

LEGITIMACY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE GLOBAL INSTITUTIONS OF POWER AND THE CONTEMPORARY DETERMINANTS OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

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Abstract: This article presents the issues of legitimacy, particularly concerning the global reality of the institution of power in the context of present-day conditions of international politics, with particular emphasis on fragile states functioning mainly in the area of the contemporary “Third World”. The legality and legitimacy of power analyzed here undoubtedly have significant implications for the internal politics of fragile states, regional good neighborly relations, and international politics, particularly in the context of the global security strategy. This article examines the above issues primarily in the context of policy theory. As a result, several research questions arise: to what extent and how does legitimacy affect the effectiveness of the political strategies used by the authorities? Are other factors and stimulators of political commitment also taken into account? What is the importance of legitimacy in the context of the complex conditions of the politically and economically ineffective fragile state? Is legitimacy, apart from the moral and ideological dimension, significant in the destabilized reality of the weak political and economic structures of a failing state? The analysis, in this way, makes it possible to interpret and present many important factors for which the concept of the legitimacy of power plays a significant role in reflecting on the geopolitical determinants of fragile states in contemporary international relations.

Keywords: legitimacy of power, fragile states, globalization, “Third World” states, international relations

INTRODUCTION

Since legitimacy of power is so deeply embedded in political reality, and its causal effects will take many forms, it certainly seems confusing to separate the behind-the-scenes and often disguised manifestations of a complex political game. From the state’s point of view, however, the legitimacy of power is one of the most critical issues to which states devote much attention and material-human

resources. Also, from the political scientist's point of view, legitimacy is one of the most challenging concepts to define. For some scholars, legitimacy appears to be a secondary idea [Huntington 1991: 46] or a "highly problematic" issue [O'Kane 1993: 471–487]. For others, it is impossible in political practice to accurately predict the consequences of the legitimation process [Easton 1965: 223].

In the political realm, however, understanding the causal importance of the legitimacy of power is hampered by several significant, albeit interrelated, issues. (1) Firstly, the legitimacy of power is inscribed in a broader spectrum of dynamically shaping conditions and relations between the expectations, requirements, as well as demands of the civil society and the administrative structures of the state acting in the name of the national interest. Therefore, it means that it is tough to separate the cause from the effect. Contrary to the non-official and difficult-to-grasp factors (e.g. fiscal and social policy, judiciary activities, labor sector activities, etc.), the legitimacy of power permeates virtually every dimension of political life and – as such – is challenging to grasp. (2) Secondly, as with many other relevant factors in the policy field, legitimacy influences the final political outcomes through complex cause-and-effect forms. States can respond to a decline in the legitimacy ratios of power by improving performance results or/and by replacing the legitimacy factor with other forms of political support as well as by reconfiguring the evaluation basis of legitimacy. However, a possible lack of reaction may cause citizens to withdraw from political activity and even lead to general opposition and political revolution. In particular cases, the cause-and-effect impact of a decline in legitimacy may differ.

In this sense, claims that a decrease in the "x" legitimacy rates will result in a "y" result certainly deserve skepticism. Despite this, legitimacy is often invoked in discourse as an initial causal argument before scholars on the subject move on to more undisputed influences in a given sequence of political events. As Herbert Kelman put it, the danger of using the concept of legitimacy in explaining political phenomena is frequently that "in trying to explain too much, it ends up explaining too little" [Kelman 2001: 55]. To what extent and how should the legitimacy of power become an element of political analysis? The above issue will be considered based on criteria related mainly to international policy at the global level. In this context, however, a question arises: can a case be made for the essential causal importance of the legitimacy of power rather than merely its contributory causal significance?

IN SEARCH OF LEGITIMACY SETTINGS, SPECIFICITY, AND DEFINITION

In justifying the invasion of Iraq and the launch of the Second Gulf War in March 2003, US President George Bush's administration and its allies firmly argued that the political regime of Saddam Hussein was highly illegitimate. Therefore, his removal and the change of the *regime* of power in Iraq constituted a just

cause for legitimating military intervention. In practice, the rapid collapse of the government and the lack of socio-political support of the native communities for the systemic transformation of the new state based on the “democratic” standards of the Western world provided a lot of evidence confirming the thesis that Iraq was a typical case of a collapsing fragile state, additionally characterized by a low level of legitimacy of power [Wimmer 2003: 2–19]. Meanwhile, right after the invasion led by the US and its allies, the question arose: how to build adequate structures for a new state that would be perceived as legitimate in the eyes of an ethnically and socially diverse fragile state society? A similar situation occurred during the military invasion of Afghanistan, which resulted in the long-term occupation of the country, culminating in the humiliating defeat of the policies of the Western powers [Whitlockand 2021: 253–275]. Legitimacy is, therefore, not only at the basis of every political discourse but also determines the specificity of political conditions both in developed states and the so-called countries of the “Third World”. In this sense, legitimacy is concerned with social, economic, and political rights, and it is it that transforms the capacity of coercion and personal influence into enduring political authority. It is the proclaimed – albeit ambiguous and vague – approval of asymmetric political relations, where only some receive, take over or inherit power over a given community. For that reason, it is of fundamental importance for the socio-political stabilization of the country, peace, and sustainable development, especially in the context of the politically turbulent circumstances of fragile states.

Thus, the issue of defining state legitimacy seems to be one of the most significant issues of contemporary political science, not only because of the importance of the moral dimension but, above all, because of the stability and integrated cohesion of the state. In much of the history of political thought, legitimacy has been interpreted using arguments typical of legal theory or political philosophy. However, analyzing the concept of legitimacy, it should be emphasized that it has many different meanings. It is especially true of the political praxis implemented by actors on the political scene at all levels, both the local political system and the international one: from the political elite to academics studying legitimacy, etc. In this context, however, everyone assigns a different meaning to the term “legitimacy”. Thus, the variety of purposes and the frequency with which the concept is used make it difficult to systematize appropriately, especially in fragile states [Maj 2013: 226]. After all, legitimacy is a condition in which obedience to the rules and institutions of the state results from the public’s belief that they are worthy of submission. In this context, society recognizes the validity of the rules that organize social order, institutions, politicians, and the ruling class. Much depends on these attitudes’ strength and nature to ensure social relations and structural stability. In particularly critical cases, it is possible to withdraw support for legitimizing authorities’ claims.

Nevertheless, the situation changed fundamentally in the “post-Cold War period”, especially in the case of politically unstable and fragile states. Max Weber’s

triple typology of the sources of government legitimacy – tradition, charisma, and bureaucracy – turned out to be one of the first empirically verified hypotheses about state legitimacy. According to it, the government's policy's general goal, assumption, and priority were implementing the principle of justice. However, responsibility, impartiality, efficiency, and creativity were also important here, as well as the principle of solidarity, participation, and social equality [Gilley 2006: 499–525; Zelditch 2001: 44]. By focusing on the causal hypothesis of legitimacy, Weber finally distanced himself from the question of legality and legitimization of power, mainly what is its justification? [Weber 1978: 36]. Weber's oversight, though, has significant consequences. Contemporary supporters of Max Weber distance themselves from researching the conditions of the right to rule, asking about the criteria used to evaluate political life [Coicaud 2002: 10–24]. In other words, Weber's legitimacy theory ignores the very idea of legitimacy. Also, Weber's "triad" refers not to the content of moral claims but to their form. In this sense, it leaves open the question of explanation and moral justification [Schaar 1981: 38; Grafstein 1981: 456–472].

In other words, there is disagreement about what exactly makes the state legitimate. Undoubtedly, this is the rule of law, down-to-earth prudence, accountability, administrative expansiveness, efficiency, and procedural and distributive justice [Weatherford 1992: 150]. It is also connected with guaranteeing an appropriate national security strategy, providing essential social services, dynamic economic development, political consensus, social stabilization, transparency in the functioning of public administration, etc. [Holsti 1996: 108–116; Milliken, Krause 2002: 757]. Nevertheless, the key issue is the need to revise, verify and test every empirical hypothesis concerning the legitimacy of power in the political practice of its effectiveness. In this context, Margaret Levi defined "good government" as the effectiveness and efficiency of delivering public goods that the populace needs and desires [Levi 2006: 5].

The last clause of the definition above emphasizes that intuition about what makes a state legitimate remains untested until it is verified by as much public opinion as possible. From an empirical point of view, only the citizens are the appropriate judges of what makes the state legitimate. It is of fundamental importance also in the context of fragile states, i.e. politically destabilized countries, often affected by the destructive effects of long-term armed conflicts. In this case, though, there is a fundamental need to address the challenges related to the issue of the legitimacy of power. Of course, a destabilized and scattered political scene may even question the very existence and boundaries of the state as such. Other actors of the political scene may contest or even reject the legitimacy of state administration institutions, as well as the principles of the division of political power [Ware 2014: 3–23].

Nevertheless, the term "legitimacy" is used to display the acceptance, justification, and support of state actions – mainly on the part of civil society, but also the international community – for this and no other form of management,

authority, or administration at the central and local level, but also aid interventions, humanitarian activities, etc. In other words, “legitimacy is the normative belief of a political community that a rule or institution should be obeyed. States are legitimate when key political elites and the public accept the rules regulating the exercise of power and the distribution of wealth as proper and binding” [Papagianni 2008: 49].

Yet, legitimacy sources can be multiple and varied. Thus, institutions of state power can draw support for their actions from many springs, and the legitimacy of these actions will generally be more vital the more it relies on more sources. It is crucial in the case of the so-called “hybrid legitimacy”, i.e. the principle combining traditional and charismatic legitimacy with legal and rational legitimacy [Boege et al. 2008: 11–12]. The concept of legitimacy itself is also not static. It is a dynamic process that can grow or weaken while its sources change. For example, legitimacy can be significantly strengthened if the complaints and needs of particular constituencies are taken into account. If this is not the case, legitimacy may take the form of support for individual ethnic groups, i.e. social creations shaped on a cultural and tribal basis rather than on issues-based foundations [*ibid.*: 4–10].

In other words, legitimacy is essential in the general theory of power, if only for instrumental reasons. There is no doubt that the fact that rulers have legitimacy lowers the cost of government and positively correlates with the stability of the political system, regardless of whether we consider legitimacy a condition for this stability [Held 2006: 197]. Therefore, when considering the relationship between the level of legitimacy and the effectiveness of the political system on the one hand and its stability on the other, four possible cases are distinguished: (1) high legitimacy and high effectiveness, (2) high legitimacy and low effectiveness, (3) high effectiveness and low legitimacy and (4) low effectiveness and low legitimacy. The first and last of these configurations are responsible for shaping the stability or instability of the political system. As for the two in-between issues, in principle, only one of the two factors can provide system stability without the other, with legitimacy appearing to play a more significant role. In other words, in a short period, a very effective but illegitimate system turns out to be more unstable than political regimes, which, although relatively ineffective, display a high level of legitimacy [Lipset 1998: 85–86].

LEGITIMACY OUTLINE: MEANING, IMPLICATIONS, AND ITS DETERMINANTS

There are two main ways of understanding legitimacy. (1) The first rule is normative and concerns specific standards that must be met by a particular actor, institution, or political order to be considered legitimate. These standards may include the express consent of civil society, usually through democratic elections or through claims of social justice and fairness. These standards typically are

derived from moral and normative assumptions, often based on considerations about fundamental human rights. (2) Another way to approach legitimacy is an empirical bias. However, it does not deal with normative assumptions as such but rather with whether, how, and why people obey (or do not) the dictates of a particular political actor or institution. In this regard, the primary focus is on people's beliefs and perceptions. The analysis of the legitimacy of authority focuses here on the concept of authority, usually understood as the power, control, or domination accepted as legitimate. Thus, states that do not even meet certain normative principles can still enjoy *de facto* legitimacy if this is the will of the civil society under their rule [Buchanan, Keohane 2006: 411–423].

The contemporary debate on peacebuilding and statebuilding in the context of fragile states was related mainly to the adequacy of a “liberal peace” based on a free market, democratization, and international security based on the criteria of military domination. Yet, critics of the above strategy question its pro-Western attitude and advocate alternative ways of guaranteeing political participation and integration in the global system of international conditions. Many promoters of these ideas perceive the issue of legitimacy in the dimension of the evolution and efficient functioning of rational and legal political systems. Moreover, every kind of legitimacy has a distinctive “family tree” inscribed and closely related to specific cultures, modes and forms of production, individual decision-making, law-making processes, and distinct notions of continuity and change. However, legitimacy should be viewed as a non-hierarchical phenomenon, albeit gradual and composed of many dimensions that do not need to be directly related to each other. In addition to the signs of acceptance of authority, expressed in various forms, the bulk of respect for the rules of obtaining it is vital for legitimacy. It is also essential to believe that the above restrictions and limitations are just and equitable [Beetham 1991: 87–98]. Strong legitimacy occurs when the belief in the fairness of the rules that constitute it is combined with the general approval of the methods of obtaining them and behavioral signs of its acceptance. The unconditional acceptance alone would be evidence of weak legitimacy or even a kind of dysfunction. In other words, legitimacy is possible without approval, and acceptance alone is insufficient for legitimation [Rapkin, Braaten 2009: 128–135].

However, one cannot deny the possibility that in special cases an accepted system, although devoid of legitimacy, will begin to gain it precisely due to its popularity. Generally, the system is legitimized when it effectively meets the people's needs. And above all, when the need to submit to authority has deeper normative foundations. It was evident that submission to power does not always result from legitimacy: it may result from fear, pragmatic or unreasonable adjustment, or some calculation. In contrast to these conditions, legitimacy is a situation where people believe that an authority has a moral right to expect subordination and that its legitimacy claims are justified and validated.

The concept of the legitimacy of power deliberated here, taking into account its complex nature and specificity – i.e. the fundamental ideas of contemporary

representative democracy – therefore, requires considering its function in the present-day political system. Of course, it should be noted that these are not the only ones or other theoretical constructions. A fuller and deeper analysis of legitimacy concerning democratic ideology, especially in the context of fragile states, should take into account related issues. However, the subject of the social contract allows one to notice the rudimentary relationship between the ruling and the ruled in the normative categories of a voluntary arrangement between the political community and the servant's position of representatives. In the context of fragile states, however, the idealization of the formula of representative power representing the interests of the civil society completes this picture, masking this power as a legal representative of the citizens themselves, of various ethnic communities, their interests, views, etc. In this way, the vector of power relations is – of a kind – reversed. It no longer runs – as it happens – from the rulers to the rule but from the sovereign people to the representatives acting on its behalf. Thus, in the democratic formula of legitimization, the scholarly description of the mechanisms of the political system gives way to its idealized approach. However, this “idealistic” approach must be incorporated back into the scientific explanation because collective legitimacy images shape social attitudes towards the rulers as well as the entire political system. In this sense, however, they are no less accurate than the “real” mechanisms of power and, in fact, enable them to be sustained.

Generally, a state is more legitimate the more its political power is based on fundamental principles of law and social justice. A vital element of the above definition is the concept of “fair and lawful”, understood as “following what is due, just, right, or fair” where “law” means “under accepted norms of moral or legal behavior, justice, etc.”. Both normative and empirical definitions of legality share this concept of legality. For John Rawls, though, legitimacy encompassed political power that was “fully justified”, just as well as “properly exercised”, i.e. according to certain “norms” [Macleod 2006: 134–149; Reidy 2006: 169–188]. For others, legitimacy is a principle that expresses a “legitimate process” as long as it adheres to the norms, values, beliefs, practices, and procedures accepted by the community. In other words, legitimation always assumes something is “right”, legally sanctioned, or “righteous” [Zelditch 2001: 34–40].

However, there is a problem distinguishing between political support and the lack of a systemic approach to legitimacy. In this case, the analytical differences are somewhat vague in practice. In the opinion of experts on the subject, the specificity of the scale of reactions of civil society to the actions of the authorities is situated in a broad spectrum: from obligatory submission, resulting from the applied coercion and pressure, to spontaneous and voluntary affirmation based on the social process of the legitimacy of power [Klosko 2007: 57–74]. In other words, political support is primarily related to motivation conditioned by the *aporia* of state dictatorship and coercion or from social conditions and cultural norms. In this context, the Weberian distinction between the so-called “legitimate

authority” and “power” seems to be merely a distinction between different types of political leadership [Westle 2007: 93–125].

In the current political reality of the “global village”, however, the legitimacy of power is defined and measured virtually every day, whether someone likes it or not. The international conditions of global politics necessitate the use of such knowledge. Without the possibility of estimating such an essential political category as the legitimacy of power, it would be difficult to develop any strategy for international action, especially in the context of the dynamically changing reality of fragile states. Again, a lot depends on whether the applied research methodology, the issue of conceptualization, verification, and validation of data, or the analytical tools used will enable obtaining constructive and substantive conclusions.

TOWARDS A NEW CONCEPT OF LEGITIMACY

Today there is talk of a universal crisis of legitimation in the political reality of the Western world [Habermas 1975; Pharr, Putnam, Dalton 2000: 5–25; Aulenbacher, Dammayr 2014: 661–77]. In the context of fragile states, the situation is also not very optimistic. Moreover, especially here, the political conditions seem more complicated. In the context of policies concerning developing countries, the issue of the legitimacy of power is a significant problem and dysfunctional embarrassment [Alagappa, 1995: 11–65; Kaplan 2008: 17–45]. In other words, the political practice of most modern countries in the world is faced with allegations of insufficient legitimacy of power on the part of civil society. Thus, their governments are characterized by various kinds of abuse, legal illegality, scandalousness, as well as the distorted concept of the rule of law, state administrative institutions, and particular governments. It is no wonder that individual political actors strive to acquire the most significant possible degree of political legitimacy, and the mass media present the above process with great pleasure. Nevertheless, the issue of the legitimacy of power still plays a significant role in influencing their political-systemic strategy.

The analysis of this subject culminated in the works of one of the greatest sociologists of the 20th century, Max Weber. However, despite numerous theoretical studies and many empirical analyzes, until today, there is no final agreement on defining the issue of the legitimacy of power, especially in the context of fragile states. In other words, due to its importance, the legitimacy of power will remain a “persistently contested” concept, i.e. an issue that is still controversial, redefined, and often non-conformist or conflicting [Kaplan 2008: 2–8]. One of the results of this state of affairs was an attempt to reject the concept of legitimacy altogether. Instead, many scholars have tried to use the idea of “trust” understood in terms of the positive attitude of society toward political power. In this context, empirical research attempted to use all available methods typical of public opinion polls [Mishler, Rose 2002: 5–37; Anderson, Tverdova 2003: 91–109]. There is a need for analytical involvement in analyzing the legitimacy issue. However, this requires the

development of an appropriate method. As David Beetham put it: “Social scientists have in fact been thoroughly confused about legitimacy and their confusion has its starting point in their failure to conceptualize it adequately” [Beetham, 1991: 7].

Another methodological approach contests the development of appropriate conceptual procedures. Therefore, this is the reason for rejecting the analysis of the concept of legitimacy as a significant factor conditioning the acquisition and maintenance of power in the state [Przeworski 1986: 54]. However, the main disadvantage of this type of approach is confusing dilemmas and complications in understanding, measuring and verifying the term “legitimacy” with the importance of this concept in political practice. In other words, the challenges involved in understanding a notion such as legitimizing power can only be weighed against the implied importance of such action in the political *praxis* if the legitimacy of power is one of the central political and social questions. For that reason, it cannot be limited to easily measurable or unquestionable concepts here, as the most important concepts may not fit into this category. Thus, ignoring legitimacy as a confusing concept and difficult to grasp and measure is the enunciation of a substantive claim essential for political analysis, which may presuppose negative conclusions. In the current political reality, the legitimacy of power is defined and measured every day, whether someone likes it or not. In the modern era of global politics and dynamic transformations of the power paradigm, the issue of reliable and objective research on complex issues of the legitimacy of power is of fundamental importance. Without an attempt to correctly specify and estimate the appropriate indicators defining the specificity and character of legitimacy, the evaluation of the conducted analyzes does not seem sufficiently reliable [Norris 2013: 579–583]. Again, a lot depends on whether such assessments are correct.

There is no universal and comprehensive concept of legitimacy in the literature on the subject. In other words, a particular form of legitimacy depends on certain socio-political conditions, historical contexts, and demographic circumstances. Legitimacy, therefore, has many different forms as well as many formal and informal sources. However, there is a consensus that the level of legitimacy is higher where there is a high level of political participation as well as involvement in public life. Many of the destructive conflicts of the 20th and 21st centuries were associated with the granting – or not granting – legitimacy and support to state institutions or individual political regimes. Also, foreign donors or international aid organizations focus primarily on building legitimate, effective, and efficient state institutions. For that reason, strengthening the state’s legitimacy is an essential condition and a central element of multilateral development aid, as well as a factor conditioning the socio-political stabilization of the state and lasting peace. In this context, however, a fundamental question arises: what are the legitimate state and political-social institutions?

Therefore, legitimacy enables rulers to exercise power with minimal use of coercive measures. It builds an expectation and conviction among the ruled that political power will be exercised in order to support the national interest

of the state and – broadly understood – the common good, as opposed to the narrow personal interests of political elites. These commitments apply to both formal and informal social and political agreements that govern the relationship between the state and its citizens and between traditional and charismatic leaders and their followers. An important role here is also played by the issue of conflict management and resolution in the national and regional dimensions, as well as local (tribes, clans, etc.) [OECD 2011]. In other words, legitimacy – by definition – is determined by whether the contractual relationship between the state and its citizens works effectively. Individual citizens or community members recognize political actors as well as institutions and functioning political relations in return for services that guarantee their individual and collective well-being. When such a “deal” is not implemented, legitimacy diminishes, and political power is often forced to shift from an agitational rule to unconditionally obligatory domination.

In this context, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development views legitimacy as follows: (1) acceptance of political power by the community living in the state; or (2) political power that is acquired and exercised according to certain socially accepted norms and criteria [OECD 2010: 15]. In other words, according to the common understanding, legitimacy is the right to rule. However, the nature of this right to rule is widely questioned, taking various forms, including as a claim-right arrangement [Simmons 1979; Morris 1998; Altman, Wellman 2009], a liberty-right [Ladenson 1980], or – as a consequence – a power-right [Raz 2009; Green 1988; Applbaum 2010: 215–239; Reglitz 2015: 291–307]. However, experts on the subject disagree on what kind of legitimation is the basic condition for the functioning of the state: is it power, a claim, or freedom? Another subject of debate is the question of what kind of “acceptance” of legitimacy should be required of others (e.g. obedience, respect, responsibility, or lack of a claim attitude). Despite these differences, all traditional theorists focus on governing because their subject of analysis is the state. Whatever happens in the political space, the state issues regulations in the form of laws and enforces them forcibly. The question of whether the state is legitimate becomes the question of whether it has the power to issue and enforce laws the way it does.

When looking for various hypothetical sources of the legitimacy of power, attention should be paid to the objective aspects and attributes of states, as well as social structures integrated at the national level, which provides the basis and inspiration for shaping the legitimacy of power. For example, subjectively individual assessments of the quality of democracy in a given country are generally concurrent with evaluating the legitimacy of power and not only related to hypotheses about its sources. Citizens who approve of the electoral law, the election campaign of political parties, as well as the process of holding parliamentary elections, and at the same time support the state's development strategies and consider state administrative institutions competent and effective, also share faith in state legitimacy. In other words, the above factors are, in practice, integral to the issue of legitimacy [Levi, Sacks 2005; Moehler 2005]. In this context, a funda-

mental question arises: what kinds of objectively measured institutional and social structures, or forms of state functioning, are responsible for the greater subjective legitimacy of the state? Were the electoral law, as well as the manner of conducting the elections, really reliable and fair? Is general development in countries with higher legitimacy satisfactory? To answer all these questions, attention should be paid to the principles that reinterpret the concepts of the legitimacy of power, especially in the context of fragile states.

CONCLUSIONS

In the existing literature on the subject, various types and dimensions of legitimacy show that efficiently functioning institutional structures of the state are necessary for a properly constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions concerning, in particular, the credibility and legitimacy of state power. Nevertheless, each type and form of legitimation is based on slightly different behavioral dynamics and geopolitical conditions. It is especially valid for fragile states. In this context, therefore, particular attention should be paid to the specificity and dynamics of the basic types of the legitimacy of power, identifying several subtypes within each major category, as well as briefly analyzing the contrasts and interdependencies between the different processes that shape the concept of legitimacy, especially in the context of the political pragmatics of the "Third World".

When approaching the debate on the issue of the legitimacy of power from the point of view of the analytical concept, one can notice the diversified nature of the political discourse relating to the essential elements constituting the proper relations between the fundamental entities of the political scene – domestic and global – not only with the norms and processes of systemic transformation in fragile states, but also to the subject and object of validity. Developing a new and weaker understanding of legitimacy does not adequately respond to these challenges. Instead, taking the relational concept of legitimacy as the conceptual core of 20th-century theoretical thinking about legitimacy seriously not only enables us to structure the debates we witness. It also allows for a better understanding of their mutual relations as well as presents additional challenges associated with the international theory of democracy or the current discourse on the legitimacy of power.

Tytuł: Prawomocność w kontekście globalnej rzeczywistości instytucji władzy i współczesnych uwarunkowań polityki międzynarodowej

Streszczenie: Niniejszy artykuł ma na celu ukazanie zagadnień prawomocności władzy, zwłaszcza w odniesieniu do globalnej rzeczywistości instytucji władzy wpisanej w kontekst współczesnych uwarunkowań polityki międzynarodowej, ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem państw rachietycznych (*fragile states*) funkcjonujących głównie w obszarze współczesnego „Trzeciego Świata”. Analizowana tutaj kwestia prawowitości władzy ma niewątpliwie istotne implikacje zarówno dla

polityki wewnętrznej państw rachitycznych, regionalnych stosunków dobrosąsiedzkich, ale także dla polityki międzynarodowej, zwłaszcza w odniesieniu do strategii bezpieczeństwa globalnego. Prezentowany artykuł analizuje powyższe zagadnienia przede wszystkim w kontekście teorii polityki. W tym kontekście pojawia się szereg pytań badawczych: w jakim stopniu i w jaki sposób legitymizacja wpływa na efektywność zastosowanych przez władzę strategii politycznych? Czy brane są pod uwagę także inne czynniki i stymulatory zaangażowania politycznego? Jakie znaczenie posiada legitymacja władzy w kontekście złożonych uwarunkowań niewydolnego politycznie i gospodarczo państwa rachitycznego? Czy legitymacja władzy, poza wymiarem moralnym i ideologicznym, ma istotne znaczenie w zdestabilizowanej rzeczywistości słabych struktur polityczno-gospodarczych upadającego państwa? Przeprowadzona w ten sposób analiza pozwala zreinterpretować i przedstawić szereg istotnych czynników, dla których koncepcja legitymacji władzy odgrywa istotną rolę w refleksji na temat uwarunkowań geopolitycznych współczesnych relacji międzynarodowych zglobalizowanego świata.

Słowa kluczowe: legitymacja władzy, państwa rachityczne, globalizacja, państwa „Trzeciego Świata”, stosunki międzynarodowe

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