "Conrad role". The use of *the* is generic, synthetic-systemic: DD- S+.

The model of conceptual blending can also be adduced for an account of Sapir's rather famous analogy, example (6-38). Without going into the details of the model, it is sufficient to indicate that blending involves several conceptual processes, such as various kinds of compression. In (6-38), it is primarily spatial and secondarily temporal compression that comes to the fore:

(6-38) When it comes to linguistic form, Plato walks with **the Macedonian swineherd**, Confucius with **the head-hunting savage of Assam**. (Sapir 1921: 234) DD- S+

There is compression of space between Plato and the Macedonian swineherd and between Confucius and the Assam "savages". On a higher level, there

is also spatial compression between the "Plato – Macedonian swineherd" dyad and the "Confucius – Assam savage" dyad. Secondarily, there is temporal compression, Plato and Confucius being separated in time by about a century. All the individuals are in effect collapsed into a singularity, the idea of "equality before linguistic form" (cf. Figure 6-2).



Figure 6-2. The analogies and compressions in Sapir's (1921: 234) *When it comes to linguistic from, Plato walks with the Macedonian swineherd, Confucius with the head-hunting savage of Assam.* (example (6-38))

Importantly for our analysis, both the Macedonian swineherd and the savage of Assam are generic, systemic usages, "categories of people" (DD- S+). Although *Plato* and *Confucius* refer to specific individuals, their participation in the series of compressions resulting in the conceptual singularity ("equality before language") allows, perhaps, the analyst to view these also as references to human "categories", i.e. the *kind(s)* of people best represented by Plato or Confucius (wise, sophisticated, above-average). It follows from the above that the proper-name status of *Plato* and *Confucius* is overridden by contextual forces (*walks with*, *the*) and cognitive processes of spatial and temporal compression (Plato – Macedonian, Confucius – Assam; as well as compression between the two dyads).

A somewhat simpler case is (6-39):

(6-39) "He's **the next Justin Timberlake**." Victoria Beckham [...] on her 3-year-old son Cruz, whose breakdancing during a Feb. 18 Spice Girls reunion concert became a YouTube hit. (*Time* 179-9, March 3, 2008, p. 10). DD- S+

The input spaces of "he" and "Justin Timberlake" are blended, together with temporal compression to allow for "him" occupying a position of a hypothetical successor to Justin Timberlake.

4.9 A temporal-plus-cognitive viewpoint

Consider now the exchange in (6-40), which illustrates what may be termed a "temporal-plus-cognitive viewpoint" phenomenon.

(6-40)

"Will you endorse any presidential candidate in the primaries?"
"My plan is to wait until the choice is made and then enthusiastically support **the Democratic nominee**." (10 questions to Jimmy Carter, *Time* 170-14, Oct 8, 2007, p. 4)
DD- S+ or DD S or DD+ S-

The "temporal-plus-cognitive viewpoint" means that the specifics of the conceptualization depend on the time frame in which that conceptualization is grounded. When the utterance was actually pronounced during the interview (before the nomination), the speaker could only refer to a role, to the Democratic nominee as a slot in the political system to be filled in by a specific individual, hence DD- S+. After the nomination, whom does the speaker support: the nominee regardless of who has been chosen or the actual person? Probably both, which is a case of DD S. But in the eyes of the public his behaviour will probably indicate that the support is granted to the specific individual. From this perspective, the individual is identified as DD+ S-. Thus, three kinds of viewing-mode arrangements are possible, depending on the time frame and the cognitive "location" of the conceptualizer (Table 6-4).

Table 6-4. The temporal-plus-cognitive viewpoint in (6-40)

	Cognitive frame	Speaker's perspective	Observer's perspective
Temporal frame	time of speaking	DD- S+ role, slot in the system	–
	after nomination	DD S both role and individual	DD+ S- individual

4.10 *The*–nil contrast neutralized

Finally, let me propose a solution to the usages that involve an apparent contradiction: *the colour red* / *the number seven* / *the seventh page* vs. *page seven*. The solution consists in regrouping these usages with regard not to the use of the definite vs. nil article but with regard to the underlying viewing modes: *the colour red* / *the number seven* are synthetically systemic (generic) instances of DD- S+, whereas *the seventh page* / *page seven* are strongly analytic DD+ S-. This suggests that the viewing modes need not be correlated with surface article uses, a claim that is perhaps somewhat controversial and proposed here only as a tentative hypothesis.

But why and how are *on the seventh page* / *on page seven* treated as (different) manifestations of DD+ S-? In contrast to *the colour red* / *the number seven*, they denote a specific entity (not a generic category), which results from strong autonomous analytic viewing and weak synthesis. However, in *the seventh page* the analyticity is marked with *the*, whereas in *page seven* it is marked syntactically – for want of a better explanation, I will say through conventional usage. The definite article, thus, is one of but not the only possible manifestation (realization) of strong autonomous analysis followed by weak synthesis.

5. Final word

We have thus arrived at the final stage of what I hope is a relatively systematic treatment of typical uses of articles, their modulation in discourse and some of their special but by no means infrequent occurrences, in terms of EVT. Undoubtedly, gaps remain, problems may not be explained away and some portions of that territory are still untrodden. For example, EVT modelling was not proposed for such uses as *The longer you practice, the better you will become* – these for Croft (2001: 16) are not directly linked to the definite article but derived from Old English instrumental demonstrative *þy*. Another area still open for investigation is the relationship between article usage and the various senses of a polysemous lexical item. An interesting observation in this respect can be found in Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk (1999: 140), who notes that the noun *depression* can occur without an article if it covers the emotional state (*moments of bitter frustration and depression*), with the indefinite article when it denotes a physical hollow (*in a depression sheltered from the snow-laden winds*), or with the

definite article if it refers to the economic low of the 1930s (*constant references to the hardships of the Depression/depression*). EVT has yet to come to grips with these issues; the present account makes no claims to complexity, or, for that matter, to being error-free – but it does make claims to offering insights on the issue.

In the Conclusion that follows I relate to the problems involved in applying (E)VT to an account of the English articles and to what it has and has not shown us. It is on the one hand daunting to attempt predictions of how the theory might work better, but on the other hand reassuring to know that its consistent application to an account of a linguistic problem can be achieved, as I hope Chapters 4, 5 and 6 of this book have shown.

Conclusion

The present book is, as far as one can tell, the first monograph-length proposal to use an adapted version of Vantage Theory in an account of a specific area of language use. Although the trail has to some extent been blazed by several earlier publications (cf. Chapters 2 and 4), this book is an attempt to seriously blaze this trail further. But you might ask, since there is no dearth of models, what makes VT attractive enough to warrant such a proposal?

First, VT emphasizes the dynamic nature of category construction: it addresses the emergence of different points of view (vantages) on a category in the conceptualization of a single speaker, as well as across a language community. In that sense, vantages exhibit a certain affinity to Bartmiński's (2009) profiles of a concept, although VT underscores the cognitive but somewhat downplays the cultural aspect of profiling thus understood. Second, it reconciles the systematic nature of categorization with its plasticity and the diversity of categories constructed by speakers of diverse languages. Third, the mechanism of categorization is deeply rooted in fundamental human experience of orienting oneself in space-time, familiar to all human beings, perhaps with the exception of the severely impaired. Fourth, it ultimately reduces to very basic cognitive processes capable of emphasizing similarity or difference when dealing with reality. Fifth, the proposed model of categorization is also claimed to account for the evolution of categorical systems (notably in the domain of colour) in the world's languages.

This approach to categorization entails a redefinition of two crucial concepts: that of a point of view and that of a category. Point of view is not treated

here as a static physical or mental location of the conceptualizer but a dynamic cognitive procedure for viewing a category. Although various other terms, e.g. perspective or mode of seeing, might describe it just as well, the construct is unique enough to warrant its own name: *vantage*. A category, then, may be viewed and termed in more than one way, with specific kinds of relationships obtaining between its vantages. It is a sum or an assembly of its vantages. Crucially, the construction of various vantages on (or profiles of) a category is not an exceptional but a regularly occurring cognitive behaviour.

However, an ambitious and innovative model such as this must necessarily contain problematic areas that require further elaboration or reformulation.

The first of these is the formal specification of the space-time : categorization analogy. Robert MacLaury regarded the proposal as a major contribution to the field and devoted the last few years of his life to explicating the equivalences between the two sides of the analogy. However, his efforts were prematurely terminated by an illness and, eventually, the scholar's death, so that most of the latest (incomplete) findings remain in the form of notes and manuscripts (mainly MacLaury 2003a). Also, not all scholars have shared his enthusiasm for and devotion to the analogy – indeed, some of them consider it a weak aspect of the theory (Kimberly Jameson, p.c.).

Second, one must perhaps more seriously inquire into the psychological and cognitive nature of attention to similarity and difference. MacLaury himself left the task to psychologists, treating the processes as cognitive primitives, and the task remains. Głaz (in preparation b) is an attempt to survey the literature for various philosophical and psychological approaches to similarity/difference, as well as to locate these notions as used in VT against a wider background. Certainly, more in-depth research, specifically in experimental psychology, is desired.

Third, an issue so far left unresolved is that of an allegedly innate nature of the ability to perform the spatio-temporal analogy. MacLaury's views are tentative: the author is reluctant to dot the "i" and merely suggests innateness as the most plausible option. In fact, not merely the spatio-temporal analogy but the very process of analogizing may be an innate faculty (1989 [1972]: 103; in Itkonen 2005: 202). But the lack of better alternatives must be replaced by positive evidence. Nyan (2002) warns that it is not easy to find neurological correlates of theoretical constructs: a process must satisfy very rigorous criteria. The author does nevertheless see a chance of finding the neurological basis of categorization, as understood by MacLaury, through carefully planned research on goal-oriented activities, especially on divergent thinking and decision making.

Fourth, because VT was originally proposed for the categorization of colour, its application to other domains calls for a resolution of several questions, such as the number and types of vantages, the types of relationship between them, a vantage's internal architecture, the kinds of viewing modes and the ability to combine them, the likely candidates for primary fixed coordinates, etc. The questions have in this book been addressed in the context suggested by the data being analysed, while other applications may call for different solutions.

Fifth, any such application requires a transfer of the theory from categorization to conceptualization. The problem is addressed in Chapter 2, section 2.

On the practical side, VT is a demanding model, uninviting for the novice. MacLaury's rather idiosyncratic writing style has also contributed to its relatively low position on the cognitivist and linguistic market. A textbook-type of presentation of the theory, possibly fleshed out of some of its less central aspects, would greatly facilitate its understanding and appreciation by a wider readership. It would then be more feasible to adapt the findings of VT as originally formulated to accounts such as the one proposed here. A work of this kind remains yet to be written but I hope to have shown that it is well worth the effort.

A separate issue is naturally the extent to which the analysis of the English articles presented here is convincing. This has as much to do with the theoretical model being employed as with the analyst's clarity of thinking and presentation. The latter issue I will leave for the reader to judge. But the model of EVT proposed here, as well as several publications referred to in Chapters 2 and 4, goes some way to seriously responding to Michel Achard's challenge: "It would be worth investigating whether Vantage Theory can be used successfully to describe linguistic data" (1999: 242). I believe EVT coherently deals with two major aspects of the data at hand: (i) the cognitive motivations behind the use of articles, grounded in fundamental processes of attention to similarity and difference, and (ii) the speakers' agency in constructing points of view on the situations to which the speakers relate. In other words, it is the language users' plastic but systematic cognitive operations, working in tandem with their ability to override the apparently irresistible forces of context, that function as the engine of linguistic creativity. For it must be appreciated that a recognition of definiteness of a certain entity, an object or an event, involves two forces, to which Karl Bühler (1990 [1934]: 347) refers as "what is definite and unmistakable in the coordinate system of the here and now ... and what is *conceptually* unmistakably determinate" (italics original). Certainly, the same applies to indefiniteness; in short, at stake is both what is "out there" in the world and what is "in here" in the human mind when it categorizes and conceptualizes

that world. Ultimately, it is cognition that plays the decisive role, as evidenced in the many examples in this book, where the speakers impose their own interpretations on the objective situation, if such can ever be said to exist.

The present attempt undoubtedly requires refinement, both in its treatment of specific cases and application to article uses not covered here – certainly such refinements are viable. Since it is not possible to exhaustively approach the richness of contexts, the ambiguity of article uses or the range of untypical article uses, the willing reader is invited to critically assess the present account and improve it for an application in the same domain or in other domains of language use.

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Index of names

Thematic index

This study has a dual orientation and a dual aim: theoretical and analytical. On the theoretical side, it presents a relatively little known cognitive model of categorization, Vantage Theory, surveys its linguistic applications and proposes its adaptation, called Extended Vantage Theory.

In the analytical part, the adaptation serves a specific purpose: an account of the use of the English articles. The book is thus as much a testing ground for a theory as it is a hands-on struggle with specific data.

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