

Honorata JAKUSZKO

**A. Cieszkowski's Prolegomena as an Attempt to Overcome
Hegel's Philosophy of History**

Prolegomena A. Cieszkowskiego jako próba przewyciężenia historiozofii Hegla

„Пролегомена” А. Цешковского — попытка преодоления историософии Гегеля

Two distinct stages can be observed in the reception of Hegelianism in Poland: the enthusiastic period of propagating the ideas of the eminent German thinker in the 1830's (1830 — W. Chłędowski, *O filozofii, About Philosophy*, 1835 — A. Z. Helcel, *Rys systemu umiejętności prawa, The Outline of the System of Law Skills*, 1836 — J. K. Rzesiński, *Charakterystyka najnowszej filozofii, The Characteristics of the Latest Philosophy*, 1835—36 — J. Kremer, *Rys filozoficzny umiejętności, A Philosophical Outline of Skills*, 1835 — G. Ehrenberg, *Wstępne myśli o estetyce, Introductory Thoughts on Aesthetics and Estetyka uważana jako umiejętność, Aesthetics Considered as Skill*) and the period of the critical estimate of this philosophy initiated in the 1840's with the German papers by Polish philosophers (1837 — Trentowski, *Grundlage der universellen Philosophie*, 1838 — Cieszkowski, *Prolegomena zur Historiosophie*, 1840 — Trentowski, *Vorstudien zur Wissenschaft der Natur*, 1842 — Cieszkowski, *Gott und Palingenesie*).¹ The latter papers constituted an attempt to overcome Hegel's philosophy, not by simply rejecting it but by appreciating its valuable and assimilable elements and by making a

¹ A. Walicki: *Polska myśl filozoficzna epoki międzypowstaniowej*, in: *700 lat myśli polskiej. Filozofia i myśl społeczna w latach 1831—1864*, Warszawa 1977, pp. 23—25. The author applied the term the 1840's to the period of 1837/38—1848 (between the uprisings of 1830 and 1863), which is characterized with a very special rise of the Polish philosophical thought with highly maximalist aspirations (pp. 12—16).

certain revision of those motifs which were untenable even for Hegel's continuators in Germany. Both the Hegelian Left and the Hegelian Right agreed about the thesis that Hegel's rationalist idealism absolutized general being whereas it neglected the concrete reality. Hence, it could not be applied to new socio-political situations. The awareness of the crisis of that essentially contemplative philosophy was also articulated in the counter-proposals by Polish national philosophers. It is characteristic that the Polish philosophical thought of the 1840's which emphasized the activistic trend alien to Hegel was not confined in its search for the sources of inspiration to the German context only, e.g. to the category of action derived from Fichte or to Schelling's conception of the identity of opposites or, finally, to Schiller's motif of free creation uniting the immediate and reflexive attitudes. This thought showed the then common European tendency to unite the German speculative theory with the views of French thinkers preoccupied with the practical idea of reconstructing the world². This tendency to break the contemplative character of Hegel's philosophy, which accepted the existing reality, must have resulted from the socio-political circumstances of the Polish nation deprived of its own State.³ Sufficiently explains why the category of the future, entirely neglected by Hegel, turns out to be so important in the views of Polish philosophers upon the philosophy of history.

Especially one of the first papers by the Polish Hegelians, the *Prolegomena zur Historiosophie* by A. Cieszkowski, which advocated the need to complement Hegel's philosophy with new motifs, bore witness to an ambitious intellectual effort. This work could be discussed from various points of view, e.g., we could try to place the *Prolegomena* in the context of German philosophy and emphasize the leftist or rightist direction of the disintegration of Hegelianism. Such an attempt was made by A. Cornu, who highly estimated Cieszkowski's important contribution to the development of the Hegelian Left and asserted that the Marxist philosophy of practice owed very much to the activistic motif of the *Prolegomena*⁴. T. Kroński was of quite a different opinion. He posed

² A. Walicki: *Francuskie inspiracje myśli filozoficzno-religijnej A. Cieszkowskiego*, "Archiwum Historii Filozofii i Myśli Społecznej", vol. XVI 1970, pp. 127—171, and B. Baczeko: *Horyzonty polskiego hegelizmu*, in: *Polskie spory o Hegla (1830—1860)*, Warszawa 1966, p. 15.

³ B. Baczeko: *op. cit.*, pp. 14—17, 24, and T. Kroński: *Filozofia mesjanistyczna i katolicka w Polsce połowy XIX w.*, in: *Rozważania wokół Hegla*, Warszawa 1960, pp. 157—227.

⁴ A. Cornu: *Karol Marks i Fryderyk Engels. Życie i dzieło*, vol. 1, Warszawa 1958, p. 137—139. See also S. Avineri: *The Social and Political Thought of Marx*, Cambridge 1968, pp. 124—130, N. Lobjkovicz: *Theory and Practice. History of a Concept from Aristotle to Marx*, Notre-Dame—London 1967, chap. 13; H. Stuck:

a thesis about Cieszkowski's closer ties rather with the German conservative right, especially with Schelling. This entanglement of Polish Hegelianism in the irrationalist — organicist trends, which had its origin in the sociopolitical conditions of Poland at that time, decided, in Kroński's view, about the fact that Cieszkowski's thought proved regressive towards Hegel's rationalism and evidenced the misunderstanding of dialectic itself, which was reduced in the *Prolegomena* to formal trichotomic verbal jugglery.⁵

Amid such extreme interpretations A. Walicki's standpoint merits attention. He contends that the estimate of the *Prolegomena* should take into consideration not only the context of German philosophy but also the inspirations derived from French social theories, especially from utopian socialism. These influences can be found in the triadic periodization of history, in the conception of action and in the broadening of historical reflection with the category of the future, which is to be a synthesis of unilateral elements in the past history.⁶

Another attempt of a theoretical study of the problems of the *Prolegomena* is an article by B. Baczko, who places Cieszkowski's philosophy against the background of two different structures of *Weltanschauung* which appear in the Polish reception of Hegelianism. They are the conservative position represented by Cieszkowski, Trentowski and Libelt and the democratic position with its representatives, Dembowski and Kamiński.⁷

Still another possibility of analyzing the *Prolegomena* is offered by I. Curyło-Gonzalez who stresses the ethical perspective of the investigated history of philosophy which reconciles the romantic call to action with the pre-positivist motif of social reforms.⁸

Philosophie der Tat. Studien zur "Verwirklichung der Philosophie" bei den Junghegelianern und den wahren Sozialisten, Stuttgart 1963.

⁵ Kroński: *op. cit.*, pp. 164, 174—175. The organic conception of nation was to justify the existence and historical role of Poland regardless of the fact that Poland was deprived of its own State. This conception, moreover, proved the unity of social forces, which was to counteract all revolutionary ideas.

⁶ Walicki: *Francuskie inspiracje...*, *op. cit.*, A. Walicki: *Filozofia Hegla w oczach myślicieli polskich epoki romantyzmu*, "Człowiek i Światopogląd" 1974, No. 7, pp. 134—136 and by the same author, *Pisma filozoficzne Cieszkowskiego z lat 1838—1842 w kontekstach intelektualnych epoki*. An introduction to J. Garewicz, A. Walicki (eds) A. Cieszkowski: *Prolegomena do historiozofii. Bog i palingeneza oraz miejsce pisma filozoficzne*, Warszawa 1972.

⁷ Baczko: *op. cit.*, pp. 9—83.

⁸ I. Curyło-Gonzalez: *A. Cieszkowski — romantyk i reformator*, "Człowiek i Światopogląd" 1976, No. 10, pp. 120—133, and by the same author, *Historia i moralność w filozofii A. Cieszkowskiego*, "Etyka" 1971, No. 9, pp. 25—41. See also B. Skarga: *Narodziny prepozytywizmu polskiego (1831—1864)*, Warszawa 1964, p. 106.

Rather than try to continue or duplicate the above interpretations, the author of the present paper has a more moderate goal, which is to show Cieszkowski's attempt to overcome Hegel's philosophy of history on the basis of the text of *Prolegomena* alone. This article poses the questions about where the idea of overcoming Hegel stems from, which prospects of this overcoming can be found in the *Prolegomena*, which problems of social philosophy are involved in Cieszkowski's polemic with Hegel and what new theoretical categories have been worked out by Cieszkowski in constructing his synthetic philosophy of history.

It must be observed that Cieszkowski was right in treating the elements of Hegelianism (logic, philosophy of nature, philosophy of spirit) as one whole, although he dealt with the philosophy of history only. He saw in it most controversial ascertainments and deficiencies which, he believed, resulted from the fact that Hegel was not consistent in applying the laws of dialectic (his most valuable achievement) also in history. This inconsistency was seen for example in distinguishing four stages of historical process, contrary to the principle of the dialectical triad, in the thesis about the end of history and in the failure to emphasize the role of synthesis and mediation for historical progress. However, the idea of surmounting Hegel came into being, as Cieszkowski wrote, not only because Hegel was inconsistent in philosophy of history but at the same time because Hegel was too consistent and orthodox about the questions pertaining to his whole system, which made his philosophy one-sided.⁹ One such

⁹ A. Cieszkowski: *Prolegomena zur Historiosophie*, Berlin 1838, p. 72. For Cieszkowski the best developed part of Hegel's system was logic while the philosophy of nature was not, according to him taken up by Hegel at all. Although Hegel had the logical idea develop into the most concrete reality, yet he retained the primacy of the general factor over the sensible individuality in recognizing consciousness as the starting point of history (pp. 113—114). That is why the central part of the system has purely instrumental functions as a transitional link towards the philosophy of spirit. Cieszkowski thought that the task of working out the natural philosophy of history postulated by the German romanticists (Novalis) and by naturalist philosophers (Bucheze, Schubart) belonged to the future thinkers (pp. 52—60). It is worth nothing that Schelling was not mentioned whereas he included philosophy of nature into the history of the development of spirit and must have inspired many of Cieszkowski's theses (see F. W. Schelling: *System idealizmu transcendentálnego*, Warszawa 1979, pp. 197—205). Cieszkowski also made some changes in Hegel's philosophy of spirit. According to the Polish philosopher, the spirit is not only the internality freed from the fetters of the senses, but also a will to act through which the subject and the object are reconciled. Similarly, when he analyzed the philosophy of the objective spirit, Cieszkowski treated the legal institutions of Antiquity and the moral ones of Christianity as still abstract premises to create a concrete ethic, a synthesis of the individual and substantial factors. The State in its abstract distinction receives a negative note from the Polish Hegelian, who, contrary to his master, did not regard the form

error is the assertion typical of absolute idealism that the apex of development is the consciousness realizing the final destiny of universal history. Cieszkowski held that this deficiency of Hegelianism (at the same time the highest achievement of philosophy until then) revealed that the philosophical domain itself was limited and must be treated not as the final result of history but as a transition to its next stage, that is post-theoretical practice, which is activity mediated by the reason of will. Thus, Cieszkowski's ultimate ambition was not only to complement Hegel's philosophy of history together with overcoming the inconsistencies of the great philosopher within his system, but also to surmount Hegelianism regarded as the apogee of the development of philosophical thought. The last remark is important because Cieszkowski's attitude to the work of his great predecessor is dual, both affirmative and negative. Cieszkowski spoke about the need to overcome Hegel rather than reject him, which for the Polish philosopher meant a continuation of the unquestionable values of Hegelianism and a revision of certain definite theses of that system.

Cieszkowski's statement defining his attitude to Hegel clearly reveals two different perspectives of overcoming Hegelianism, which are outlined in the *Prolegomena*. The ascertainment of the deficiencies of the "classical" form of Hegel's philosophy led to a postulate that his philosophy be transformed into a romantic philosophy expressing opposition against panlogism, abstractness and formalism. The new philosophy would be an attempt to apprehend history not only as a classical monolithic edifice but also as Gothic tectonics which brings out the multitude of points of view, the individuality of epochs and nations, the diversity of the living process, which cannot be locked in the abstract schemes of reason.¹⁰ To

of State as the indispensable condition of the existence of national spirit and thereby of history. In the future epoch, as we can infer from Cieszkowski's assertions, mankind will be an organic federation of nations rather than a mechanical system of states (p. 153). Cieszkowski also differed from Hegel in his views upon the absolute spirit. He did not recognize three separate steps of the development of the absolute: art, religion and philosophy, or the hierarchy presented in such a scheme. He rather believed that religion was an entire absolute sphere of the spirit, where art and philosophy are only certain subordinate modes of its manifestation. For example, religiousness in the first epoch was manifested in feelings, faith and in the works of art; in the second epoch — it primarily appeared in reflection and in philosophical consciousness; in the third epoch its fullest realization is to be will, action, practice. (p. 100, note).

¹⁰ *Ibidem.*, pp. 34—43, 123—124. It should be stressed that the postulate of the transition of Hegel's rationalist philosophy into its more mature form of the so-called romantic philosophy could be formulated in the Polish situation only, where romanticism was just beginning to develop. In Germany Hegelianism was in fact settling the accounts with the German romanticism.

avoid misunderstanding it must be stressed that the new philosophy is not a mere antithesis of Hegel's rationalism but it is also a synthetic attempt to reconcile ideas and life, the abstract and the concrete. It thus includes Hegel's achievements while abolishing his one-sidedness.¹¹ Therefore, Cieszkowski postulates that we study the diversified whole of the contents of historical process, the synthetic character of each of its phases, the existence of various steps of progress, both one after and along another, and the total structure of individual and collective personality.

The other perspective of overcoming Hegelianism can be found by analyzing the laws of dialectic which, Cieszkowski believes, demonstrate, that it is necessary for philosophy to retreat, to turn into social life and into practice. The task of the new epoch is therefore to translate ideas into being or to eliminate the discrepancy between the rational and the real.¹² Cieszkowski's two perspectives of overcoming Hegel do not, as one might think, express an antinomy. The thesis about the end of philosophy, about its transition into social life, does not exclude the possibility that philosophical thought can develop as theory. Cieszkowski asserts that "*...die Philosophie wird wohl noch Vieles entdecken, sich selbst aber hat sie bereits entdeckt, und darum eben überlebt sie sich in diesem Augenblicke*".¹³ Philosophy owes the discovery of its own essence to Hegel. That is why we could think that future philosophy will not so much develop new theoretical problems as work for the social reality in agreement with its notion of a force that guides man's free actions. From one point of view Hegelianism appears the apex of the possibilities of philosophy, its limit; in another aspect it is a transitional link of philosophical thought. Philosophy, Cieszkowski believes, will not entirely disappear; it will only abandon its abstractness and that will decide about the progress of spirit. "*Nichts desto weniger aber wird dies ein Fortschritt des Geistes seyn, so wie die Romantik der antiken Kunst gegenüber auch wirklich ein Fortschritt der Idee der Schönen war*".¹⁴ To conclude the foregoing remarks we must assert that progress, i.e. overcoming Hegelianism, is seen by Cieszkowski both as new romantic philosophy and as a suppression of all theory in favour of practice, of the rationalization of social being. "*In dieser Weise wird die künftige Philosophie das Hinausgehen der Philosophie über sich selbst doch innerhalb ihres eigenen Gebiets und in der Form der Philosophie selbst seyn*".¹⁵

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 91.

¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 99, 112, 118, 129.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 131.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 102.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 127.

In his appreciation of Hegel's merits for philosophy Cieszkowski did not, however, omit the deficiencies of his absolute idealism, especially in philosophy of history as it was the object of particular interest of the Polish philosopher. He was not content with many judgments passed by Hegel: the fallacy of definite views clearly provoked a discussion. The polemic between the Polish Hegelian and his master referred to several basic questions of philosophy of history: the problem of historical subject, the structuralization of historical process, the functions of philosophy and consciousness in social life, and finally the rhythm and goal of development. The starting point of Cieszkowski's considerations became a definition of the object of the reflection of philosophy of history, broader than in Hegel. Apprehending history as an ideal and organic whole Cieszkowski contended that the future also belonged to the historical process and should therefore be included in theoretical reflection. The future road of mankind can be reconstructed on the assumption of necessary and common laws of development which inform that every one-sided event in history forces out its opposite while the already developed opposites condition synthesis, that is a reconciliation of the two members of opposition. It follows that the future is cognizable as to its essence although concrete events, particular occurrences of the general, cannot be foreseen.¹⁶ The cognitive possibilities and functions of philosophy were understood differently by Hegel, who was hostile to all utopias. He believed that it was theoretically unfounded to construct the image of the future because consciousness usually appears *ex post* after each historical stage has taken place. Such a conviction was inseparably connected with the resignation of the activist attitude and of practical — reformatory tendencies in social life. The goal of history understood by Hegel as the process of becoming aware of freedom was to achieve self-consciousness in the system of absolute philosophy. This, already took place in his time, Hegel believed, while Cieszkowski negated that interpretation of historical process. Since he was convinced that his epoch could not be the final stage of history because it was one-sided, Cieszkowski asserted that mankind was yet to achieve the future epoch, an organic synthesis uniting the opposing elements of Antiquity and Christianity. History does not end with achieving self-consciousness. It is rather a process of mankind attaining social happiness. It is a realization of definite moral values, the activity not only of reason but also of will. The difference in understanding the object of philosophy of history between Hegel and Cieszkowski produced in consequence different views of the two thinkers upon the role of consciousness in social life. Hegel confines himself to retrospection and re-

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 9—11. See also G. W. F. Hegel: *Wykłady z filozofii dziejów*, Warszawa 1958, vol. 2, pp. 205—206.

cognizes only pretheoretical practice, whereas Cieszkowski surmounts that position with his thesis about the superiority of action or post-theoretical practice.¹⁷ In his view, not only can philosophy follow events as consciousness of past history but it can also anticipate future stages, making it possible for human subjects actively and consciously to make their own social reality.

The central problem in Cieszkowski's considerations, which also defined the directions of the continuation of Hegelianism and the causes of its decline in Germany, was Hegel's ambiguous conception of *Aufhebung*, which was to define the rhythm of the development of history. The difficulty was that the category contained both the negative moment and the mediation of opposing sides and forces which find expression in historical progress. The opposition of the two meanings usually prompted Hegel's continuators to reduce one of the constituents of the concept of *Aufhebung*. Cieszkowski chose such a conception of changes which took into account mediation of contradictions (*Vermittlung*) and reconciliation (*Ver-söhnung*) of opposing elements within a higher synthesis. Such a choice seems to agree with Hegel's intention. He holds in his description of the dynamics of being that the transition from thesis (the initial state) to synthesis (the final state) is effected not through a total destruction and complete annihilation of thesis but through the abolition of its exclusiveness, through autonomy due to antithesis. Hence follows the final stage of reconciliation of the negated and negating moments.¹⁸ Cieszkowski maintained that for the description of historical process the category of dialectical negation was useful — it did not exclude continuation manifested in synthesis, that is in the retention of the negated moment.¹⁹ Moreover, Cieszkowski contended that Hegel himself was not faithful enough to his general standpoint as far as philosophy of history was concerned. Namely, Hegel's lectures on the philosophy of history did not at all confirm the triadic character of all becoming. Already the distinction of four phases in history (the Orientals, the Greeks, the Romans, and the Christians and Germans) reveals that Hegel adopted the *a posteriori*

¹⁷ Cieszkowski: *Prolegomena zur Historiosophie*, pp. 18, 19, 137, 143, 150. It is worth nothing that Cieszkowski was the first to formulate the philosophy of action, which became a distinctive feature of the Hegelian Left in Germany in the early 1840's (Ruge, Hess, Feuerbach, Marx). In Russia the continuators of the idea of the transition of philosophy into practice were Hercen, Stankiewicz, Bakunin, Bieliński.

¹⁸ G. W. F. Hegel: *Nauka logiki*, Warszawa 1967, vol. 1, p. 113.

¹⁹ Cieszkowski: *Prolegomena...*, pp. 37, 91, 137. Compare a different interpretation of *Aufhebung* by the young Hegelians. R. P a n a s i u k: *Młodoheglisci: dialektyka i polityka* in: *Dziedzictwo heglowskie i marksizm*, Warszawa 1979, pp. 81—139.

method of presenting it, having neglected his own *a priori* construction of the system. Although an important assertion about the absolute opposition between the ancient and modern world can be found in Hegel, nevertheless, it was not used by the philosopher. He failed to draw a consequence that from the one-sided premises of past time followed the necessity of their unification in the synthesis of the future.²⁰ The merit of that addition fell to Cieszkowski.

In his description of the rhythm of historical process the Polish philosopher especially emphasizes the idea that the synthesis of syntheses is the ripest fruit of the tree of history. This did not mean that all the stages preceding the final phase of history were treated in terms of means to an end. Rather, Cieszkowski followed Herder in recognizing that each epoch is its own objective, that is already a certain synthesis that did not close the possibility of being surmounted in a new affirmative form, in a higher synthetic unity. One might think that the absolute synthesis of history, out of its potential existence burdened with abstractness, tends to become diversified and concrete by distinguishing opposites, by attempting to solve and reconcile them in each phase of history. This concretization is then to be achieved by negating this still insufficiently concrete unity, by forming a new synthesis on the level antithetic to the previous stage, and finally by raising to the higher power the two steps of development to obtain their harmonious identification, the substantial and not only formal unity of opposites. Thereby the synthesis of syntheses contains various stages of historical process, it is a testimony of development taking place in the way of a spiral. Therefore it is not a simple linear cumulation of positive values. This is settled by the existence of the law of negation which influences the direction of the future stages of development. Overcoming the extreme one-sided moment in history should not, in Cieszkowski's view, be interpreted as its destruction since the negated continues to be an element of the new. The first negation (the opposite of the previous stage) must in turn solve itself and find its transition in the postulate of the third phase mediating the two one-sided members.

This transition turns, therefore, to be the negation of negation, the necessity to retreat for that value which has already reached its culmination and from then on ceases to be the most important centre of the spirit of mankind. The third epoch of history is, in a sense, a return to the first synthesis. But since this first reconciliation, which comprises internal antitheses, discriminates one member of opposition while strengthening the domination of the other elements, this return is a higher level of real reconciliation, of the harmonious identification of abstract opposites

²⁰ Cieszkowski: *op. cit.*, pp. 24, 31.

It is an activation of elements alternately dominating in the past epochs. The absolute synthesis represented by the third phase of history should, Cieszkowski held, be distinguished from indifference, the neutralization of opposites, from their formal identification because this synthesis is a substantial unity of antithetic premises, the concreteness of the synthesis being preserved and evident in the internally diversified structure.²¹

Cieszkowski illustrated the above arguments about the mechanism of development with the example of empirical history. The first stage of history — the thesis — was Antiquity. It was a stage where the subjective spirit remained at the level of the senses and objectivity; the objective spirit was manifested in abstract law, and the absolute spirit — in the idea of beauty realized by art. In Cieszkowski's view, a natural analogy of this historical phase can be a mechanism: the natural, immediate, undeveloped unity of components of the whole. That first synthesis in history proved insufficient while realizing its teleological destiny and had to serve as a transition to a higher level of development which was its opposite. The antithesis required by the laws of dialectic was Christianity — the period of the domination of consciousness and subjectivity over nature external to man. The abstract law lost its hegemony in favour of morality, the idea of beauty was replaced by truth revealed in philosophical cognition and knowledge negated presentiment in the individuals psychic structure. In nature the counterpart of this phase of history is chemical antagonism expressing the dualist character of Christianity and secondary mechanicity symbolizing the superficiality of attempts to equalize or neutralize opposites. That epoch was not only the antithesis of the first stage but also its own self-negation. On the other hand, this level of spirit (the stage of thought) realized its own destiny like the previous stage of art; it was a certain synthesis burdened with the error of one-sidedness and that is why it also had to be the means of further development. As Cieszkowski observed, if the first epoch (immediate realism of art) represented the existence of the identity of being idea, the other (the absolute idealism of philosophy) was characterized by the conception of the identity of being and idea.²² The domination of one member of the opposition in each epoch proves the necessity of a higher synthesis which will be an equally valid, mutual and absolute reconciliation of opposites. Therefore the third epoch, represented by the idea of a biological organism, is to turn out as the unity of those elements which dominated one-sidedly in particular stages: in the phase of sensible individuality and abstract generality, of nature and spirit, of truth and beauty, of being and idea. The future will ultimately express the achieve-

²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 23, 91—99, 106, 108, 111, 144.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 104.

ments of the highest concreteness in the evolution of spirit, the actualization of the potential synthesis of their subject not diversified in himself at the beginning of history.

As can be seen from this brief reconstruction of the organism of history in the *Prolegomena*, Cieszkowski doubtlessly continued Hegel's dialectic and concretized some of its ambiguous categories. In formulating the answer to the question about the rhythm of development he tried to take into account the double sense of the concept of *Aufhebung* which he connected with such categories as *Versöhnung* (reconciliation) and *Vermittlung* (mediation). The two thinkers differ decisively about the structuralization of historical process. For Cieszkowski the structure of history is identical with the structure of historical time. The distinguished stages — of art, philosophy and practical life — correspond to the past, the present and the future. Thus in Cieszkowski's work the first epoch contains in a way the three stages distinguished by Hegel (Oriental, Greek, and Roman), the second one is the counterpart of the fourth and last phase in Hegel's periodization of history, while the third epoch, the future, proves to be a significant novelty of the *Prolegomena*. According to Hegel the present (the Christian-German phase) was to be the fulfilment of the objective of history, whereas Cieszkowski transferred the teleological destiny of mankind into the future because he saw in the present, in its conflicts and deficiencies, the possibility and even the necessity of the future stages of development.²³ The basic conflicts, antagonisms, the already developed contradictions both in the idea and in social being, the chaos in material and spiritual matters were judged by Cieszkowski as "...ein wirklicher Elementar-Process des Lebens, der sich durch Fermentation, ja sogar partiell durch Putrefaction kund giebt".²⁴ Cieszkowski regarded the discrepancy between duty and being as the fundamental contradiction, interpreting the solution of this conflict not as an act of revolutionary negation but as a slow and gradual approach of the stage of synthesis. In his view, utopian theories like e.g. Fourier's, are erroneous when they try to break into the reality rather than develop with it. This rather deepens the abyss between idea and being instead of abolishing it. From the fact that philosophy achieved its classical mature form in Hegel's system Cieszkowski inferred that since reason had solved its internal conflicts, a similar victory had to take place in reality when the truth of idea was translated into being. "...Also wenn das Vernünftige von dem Wirklichen getrennt ist, so müssen sie beide ge-

²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 24, 28. Baczko differs in asserting that Cieszkowski ignored the contradictions of his contemporary epoch, which he regarded as inessential for the future synthesis. See Baczko: *op. cit.*, p. 37.

²⁴ Cieszkowski: *op. cit.*, p. 153.

geneinander gravitieren und sich durch unvollkommene Versöhnungen immer mehr nähern bis sie endlich organisch zusammenfallen. An ein einseitiges Einholen ist gar nichts zu denken".²⁵

In his discussion of two roads of the development of societies, Cieszkowski gave clear preference to the evolutionary attempt to improve social life, having found its premises in Hegelianism. In that way he demonstrated that Hegel's standpoint was unequivocally opposed to the revolutionary contents of the philosophy of the Enlightenment. "*Man hat also ganz richtig gesagt, dass die revolutionären Bewegungen unserer Zeit aus der Philosophie hervorgegangen sind: aber man hätte hinzufügen sollen, dass nachdem die Philosophie ihre Classicität erreicht haben werde, umgekehrt aus ihr eine Evolution zu erwarten wäre, welche das Abstracte, das direkt aus ihr stammt, vermitteln und zum positiven Concreten herausgestalten wird.*"²⁶

In the considerations so far the future has been presented in its relation to the present. Cieszkowski did not confine himself to characterizing this relation. He also attempted to derive the future stage of history from the one-sided abstract premises of the past and the present while stressing the changes of the situation of the subject of history towards its still fuller autonomy. It seems important that the third epoch was interpreted as the return to the first phase. Moreover this will unite the positive achievements of the present and hence it will mediate the second stage.

The first main step of spirit was *Selbstseyn* — the passive, immediate, natural state of mankind with the domination of the objective factor. It appeared in the pre-theoretical, or unconscious, practice (*vorthoretische Praxis, Thatsachen*) as existence given independently of man's will (*etwas Daseiendes ohne unsere Mitwirkung und unser Bewusstseyn*)²⁷. The human individual confined himself to his sensible shape as a being in itself (*An-sich*), that is unaware of his substantial subjective essence. The dominant element of his personal structure was emotion (*Gefühl*) and

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 149, 145—146.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 143. Hegel's philosophy of history had a dual possibility of interpreting the ways of social development. Compare K. Bał: *Reforma czy rewolucja? Antynomie heglowskiej koncepcji procesu historycznego*, "Acta Universitatis Wratislaviensis. Prace filozoficzne", vol. 10, 1972, pp. 26—45. According to Bał, Hegel justifies both the evolutionary and revolutionary ways of historical development. German students of the problem are of a different opinion. For example, Hegel's support of the Reformation was discussed by E. Bloch: *Geschichtliche Vermittlung und das Novum bei Hegel*, "Praxis" 1972, Nos 1—2, whereas a proponent of the opposite theory about the priority of revolution over Reformation in Hegel's views was M. Kangra: *Hegel — Metaphysik oder Revolution?*, "Praxis" 1972, Nos 1—2.

²⁷ Cieszkowski: *Prolegomena...*, pp. 17—18.

faith in God's providence, while the typical product of exteriorization were works of art realizing the idea of beauty: the synthesis of sensible form and internal spiritual content. At the stage history demonstrated the still imperfect reconciliation of the divine and human factors, of the spiritual and sensuous, burdened with fortuitousness and one-sidedness.

The second epoch of history (*Selbstdenken*) transformed the sensible, immediate individual into self-conscious internality, an abstract transcendental being (*Für-sich*). This spiritual being, subjectivity (*Subjektivität*), was realized mainly in philosophy, in the cognition of the necessary laws of historical process as the divine idea developing in history.

The third step of spirit (*Selbstthun*) will be the evidence of the highest possibility of reconciling God and man, spirit and matter, subjectivity and individuality in the process of absolute action whose author will be the many-sided concrete personality (*Aus-sich*). Idea will return to being without alienation towards itself, art and philosophy will be united in social life, feeling and reason will be reconciled through will, the highest predicative of the absolute. The future, Cieszkowski held, will give birth to the executors of history (*Vollführer, Werkmeister*) who will not be content with what is given but will shape the reality by objectively fulfilling teleology subjectively realized.²⁸ The real subject of history, in the broad sense of the word, will be manifested only in the future epoch where passive facts (*Thatsachen*) will be replaced by actions (*Thaten*). If mankind has so far seen a blind instrument of chance or necessity, when it achieved self-consciousness and surmounted contemplative theories, it will prove to be the really concrete, creative, individualized personality realizing freedom in the process of action.

It is in order to recall here that polemics directed against Hegel are contained in Cieszkowski's description of the steps of the development of spirit. As Hegel's main error Cieszkowski regarded the closure of historical process at the stage of being "for itself". This deficiency implies all other shortcomings of Hegelianism — contemplativism, the instrumental conception of individuals as instruments of the absolute idea, the narrow treatment of the concept of practice as unconscious action, as an element of theory, excess of abstractness⁹². Another cause of the above errors, or in fact the same though differently formulated, was Hegel's negative attitude towards the so-called aesthetics of history of Herder and Schiller which corresponded to the stage of Antiquity. Cieszkowski, however, tries to synthesize the achievements of the opposing epochs in the future phase of history, to unite the effort of his predecessors in the history of philosophy. His advocacy of the return to the

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

⁹² *Ibid.*, pp. 66—67, 95—97, 99, 113—115, 120.

first phase of the development of spirit was connected with the rehabilitation of the neglected laws of individuality, randomness and spontaneity, which did not mean that the equally important gains of the stage of idea were to be disregarded. Cieszkowski's synthetic position was evident in the construction of such categories as free freedom (*freie Freiheit*), active action (*thätige Thätigkeit*), post-theoretical practice (*nach-theoretische Praxis*), personality (*Persönlichkeit*) etc.

The concept of free freedom³⁰ meant that Cieszkowski rejected the voluntaristic conception of historical process which did not recognize objective regularity and overestimated the subjective factor in history. Secondly, this expressed the resignation of extreme determinism which advanced a thesis about the supremacy of objective necessity over the passive subject aware of this state of things. Therefore neither the so-called accidental freedom (*zufällige Freiheit*), personifying the historically overcome phase of art or the Greek spirit — the theme of Herder's and Schiller's one-sided philosophies of history, nor the necessary freedom (*nothwendige Freiheit*), which corresponded to the contemporary phase of idea — the theme of Hegel's considerations — could satisfy Cieszkowski, who sought to synthesize all one-sided views. The concept of free freedom is thus a synthetic qualification, an attempt to reconcile the accidental, subjective and necessary moments, objective in the philosophy of action.

For Cieszkowski, the most important qualification of spirit was the attribute of action which, he held, was not confined to passive activity (*passive Thätigkeit*) that is the activity of reason becoming aware of the phases of development it had undergone, as Hegel would have it. Moreover the activity like that laden with passivity whereas the so-called active action is the active and conscious creativity of human will which be dominant on the future stage of history.³¹ Owing to the mediation of the achievements of theory through practice, the way of realizing the destinies of mankind will change. Development has so far taken place by the grace and omnipotence of Providence. Henceforward, it will be the merit of man, the proper subject of history, who is, however, manifested not as the naked, abstract I (*nackte, abstracte Ich*) but as a concrete personality, the reconciliation of individual and general factors.

Ultimately, history in Cieszkowski's synthetic philosophy of history was defined as "...*der Entwicklungsprozess des Geistes der Menschheit in der Empfindung, im Bewusstseyn, und in der Bethätigung des Schönen, Wahren und Guten, ein Entwicklungsprozess, den wir in seiner Nothwen-*

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 84.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 121—122.

dingkeit, Zufälligkeit und Freiheit zu erkennen haben".³² It is worth stressing that Cieszkowski does not characterize the future by giving completely new elements, like action, good or will, but he presents their anticipations in the previous stages and the reflection of the previous steps of development in the latest.³³ Cieszkowski contends that the three main forms of the spirit of the world follow in succession which does not exclude their parallel existence and interaction. For example, the embryos of the organic phase of history could be observed in the phase of mechanism and chemism. Just as in feeling there is consciousness in itself, so, too, the will in itself can be found in consciousness. The will, in turn, developed in the third stage of history, includes in itself the previous moments: both presentiment and self-knowledge. Also beauty, truth and good develop in mutual negations and reconciliations, expressing love, wisdom and the omnipotence of life. According to Cieszkowski it is especially in building the future that various elements, not only pure reason but also presentiment, faith and will, are to co-operate. That is why he evaluates Fourier's utopia as an expression of theory not sufficiently rational for the reality, yet at the same time as a brilliant anticipation of the practical tendency of the world. This was an organism at the level of mechanism, a reconciliation of spirit (Plato's principles) and nature (Rousseau's principles), but it had a character of thesis on account of its immediate, accidental and particular expression.³⁴ The utopias of the French thinkers, Cieszkowski held, although not based on self-knowledge, expressed, after all, the important human aspirations to build the real, humanized being which would be approved by all the spheres of man's personality. If for Hegel values are realized in the order surmounting the individual, then the utopians accentuate the anthropocentric evaluation of the world and the humanization of reality. Cieszkowski therefore included the achievements of utopian socialists and Hegel's philosophical self-knowledge into his philosophy of the future.

To prove the insufficiency of the conception of history as a process of the development of spirit towards self-knowledge, Cieszkowski pointed

³² *Ibid.*, p. 137.

³³ *Ibid.*, pp. 24, 60; Kroński (*op. cit.*, p. 199) holds that for Cieszkowski the future is determined by quite a new factor. This breaks the bridge between the epoch of feeling and thought on the one hand and the epoch of action on the other. Therefore, to refer to Cieszkowski's affinity with Fichte is, on Kroński's view, unfounded: Sichte recognized action as the primary ontological category, as the beginning of the visible world. He saw the future as the realization of rational freedom pushing forward. The subject of action was for Sichte the supra-individual being as species. Cieszkowski allegedly understood action as the activity of a single individual ignoring the regularity of the historical process.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 132, 147.

out the essential errors of Hegelianism. He asserted that Hegel had wrongly examined the relations between individuality (*Einzelheit*), particularity (*Besonderheit*) and generality (*Allgemeinheit*) having thereby fallen into panlogism and excessive formalism like a man who loses the sight of trees when he sees a wood. Instead of presenting the real identification of idea with being, Hegel's philosophy rather shows the supremacy of generality over particularity and resigns the acquisition of any elements of the direct position of art, the first stage of the development of spirit. Conversely, Cieszkowski asserted that "...für das Leben der Idee brauchen wir gar nicht das Leben des Lebens zu tödten".³⁵ Hegel was wrong in reducing the features, passions and goals of individuals to the role of the instrument realizing general laws and in excluding all other specific characteristics from the sphere of historical research. He repeated the same error in the conception of nation-state as the level of the development of the spirit of the world without taking into consideration its distinct character and unique specificity.

Trying to complement Hegel's position, Cieszkowski proposed that the historical process should be considered in its generality (with the help of the *Weltgeist* category), in its particularity (including the concept of *Völkergeist*) and in its individuality (represented by great men). The eminent personality is, on the one hand, the focus of the particular spirit of nation; on the other, it is a specific knot on the general line of the development of the spirit of the world, and, moreover, it does not lose its autonomy, "...selbst bei sich bleibt, d.h. an und für sich ist und denkt, und aus sich selbst wirkt".³⁶ The autonomy of nations can likewise be reconciled with the idea of universal history. Every nation realizes a particular historical mission and expresses a definite step of the progress of the spirit of mankind, being at the same time a collective personality. However the historian should not confine himself to ascertaining the thesis about the linear course of history (*Längenprospect*). He should also remember about their transverse analysis (*Querschnitt*) and that the individual stages of development not only follow in succession (*Nacheinandersein*) but also co-exist along one another (*Nebeneinandersein*). We can thereby grasp in one moment the whole organism of history, all the past, present and future moments that exist in different nations in a real way. From this principle follows the equal treatment of every national spirit which either already realized its own destiny and gained supremacy in a given period and in the general line of the spirit of mankind, or it contains such a potential chance. Contrary to Hegel's thesis that the Slavs were not a historical nation because they did not distinguish them-

³⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 66—67.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 43.

selves in the past epochs, Cieszkowski contended that the actualization of the historical mission of the Slavs belonged to the future history.³⁷

Another expression of the polemic with Hegel is also a different solution of the problem of God's relation to universal history. God, according to Cieszkowski, turns out to be the alpha and omega of history, which means his realization through history. We might recall here Schelling's thesis, which is a certain modification of the emanative theory of Plotinus' absolute towards giving it evolutionary sense. According to this thesis, God as alpha (*Deus implicitus*) is not what he is as omega (*Deus explicitus*).³⁸ The final stage of general history proves that the absolute reveals its true nature in the higher synthesis which retains diversification and all the previous individuations. In that sense the laws of the progress and development of mankind are true qualifications of God's absolute idea, a manifestation of the objective logos in universal history. But God also stands above history, he seems to be in a way divided into transcendental and immanent beings. The aim of the historical process will therefore be, as Cieszkowski believes, a reconciliation of the human world and the transcendental world (*Diesseits, Jenseits*), the active elevation of mankind to God. Therefore, Cieszkowski does not seemingly break off with Hegel's tradition of Providence existing immanently in history, but he lays much greater emphasis on God's transcendency, referring to St. Augustine and Bossuet.

The synthesis in history, the epoch of action is similar to the presented synthesis in Cieszkowski's philosophy of history, which is an attempt to overcome the one-sidedness of Hegel's rationalism. While interpreting action we should follow Cieszkowski's warning that we do not confuse the process of action with its complete manifestations. In determining the dominant of the future he writes: "*Das absolute Practische, das sociale Wirken und Leben im Staate (welches man sich wohl hüten wird mit dem endlichen Thun und treiben zu verwechseln) wird von jetzt an das Bestimmende und die bis jetzt für höchste Identitäten geltende Kunst und Philosophie werden nun ehr zur Bedeutung abstracter Prämissen des Staatslebens herabgesetzt werden*".³⁹ In Cieszkowski's conception the absolute action is thus a process, the dynamics of opposing elements, their struggle and unity at the same time. This

³⁷ Cieszkowski: *op. cit.*, pp. 69—70. Schelling's thesis quoted after M. cit., vol. 2, pp. 205—206, 307.

³⁸ A. Cieszkowski: *op. cit.*, pp. 69—70. Schelling's thesis quoted after H. Abrams: *Formy wyobraźni romantycznej*, translated by P. Graff after M. H. Abrams: *Forms of Romantic Imagination, in Natural Supernaturalism. Tradition and Revolution in Romantic Literature*, New York 1971, "Pamiętnik Literacki" 1978, No. 3, p. 219.

³⁹ Cieszkowski: *op. cit.*, p. 112. See also pp. 126—127.

idea is very aptly rendered by the analogy of action with the electromagnetic process where neither the north pole (idea) nor the south pole (being) is privileged, but they are equally important while their relationship does not rule out the opposition and diversification of the two members. "So wird die ringende und die ruhende Synthesis in die schaffende übergehen".⁴⁰ From that follows a very interesting conclusion: the stimulus for creative action is necessarily the divergence and struggle between idea and reality. The reconciliation of idea and being, of the subject and object, cannot be achieved by one stroke only but gradually in the whole process of changes approaching the realization of the ultimate goal of history.⁴¹ According to Cieszkowski, action, should be understood as a train of man's efforts tending to rationalize social life, the train of indirect and imperfect reconciliations, which will in the last instance bring nearer the time of the organic, absolute unity. A question then arises whether the process-like character of development does not exclude the thesis about the absolute and static realization of the goal of the spirit of the world if Cieszkowski does not appear to conceive the future epoch as a state but as evolutionary progress. The spirit of the world will then make its self-determination in relation to its phases undergone so far in an I attempt to return to beauty, in the translation of truth into the objective being, finally, in the realization of good — the proper dominant of the third stage of history. From the hitherto phase of becoming, Cieszkowski observes, the spirit of the world passes into definite existence (*bestimmtes Daseyn*) which in turn still remains becoming (*noch Werden*), that is the existence that develops more and more not as unconscious facts but in the form of man's conscious actions, which are the institutions. The organic system of institutions unites the abstract and objective elements of human life and thereby makes possible the real, concrete freedom, the highest good of the society.⁴² The ideal of mutual relations between people is, according to Cieszkowski, not some abstract law or morality referring to the "general I" but concrete ethics (*concrete Sittlichkeit*) where man is treated as a person with various social relations in the family, the State, and mankind. This ideal is also the State itself as an organic link of a concrete family of nations, and last — mankind as the individualized, organic Church.⁴³

Finally, there remains the following problem: does Cieszkowski think that his synthetic philosophy of history is the ultimate formulation that

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 122.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 97, 142, 145—146.

⁴² *Ibid.*, pp. 149—150.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 153.

rules out any future studies on that subject? To suspect Cieszkowski of a self-estimate like that seems problematic. When he postulated the examination of the historical process from the formal and teleological aspects and its contents, Cieszkowski often pointed at the yet incomplete themes, hoping that they would be taken up in the future considerations in this field. Admittedly, he claimed with full conviction that the general scheme of history, which he broadened with the element of the future, could not be questioned, but it was a highly responsible task of the future philosophers to develop the details of various elements of the so-called Gothic edifice of history.⁴⁴ In analyzing the content moments of development, that is the logical, physical and spiritual categories, Cieszkowski indicated that *Naturphilosophie der Geschichte* was least elaborated, which posed some difficulty in proving the thesis that *Weltgeschichte* meant the spiritual macrocosm, the apex of development and the objective not only of the spirit but also of the universe (*Universum*).⁴⁵ It appears that the philosophy itself of the future presented in a general outline could provoke different concretizations, which was predicted and agreed upon by the Polish philosopher. Paraphrasing Cieszkowski's statement about the proper attitude of a disciple towards Hegel's work, we can assert that if a thinker does not perceive all the consequences of his position, while his continuator fills this gap and further develops his master's work, then he will certainly commemorate his predecessors better than someone who is orthodox in trying to preserve his master's legacy intact.⁴⁶ Therefore, even the history of philosophical thought and its practical realizations are still an incomplete process. The dialectic of ideas and the dialectic of reality will very often meet and go apart, thereby conditioning man's continuous effort manifested in actions. The two perspectives of overcoming Hegel's absolute philosophy can then and should, be still intensified according to Cieszkowski. That consciousness of Cieszkowski's reveals probably the highest value of his philosophy of the future which is to be the prefiguration of the epoch of action.

It can be observed quite incidentally that it would be wrong to look for the origin of Cieszkowski's philosophy solely in the sphere of theoretical inspirations. The philosophical problems for the Polish thinkers in the period between the uprisings of 1830 and 1863 were prompted by the needs of the "unreasonable" political reality. Hence Polish Hegelianism proved to be a necessary transformation of Hegel's essentially apologetic philosophy. It is no accident that it was philosophy of history that was recognized as the most important domain of the philosophical system. It was to express the needs and ideals of the nation

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 74—75.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 80.

deprived of its own State yet claiming to accomplish a definite, specific historical mission. Especially controversial and unacceptable for Cieszkowski was Hegel's thesis about the end of history, about the identity of the rational with the real. There were only two possibilities of choice: either admit that Hegel is right — consequently, history is devoid of any sense, or, defending the conviction that history is sensible, surmount Hegel and assert that the real synthesis of duty and being will take place. Cieszkowski chose the latter possibility, having emphasized that the future reconciliation would not be accomplished by the anonymous necessity of historical process, but the conscious and free action initiated by the new migration of nations. That migration would actualize the historical mission of the nation not revealed so far in the general course of the spirit of mankind. In his estimate of the modern states as resulting from the struggle of chemical elements, as synthetic — neutral objects, as products of secondarily manifested mechanicity in history, Cieszkowski criticized the principle of balance of the states of the Holy Alliance, the mechanical balance of powers inside a given state, especially the indifferent relation, the division between the secular power and the ecclesiastical power. His ideal is an organic federation of nations united in the Church of Humanity, where it is not external coercion that will warrant mutual respect and brotherhood of the members of the same organism. In Cieszkowski's view, the absolute synthesis in history will prove that it is possible for man to give sense to the existing external and so far hostile socio-political reality. With the advent of the new epoch the elements of the past one-sided phases of development — beauty, truth, good — will constitute together the new being created by man by the efforts of his feeling, ideas and will, and worthy of approval.

STRESZCZENIE

Autorka artykułu, analizując *Prolegomena A. Cieszkowskiego*, wskazuje na zarysowane w nich dwie perspektywy przewyciężenia heglizmu. Cieszkowski zgodnie z heglowskim rozumieniem terminu *Aufhebung* aprobuje cenne treści w filozofii swego mistrza, próbując jednocześnie znieść dostrzeżone w niej braki — i stąd rodzi się idea przekroczenia Hegla, próba stworzenia nowej syntetycznej historiozofii, romantycznej filozofii życia. A z drugiej strony Cieszkowski jest świadom tego, że na Heglu skończyła się filozofia, osiągając swe apogeum — stąd głosi ideę kresu filozofii, konieczność jej przejścia w życie społeczne. Wobec tego zgodnie z triadycznym charakterem rozwoju po tetycznym okresie sztuki (starożytność) i po antytetycznym okresie filozofii (nowożytność) musi nastąpić w przyszłości synteza, będąca pojednaniem myśli i bytu. Przyszłość u Cieszkowskiego rysuje się jako konieczny etap po epoce ukonstytuowanych sprzeczności, choć ta konieczność może być realizowana jedynie przez wolny czyn podmiotów ludzkich.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

РЕЗЮМЕ

Автор данной работы анализируя „Пролегомена” А. Цешковского, показывает две возможности преодоления гегельянства. Цешковский согласно гегельянскому пониманию термина *Aufhebung* одобряет ценную суть в философии своего учителя, стремясь одновременно устранить замеченные недостатки — и так создается идея превращения Гегеля, попытка создания новой синтетической историософии, романтической философии жизни. С другой стороны Цешковский знает, что Гегель замыкает философию, достигая своего апогея, и поэтому выдвигает идею конца философии, необходимость перехода ее в общественную жизнь. Итак, согласно триадному характеру развития, после тетичного периода искусства (древность) и после античного периода философии (современность), должен наступить в будущем синтез, являющийся согласием мысли и бытия. Будущее Цешковский представляет как необходимый этап после эпохи сформировавшихся противоречий, хотя эта необходимость может быть реализована только как непринужденный поступок человеческих субъектов.

СОТРУДНИЧЕСТВО

... (The text is extremely faint and largely illegible due to low contrast and blurriness. It appears to be a multi-paragraph document discussing international relations or cooperation in a specific region.)